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i  
PREFACE 
 
“He who understands baboon would do more towards metaphysics 
than Locke” Charles Darwin 1838 Notebook M 
 
This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring 
them up to date (2019). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new 
editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles 
are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so 
about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or 
much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the 
framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  
As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not 
that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If 
everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and 
psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe 
civilization would have a chance.  As things are however the leaders of society 
have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into 
anarchy is inevitable.  
 
The first group of articles attempts to give some insight into how we behave 
that is reasonably free of the theoretical delusions that are universal. In the 
next group, I show how these insights apply by reviewing some books in 
philosophy and psychology.  Next I review books on science and religion and 
finally provide reviews and articles showing how understanding of both 
science and philosophy gives insight into the tragic delusions destroying the 
world. People believe that society can be saved by science, religion and 
politics, so I provide some suggestions as to why this is unlikely via short 
articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers.  
 
It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section 
presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) 
behavior.  I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which 
provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, 
personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution 
of social behavior.  This centers around the two writers I have found the most 
important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I 
combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) 
framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. 
As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, 
in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic 
discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). 
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Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how 
the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of 
Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of 
the discussion.  
 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as 
Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run 
throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for 
philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, 
religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology.  It 
is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as 
to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid 
it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue 
and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness." (BBB p18) 
 
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads 
millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope 
to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth.  
As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.   We 
live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is 
unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the 
universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), 
Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model.  
 
The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly 
counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every 
action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated 
System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we 
must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must 
lead directly to actions.  
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less 
accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and 
so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else 
(history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that 
intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) 
view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious 
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automated System 1 actions or reflexes.  
 
Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows 
how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our 
automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout 
philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg 
and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same 
problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in 
degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their 
frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via 
the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true.  While 
the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the 
earth and their descendant’s futures. 
 
Many of the articles describe the ‘digital delusions’, which confuse the language 
games of System 2 with the automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish 
biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers).  
The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but 
what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand 
in’ for it.  Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book 
(“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most 
contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, 
biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Also for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or 
physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty.  Anything can be 
‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it 
is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean.  Reductionist 
metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate 
sense of humor.  
 
Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) 
of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by 
System 2.  The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and 
possibly fatal consequences.  The adventurous may regard this principle as a 
higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-
tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems resulting from 
unrestrained motherhood, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically 
correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) 
to be honest about it.  
 
The last section describes various versions of the ‘altruism delusion’ that we are 
selected for cooperation, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, 
Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things 
correctly (the possibility of politics).  Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought 
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to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the 
contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain 
the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the 
monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our 
descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the 
problems.  
 
I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just 
given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on 
sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing 
out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our 
evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1.  
Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from 
ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, 
when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of 
our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, 
economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about 
evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection).  
 
Many accept the delusion that we are selected for cooperation with people 
generally (group selection or altruism) and not just our immediate relatives (kin 
selection or inclusive fitness), so I spend some time in the essays of the last 
section demolishing this fantasy. One thing rarely mentioned by the group 
selectionists is the fact that, even were ‘group selection’ possible, selfishness is 
at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) to be group selected 
for as altruism. Just try to find examples of true altruism in nature –the fact that 
we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) tells us 
that its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life concealing the 
facts, and that it can no more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which 
in fact it is). One does not really need science or mathematics to grasp this – it 
is crushingly obvious that an organism cannot be selected for behavior that 
decreases the frequency of its own genes in the next generation.  
 
One might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my 
experience) mentioned by group selectionists -- cancer. No group has as much 
in common as the (originally) genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 
trillion cell clone-- but we are all born with thousands and perhaps millions of 
cells that have already taken the first step on the path to cancer and generate 
millions to billions of cancer cells in our life.  If we did not die of other things 
first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of cancer. Only 
a massive and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses 
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or derepresses trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions 
of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One 
might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for any 
kind of entity on any planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no being 
or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that are 
universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness is a 
law of physics.  
 
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth 
and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind.  In 
the 20th century an even more evil notion arose—that humans are born with 
rights, rather than having to earn privileges.  Thus, every day the population 
increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space 
to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc.  And one almost never hears 
it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive. Their 
lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle 
ways.  Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. 
There cannot be human rights without human wrongs.  It cannot be more 
obvious, but one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood.  
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population 
growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. 
Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will 
collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and 
war on a staggering scale. The earth loses at least 1% of it’s topsoil every year 
and sea level rise and climate change will dramatically reduce food production 
in many countries, so as it nears 2100, most of it’s food growing capacity will be 
gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being 
hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, 
combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature 
inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of 
crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, 
as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness and permits 
long term planning (i.e., exactly the opposite of the new Neomarxist, Third 
World Supremacist rulers of America). The root cause of collapse is the inability 
of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to 
treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus 
ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering 
delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies.  Few 
understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no 
free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond 
repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by 
one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into 
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anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no 
hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a 
democratic system.  The popular notions supported by the Democratic Party 
and Third World Supremacists are that Democracy, Diversity, Equality and 
Social Justice will produce a Utopia in America and the world, but it is clear as 
crystal that they they have no grasp at all of basic psychology, history or ecology 
and unavoidably foster selfishness and divisiveness and are producing 
collapse. Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”.   
 
The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough 
resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out 
of poverty and keep them there.  Even the attempt to do this is already 
bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to 
produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, 
by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich, though these 
basic truths are beyond the ability of the Neomarxist  mob to grasp.  
 
I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, 
as Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, that the mind (roughly the same as 
language as Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved 
for many contexts, and there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, 
i.e., evolution by natural selection. 
 
Finally, as with my other writings 3DTV and 3D Movie Technology-Articles 
1996-2017 2nd ed.(2018), Psychoactive Drugs-- Four Classic Texts (1976-1982) 
878p (2016), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and 
Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed. (2019), Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed. (2019) and Suicide by Democracy: 
an Obituary for America and the World 2nd ed. (2019). and in all my letters and 
email and conversations for over 50 years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ 
instead of ‘his/her’, ‘she/he’, or the idiotic reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being 
perhaps the only one in this part of the galaxy to do so.  The slavish use of these 
universally applied egregious vocables is of course intimately connected with 
the defects in our psychology which generate academic philosophy, democracy 
and the collapse of industrial civilization, and I leave the further description of 
these connections as an exercise for the reader. 
 
I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually 
revise it, but I took up philosophy and psychology 12 years ago at 65, so it is 
miraculous, and an eloquent testimonial to the power of System 1 automatisms, 
that I have been able to do anything at all. It was ten years of incessant struggle 
and I hope readers find it of some use.   
vyupzz@gmail.com 
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The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and 
Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), 
taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all 
truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use 
language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking 
at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions 
(Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one 
can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary 
utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin with 
‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and about 
them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new 
table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
“He who understands baboon would do more towards 
metaphysics than Locke” Charles Darwin 1838 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting 
whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to 
know, after all.” Wittgenstein ‘On Certainty’ p48 
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“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or 
data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language 
can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of 
Satisfaction or COS) are clear.  The basic problem is that one can say anything 
but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning 
is only possible in a very specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words 
‘know’, ‘doubt’ and ‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, 
interlocutor and commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use 
(clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses 
of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical 
insights. There are no ‘problems’ of ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., 
but only the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. It is truly sad that 
most philosophers continue to waste their time on the linguistic confusions 
peculiar to academic philosophy rather than turning their attention to those of 
the other behavioral disciplines and to physics, biology and mathematics, 
where it is desperately needed. 
 
What has W really achieved? Here is how a leading Wittgenstein scholar 
summarized his work:  “Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that 
have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two 
millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the 
relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary 
truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European 
philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful 
array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn 
centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker-- 
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
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To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the 
two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a 
vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be 
doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, 
this being possible only for behavior with a public language (the impossibility 
of private language). He predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic which only 
emerged much later. Incidentally he patented helicopter designs which 
anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors, and 
which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, designed a 
heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist house, 
and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by others. 
He laid out the psychological foundations of mathematics, logic, 
incompleteness, and infinity. 
 
And Paul Horwich gives a beautiful summary of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic  to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124,132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist, since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. Though nobody seems aware of it, he described the 
psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure 
used in Evolutionary Psychology (EP) decades later. He noted the 
indeterminate or underdetermined nature of language and the game-like 
nature of social interaction. He described and refuted the notions of the mind 
as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical 
computers or the famous writings of Searle. He invented truth tables for use in 
logic and philosophy. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He 
showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open 
before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
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When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of 
the world, and, like Einstein, nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they 
wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even 
nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds 
of books and tens of thousands  of papers discussing it; that many physicists 
knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of 
Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that 
it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really 
grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle 
(another modern genius of descriptive psychology), Pinker, Tooby and 
Cosmides, Symons, and countless other students of behavior. If his brilliant 
friend Frank Ramsey had not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration 
would almost certainly have ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing 
had become his lover, one of the most amazing collaborations of all time would 
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likely have evolved. In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th 
century would have been different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost 
certainly have been very different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual 
isolation, few knew him well or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and 
only a handful have any real grasp of his work even today. He could have 
shined as an engineer, a mathematician, a psychologist, a physiologist (he did 
wartime research in it), a musician (he played instruments and had a renowned 
talent for whistling), an architect (the house he designed and constructed for his 
sister still stands), or an entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes 
in the world but gave it all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and 
prison camps and repeatedly volunteering for the most dangerous duty (while 
writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (3 brothers 
succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the 
Nazis (he was partly Jewish and probably only the Nazi’s desire to lay hands 
on their money saved the family), and that he was not persecuted for his 
homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized nobody 
understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was half 
a century –or a whole century depending on your point of view-ahead of 
psychology and philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that 
our brain is an evolved organ like our heart.) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), 
Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of TLP, BBB, 
PI, OC by W, and PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social 
World (MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA), Searle’s Philosophy and 
Chinese Philosophy (SPCP), John R Searle – Thinking About the Real World 
(TARW), and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear 
description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will 
refer to as the WS framework. I begin with some penetrating quotes from W 
and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
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tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence "It is 
no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is an idea 
that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins onto the 
confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule 
as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest similarity 
with what it represents." 
BBBp37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word "kind", 
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when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word "kind" 
here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word "discovery" when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer." 
TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
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anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got 
it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the 
realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already 
there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future." 
(said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from two of our greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy (in the strict sense I consider here) is the descriptive psychology 
of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are 
totally overlooked -i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. In addition 
to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, 
philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to 
this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting 
W's above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a 
good start on it. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
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We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or 
receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, 
but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one 
believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognizing, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15(2005). 
 
On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. 
Apart from the Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, 
although some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his 
classes), leading to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some 
works are known to have been lost and many others W had destroyed. Most 
of this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and copies 
were bought by a very few libraries. Budd -Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology(1989)- like most W commentators of the period, does not reference 
the microfilm. Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive and appears in 
some form in his subsequently published works (which are referenced by 
Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and there is substantial material 
that has never been translated from the original German nor published in 
book form. Lecture notes by Yorick Smithies appeared in 2018 and even now 
we awaiting what seems to be a version of the Brown Book, left with his lover 
Francis Skinner – ‘Wittgenstein, Dictating Philosophy to Francis Skinner’ 
(Springer, 2019). In 1998, the Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- 
Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic 
Edition $2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan 
and free on the net as well. Like the other CDs of W’s work, it is available 
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from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is indexed and searchable and the prime W 
resource. However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that very 
few people have bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a 
critical element. One can see Victor Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel 
for one notable exception. One major work dating from W’s middle period 
(1933) that was published as a book in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. 
Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (1991) is one of the better 
treatments of W (see my review) but since he finished this book in 1989, 
neither the Big Typescript nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he 
neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far the most important 
works date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by 
Budd. 
 
Wuttgenstein’s wholly novel ideas and unique super-Socratic trialogues and 
telegraphic writing, coupled with his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, 
and premature death in 1951, resulted in a failure to publish anything of his 
later thought during his lifetime and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 
20,000 pages been published- a project which continues to this day. The only 
complete edition of the largely German nachlass was first issued by Oxford in 
2000 with Intelex now publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English 
language books on a searchable CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the 
Oxford CD is over $1000 or over $2000 for the set including the images of the 
original manuscripts. They can however be obtained via interlibrary loan and 
also, like most books and articles are now freely available on the net (libgen.io, 
b-ok.org and on p2p).  The searchable CDROM of his English books as well 
as that of the entire German nachlass, is now on several sites on the net and 
the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca 2021-- 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of course 
most academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and libgen.io. 
 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, 
German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works 
suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to 
translate. Since, in my view, nobody except Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) has 
grasped the full import of his later works (but of course she has recently 
published widely and many are now aware of her views), one can see why W 
has yet to be fully appreciated. Even the more or less well-known critical 
difference between understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 utterance) vs 
‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in various contexts has usually escaped 
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notice. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern and DMS in a recent article are rare exceptions) 
that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into 
being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a 
memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end, 
and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of 
science) to trace it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be 
applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over 
a century now in a few instances). 
 
With DMS I regard W’s last book ‘On Certainty’ (OC) as the foundation stone 
of philosophy and psychology. It is not really a book but notes he made during 
the last two years of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to 
work. He seems to have been principally motivated by the realization that G.E. 
Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all philosophy-
-how it’s possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and not to be able 
to doubt it. All anyone can do is to examine minutely the working of the 
language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are used to describe 
the primitive automated prelinguistic system one (S1) functions of our brain 
(my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced deliberative linguistic system two (S2) 
functions (my K2, C2 and D2).  Of course, W does not use the two systems 
terminology, which only came to the fore in psychology some half century after 
his death, and has yet to penetrate philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two 
systems framework (the ‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, 
and one can see clear foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after 
half a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and 
Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), The Varieties of Self- 
Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014) and Andy Hamilton’s 
‘Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’,  and the 
many books and papers of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) and Peter Hacker 
(PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. DMS and PH 
have been the leading scholars of the later W, each writing or editing half a 
dozen books (many reviewed by me) and many papers in the last decade. 
However, the difficulties of coming to grips with the basics of our higher order 
psychology, i.e., of how language (approximately the same as the mind, as W 
showed us) works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most brilliant and prolific 
contemporary philosophers, who made remarks in a very recent article which 
show that after years of intensive work on the later W, she seems not to have 
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grasped that he solved the most basic problems of the description of human 
behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even coherently state misgivings 
about the operations of our basic psychology (W’s ‘Hinges’ which I equate with 
S1) without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of both of 
these workers (limitations shared by all students of behavior) in her recent 
articles, which (like those of Coliva and Hacker) are freely available on the net. 
 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the 
concept of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not 
only to Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On 
Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – 
the problem that occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the 
foundation of knowledge. 
 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers 
have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must 
ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be based 
on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are really 
animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by 
philosophers), look like (empirical) propositions. It is this misleading 
appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the foundation of thought 
is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look like empirical conclusions, 
our basic certainties constitute the ungrounded, nonpropositional 
underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus situating the foundation of 
knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest themselves as ways of 
acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification comes to an end, 
and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, shown the 
logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is a 
groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of calling On Certainty 
Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.”  
 
I reached the same general conclusions myself some years ago and stated it in 
my book reviews. 
 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type 
hinge certainties in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical propositions', 
but are not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties are not putative 
metaphysical propositions that appear to describe the necessary features of the 
world, but they are putative empirical propositions that appear to describe the 
contingent features of the world. And therein lies some of the novelty of On 
Certainty. On Certainty is continuous with all of Wittgenstein's earlier writings 
– including the Tractatus – in that it comes at the end of a long, unbroken 
attempt to elucidate the grammar of our language-games, to demarcate 
14  
grammar from language in use. Baker and Hacker have superbly elucidated the 
second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the grammatical nature of metaphysical or 
super-empirical propositions; what sets On Certainty apart is its further 
perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' propositions and others ('Our 
"empirical propositions" do not form a homogenous mass' (OC 213)): some 
apparently empirical and contingent propositions being in fact nothing but 
expressions of grammatical rules. The importance of this realization is that it 
leads to the unprecedented insight that basic beliefs – though they look like 
humdrum empirical and contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting 
which, when conceptually elucidated, can be seen to function as rules of 
grammar: they underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the hinge certainty 'The 
earth has existed for many years' underpins all thought and action, but not as a 
proposition that strikes us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that 
underpins what we do (e.g., we research the age of the earth) and what we say 
(e.g., we speak of the earth in the past tense): ‘Giving grounds, however, 
justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain 
propositions striking us immediately  as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ (OC 
204)” 
 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that has 
plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying 
propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true empirical 
propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-breaking insight 
that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain propositions 
striking us… as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC was to claim 
that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, why bother? He would be 
merely repeating what philosophers before him have been saying for centuries, 
all the while deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather appreciate 
that Wittgenstein has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” -
(2013)).” 
 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy 
and psychology) that (as I have noted many times) in a decade of intensive 
reading, I have not seen one person make the obvious connection between W’s 
‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which constitute 
System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For anyone 
familiar with the two systems framework for understanding behavior that has 
dominated various areas of psychology such as decision theory for the last 
several decades, it should be glaringly obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call 
them B1) are the inherited automated true-only structure of S1 and that their 
extension with experience into true or false sentences (or as I call them B2) are 
what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. This may strike some as a mere 
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terminological trifle, but I have used the two systems view and its tabulation 
below as the logical structure of rationality for a decade and regard it a major 
advance in understanding higher order behavior, and hence of W or any 
philosophical or behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to grasp the 
fundamental importance of the automaticity of our behavior due to S1 and the 
consequent attribution of all social interaction (e.g., politics) to the 
superficialities of S2 can be seen as responsible for the inexorable collapse of 
industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to basic biology and 
psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the world’s problems via 
politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society with understanding of the 
fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested via the automaticities of S1 
has any chance to save the world. The oblivion to S1 has been called by Searle 
‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and 
Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He 
realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look at 
how language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of 
language from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of 
finding one’s way out. The entire book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ 
which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ certainty 
that cannot meaningfully be questioned (my K1 or W’s Intransitive) and ‘know’ 
as a disposition to act (my K2 or W’s Transitive), which functions the same as 
think, hope, judge, understand, imagine, remember, believe and many other 
dispositional words. As I have suggested in my various reviews of W and S, 
these two uses correspond to the modern two systems of thought framework 
that is so powerful in understanding behavior (mind, language), and this (and 
his other work) is the first significant effort to show how our fast, prelinguistic 
automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis (‘hinges’) for 
our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As I 
have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has ever 
stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away with no clear idea 
of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any of his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s 
death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. There are few 
references to it in Searle (along with Hacker, W’s heir apparent and one of the 
most famous living philosophers) and one sees whole books on W with barely 
a mention. There are however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, 
Coliva, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but the 
best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume 
“Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated 
16  
person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) all analysis of W falls 
short of fully grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing to put 
behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which 
I will attempt here. I will not give a page by page explanation since (as with any 
other book dealing with behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, history, law, politics, religion, literature etc.) we would not get past 
the first few pages, as all the issues discussed here arise immediately in any 
discussion of behavior.  
 
The table below summarizing the Logical Structure of Rationality (Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) provides a framework for this and all 
discussion of behavior. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
behavior or even higher order animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his 
works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as 
relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by 
psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few 
who have understood him have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but his work 
can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not seem to 
see this. W analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, 
Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but mostly stop short of 
putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. It 
should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of 
higher order behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to 
translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of 
“Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and 
into W’s work (and they do). 
 
The failure of most to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited 
attention On Certainty (0C) and his other 3rd period works have received until 
recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and others to 
understand how profoundly our view of behavior alters once we embrace the 
evolutionary framework. I call the framework the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought- DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language 
used in DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), 
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which grounds anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature and history. 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half 
a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant 
to it into our true-only axiomatic background via the inexorable workings of 
EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly 
stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic 
fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which 
was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic 
and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human 
nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out 
of and are tied to countless others in the true-only network that begins with 
birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms 
and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without 
education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in 
the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s 
‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent 
article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS 
of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously 
experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review 
of it. 
 
It is essential to grasp the W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework so I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein 
(W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) et. 
al. To grasp my simple two systems terminology and perspective, it will help 
to see my reviews of W/S and other books about these geniuses, who provide a 
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clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology books. To 
say that Searle has extended W’s work is not necessarily to imply that it is a 
direct result of W study (and he is clearly not a Wittgensteinian), but rather that 
because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only 
ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be 
enunciating some variant or extension of what W said. 
 
However, S seldom mentions W and even then, often in a critical way, but in 
my view his criticisms (like everyone’s) nearly always miss the mark and he 
makes many dubious assertions for which he is often criticized. In present 
context, I find the recent criticisms of DMS, Coliva and Hacker most relevant. 
Nevertheless, he is the prime candidate for the best since W and I recommend 
downloading the over 100 video lectures he has on the net. Unlike nearly all 
other philosophy lectures they are quite entertaining and informative and I 
have heard them all at least twice. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) 
from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To rephrase: all 
study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast System 1 (S1) and 
slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher 
order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, while the later W shows 
how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and 
in each of our personal histories developed into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that 
philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another notable 
comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities of the 
mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his 
nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to find the 
solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only a preliminary. 
See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 years ago that we ought to 
realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior and that these are not 
hints of explanations (BBB p125). See the full quotes at other places in this 
article. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
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speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even 
(Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language 
of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, 
with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in 
action, that language is not a picture of, but is itself thinking or the mind, and 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. 
 
Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view 
none better than W in BBB p37 — “if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture 
which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a 
shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence 
itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which 
hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, language issues 
direct from the brain and what could count as evidence for an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games 
(LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front 
of our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a 
window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved 
Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, 
knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his 
later second and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and 
slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our subjective ‘mental life’ to 
the functioning of language, and the impossibility of private language. The 
bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, true-only, 
mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, while the 
evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, testable true 
or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is 
Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical 
questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find 
the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have 
to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1 “the greatest danger here is 
wanting to observe oneself”). 
 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to describe and extend our innate axiomatic 
20  
psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, 
multiply our language games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms of ‘’On 
Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we 
now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated 
true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operate by the mechanism 
of inclusive fitness (IF), i.e., by natural selection. 
 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb 
“Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of 
evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF 
is the prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The 
Social Conquest of Earth' (2012)). 
 
As W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes 
a true-only extension (i.e., S2 Hinges or S2H) of our axiomatic EP (i.e., S1 Hinges 
or S1H) and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without threatening our sanity—as he 
noted, a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different consequences from 
one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his 
own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot get a foothold, as “reality” is 
the result of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not testable propositions (as 
I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 
that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and 
Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework 
over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and automatic and which corresponds 
to the mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and 
over. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our 
cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more 
or less “conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-self 
brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or 
“inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, 
are conscious, deliberate and propositional (true or false), and do not have any 
definite time of occurrence. 
 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally 
termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-
Reflexive) or reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), and 
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the S2  use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, 
and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called 
transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms from modern psychology with 
those used by W and S (and much else here) is my idea, so don’t expect to find 
it in the literature (except my books, articles and reviews on viXra.org, 
philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu, Amazon, libgen.io, b-ok.org 
etc.). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of involuntary 
fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s 
Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, 
“priming”, “implicit cognition”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did 
not use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional 
thinking only, since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without 
involving much of  the  intricate S1 network of the “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our EP) which must 
also use S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by 
all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1, 
composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. As he famously said 
in OC p94— “but I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of 
its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: 
" When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." 
And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say 
it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's aphorisms (p132 in 
Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet 
and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is 
to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that 
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`grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT—see table) and 
that, in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing (for 
which he is often incorrectly criticized by Searle), this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find (as DMS also notes).  
 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning “speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” -- which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, and this is an act and not 
a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century p193 — “the 
basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- propositions being public events 
that can be true or false –contra the perverse use of the word for the true-only 
axioms of S1 by Searle, Coliva and others. Hence, the famous comment by W 
from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able 
to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole 
problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the 
image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) –“what it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is 
fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does 
not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish 
had been satisfied. Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for before I 
get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes is now called Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 
and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has become aware of the work 
of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1-- that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his first book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly 
has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily 
defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
implicit cognition, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most of the 
above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the case 
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of some of W’s teachings), I have rarely seen anything approaching an adequate 
discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts, and commonly there 
is barely a mention. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, 
and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, 
Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or 
ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of 
Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the 
classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language 
of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and 
in my other recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in Wittgenstein, and a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come from decision 
research, mainly by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by 
myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2   and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****      Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****    Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
*******Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
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philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain 
present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 
500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that 
are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 
500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-
my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the 
stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short term memory 
(working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions 
one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is 
causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-the 
presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same 
words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to 
call the percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public 
COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do 
not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences 
and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states 
or the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing 
a red apple’) and this is one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order 
behavior to a ‘system of laws’ which would have to state all the possible 
contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. And what counts as 
‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy Cartwright). This is a 
special case of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones 
that has been explained many times by Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only “mental states” with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction- Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Dispositions, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), 
Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and 
not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W - ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
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occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of my table 
here in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). This table expands on W’s 
survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from 
his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
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Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action – IA - Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle, e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…”), or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…’) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions 
— (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential 
public acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, 
Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition, and there is no 
language (concept, thought) of “private mental states” for thinking or willing 
(i.e.,no private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will 
acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do. 
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INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior ((The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social 
Science Model (SSSM)). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects, nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences 
leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded 
as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules 
which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development 
and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions 
of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer 
programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an 
analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination - i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
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Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 
for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle) - (i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895, cf Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts, as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking 
of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like 
all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), 
and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories 
can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for 
such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) or 
automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 functions 
of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the efforts of 
cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
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neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life 
as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) 
the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously 
said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth 
but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes 
itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be 
causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable 
(i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by 
information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). 
 
Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions 
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or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 
and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading 
for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are 
Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who, like many 
scholars now, have posted most of their work (often in preprint form) free 
online at academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, and other sites, and 
of course the diligent can find almost everything free online via torrents, p2p, 
libgen.io, b-ok.org etc. Baker & Hacker are found in their many joint works and 
on Hacker’s personal page. The late Baker went overboard with a bizarre 
psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic interpretation that was ably refuted by 
Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is a must 
read for any student of behavior. 
 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework 
of S1, which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders 
of scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- hereafter CDC—
my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many 
others pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in 
the BBB in the 30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and 
answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, 
Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really 
only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal terms is incoherent and even for 
S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that the highly diverse language 
games of “causality” can ever  be made to apply (as has been noted many times) 
- even their application in physics and chemistry is variable and  often obscure 
(was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or all of them 
that made the apple fall, and when did the causes start and end)? But as W said 
- “now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side, as usually 
stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not leaving his 
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trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my reviews of W, 
S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, Glock, 
DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of causality and 
the philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has 
hit the mark. 
 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different 
uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature of 
dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as 
private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which 
W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they 
cite. Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely 
discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of articles 
largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own journal 
“Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds that of the 
next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next among moderns 
(and the only one with many lectures on YouTube, Vimeo, University sites 
etc.—over 100, which, unlike almost all other philosophy lectures, are a delight 
to listen to) and Hutto, Coliva, DMS, Hacker, Read, etc., are very prominent 
with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks and reviews. But CDC and 
other metaphysicians ignore them and the thousands who regard their work as 
critically important. 
 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large as that of 
modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has 
cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, 
hopefully your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different from 
theirs. But as W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As 
often noted, his super-Socratic trialogues had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted 
in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple 
as pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only 
be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. 
If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is 
inside a ‘beetle’, then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box 
could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private 
language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not 
publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down 
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Carruther’s ISA theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories 
which he references. I have explained W’s dismantling of the notion of 
introspection and the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s 
books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations” (2004) for a 
nice explanation of Private Language and everything by Read et al for getting 
to the roots of these issues as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. But, 
the very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language games) 
presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- contradictory 
cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact on the daily life 
of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person point of view 
is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but absence 
of coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. Likewise, with the 
description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information 
processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of 
many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and 
hopeless, but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like this. 
There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and 
then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with 
human behavior combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious 
automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that 
self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they are showing us 
the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That 
is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of 
S1. Hence, a reason for the shift from the philosophy of language to the 
philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review of Carruther’s recent ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’. Even Searle is a frequent offender here as noted by Hacker, Bennet and 
Hacker, DMS, Coliva etc. 
 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken, 
or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described 
as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we 
must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent), but 
irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which should be regarded 
as the point from which to begin and end such discussions. 
 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
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problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-
not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
consider here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the 
appearance of a question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or the 
universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious 
machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does, courtesy of 
the death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. We can 
describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ 
should look like. So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the 
mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the 
brain, we would still just have a description of what neuronal patterns 
correspond to seeing red, but it is not clear what it would mean (COS) to have 
an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, explanations 
come to an end somewhere. 
 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruther’s “Opacity 
of Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds 
of others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of 
our higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given 
a quite different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no 
reasons for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary 
problems by trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike 
us that these views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who 
spend most of their adult life promoting them. 
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and more 
remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information 
and perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced 
if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, 
embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, 
etc…then it can become perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only when 
one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human domains 
(supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of as 
mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to 
front), does it begin to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ 
(cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push 
further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem 
is the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no 
good reason has ever been given for us to think that there must be a science of 
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something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no good reason to think that 
there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more 
than there need be a science of numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of 
games or of constellations or of objects whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. 
We need to start with the idea of ourselves as embodied persons acting in a 
world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ in them or 
‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap into an 
‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and when it is 
really present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when our 
machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our 
machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no 
such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard 
problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been 
defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive 
indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological satisfaction 
of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the 
understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, that in 
stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein made 
clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn in language 
and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 88 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the 
‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and 
that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in the 
fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except by 
repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 1931). I 
also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition is nothing 
but belief in the causal nexus” --written a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical 
problems). "How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and 
states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. But 
that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we 
have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The 
decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one that we thought quite innocent.) -- And now the analogy which was to make 
us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.” 
38  
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a 
person who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he 
used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all 
scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to question, and that is 
itself the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to 
scientism, not science) failures of CDC et al is his observation that it is a very 
common mistake to think that something must make us do what we do, which 
leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake which we 
here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the word 
“to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes 
us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make 
us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and 
reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of 
reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no 
reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. W saw in 
his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself by 
working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told the 
answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and 
‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there 
is often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the most 
prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also 
the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, 
reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be 
extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum 
mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that 
nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the universe as a giant 
machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the history of 
pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton in 
‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, 
behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books 
in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive 
commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W 
realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard working 
through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
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An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy 
it is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James 
Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like 
a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’,  ‘cause’, ‘event’, 
‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in 
science or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in 
at random with many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without 
sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high 
comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass 
media): i.e., “comedy dealing with polite society, characterized by 
sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”-(Dictionary.com). But 
philosophy is not a waste of time--done rightly, it is the best way to spend time. 
How else can we dispel the chaos in the behavioral sciences or describe our 
mental life and the higher order thought of System 2--the most intricate, 
wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s 
examples describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of 
System 2 to build on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and 
as societies acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that 
build on the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive 
perception and action to the amazing edifice of science and culture. The theory 
of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from something that 
could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, and at the other 
end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that there are no such 
things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is incoherent. We can say 
anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though 
written when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as 
brilliant as his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy (the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the light, 
after three thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away from 
philosophy and from physics. 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
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Let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult 
or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him 
is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
An excellent recent work that displays many of the philosophical confusions in 
a book putatively about science and mathematics is Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason: What Science, Mathematics and Logic Cannot Tell Us’ (2013) 
(see my review). 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one - i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. 
Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does not get that 
there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., Language 
Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about how the 
world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False) 
states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --COS in 
Searle’s terminology)—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are those that 
are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe these states 
of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person 
with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another poorly understood but 
critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, inferring, 
understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true or false 
statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star 
shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing 
that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by 
the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. 
in which there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no COS) 
and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives its 
inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to view 
reasoning or rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, 
of which science, math and philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and 
rapidly growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of 
behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually 
reason (i.e., use language to carry out actions—see W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.) is 
‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen 
(2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and 
the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of 2019) the best single 
source I know. 
 
W wrote a great deal on the philosophy of mathematics since it clearly 
illustrated many of the types of confusions generated by ‘scientific’ language 
41  
games, and there have been countless commentaries, many quite poor. I will 
comment on some of the best recent work as it is brought up by Yanofsky. 
 
Francisco Berto has made some penetrating comments recently. He notes that 
W denied the coherence of metamathematics - i.e., the use by Godel of a 
metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” 
interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his argument, 
I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories 
and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words, language 
games) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and 
even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal 
fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding 
that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as 
illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no practical 
impact whatsoever? 
 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very 
same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal 
system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta- system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, then 
it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same 
meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different 
system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a 
formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence 
that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all 
arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, 
then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete 
meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics 
based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more 
important, the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some 
of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows 
them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s 
undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there 
cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the 
decidability of paraconsistent arithmetics harmonizes with an opinion 
Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a 
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motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Gregory Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one 
applies a test. W often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world 
applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot 
be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider 
arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it 
cannot be used in the real world either. As Victor Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein 
holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical 
language-game) if it has an extra-systemic application in a system of contingent 
propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” 
Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of 
words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and 
‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and 
‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. 
Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such 
thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, 
everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008 - see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can 
be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are infinite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an 
infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater 
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than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first 
serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this 
subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various 
versions of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer 
reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA 
journals, and has gotten news items in major science journals, few seem to have 
noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision 
theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, 
since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantor’s 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning 
the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not 
how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular 
physical laws or computational structures in establishing the physical limits of 
inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, observation 
and control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about 
being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or 
present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation 
or control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be 
so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the 
“monotheism theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, 
the device can even be the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a 
physical analog of incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one 
self-referential device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe 
proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique 
(unlike algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and only one 
version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.” 
 
Another way to say this is that one cannot have two physical inference devices 
(computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output 
of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can 
pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference 
engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state of the 
universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a 
computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system 
before it occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be 
posed to it—that is, it cannot process information (though this is a vexed phrase 
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as S and Read and others note) faster than the universe. The computer and the 
arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be physically coupled 
and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, 
causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The inference 
device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal dynamical 
processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well aware that this puts 
the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the 
universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, in a new light 
(though the indices of their writings make no reference to him and another 
remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky 
either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that 
can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a 
perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never 
be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also 
proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can 
overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the 
observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, 
math and language that concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on W:  ”He is 
articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on 
any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In 
that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not 
essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed 
and insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). 
Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. 
[The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly 
invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an 
everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow 
them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an 
instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” It 
should be obvious how Wolpert’s work is a perfect illustration of W’s ideas of 
the separate issues of science or mathematics and those of philosophy (language 
games). 
 
Yanofsky also does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is 
expanding rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, 
mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom have 
been publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, 
impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is 
the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state formulation of 
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quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game between the universe and 
an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and 
the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an 
impossibility result, and (until the remarkable papers of David Wolpert—see 
here and my review article) it is the most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent), 
but there have been an avalanche of others. One of the earliest in decision theory 
was the famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth 
Arrow in 1951 (for which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five 
of his students are now Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science).  It states 
roughly that no reasonably consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of 
aggregating individuals’ preferences into group preferences) can give sensible 
results. The group is either dominated by one person, and so GIT is often called 
the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original 
paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be 
stated like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that 
satisfies all of the following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual 
Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of 
Group Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the 
many related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not 
may find it (and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to 
find a career path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See 
”The Arrow Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and 
Imperfection”(2013) among legions of publications. 
 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and 
Keisler (2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and 
like all these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) 
which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just 
logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs 
that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold (i.e., 
no clear COS). “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s 
assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) has 
been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at 
least, but they showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these 
beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for 1 
or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel 
and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper from among the avalanche on the 
B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv.org, which takes 
us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is about 
“interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, 
Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofksy’s paper “A 
universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of 
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Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among other 
things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend, and so Yanofsky 
contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games 
and Quantum Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) 
commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture 
free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes 
about Knowledge and Belief’.  For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective 
Decision Making (2010). 
 
Since Godel’s famous theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic ‘randomness’ (‘incompleteness’) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior, 
language, mind) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded 
as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this 
‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there are limitless theorems that 
are true but unprovable— i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to 
say that there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense 
that do not describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these 
puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue 
of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, 
“incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math and logic. 
The recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know 
of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
As noted, David Wolpert has derived some amazing theorems in Turing 
Machine Theory and the limits of computation that are very apropos here. They 
have been almost universally ignored but not by well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser, who, in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has 
already crossed your mind”, give three theorems on the limits to rationality, 
prediction and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the 
limits to computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. 
Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its 
social science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite-dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can 
be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has 
been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
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we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. 
K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other 
than calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, 
the subject of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or false) 
and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That is, there 
are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth or falsity. 
“Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are not clear 
and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It is a matter of 
fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make the 
observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but 
it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind 
and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs scientific or mathematical 
investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in which this 
language will be used, since these are ordinary and unproblematic terms and it 
is only their context which is puzzling. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only 
clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the 
problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and 
philosophy in their sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is 
only one reality, so there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the 
world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our one 
public language. There cannot be a private language and any “private inner” 
thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our social life. 
It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this 
sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, 
then the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which 
S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology 
of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the 
language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on 
philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of 
language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language 
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dispels the confusion. I repeat what Horwich has noted on the last page of his 
superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review): “What sort of 
progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have 
been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or 
reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as 
Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should 
be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes 
various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are 
comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language 
(the mind) works, and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they 
become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” 
When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or consider new 
ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive 
(W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly 
unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the need 
for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the causal 
framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. 
 
Once again: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science 
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
 Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, 
but there is a residue which evinces itself when he insists on using dispositional 
S2 terms which describe public behavior (thinking, knowing believing etc.) to 
describe S1 ‘processes’ in the brain, that e.g., we can understand consciousness 
by studying the brain, and that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. 
W made it abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language 
games and giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As 
noted in my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the 
major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went 
to England to study) and making the common fatal mistake of thinking he is 
smarter than W. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- 
-I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing 
as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
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have already said everything. --- Not anything that follows from this, no this 
itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting 
an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give 
it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get 
beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', ` self' and ` consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian 
subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, 
and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) 
their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s 
above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading 
expert on W for many years) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to 
scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of 
our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, 
the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute 
nothing whatsoever.” ((Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de- sac- 
p15(2005)) 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2, which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the 
basic structure of social behavior. 
 
Several comments bear repeating. So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly 
causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) 
while S2 has content (i.e. is representational) and is downwardly causal (mind 
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to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I 
would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and 
ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention-- and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the 
Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. 
In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such 
as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of 
the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike 
S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often 
orchestrated seamlessly by learned deontic cultural relations, so that our 
normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This 
vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as 
`The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s 
BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing 
etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or  false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR 
(called transitive in BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we 
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thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W PI p308 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
Like Carruthers, Coliva, S and others sometime state (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in my reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what 
S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in 
turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become 
propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious or conscious but 
automated activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious or deliberative 
ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional 
in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that 
was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world 
could be decided without consciousness. As W stated often and showed so 
brilliantly in his last book ‘On Certainty’, life must be based on certainty-- 
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary 
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of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need 
to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons 
for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on 
p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious 
DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right”, but the ultimate 
cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of 
their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the 
conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often 
result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and 
by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see 
that this view is not credible. 
 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd- 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as Evolutionary 
Psychology (EP) and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing 
and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle’s 
‘theories’ (who often criticizes W for his famous anti-theoretical stance). 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W BBB p34 
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“Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” (SPCP) (2008) is a superb and 
unique book, but so totally ignored that my 2015 review was at the time the 
only one! It should be obvious that philosophical issues are always about 
mistakes in language used to describe our universal innate psychology and 
there is no useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, 
Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can exist of philosophy in the broad 
sense but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any 
interesting and substantive philosophy) is about. It could take a whole book to 
discuss this and S does an excellent job, so I will just comment here that 
regarding p35 in SPCP, propositions are S2 and not mental states, which are S1 
as W made quite clear over ¾ of a century ago, and that both Quine and 
Davidson were equally confused about the basic issues involved (both Searle 
and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of Quine). As often, S’s discussion 
is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its 
logical conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have 
to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find (with W) incoherent. What 
are the COS (the truthmaking event, the test or proof) that could show the truth 
vs the falsity of our not having a choice to lift our arm? 
 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our 
axiomatic EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W noted 
frequently). It’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, etc.  
are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in little 
backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
another usage (context) differs. 
 
Philosophers (and would-be philosophers) create imaginary problems by 
trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. This situation is nicely 
analyzed by Finkelstein in ‘Holism and Animal Minds’ and also admirably 
summed up by Read in ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’ quoted above. 
 
Wittgenstein’s ``Culture and Value`` (published in 1980, but written decades 
earlier), though it´s perhaps his least interesting book, has much that is 
pertinent to this discussion, and of course to a large part of modern intellectual 
life. 
 
``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.`` 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But 
the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our 
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language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same 
questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it 
functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we still have the 
adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of 
a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over 
the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which 
no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a 
longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the 
limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond 
these.`` 
 
Likewise let us try to distill the essence from two of Searle’s recent works. 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact - value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The general 
point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
That is, the functioning of our linguistic System 2 presupposes that of our pre-
linguistic System 1. Also it is not possible for us to accept or reject DIRA, rather 
as part of S1 they are innate and rejecting any of S1 is incoherent. 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
That is, our mental functioning is usually so preoccupied with system 2 as to be 
oblivious to system 1. 
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"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and 
maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) 
Status Function  Declarations,  including the cases that  are not  speech  acts in  
the explicit  form of Declarations." 
Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word) – to - world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to these 
two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is 
not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of 
cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that 
it represent with either direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic 
intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as 
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already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true not 
just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally 
produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents 
something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a 
physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents a 
type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which gross muscle movements were able to 
convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most people will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 
2" or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to Searle's taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins thinking 
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about them in S2. 
 
Searle often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description 
of one event so for Intention in Action (IA) "We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in 
addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means 
of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those 
of IA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are 
mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action (IA) 
which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-reflexive (CSR). The 
critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) it is 
essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of 
cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 (p38 MSW), which Searle 
has used for many years and is the basis for the much extended one I present 
here and in my many articles. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to 
modern psychological research by using my S1, S2 terminology and W's true-
only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-
only perception, memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as 
belief and desire. 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ` will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A 
function is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
 
I suggest, the translation of "The  intentionality  of  language  is  created  by  the  
intrinsic,  or  mind-  independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) 
as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in mind 
that behavior is programmed by biology. 
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Once again, Searle states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, 
reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it 
is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is 
axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 
were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact 
if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology 
shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no 
evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of 
vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude 
higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of 
billions and hundreds of millions of years of natural selection by inclusive 
fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-
linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring to EP 
and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all 
behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason invisible. 
 
Here again is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason 
operates: We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-- i.e., desires displaced 
in space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness- IF (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all 
unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we 
include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the 
higher order DIRA of S2 (DIRA2) that require language are uniquely human. 
The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 acts and 
their cultural extensions that are desire independent) is that the unconscious 
DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 
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which often override the short term personal immediate desires. Agents do 
indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious or merely automated DIRA1 (the ultimate 
cause). 
 
Following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only 
reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the 
basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your 
awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and 
the impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly 
(“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this 
argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be 
public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide 
to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and 
say ‘coconut’ it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what I say 
(since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ 
and the next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and we have 
great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction from others 
and with incessant input from media. This may seem like a trivial point, but it 
is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer—i.e., our true-only 
untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable statements 
regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. Though W 
explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century ago, it has 
rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any discussion 
of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, Johnston and 
others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity with Skinner, 
Quine, Dennett, Functionalism, or any other behaviorist excretions that deny 
our inner life, needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
 Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’(1991) is one of the better 
works for gaining insight so I discuss it in detail (see my review for more). 
 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. 
Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that 
is not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, 
believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston and Moyal-Sharrock are exceptions) 
that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into 
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being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a 
memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end, 
and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of 
science) to trace it any further or that the concept of `cause' ceases to be 
applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over 
a century now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” 
refer again to dispositions such as “may think it’s raining” which are possible 
states of affairs (or potential actions—Searle’s conditions of satisfaction) which 
may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to Searle’s 3 gaps of intentionality, 
which he finds critically necessary. 
 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is 
anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there 
is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is 
an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another 
statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations vs 
publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation on p36 
-41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) 
miss the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to community 
practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that underlies language 
and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are 
only possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the 
background. Budd correctly rejects this misinterpretation several times (e.g., 
p58). 
 
In Budd’s next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in 
modern psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and 
untestable background. His comment (p47) ...” that our beliefs about our 
present sensations rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the ‘myth of the 
given’ is one of the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be 
misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, 
but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made 
very clear, the sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and 
not subject to belief in the usual sense but are better called understandings (my 
U1). Unlike our S2 beliefs (including those about other people’   s S1 
experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd explains this well, as on 
p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying one is in 
pain. That is, justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 dispositional 
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slow conscious thinking, not S1 reflexive fast unconscious processing. His 
discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like everyone who 
discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he needs to do is say 
that in S1 there is no possible test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the 
‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria’. That is, introspection is 
vacuous. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true-only causal experiences of S1 and the 
reasoned dispositions of S2. 
 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the 
designation of dispositions to act, or in Searle’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction, which make the utterance true. 
 
Again, Budd’s discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that 
we ‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that 
we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-only 
and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different kind 
than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns reasons, 
and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of the way 
of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets it right 
again — “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is 
compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused by 
a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he 
experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W would not 
accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, since in his later 
work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal 
automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back 
to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only 
because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are 
highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how 
S1 and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean 
by ‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the 
slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they 
are so well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple 
ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively 
interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., 
aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of behavior, 
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it is of great value to refer to Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ 
(1993) and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate nature of language. 
 
In Budd’s chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later 
work—the relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, 
few have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is 
not surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion of seeing (automatic S1) vs visualizing 
(conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there being no test for 
my inner experiences, so whatever I say comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s 
face counts as the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation which 
can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply 
S2 terms to S1 processes where that lack of any test makes them inapplicable. 
See Bennet and Hacker’s ‘Neurophilosophy’, DMS, etc. for discussions. On p120 
et seq. Budd mentions two of W’s famous examples used for combatting this 
temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had only 
S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was not possible. 
‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc. 
But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ 
as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence 
W’s famous comment (p120)—“The decisive movement in the conjuring trick 
has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the 
speech itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process 
and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument -- 
there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we 
thought before we act (speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb 
‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a 
potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to 
eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t 
describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is 
speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in 
either case? 
 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a 
meaning), we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth 
conditions. Hence the quote from W: “When I think in language, there aren’t 
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‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, 
the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible 
criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” 
 
And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ 
and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, 
this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order 
descriptive psychology as one can find. Again, this quashes Searle’s frequent 
criticism of W as anti- theoretical—it all depends on the nature of the 
generalization. 
 
It helps greatly in this section of Budd on the harmony of thought with reality 
(i.e., of how dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it 
means to utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE 
(possible events) which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the 
COS (PE) which makes it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or 
physical behavior (pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The 
harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or 
subsequent behavior or any mental states I may have and Budd is confused or 
at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an internal 
description of a mental state that can agree with reality and that this is the 
content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted to the automatisms of 
S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The content (meaning) 
of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that he comes and 
not any inner mental event or state, which the private language argument 
shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. We have very clear 
verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. And as W and 
S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the 
sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought (sentence) that Jack will come 
and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so the answer to the two 
questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be 
crystal clear — “In virtue of what is it true that my expectation does have that 
content?” and “What has become now of the hollow space and the 
corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the 
sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such 
a shadow.” And thus, it should also be quite clear what Budd is referring to as 
to what makes it “possible for there to be the required harmony (or lack of 
harmony) with reality.” 
 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my 
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image of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS 
is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if 
shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not 
that the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the 
COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had 
looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence W’s summation (p140) that 
“What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the question whether 
I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact 
that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I 
should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … Suppose it 
were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the 
COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on 
the way dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I 
express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is 
less substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are the 
same—i.e., they are causally self- referential (or causally self reflexive as Searle 
now prefers)—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at my table, it is 
clear emotions have much more in common with the fast, true-only 
automatisms of S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2, but of course 
S1 feeds S2 and in turn S1 automatisms are often modified by S2 and S2 
“thoughts” can become automatized (S2A). 
 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the 
model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the 
denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of 
the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility 
to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate 
foundation.” 
 
Now let us take another dose of Searle. 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
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identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition ... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
And another shot of Wittgenstein. 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name 
`philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 
126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
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considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture. 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true- only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophy has no practical impact 
whatsoever except to clear up confusions about how language is being used in 
particular cases. Like various ‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon views 
of life (religious, political, psychological, sociological, anthropological), it is too 
cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so 
unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Likewise, with other academic ‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social 
Science Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history and literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, 
and sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing cartoons 
that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or 
cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (EP defaults), and help to lay waste to 
the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice and institution, which 
are there to facilitate replication of genes and consumption of resources). The 
point is to realize that these are on a continuum with philosophical cartoons 
and have the same source (our evolved psychology). All of us could be said to 
generate/absorb various cartoon views of life when young and only a few ever 
grow out of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ anywhere 
substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others 
believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (Understanding of Agency or UA in my terminology) either. In 
S’s terms, the COS are the test of what is being thought and they are identical 
for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s raining’, ‘I believe I believe it’s raining’ and ‘he 
believes it’s raining’ (likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), 
namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact to keep in mind regarding 
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‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’). 
 
Now for a few extracts from my review of Carruthers’ (C) ‘The Opacity of Mind’ 
(2013) which is replete with the classical confusions dressed up as science. It 
was the subject of a precis in Brain and Behavioral Sciences (BBS) that is not to 
be missed. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), 
who seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the 
use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard 
reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading and all the 
language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness 
and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just a cartoon of life 
without any value whatsoever, which one could say of most philosophical and 
many ‘scientific’ disquisitions on behavior. The W/S framework has long noted 
that the first person point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person 
one, but this is no problem for the cartoon view of life. Likewise, with the 
description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information 
processing’ etc., -- all well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, 
Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear 
“representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) 
is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the COS 
that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett and Searle) thinks he is an expert on W, 
having studied him early in his career and decided that the private language 
argument is to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism 
and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t 
you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction? 
If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one 
can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern ‘computationalist’ form. 
W/S insist on the indispensability of the first person point of view while C 
apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or “self”. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to 
characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and 
many others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed 
D in various writings and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let us 
recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the 
point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is captivated by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., 
chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers with 
specific language games, preferring experiments and observations that are 
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quite difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the BBS responses), and 
which in any case have no relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior 
(e.g., exactly how do  they fit into the Intentionality Table). One book he praises 
as definitive (Memory and the Computational Brain) presents the brain as a 
computational information processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and 
repeatedly annihilated by S and others, including W in the 1930’s. In the last 
decade, I have read thousands of pages by and about W and it is quite clear that 
C does not have a clue. In this he joins a long line of distinguished philosophers 
whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, 
Putnam, Chomsky etc. (though Putnam began to see the light later). They just 
cannot grasp the message that most philosophy is grammatical jokes and 
impossible vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
 
Books like ‘The Opacity of Mind’ that attempt to bridge two sciences or two 
levels of description are really two books and not one. There is the description 
(not explanation, as W made clear) of our language and nonverbal behavior and 
then the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the 
problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by."(W 
PI p232), Cet al are enthralled by science and just assume that it is a great 
advance to wed high-level descriptive psychology to neuroscience and 
experimental psychology, but W/S and many others have shown this is a 
mistake. Far from making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it 
makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, 
Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such 
memorable accounts of behavior without any experimental science whatsoever. 
Of course, like politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut up, so 
this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The bottom line has 
to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest the 
philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to 
those of W/S, are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and 
consciousness are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are meaningless, 
having no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive science have 
any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other 
animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into 
physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the many 
criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and physiology 
may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others often do, C 
does not reveal his real gems til the end, when we are told that self, will, 
consciousness are illusions (supposedly in the normal senses of this words). 
Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these 
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‘superstitions’ (i.e., doing the usual philosophical move of not explaining at all 
and in fact not even describing) but amazingly C admits it at the beginning, 
though of course he thinks he is showing us these words do not mean what we 
think and that his cartoon use is the valid one. 
 
One should also see Bennett and Hacker’s criticisms of cognitive science in 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ (2003) and their debate with S and 
Dennett in ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ (2009-and don’t miss the final essay 
by Daniel Robinson). It is also well explored in Hacker’s three recent books on 
"Human Nature". 
 
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but 
there is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that 
chemistry will absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will absorb physiology or 
genetics, nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, 
sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact 
that they are different levels of description with entirely different concepts, data 
and explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerfull and we just cannot 
resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation vs the 
vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. Reductionism thrives in spite 
of the incomprehensibility of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, wave/particles, 
live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and the incompleteness and 
randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my full review of Yanofsky’s ‘The 
Outer Limits of Reason’ and the excerpts here) and its irresistible pull tells us it 
is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air from W: “For 
the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was 
a requirement.” PI p107. It is hard to resist throwing down most books on 
behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything trying to ‘explain’ 
higher order behavior to e.g. these quotes from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-
138_239-309.html. 
 
It is clear to me after reading ten thousand pages of philosophy in the last 
decade that the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, 
where ordinary language morphs into special uses both deliberately and 
inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy 
and other behavioral disciplines).Using special jargon words (e.g., 
intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no philosophy 
police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what they mean are 
interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and dense it’s often 
painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to embrace his terminology 
and makes some egregious mistakes, while W is hands down the clearest and 
most insightful, once you grasp what he is doing, and nobody has ever been 
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able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement of the mechanical 
reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and diagnosed and cured 
the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore him and 
biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and millions of 
articles and most religious and political organizations (and until recently most 
of economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life.  But the world 
is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of 
life (e.g., socialism, democracy, multiculturalism) collide with reality and 
universal blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse of civilization. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as all basic behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious. 
 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is 
most striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping 
back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes 
with no conscious awareness of driving at all. On reflection, this automatism 
can be seen to account for almost all of our behavior, with just minimal 
supervision and awareness from S2. I am writing this page and have to “think” 
(i.e., let some time pass) about what to say, but then it just flows out into my 
hands which type it and by and large it’s a surprise to me except when I think 
of changing a specific sentence. And you read it giving commands to your body 
to sit still and look at this part of the page, but the words just flow into you and 
some kind of understanding and memory happen, but unless you concentrate 
on a sentence there is only a vague sense of doing anything. A soccer player 
runs down the field and kicks the ball and thousands of nerve impulses and 
muscle contractions deftly coordinated with eye movements, and feedback 
from proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, but there is only a 
vague feeling of control and high level awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief 
of Police who sits in his office while S1 has thousands of officers doing the actual 
work according to laws that he mostly does not even know. Reading, writing 
or soccer are voluntary acts A2 seen from above, but composed of thousands of 
automatic acts A1 seen from below. Much of contemporary behavioral science 
is concerned with these automatisms. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of Searle’s PNC, “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to 
obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious 
thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate 
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blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and gave the 
reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic 
network of our innate System 1 which is the source of the Inner. Very roughly, 
regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 or The Inner, and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer should prove very revealing. 
As Searle notes, the Phenomenologists have the ontology exactly backwards, 
but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
Another excellent work on W that deserves close study is Johnston’s 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (1993). He notes that some will object that 
if our reports and memories are really untestable they would have no value but 
“This objection misses the whole point of W’s argument, for it assumes that 
what actually happened, and what the individual says happened, are two 
distinct things. As we have seen, however, the grammar of psychological 
statements means that the latter constitutes the criteria for the former. If we see 
someone with a concentrated expression on her face and want to know ‘what is 
going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us that she is trying to work out 
the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly what we want to know. The 
question of whether, despite her sincerity, her statement might be an inaccurate 
description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The source of confusion 
here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have a different 
grammar from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What makes the 
inner seem so mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one concept 
in terms of another. In fact our concept of the Inner, what we mean when we 
talk of ‘what was going on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious inner 
processes, but to the account which the individual offers of her experience…As 
processes or events, what goes on inside the individual is of no interest, or 
rather is of a purely medical or scientific interest” (p13-14). 
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer 
matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he 
underlines the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior. We don’t just want 
to know that the person’s body was in such and such a position and that her 
features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her 
account of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails 
to lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that 
without publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between 
following the rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
On p55 Johnston makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made 
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many times by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the 
Outer is entirely dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable 
nature of our direct first person experience of the Inner. The System 2 sceptical 
doubts concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the 
true-only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are reading these 
words now is the basis for judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged. This 
mistake is one of the most basic and common in all philosophy. 
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of checking 
your statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly called 
‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling, far from 
being a defect of our psychology, is exactly what gives these statements interest. 
“I am tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another bit of 
data about the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under your 
eyes. 
 
Johnston then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that 
meaning or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that 
accompany speech. As W pointed out, just consider the case where you think 
you understand, and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any 
inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc. 
The experience which counts is the awareness of the public language game we 
participate in. Similar considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning 
speed of thought’. “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a process or a 
succession of experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What 
corresponds to the lightning speed of thought is the individual’s ability to 
explain at any point what she is doing or saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if 
one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the beginning and end of 
the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the experience of 
thinking that it is uniform during this time or whether it is a process like 
speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar as 
her account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are 
interested in is the account of the past she is inclined to give and the assumption 
that she will be able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her 
as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our conscious, 
voluntary S2 psychology. 
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to 
communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural 
and unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, we can 
only contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep communication is 
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by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it is 
in plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest 
form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them 
and thus lack a precise duration as well as levels of intensity and the content is 
a decision and so is not a precise mental state, so in all these respects they are 
quite different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses like S1 
emotions. 
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put it- this was not a terminology 
available to J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with 
the first person use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere 
utterance) true-only sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being 
true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining 
and it isn’t” but other tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” or 
the third person “He believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: “The 
general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the individual can 
observe her own dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note that 
the individuals description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the 
description of a state of affairs…In other words, someone who says she believes 
P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason therefor that the 
individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory 
stance towards it, she undermines it. Someone who said “I believe it’s raining 
but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her own assertion. As W notes, there can 
be no first person equivalent of the third person use of the verb for the same 
reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely would lack a first person present 
indicative...the two propositions are not independent, for ‘the assertion that this 
is going on inside me asserts: this is going on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-
56). Though not commented on by W or J, the fact that children never make 
such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., shows that 
such constructions are built into our grammar (into our genes) and not cultural 
add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the 
point of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when in 
any case I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my knowing 
what I believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer my 
behaviour from my words? That is the fact.” 
 
(RPP1 p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis 
for cognition, and as the non- propositional substrate for determining truth and 
falsity, cannot be intelligibly judged. 
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He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the 
LG’s (within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
Johnston continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which 
is summed up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it 
is hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden 
from the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under certain 
conditions, believe his expression and there, error has no place. And this 
asymmetry in the game is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden 
from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is not that inner is 
hidden but that the language game it involves is very different from those 
where we normally talk about knowledge.” And then he enters into one of W’s 
major themes throughout his life—the difference between man and machine. 
“But with a human being the assumption is that it is impossible to gain an 
insight into the mechanism. Thus, indeterminacy is postulated…I believe 
unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of the Inner. As also is the 
endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). Again, W 
probes the difference between animals and computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our 
humanity. Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling 
(and so the Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence for 
something important, that we base a judgement on this involved sort of 
evidence, and so that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and is 
made prominent by a concept.” (Z p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades 
of meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner 
states and the lack of fixed relationships between our concepts and experience. 
W:  ”One can’t say what the essential observable consequences of an inner state 
are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, 
and what not? There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they 
can’t be described in the same way as reactions which characterize the state of 
a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90). J “Here her inner state is not something we 
cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is 
nothing determinate to know.” (p195). 
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless of 
scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity 
might turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of 
understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that involved 
in the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientist’s 
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discovery, it could not be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” 
(p213). 
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one 
thought is a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the 
Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a 
rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar problems…These 
subsequent statements can all be seen as amplifications or explanations of the 
original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates to the brain state? Are 
we to imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible question 
about the thought? ..we would have to allow that two significantly different 
thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words may in one sense be 
interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems for the attempt 
to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the same in one 
sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a fragile and 
artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could make to 
talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219). That is, the same 
thought (COS) “it’s raining” expresses an infinite number of brain states in one 
or many people. Likewise, the ‘same’ brain state might express different 
thoughts (COS) in different contexts. 
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. “Here 
the postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what happened 
from a trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He then notes an 
example from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he reads and who 
cannot repeat the text without the marks but they don’t relate to the text by 
rules …  ”The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be 
stored up in our nervous system?” and also “…nothing seems more plausible 
to me than that people will someday come to the definite opinion that there is 
no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds 
to a particular thought or a particular idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This 
implies that there can be psychological regularities to which no physiological 
regularities correspond; and as W provocatively adds ‘If this upsets our 
concepts of causality, then it is high time they were upset.’” (RPP1 p905) 
…’Why should not the initial and the terminal states of a system be connected 
by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary state? (RPP1 p909) ... [It 
is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated with associating 
or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes 
from brain processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed out of 
chaos? ...as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not 
really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing.’(RPP1 
p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just 
76  
leave explaining alone? -but you would never talk like that if you were 
examining the behavior of a machine! – Well who says that a living creature, an 
animal body, is a machine in this sense?’” (RPPI p918) (p 220- 21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W 
anticipates the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self organization in 
biology. Since uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine 
now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather 
etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? The only detailed 
comments on these remarks I have seen are in a recent paper by Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS). 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study 
of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, 
politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, 
with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat 
wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly 
this preposterous situation will change, but probably not much. 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes 
and the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book ‘Human Nature’ (2011), 
especially p226-32, is critical for any student of behavior. It is a nearly universal 
delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” is not but 
W exposed this many times. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific 
and mathematical concepts. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind 
that ‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, 
‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully 
described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
Searle make many interesting remarks in one of his most recent books ‘Thinking 
About the Real World’ (TARW)(2013),and I seem to have written the only 
review, so I will discuss it in detail here. 
 
On p21 of TARW we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in 
S’s work and one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read the 
later W and his commentators more carefully. He refers to free will as an 
“assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, 
self, world, and all the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the 
axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. 
Can we “assume” we have two hands or live on the surface of the earth or that 
Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps this huge mistake is connected with his 
blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which I have noted. Amazing that 
he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
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On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which 
he first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts 
of things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to 
comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you 
can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is 
unfortunate that he does not use the S1/S2 concepts as it makes it so much easier 
to keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very un-
Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical elements, 
you can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of 
perceptions and memories, in a way that it is not possible to make detachments 
of unsyntactically structured representational elements.” (p31) just says that 
with language came the dispositional intentionality of S2, where conscious 
thought and reason (i.e., potential public actions expressible in language) 
became possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) see elsewhere here and my reviews of his 
other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states, and his reference to 
mental states as representations (actually ‘presentations’ here) with COS, is (in 
my view) counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the 
apple we see is the COS of the CSR – (Causally Self Reflexive--i.e., cause is built 
in) perception of the apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch 
has the same status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. 
Thus, the mental states of S1 are to be included with the actions of S2 as COS. 
Though I accept most of S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t see the 
advantage of this, but I have the greatest respect for him so I will work on it. I 
have noted his tendency (normal for others but a flaw in Searle) to mix S1 and 
S2 which he does on p29 where he seems to be referring to beliefs as mental 
states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in the 30’s that S2 are 
not mental states in anything like the sense of S1. We need always to keep clear 
the difference between the language games of S1 and S2 and so if he insists to 
use the game of belief in reference to S1 then it is much clearer if we refer to B1 
and B2 where B2 is the word “belief” as used in reference to the public linguistic 
acts of System 2. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true-only 
unconscious percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic 
automatic functions of our evolved psychology (EP). As noted, one can read 
Hutto and Myin’s book ‘Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without 
Content’ (2012) and their sequel for a very different recent account of the 
nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
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The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and 
which I have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a 
revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior (though less so if one 
understood W). He has continued to develop the naturalistic description of 
behavior and on p39 he shows how ethics originates in our innate social 
behavior and language. A basic concept is the Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (DIRA), which is explained in his various books. For an outline see my 
reviews of his MSW and other works. He tends to use the proximate reasons of 
S2 (i.e., dispositional psychology and culture) to frame his analysis but as with 
all behavior I regard it as superficial unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 
and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the description in 
terms of the unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive 
fitness. Thus, I would restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to 
override their natural inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as 
“…people are compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to 
secure long term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology 
as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate 
(as I have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of 
describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC 
represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the fact 
that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is 
too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this book. 
As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten 
all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and 
biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on 
p202 is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain 
is automatic true-only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (ca. 500 
msec or more) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 
function that can be expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle 
contractions as well). Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the 
pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain, once we begin to reflect on it, normally 
are blended together into one ‘experience’. For me by far the best place to get 
an understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB 
and ending with OC. Nobody else has ever described the subtleties of the 
language games with such clarity. One must keep constantly in mind the 
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vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, ‘experience’, 
‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—even S 
stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly restate 
all of p202 separating the true-only non-judgeable S1 from the propositional S2 
then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. And of course, very 
often (i.e., normally) words are used without a clear meaning—one has to 
specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to be used in this context and W 
is the only one I know of who consistently gets this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional automatic causal 
dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way 
to describe S1 states, which provide the raw material for deliberate conscious 
S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary point of view (and 
what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is right 
on the money— the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can 
only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self and intention 
work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall S’s 
famous review of Dennett’s ‘Consciousness Explained’ entitled “Consciousness 
explained away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that S should 
repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will and that we 
have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that 
the confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, 
idealism, materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal 
susceptibility to the defaults of our psychology — ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI) as he has termed it, and bewitchment by language as beautifully 
described by W. As he notes, “The neurobiological processes and the mental 
phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” and “How can 
conscious intentions cause bodily movement? …How can the hammer move 
the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if 
you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is 
no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer 
only if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a 
condition that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue 
of the satisfaction of that condition.” as “Meaning is achieved by stating a 
publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is 
raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise. 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, 
as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
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representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
Time for some more quotes and a discussion of his recent book of reprints 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (2008) and as elsewhere I will repeat some 
comments to place them in a different context. 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, 
only a machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does 
not name a machine process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, 
implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a 
physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is 
essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. 
I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to 
physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive 
decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the 
physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” 
Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
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virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The   
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.”  Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a  reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has 
no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying 
neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot 
be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that 
Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, 
but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing 
behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said (as they 
must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find most of S 
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foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument 
against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. 
Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor 
Rodych's excellent, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle 
Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's 
philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the 
axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended into the endless 
System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. 
 
W’s insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into 
intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the 
multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems 
to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful 
statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical 
processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Of course, later (but before the 
digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in great detail why 
these were incoherent descriptions of mind (thinking, behavior) that must be 
replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life). 
S however makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as 
mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work. 
 
Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of 
behavior, and perhaps the most important descriptive psychologist 
(philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by 
and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and 
Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, 
and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach 
it from the right direction.  See my articles for more details. 
 
Like W, Searle is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his 
written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and 
confusions. On p7 of PNC he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is 
due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but as Coliva, 
DMS et al have noted, W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no 
possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 
perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is the basis for judgment and 
cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is 
revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the 
result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via 
experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of 
course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our 
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intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One 
word-- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one 
that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear 
examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a 
theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a 
summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten 
pages. 
 
Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning 
that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, 
a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-
only perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if 
nothing is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner 
experience stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to miss this.  
See W or Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many 
contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in 
numerous perspicuous examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it 
is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities 
of the mind lie open before us." And, as explained above, I feel the questions 
with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering W’s OC from 
the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of 
science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at 
the time, but I will have to reread it to make sure. 
 
Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language 
games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read 
just about any page of W and much of DMS, Coliva, Hacker etc. for the reasons. 
It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from 
quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant 
to our normal use of words. 
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and 
life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, 
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‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1, which is composed of mental states in the present 
only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on ‘social 
glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast 
actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and 
universally expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into 
cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view 
of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to 
them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) 
points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a century earlier before 
there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, 
fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- propositional, true-only mental states, 
while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions 
that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that 
are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have 
only derived (ascribed) intentionality that is dependent on our perspective 
while higher animals have primary intentionality that is independent of 
perspective. As S and W appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or 
mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but 
in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it 
is Hofstadter, Dennett, Carruthers, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still 
not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms 
of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, 
he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious 
to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather 
than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious. As noted 
above, Searle has described this as TPI. Again, on p65 I find W’s description of 
our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other 
works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that 
dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. See the earlier section of 
this article dealing with OC and DMS. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative 
(i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning 
(COS) in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they have 
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been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by 
the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in its use (meaning). 
These comments are all extensions of classic Wittgenstein and in this 
connection, I recommend Hutto’s and Read’s papers too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, 
while demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his 
failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value 
of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI 
is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic 
Blank Slate blindness. It is clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and 
also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic 
axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, Searle dances 
all around it but never quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer 
independent’ features of the world as S1 and ‘observer dependent’ features as 
S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the others have the 
ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the 
defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing 
that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to 
our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these words 
at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its immense 
implications for the world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras 
going back over 5000 years to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most 
recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc.), 
we are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically programmed 
mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with using the 
second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating 
Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction and 
accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming and 
the imminent collapse of industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing 
is likely to stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want 
to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this and this and this is 
baby. Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another 
primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. 
Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a 
rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, 
and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person ontology is 
totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) 
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type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view, it is 
clearly another instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) 
has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb Chapter 
9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) 
of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments 
or those of DMS on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the 
bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning 
it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that 
the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the unconscious 
automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 
2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the 
world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance 
over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions and 
S makes a similar point in Chapter10. The genes program S1 which (mostly) 
pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. 
Again, he needs to read my comments and those of DMS, Coliva, Andy 
Hamilton etc., on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the 
bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s various 
books and papers, as they make clear the difference between true only sentences 
describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a 
far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they 
only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his 
point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, 
of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or 
protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at 
all that can determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of 
satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might 
be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is created 
and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form 
as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in 
the explicit form of Declarations.” 
Searle MSWp11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these 
two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is 
not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of 
cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that 
it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSWp15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state 
…and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a 
distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different psychological 
mode in the case of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or 
type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true 
or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can 
be true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as my 
desires or intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied 
or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises cannot be true or false but can be in 
various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—we can think of all the intentional states 
that have a whole propositional content and a direction of fit as representations 
of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief represents its truth conditions, a 
desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention represents it’s carrying 
out conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation 
must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using 
it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of 
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satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, 
corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to Expressives 
is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit 
is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. 
Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing 
those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language” MSW 
p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human 
cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a 
way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance 
represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one 
level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments.  This is true 
not just for statements but for all speech acts” MSW p82 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we 
can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories 
but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and it seems 
to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other name…. W’s 
point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true 
accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account 
for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to generalize and 
inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in PNC). 
As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games, they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of 
numerous examples as did W. 
 
The Primary Language Games (PLG's) are the simple automated utterances by 
our involuntary, System  1,  fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts 
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(‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and 
Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger, which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later Secondary Language Games (SLG's) are expressions or 
descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, 
loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, 
supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc., which can only be 
described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's a fact that attempts to describe System 2 
in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--
see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with Searle’s work. 
 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of 
mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As 
quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned 
with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can deny that any 
revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free will are necessary 
or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for the reasons. It’s one 
thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from quantum 
mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our 
normal use of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
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cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather 
it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Now let us review Searle’s brilliant summary of his many years of work on the 
logical structure of the ‘social glue’ that holds society together as set forth is his 
‘Making the Social World’ (2010). 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or 
DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions permit 
statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is 
cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one 
event, so for IA (Intention in Action) “We have different levels of description 
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where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition 
to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of 
relation.” (p37). 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
“representations” or “information”) while S2 has “content” and is downwardly 
causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with “conditions 
of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be 
with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other 
S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR (Causally Self Reflexive) 
rapid automatic primitive true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in 
neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending 
(prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., 
with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which 
is always in the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often 
orchestrated by the learned deontic cultural relations seamlessly, so that our 
normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This 
vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ‘will’, 
‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. S understands 
and uses basically this same argument in other contexts (e.g., skepticism, 
solipsism) many times, so it is quite surprising he can’t see this analogy. He 
makes this mistake frequently when he says such things as that we have “good 
evidence” that our dog is conscious etc. The true-only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. Here you have one of the best descriptive psychologists since 
W, so this is not a stupid mistake. 
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His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are 
built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in 
order to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented with “The 
prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our 
EP) which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by 
the intrinsic, or mind- independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as 
“The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious 
axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep in mind that 
behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., 
true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, 
it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, 
that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality 
of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact social life (and perhaps all animal life depending on 
what one regards as “propositions”) would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty— 
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die (could not evolve). 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for 
material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see 
them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the world 
into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any 
problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences 
being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our 
evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
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SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders 
of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” 
is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no 
general answer to why people accept institutions is clearly wrong. They accept 
them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive 
fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra- 
linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to EP 
and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all 
behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved 
in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and 
critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many animal precursors 
(as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats and mating dances, 
the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing pretense of 
mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a bite out of 
their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in many 
animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq.). Saying 
that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
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In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic 
book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing 
the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. 
“Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ 
(desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles), ‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) 
and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to 
clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has 
programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often 
give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our 
higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get much 
simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’) is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which 
we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology 
and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary 
of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires 
(genetically programmed need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced 
in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly 
result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness 
(increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I 
would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the 
language game of DIRA in System 2) as "The resolution of the paradox is that 
the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the 
conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, 
but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate 
cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the 
ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive 
fitness of their distant ancestors (and also e.g., the Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacism destroying America and the world).  
 
95  
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2, 
which produces reasons for action that often result in activation   of   body   
and/or   speech   muscles   by   S1   causing   actions.   The   general   mechanism   
is   via   both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted 
areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The 
Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the 
action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is 
not credible. 
 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: “We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA— i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions 
to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those 
closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal 
in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending 
her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 
(i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 or DIRA2 that require 
language are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer 
description of his “explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called 
‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural extensions). That is, “The 
resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent reasons 
can ground the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not logically 
inevitable that they do and not empirically universal that they do” can be 
translated as “The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his 
discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 (Evolutionary 
Psychology, Reciprocal Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, System 1) which ground the 
dispositions and ensuing actions ofS2. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must 
get them from biology as there is no other option and the above description 
shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations 
DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics 
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works because the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate 
personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, 
extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2, but these are not just anything but, with few if any 
exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really 
means to ascribe deontics to our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which he so beautifully demolished in his 
classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I have noted above, there 
is a huge body of recent research on implicit cognition exposing the cognitive 
illusions which comprise our personality. TPI is not merely a harmless 
philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which 
produces the illusion that we control our life and our society and the world, and 
the consequences are almost certain collapse of industrial civilization during 
the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will 
(i.e., choice) in some non-trivial sense it would all be pointless, and he has 
rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain 
an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. But, like 
nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests 
(p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite 
clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. 
You cannot in the normal case doubt you are reading this page as your 
awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Now lets us briefly review Searle’s most recent book, ‘Seeing Things As They 
Are’ (STATA-2015). See the full review for further comments. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for 
on page 4 we have the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used 
in some normal sense, but we are doing philosophy, so we are going to be 
undulating back and forth between language games with no chance of keeping 
our day to day games distinct from the various philosophical ones. Again, you 
can read some of Bennett and Hacker’s ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Sadly, like 
nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has still not adopted the two systems 
framework, so it’s much harder to keep things straight than it needs to be. 
 
On p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence, and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
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propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is 
system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s 
COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), nontestable (Wittgenstein’s true-only or intransitive), and nonpublic, 
automatic and not linguistic, i.e., not propositional and presentational and only 
describable in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after 
crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, he 
says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is 
true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 
where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and 
then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description, 
which W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the 
end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) 
so for “The subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an 
intentional content and the specification of the intentional content is the same 
as the description of the state of affairs that the intentional content presents you 
with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be 
described in the public language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting 
again the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of 
our perception, he is repeating what W noted long ago, and which is due to the 
fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, 
etc. are all different psychological or intentional modes or language games 
played with the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private experiences’ (i.e., S1) 
can only be their public manifestations (S2) —i.e., language we all use to 
describe public acts, as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach 
language to something internal. This is of course W’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language. He also mentions several times that 
hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X, but what can be the test for this 
except that we are inclined to use the same words? In this case, they are the 
same by definition, so this argument rings hollow. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which 
is not an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, 
i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front 
of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man 
himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual experience 
has a content, but no object. The content can be exactly the same in the two 
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cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence of an object.” 
The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the 
mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a 
public truthmaker) and this does entail the public object, but for an 
hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the similar 
mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not about understanding perception but 
about understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are 
exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a 
particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we 
fail to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 
or we must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., no 
COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 
and not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the 
next page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of philosophy, 
and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral sciences, 
cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems terminology which 
renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise with the failure to grasp 
that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific issue  or  a  philosophical  
one  and  if philosophical then which language game is going to be played and 
what the COS are in the context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W 
made so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the 
whole neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only 
be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my 
having an experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which 
will lead to others. Many think these don’t matter, many think they do. 
Something happens in the brain but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue 
and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means the 
neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for scientific investigation but one 
of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more 
philosophical jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted 
the two systems framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). 
Likewise, for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, 
‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we 
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have to decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties 
of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could 
stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means 
that perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, 
untestable (true-only, i.e., no public tests) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions 
are S2 and so not mental states, do not have a definite time, have reasons and 
not causes, are testable with COS etc. 
 
On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are 
part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts 
which have become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate 
dividing line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2), which means S1 passes the 
percept to higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and 
expressed in language. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 
and ‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in 
the same sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science 
(e.g., physics) would be different if people realized they were playing language 
games and not doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no 
language as it’s automatic and reflexive, so when saying what I saw, or to 
describe what I saw, I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out 
long ago as showing the limits of language. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so 
that “Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of 
representation, and because all representation is under aspects, the visual 
presentations will always present their conditions of satisfaction under some 
aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data 
to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has public 
COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events 
which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ 
refer to S1 and S2. 
 
On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds 
its data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract 
muscles, and lower level perception (P1) and higher level perception (P2) can 
only be described in the same terms due to there being only one language to 
describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less mysterious if he 
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would adopt the two systems framework, so that instead of “internal 
connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception would just 
be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because the 
language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly 
speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is 
‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the 
experience’) merely describes the conditions of the language game of 
perception—it is an automatic causal mental state (P1) when we are speaking 
of System 1. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective 
world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual 
experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer 
‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to 
incline me to call it ‘red’ ”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest 
of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of 
S1, and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times, these 
cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously 
activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or 
most of philosophy in the narrow sense ) could be titled “The language games 
describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient  
mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking 
of S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted, 
but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of 
W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my 
comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and 
W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of 
perception where it can at best only describe how the language of perception 
works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used and 
that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say that for 
something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the same words 
being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated 
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what many ((e.g., DMS (Danielle Moyal-Sharrock) an eminent contemporary 
philosopher and leading W expert)) regard as the greatest discovery in modern 
philosophy—W’s revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’, as 
nobody can do philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without 
looking antiquated and being confused. And though Searle almost entirely 
ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication 
of this book) he spoke at a symposium on it held by the British Wittgenstein 
Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly aware of the view that has 
revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. I don’t think this meeting 
was published, but his lecture can be downloaded from Vimeo. It seems to be a 
case of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. Though he has probably 
pioneered more new territory in the descriptive psychology of higher order 
behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein (excepting perhaps Peter Hacker 
whose writings are rather dense), once he has learned a path he tends to stay 
on it, as we all do. Like everyone, he uses the French word repertoire when 
there is an easier to pronounce and spell English word ‘repertory’ and the 
awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when one can always use ‘they’ or 
‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and education, academics are sheep 
too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W 
made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to 
describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary 
qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows 
the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge 
epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is 
with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter 
(and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and 
often in my reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only give a couple brief 
examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. 
The concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to 
produce certain sorts of experiences. So, the reason that these experiences 
present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity 
to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to 
produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have 
these experiences without it seeming to them that they are seeing a red object 
or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality 
of the perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 
and the way we use the word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so using 
these words in a particular way is what it means to see red. In the normal case, 
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it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem to” to 
describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand 
that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 
due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, i.e., 
percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing behavior 
(language, thinking) perfectly in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or 
of extrapolating from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous 
acts (language games - i.e., words in limitless contexts) we use to describe it. 
The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 used to describe S1. Again, I 
think his failure to use the two systems framework renders this quite confusing 
if not opaque. Of course, he shares this failing with nearly everyone. Searle has 
commented on this before and so have others (e.g., Hacker, W in various 
contexts) but it seems to have escaped most philosophers and almost all 
scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem 
to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the 
experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that 
constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have 
the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public 
language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this is 
a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is the 
basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly 
be judged, tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 
is of an entirely different kind than one in S2. No explanations are possible—
we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility of getting a 
nontrivial “explanation” of our higher order psychology. As he always has, 
Searle makes the common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands 
behavior (language) better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S and 
many others I find that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’, aphorisms and trialogues 
usually provide greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone 
else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
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description alone must take it’s place.” (PI 109). 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a 
pattern of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that 
we see a red rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English 
speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces 
the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or 
simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So, on p136 we can say S1 leads 
to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes 
(but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context 
and we can translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional 
content is internally related to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is 
characterized non- intentionalistically, because being the feature F perceived 
consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. And in the case of action, 
experiences of that type consist in their ability to cause that sort of bodily 
movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to 
basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to withdrawing the arm) 
which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and described 
in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true 
or false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and 
Myin’s first book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way 
to play a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 
for a few hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get 
language attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that Searle, as part of his lack of attention to the 
later W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis 
of color words in W’s ‘Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every 
discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game 
with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience‘, etc. in this public 
linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language 
and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not matter (except to 
neuroscientists) what happens in the mental states of S1 but only what we say 
about them when they enter S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.8 billion on earth have 
a slightly different pattern of neural activation every time they see red and that 
there is no possibility for a perfect correlation between S1 and S2. As I noted 
above it is absolutely critical for every philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the 
normal relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. The 
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same applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation definitively 
over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
Chapter 6: yes disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent 
and the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and 
even among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy 
of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his 
Wittgenstein studies. 
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is 
true-only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental 
states which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language 
games of S2. 
 
On p204 -5, representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, 
knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is infinitely 
variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then 
one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological 
mental states, and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual 
shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion 
of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any 
clear sense. 
 
Sadly, on p211 Searle, for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly 
in his lectures), says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on 
noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ such as our having 
choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express the 
true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis 
for action. 
 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On 
Certainty’ who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and 
that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is the basis 
of doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted 
many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public 
COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads not 
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to further testing but to insanity. 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent 
essay ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private 
experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed 
us, language can only be a public testable activity (no private language). And 
on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that 
(like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that 
has no clear COS. As W insisted all we can do is describe—it is the scientists 
who can make theories. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as 
good as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two 
systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. 
 
Finally, permit me to again note that W posed an interesting resolution to some 
of these ‘puzzles’ by suggesting that some ‘mental phenomena’ (i.e., words for 
dispositions leading to public acts) may originate in chaotic processes in the 
brain and that there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace, nor to a 
single brain process identifiable as a single intention or action--that the causal 
chain ends without a trace, and that ‘cause’, ‘event’ and ‘time’ cease to  be 
applicable (useful—having clear COS). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity and chaos.  One 
must however recall that ‘chaotic’ in the modern sense means determined by 
laws, but not predictable, and that the science of chaos did not exist until long 
after his death.  
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Review of Making the Social World by John Searle 
(2010) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) 
and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any 
commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my 
reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these two geniuses of 
descriptive psychology. 
 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, 
and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal 
deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important 
descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W 
anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books 
of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to 
follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly 
clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and 
other books for more details. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If 
I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019  
3rd (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
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"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false."  Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted 
and which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our 
eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
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independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” 
Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has 
no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying 
neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot 
be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is created 
and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form 
as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in 
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the explicit form of Declarations.”  Searle MSW p11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like them 
to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two faculties, 
there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed 
to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition 
are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment is abandoned and we have 
a propositional content without any commitment that it represent with either 
direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state 
…and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a 
distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different psychological 
mode in the case of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or 
type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true 
or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can 
be true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as my 
desires or intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied 
or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises cannot be true or false but can be in 
various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—we can think of all the intentional states 
that have a whole propositional content and a direction of fit as representations 
of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief represents its truth conditions, a 
desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention represents its carrying 
out conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation 
must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using 
it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of 
satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
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corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, 
corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to Expressives 
is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit 
is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. 
Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing 
those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language” MSW 
p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human 
cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a 
way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance 
represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one 
level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true not 
just for statements but for all 
speech acts” MSW p82 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews 
of books by these two geniuses) are a précis of behavior from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. 
 
Before commenting in detail on Making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) 
and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any 
commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my 
reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC,TARW and other books by these two geniuses of 
descriptive psychology,To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say 
that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE 
human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), 
that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or 
extension of what W said (as they must if they are both giving correct 
descriptions of behavior). I find most of S foreshadowed in W, including 
versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI and related 
issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room 
interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's xlnt, but virtually unknown, 
supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw.” 
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S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, 
and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal 
deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important 
descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W 
anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books 
of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to 
follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly 
clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and 
other books for more details. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from 
unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1) and is extended logically into culture 
(System 3(S3). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this 
idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the 
foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind 
works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains 
share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way 
they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher 
animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that 
in humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological 
illusion) based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these 
ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, 
which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss 
this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are 
dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study 
of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--
see below), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it 
was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
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behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest 
work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a 
stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of 
the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W 
shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved 
into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, Computational Theory of 
Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language 
Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted are to understand what is 
always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to System 1 
(roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) and to capture vagueness 
("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing 
vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment 
that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are 
thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, 
of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and 
remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are always 
causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not 
a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the 
waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W 
did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the 
higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory but a description 
about how language (thinking) works. 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we 
can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories 
but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and it seems 
to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other name…. W’s 
point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true 
accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account 
for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to generalize and 
inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in PNC). 
As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of 
numerous examples as did W. 
 
113  
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston- ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking 
the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and 
psychology), the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure 
of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as 
S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology 
of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing 
pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are the simple automated utterances by our 
involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts 
(‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UOA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- 
and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while 
the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, 
System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, 
propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for 
many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-
- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On 
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Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather 
than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one 
person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true-
only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, 
animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true 
only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex 
language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only 
Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn 
animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have and 
subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note here, W 
made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 
2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the Slow 
conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. 
Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher 
cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive thinking 
that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples explore this two 
way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in 
Johnston). 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On Certainty'), are 
equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current 
research (e.g., see Kahneman-- "Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W 
laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of 
all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
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have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from 
direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I 
know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 
to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more and better 
examples of language in action than anyone, one might say that his aggregate 
aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most comprehensive “theory” 
of behavior (“reality”) ever penned. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
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analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but 
I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to 
thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings.  
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
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critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
Now for some comments on Searle’s MSW. I will make some references to 
another of his recent works which I have reviewed- Philosophy in a New 
Century (PNC). 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best 
standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously 
enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. In various places in his work 
(e.g., p7 of PNC) he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, 
since it is itself the basis for judgment (reason) and cannot itself be judged. In 
the first sentence on p8 of PNC he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this 
kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending 
our axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1 of S1) via experience and 
is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic 
example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” 
which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct 
uses. 
 
On p12 of PNC, ‘consciousness’ is described as the result of automated System 
1 functioning that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the 
normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own 
case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of 
mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As 
quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned 
with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can deny that any 
revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free will are necessary 
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or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for the reasons. It’s one 
thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from quantum 
mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our 
normal use of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
Those who wish to become acquainted with S’s well-known arguments against 
the mechanical view of mind, which seem to me definitive, may consult Chaps 
3-5 of his PNC. I have read whole books of responses to them and I agree with 
S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and 
which, by and large, W made half acentury earlier). To put it in my terms, S1 is 
composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, 
true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms 
of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior 
(potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers and 
the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is dependent on our 
perspective while higher animals have primary intentionality that is 
independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the great irony is that these 
materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting 
edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive 
psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming 
hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in 
the cold. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather 
it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Chapter 5 of S’s PNC nicely demolishes Computational Theory of Mind, 
Language of Thought etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’, ‘syntax’, 
‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) 
terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning in this psychological 
sense, but of course there are other senses they have been given recently as 
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science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the same 
word into ignoring the vast difference in its use (meaning).  And of course, this 
is all an extension of classic Wittgenstein. 
 
Every thinking person should read Chapter 6 of S’s PNC “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) as it shows his supreme logical abilities and 
his failure to appreciate the full power of the later W, and the great heuristic 
value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal 
that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic 
Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier 
and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious 
automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 (though of course he did 
not use these terms). 
 
But the really important thing is that TPI is not just a failing of a few 
philosophers, but a universal blindness to our Evolutionary Psychology (EP) 
that is itself built into EP and which has immense (and fatal) implications for 
the world. We are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically 
programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with 
using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 
is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction 
and accumulating resources therefor. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick 
and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this 
and this and this is baby. 
 
Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another 
primate-a fatal cognitive illusion. 
 
The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) 
of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments 
on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 
and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
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been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or 
DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions permit 
statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is 
cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one 
event so for IAA “We have different levels of description where one level is 
constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition to the constitutive 
by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation.” (p37). 
 
“The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in- action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different.” (p35). The COS of PI need a whole action while those of 
IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are 
mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action 
(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-referential 
(CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and 
desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which 
Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have 
created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W’s true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
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representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with “conditions 
of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions- in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be 
with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other 
S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive 
true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated by the 
learned deontic cultural relations of S3 seamlessly, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena 
of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ‘will’, 
‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. S understands 
and uses basically this same argument in other contexts (e.g., skepticism, 
solipsism) many times, so it is quite surprising he can’t see this analogy. He 
makes this mistake frequently when he says such things as that we have “good 
evidence” that our dog is conscious etc. The true-only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. Here you have the best descriptive psychologist since W, so 
this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are 
built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in 
order to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented with “The 
prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our 
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EP) which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in 
S3.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by 
the intrinsic, or mind-independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as 
“The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious 
axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep in mind that 
behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., 
true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, 
it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, 
that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality 
of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return and in fact life would not be possible (no this is not a joke). As W 
showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on 
certainty—automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die. 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for 
material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see 
them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the world 
into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any 
problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences 
being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our 
evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
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a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders 
of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” 
is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no 
general answer to why people accept institutions is clear wrong. They accept 
them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive 
fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra-
linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to EP 
and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all 
behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved 
in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and 
critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many animal precursors 
(as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats and mating dances, 
the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing pretense of 
mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a bite out of 
their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in many 
animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq). Saying 
that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic 
book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing 
the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. 
“Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ 
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(desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles),‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) 
and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to 
clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has 
programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often 
give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our 
higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get much 
simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’) is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which 
we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology 
and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: “We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA—i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to 
behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve 
our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal 
in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending 
her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 
(i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require 
language are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer 
description of his “explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called 
‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural S3 extensions). That is, 
“The resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent 
reasons can ground the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not 
logically inevitable that they do and not empirically universal that they do” can 
be translated as “The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his 
discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 which ground the 
dispositions and ensuing actions of S2/3. 
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On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must 
get them from biology as there is no other option and the above description 
shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations 
DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics 
works because the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate 
personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, 
extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are not just anything but, with few if any 
exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really 
means to ascribe deontics to our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which he so beautifully demolished in his 
classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I have noted above, there 
is a huge body of recent research exposing cognitive illusions which comprise 
our personality. TPI is not merely a harmless philosophical error but a universal 
obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we control our 
life and our society and the world and the consequences are almost certain 
collapse of civilization during the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will 
(i.e., choice) in some non- trivial sense it would all be a pointless, and he has 
rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain 
an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. But, like 
nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests 
(p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite 
clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. 
You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis 
for doubting. 
 
Few notice (Budd in his superb book on W is one exception) that W posed an 
interesting resolution to this by suggesting that some mental phenomena may 
originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything 
corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the 
causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible 
(regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of 
‘cause’ ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point. Subsequently, many have 
made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity and 
chaos. 
 
On p155 one should note that the Background/Network is our EP and its 
cultural extensions of S1, S2, S3. 
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Given the above I don’t feel it necessary to comment on his discussion of Power 
and Politics but I will say a few words about human rights. I agree completely 
with his comment on p185 that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is an 
irresponsible document. The rapid and probably inexorable collapse of society 
is due to people having too many rights and too few responsibilities. The only 
tiny ray of hope for the world is that somehow people can be forced (few will 
ever do it voluntarily) to place the earth first and themselves second. 
Consuming resources and producing children must be regulated as privileges 
or the tragedy of the commons will soon end the game. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If 
I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Seeing With the Two Systems of Thought—a Review 
of ‘Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of 
Perception’ by John Searle (2015)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes 
the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the 
language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a 
‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the 
language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory 
about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic Searle—superb 
and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full 
understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with 
no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it 
brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are 
frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language 
games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework 
consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and 
thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
As with Wittgenstein (hereafter W), everything that Searle (hereafter S) writes 
is a treasure and it is wonderful that he remains sharp as he nears 80. Unlike 
most, even his early work is still relevant and he is working on several other 
books. I also suggest his 100 or so lectures and interviews on youtube, vimeo 
etc., which, though inevitably a bit repetitious, contain many statements not in 
his writings. I have read almost all of his work, and listened to all the lectures, 
most of them 2 or 3 times. These are of special interest as (like Wittgenstein) he 
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does not read from notes, and so each is unique and not a replica of a paper, 
and he is a superb extemporaneous speaker who mostly uses unpretentious 
language (both so different from most others). The recent lectures given at 
European Universities are superb, but don’t miss the old ones such as the BBC 
lecture “A Changing Reality-the science of human behavior”, which gives an 
excellent account of why the lawful repetitious causality of the brain’s fast 
automatic, nonlinguistic system 1 (S1) is fundamentally different and not 
describable in the same way as the limitless complexity of reasons 
characterizing the slow deliberative, linguistic conscious system 2 (S2), which 
generates a combinatorial explosion not usually representable in a useful way 
by scientific laws. The dual system (S1, S2) method of describing thought used 
in this review, common to reasoning research for some 20 years now, is my own 
and not Searle’s. Since I have recently written a 75p article analyzing Searle’s 
work in comparison with that of Wittgenstein (The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle) I will not repeat it and will concentrate on this 
book only. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or 
data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language 
can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of 
Satisfaction or COS, a term not used by W and popularized principally by S) 
are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean 
(state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a 
very specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks 
at perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and 
‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and 
commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the 
sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses of related sentences 
and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. There are 
no ‘problems’ of ‘perception’, ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only 
the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. It is useful to keep in mind 
two comments by W that summarize scientism. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
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The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
More than most, S avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses which I have 
pointed out in my many reviews of his work and in spite of his being perhaps 
the best all-around philosopher since W, he does not fully grasp that it is all 
about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes 
the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the 
language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a 
‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’, which can only be about how the 
language of perception works, as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory 
about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. The subtitle (A theory of 
Perception) is likewise contentious (for Wittgensteinians at least) since W 
warned repeatedly against theorizing and even insisted it was impossible to 
produce theories about behavior, as everyone would agree with them—i.e., 
they would be truisms about our use of language. Anything that looks like a 
theory of higher order thought (mind, behavior) is really just a description of 
what we do, unless of course they are making the near universal mistake of 
giving a scientific theory of how the brain or the world works-a different kind 
of ‘philosophy’ entirely—i.e. ‘Scientism’. Searle is well aware of this and has 
commented on it many times, insisting W is wrong about theories, but I don’t 
think so. Only science has theories, i.e., propositions that can be shown true or 
false and often new evidence leads us to change or even abandon them, while 
philosophy proper (the elucidation in a given context of a language game 
describing our higher order behavior) will be obviously correct and not subject 
to revision as we all recognize it as true—i.e. as a correct use of language. But if 
S wants to call his generalizations about language use ‘theories’ that’s fine, just 
so long as we are not led astray. I have dealt with these issues at length in my 
other writings and in particular my review of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’. 
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It is very useful to read the little volume ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ where 
Searle, Dennett, and Bennett and Hacker have at one another over which 
language games should be played. Bennett and Hacker have given the most 
detailed exposition of these games in ‘Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience’(2003) which is continued in Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on 
Human Nature. 
 
W insisted that there are no new discoveries to be made in philosophy, nor 
explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language) in 
a particular context. Once one understands that all the problems are confusions 
about how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in W’s sense has 
achieved its purpose. As W and S have noted, there is only one reality, so there 
are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully 
be given, and we can only communicate in our one public language. There 
cannot be a private language and any ‘private inner thoughts’ cannot have any 
role in our social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve 
philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections 
which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." 
Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933).  In our modern idiom, perception is the 
automatic, causally self-reflexive (Searle), rapid, true-only mental states or 
presentations (Searle) of System 1 (S1), while most of what we ‘mean’ by the 
‘mind’ are the deliberate, slow, reasoned dispositions with public true or false 
representations (conditions of satisfaction-COS) of System 2 (S2). 
 
Searle waits until p45 to present the most recent version of a table he has used 
before. I have been expanding it for some years and as I find it critical to 
understanding behavior, I begin by presenting its most recent version here. In 
accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations 
of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense the 
‘phenomena’ of S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings 
Searle says they do, but as noted in my other reviews, I think it is then essential 
to refer to COS1 (“private” presentations) and COS2 (public representations). 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and 
his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
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I have adopted this terminology in the table.  
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, 
and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, 
Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or 
ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of 
Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the 
classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language 
of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and 
in my other very recent writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description 
may consult my articles and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and 
others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org and 
abbreviated versions on Amazon. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
(Involuntary –automated-Rules R1) Thinking(Cognition) (No gaps) 
 (Voluntary-deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition)(3 gaps) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
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context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since 
the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - 
Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to 
distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do 
not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences 
and in the brain states), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws, which would have to state all the possible contexts 
–hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. This is a special case of the 
irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been 
explained many times by Searle, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. 
Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
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Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ 
(OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
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Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public 
acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, 
Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature Memories, Remembering : (X was true) 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions: (X might become True) 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS: Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
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CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the Standard Social Science 
Model--SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences 
leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded 
as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules 
which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development 
and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions 
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of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer 
programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an 
analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 
for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf. Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—non-rational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking 
of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like 
all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), 
and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories 
can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
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meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for 
such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) or 
automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 functions 
of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the efforts of 
cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life 
as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) 
the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously 
said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth 
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but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes 
itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be 
causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable 
(i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by 
information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions 
or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 
and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Thus when Searle introduces some terminology on p6 of STATA we see that 
VisExp (it is raining) is S1 while Bel(it is raining) or Assert(it is raining) is S2. 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which 
S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology 
of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the 
language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on 
philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of 
language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language 
dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb 
‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review): “What sort of progress is 
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this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have been 
plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or 
reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as 
Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should 
be found satisfying enough.” Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W 
suggested we ought to say “describing”) and S states that the logical structure 
of rationality constitutes various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided 
one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general 
idea of how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated 
via examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by 
any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples 
or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and 
context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and 
so it is utterly unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense 
with the need for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and 
the causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. “Philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is 
the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often 
demolished scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself when he 
remarks in various writings that we can understand consciousness by studying 
the brain or that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it 
abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language games and 
giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As noted in 
my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major tragedy 
of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to take 
the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to England to 
study). 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
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explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', ` self' and ` consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian 
subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, 
and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) 
their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are 
not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s 
above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading 
expert on W) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of 
our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, 
the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute 
nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- 
p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking further on ‘STATA’ I will first offer some essential comments 
on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will 
help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the 
Social World (MSW) and W’s BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical 
Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
 
As noted in my other reviews, philosophical mistakes are of interest since they 
are the universal defaults of our psychology, due the fact that our language 
lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a 
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century ago. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow 
S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how 
it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and 
UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, 
etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that 
attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, 
mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the 
basic structure of behavior as described in my other reviews. 
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So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is 
representational) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my 
review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the 
paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the 
Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. 
In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such 
as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of 
the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike 
S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often 
orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations, so that our 
normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This 
vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as 
`The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive(CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s 
BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing 
etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not 
CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
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“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we 
thought quite innocent). — And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W’s PI p308 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what 
S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in 
turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become 
propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious activities of S2 
must be able to become the conscious ones of S2. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
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mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean 
that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without 
consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book On 
Certainly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no 
evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of 
MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." 
And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short 
term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the 
poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
which generates endless cultural extensions, and which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware 
and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can 
see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-
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Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that 
in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle. 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" 
and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in 
"that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which 
it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some 
event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not 
have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do 
I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of 
his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems 
view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in 
philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
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here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock 
(DMS) but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
(i.e., philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature etc.) and with 
rare exceptions there is barely a mention. 
It should be obvious from the above that the issues are always about mistakes 
in language used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no 
useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. 
view of them. Such views can exist of philosophy in the other sense but that is 
not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and 
substantive philosophy) is about. As often occurs, S’s discussion is marred by 
his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical 
conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give 
up the concept of free will, which I find (with W) incoherent. Not that we ought 
not to give it up but there is no sense that can be made of such a suggestion 
anymore that one can give up running, desiring, intending, hoping etc. 
Likewise, nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic 
psychology), as our being able to talk or to live at all presupposes it (as W noted 
frequently). Yes, it’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, 
etc., are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in little 
backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are hands 
down the best lesson on how this has to be done. 
 
One needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a 
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COS are thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are 
true only). And the “radical underdetermination of meaning” aka “the 
combinatorial explosion” was first solved by W who noted that S1 can be true 
only. 
 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our 
linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists 
independently of our representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows a 
world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
 
Now that we have a framework, we can consider Searle’s comments on the 
nature of perception. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for 
on page 4 we have the terms 
‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used is some normal sense but we 
are doing philosophy so we are going to be undulating back and forth between 
language games have no chance of keeping our day to day games distinct from 
the various philosophical ones. Again, you can read some of Neuroscience and 
Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Also, a quick 
review of the table of Intentionality above will place his terms, ‘causally self-
reflexive’ etc. in context. Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has not 
adopted the two systems framework, so it’s much harder to keep things 
straight. 
 
So on p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is 
system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s 
COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), non-testable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic 
and not linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only describable 
in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after crushing the 
horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, he says that 
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perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is true-only 
and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 where 
propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and 
then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description 
which W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the 
end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) 
so for “The subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an 
intentional content and the specification of the intentional content is the same 
as the description of the state of affairs that the intentional content presents you 
with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be 
described in the public language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting 
again the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of 
our perception, he is repeating what W noted long ago and which is due to the 
fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, 
etc. are all different psychological or intentional modes or language games 
played with the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private’ S1 ‘experiences’ can 
only be their public manifestations—i.e., language we all use to describe public 
acts as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach language to something 
internal. This is of course W’s argument against the possibility of a private 
language. He also mentions several times that hallucinations of X are the same 
as seeing X but what can be the test for this except that we are inclined to use 
the same words? In this case, they are the same by definition so this argument 
rings hollow. 
 
On p33 his ‘basic forms’ of intentionality are S1 while the ‘derivative forms’ are 
S2 and the two modes ‘seeing’ and ‘thinking’ as used here are S1 and S2 but the 
universal problem is that these words can be used for either S1 or S2 and 
nobody keeps them distinct. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which 
is not an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, 
i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front 
of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man 
himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual experience 
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has a content, but no object. The content can be exactly the same in the two 
cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence of an object.” 
The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the 
mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a 
public truthmaker) and this does entail the public object, but for an 
hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the similar 
mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
On p37 as usual in describing human behavior it seems to me very useful to try 
to keep S1 and S2 separated so here we can refer to the perception of something 
as P1 but when we describe it we can refer to the perception as P2. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not just about understanding perception 
but not understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are 
exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a 
particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
 
On p53 what exactly is the test (COS2) that shows that the cause of or mental 
state of an hallucination is the ‘same’ as that when there is no hallucination? 
Even if we ‘see’ our long dead mother, with a few possible rare exceptions of 
insanity, brain damage etc., we know it’s not her—i.e., it’s false and we take the 
failure to distinguish the two as a sign of illness. So, the COS2 in hallucination 
is only that we feel as if she were present, though we (normally) know it cannot 
be, while the COS2 when she was alive is that we can confirm by a public test 
it is her. But he is correct that there is a more or less common percept in the two 
cases so that the presentation or COS1 is similar and conceivably could 
sometimes be as identical as any two mental states, thoughts, feelings etc. ever 
get—i.e., not very. 
 
On p59 I believe that the argument from transparency originated with W. "The 
limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." (Wittgenstein CV p10). At the bottom of the page, once again the 
presentation is S1 and the description or representation is S2. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we 
fail to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 
or we must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., no 
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COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 
and not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the 
next page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of philosophy, 
and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral sciences, 
cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems terminology which 
renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise, with the failure to grasp 
that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific issue or a philosophical 
one and if philosophical then which language game is going to be played and 
what the COS are in the context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W 
made so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the 
whole neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only 
be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my 
having an experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which 
will lead to others. Many 
think these don’t matter, many think they do. Something happens in the brain 
but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or 
by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a 
matter for investigation but one of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more 
philosophical jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted 
the two systems framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). 
Likewise, for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, 
‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we 
have to decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties 
of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could 
stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means 
that perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, 
untestable (true-only) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not 
mental states, do not have a definite time, have reasons and not causes, are 
testable with COS etc. On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception 
(IA1 in my terms) are part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which 
may originate in S2 acts which have become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate 
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dividing line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the 
percept to higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and 
expressed in language. 
 
Regarding p100, see W’s ‘On Certainty’ and DMS’s papers and books on it or 
just my brief analysis of their efforts in my LSR paper. On p101 we can usually 
substitute COS for ‘truth conditions’. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 
and ‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in 
the same sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science 
(e.g., physics) would be different if people had realized they were playing 
language games and not doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no 
language as it’s automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to 
describe what I saw I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out 
long ago as showing the limits of language. 
 
On p108 we can say that deliberate acts (A2) always must happen by activating 
S1 just as must reflexive acts (A1). On p109 we might rephrase ‘…whenever you 
consciously perceive anything, you take the cause of your perceptual 
experience to be its object’ as ‘perceptions, like all functions of S1 are 
nontestable’. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so 
that “Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of 
representation, and because all representation is under aspects, the visual 
presentations will always present their conditions of satisfaction under some 
aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data 
to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has public 
COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events 
which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ 
refer to S1 and S2. On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic 
because S1 feeds its data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back 
to S1 to contract muscles, and lower level perception and higher level 
perception can only be described in the same terms due to there being only one 
language to describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less 
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mysterious if he would adopt the two systems framework so that instead of 
“internal connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception 
would just be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p118 if W did commit the Bad Argument it was in the TLP and not his later 
work, and in any case the ‘fact’ is the COS (the representation) or the truthmaker 
of S2 stated by a sentence which is just the right description. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because the 
language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly 
speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is 
‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the 
experience’) merely describes the conditions of the language game of 
perception—it is an automatic causal mental state. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective 
world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual 
experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer 
‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to 
incline me to call it ‘red’”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest 
of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of 
S1 and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times these 
cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously 
activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or 
most of philosophy in the narrow sense) could be titled “The language games 
describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient 
mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking 
of S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted 
but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of 
W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my 
comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and 
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W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of 
perception where it can at best only describe how the language of perception 
works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used and 
that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say that for 
something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the same words 
being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated 
what many (e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W 
expert) regard as maybe the greatest discovery in modern philosophy— W’s 
revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do 
philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated. 
And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 
2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at a symposium on 
it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly 
aware of the view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. 
I don’t think this meeting was published, but his lecture can be downloaded 
from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. 
Though he has probably pioneered more new territory in the descriptive 
psychology of higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein, once he 
has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. Like everyone, he uses 
the French word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and spell 
English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when 
one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and 
education, academics are sheep too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W 
made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to 
describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary 
qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows 
the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge 
epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is 
with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter 
(and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and 
often in my reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only give a couple brief 
examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. 
The concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to 
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produce certain sorts of experiences. So the reason that these experiences 
present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity 
to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to 
produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have 
these experiences without it seeming to them that they are seeing a red object 
or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality 
of the perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 
and the way we use the word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so using 
these words in a particular way is what it means to see red. In the normal case, 
it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem to” to 
describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand 
that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 
due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, i.e., 
percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing behavior 
in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating from a given 
neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts (language games) we 
use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 used to 
describe S1. Again, I think his failure to use the two systems framework renders 
this quite confusing if not opaque. Of course, he shares this failing with nearly 
everyone. Searle has commented on this before and so have others (e.g., Hacker) 
but it seems to have escaped most philosophers and almost all scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem 
to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the 
experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that 
constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have 
the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public 
language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this is 
a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is the 
basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly 
be judged, tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 
is of an entirely different kind than one in S2. No explanations are possible—
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we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility of getting a 
nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As he always has, Searle makes the 
common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands behavior (language) 
better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S and many others I find 
that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and trialogues usually provide 
greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place.” (PI 109). 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything.” (PI 126) “In philosophy we do not draw conclusions” (PI 
599) 
 
“If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would not be possible to debate 
them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI 128) 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a 
pattern of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that 
we see a red rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English 
speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces 
the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or 
simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So on p136 we can say S1 leads 
to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes 
(but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context 
and we can translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional 
content is internally related to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is 
characterized non-intentionalistically, because being the feature F perceived 
consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. And in the case of action, 
experiences of that type consists in their ability to cause that sort of bodily 
movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to 
basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to withdrawing the arm) 
which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and described 
in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true 
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or false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and 
Myin’s book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to play 
a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for a few 
hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get language 
attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that S, as part of his lack of attention to the later 
W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of 
color words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every 
discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game 
with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public 
linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language 
and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not matter what happens in 
the mental states of S1 but only what we say about them when they enter S2. 
It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of 
neural activation every time they see red and that there is no possibility for a 
perfect correlation between S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical 
for every philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the 
normal relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. The 
same applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation definitively 
over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
It is a sign of Wittgenstein’s unique genius that even though I have spent many 
years reading the best philosophers and psychologists of our times, I always 
have to resist the urge to throw the book down and go back to the master, and 
when I come to a quote from him it is like coming upon a glass of cold water 
while trudging through the desert. 
 
Chapter 6: Yes, disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent 
and the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and 
even among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy 
of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his 
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Wittgenstein studies. Also, we all start with default language use which is full 
of confusions or as W likes to say it is not ‘perspicuous’. 
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is 
true-only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental 
states which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language 
games of S2. 
 
On p204 -5 we are reminded that the first and maybe best refutation of mind as 
machine was given by W in the 30’s. Representation is always under an aspect 
since, like thinking, knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, 
which is infinitely variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then 
one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological 
mental states, and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual 
shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion 
of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any 
clear sense. 
 
Discussions of blind sight (p209), like those of split brains (commissurotomy) 
and so much else in cognitive science are typically incoherent due to the fact 
that the phenomena are new and the usual language games are not applied in 
a clear and consistent way. Bennett and Hacker, among others, give some 
excellent discussions of this. Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in 
his writings (and endlessly in his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, 
but as W from the 30’s on noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the 
‘hinges’ such as our having choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., 
as these words express the true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic 
behaviors that are the basis for action. Libet’s famous experiments have been 
debunked in various ways by philosophers and by other experiments. 
 
On p214 the reflexes referred to are the formerly deliberative conscious actions 
of S2 which have become automated and part of S1 which I call S2A 
(automated) as distinct from S2D or those which remain deliberative and 
conscious. 
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On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On 
Certainty’ who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and 
that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is basis of 
doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted 
many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public 
COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads not 
to further testing but to insanity. 
 
P222 section II brings us again to the definitive statement on this foundational 
issue which W addressed in ‘On Certainty’. Searle makes further comments in 
the 5th of his audiotaped lectures on the Philosophy of Society (see youtube). 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent 
essay ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private 
experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed 
us, language can only be a public testable activity (no private language). And 
on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that 
(like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that 
has no clear COS. As W insisted, all we can do is describe—it is the scientists 
who can make theories. 
P233. The most basic of the primary qualities or axioms of our psychology are 
time, space, event, object etc., which following W, we can call the basic hinges, 
but it does not seem clear how to distinguish these from color, shape, size etc. 
See the excellent recent papers and books of DMS on this. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as 
good as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two 
systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant 
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A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature -A 
Review of Human Nature-the Categorial Framework 
by PMS Hacker (2010) (review revised 2019)  
  
Michael Starks 
 
Abstract 
 
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems 
theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by 
Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of 
behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and 
unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which 
Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have 
a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I 
call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After 
summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as 
extended by myself and by modern reasoning research, I comment on this first 
book in a trilogy on Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker, the leading authority on 
Wittgenstein and one of the best modern philosophers. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Before remarking on "Human Nature", I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will 
help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC by 
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W, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. I begin with some 
penetrating quotes from W and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false."  Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence "It is 
no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is an idea 
that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins onto the 
confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule 
as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest similarity 
with what it represents." 
BBB p37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word "kind", 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word "kind" 
here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word "discovery" when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
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other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer." TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
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"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got 
it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the 
realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already 
there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future." 
(said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
 
Incidentally, these quotes from W show that in spite of Searle’s frequent 
disparaging of W for his famous rejection of ‘theory’, W makes far more and far 
broader and more profound generalizations than Searle. 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
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reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked -i.e., 
I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. In addition to failing to make it 
clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely 
specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that other 
students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W's above remark 
on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or 
receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, 
but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one 
believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul- de-sac- p15-
2005). 
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And also, Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for 
bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --
Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe 
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System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no 
sense--see W for many examples and Searle and Hacker (Human Nature)for 
disquisitions). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our 
mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of 
Cognitive Psychology. Yes, a cognitive psychologist of the future may be able to 
see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking and 
acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) but S2 
dispositions are only potentially CMS and so not realized or visible. This is not 
a theory but description of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, Carruthers 
(C) and others muddy the waters here because they sometimes refer to 
dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, S, Hacker and 
others show that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher 
order emergent S2 descriptions--again not a theory but a description of how our 
dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional 
(T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view 
of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is the default 
operation of our evolved psychology (EP) which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly (S2), rather than in the 
automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC `The 
Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical error but 
a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we 
control our life and among the consequences are the inexorable collapse of what 
passes for civilization. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense as S1 states), 
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and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-
only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate 
axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally 
Self Reflexive (CSR, termed Causally Self Referential by Searle in his earlier 
work)—i.e., to see a cat makes it true and in the normal case no test is possible, 
and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted 
out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
external, public, testable Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later 
Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
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These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of 
MSW, which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended 
one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only 
perception, memory and prior intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as 
belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning 
"In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things 
to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by 
the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that 
we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life S has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ` will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
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(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of 
vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude 
higher for visual information. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous 
utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes or Primary Language Games 
(PLG) of S1, while conscious representations are the dispositional Secondary 
Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the 
most basic statement of how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever 
understood it. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to 
behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve 
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our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out 
DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed 
consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of 
meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental state. This can be 
seen as another statement of W’s argument against private language (personal 
interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and 
interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or 
private interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously 
Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent referrals to community 
practice into thinking it's just arbitrary public practice that underlies language 
and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are 
only possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the 
background, and it this which underlies all behavior and which is schematized 
in the table. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the later 
W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can 
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understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner experiences, so whatever comes to 
mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading 
and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is the 
constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of any test 
makes them inapplicable. Two of W's famous examples used for combatting 
this temptation are playing tennis without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and a tribe that 
had only S2 calculation so `calculating in the head (`S1 calculating') was not 
possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' etc. 
But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss `calculating1' 
as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence 
another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent." That 
is, the first few sentences or often the title commit one to a way of looking at 
things (a language game) which prevents clear use of language in the present 
context. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and this 
means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think 
in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be interpreted as the logical structure of language, and that in spite of 
his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as 
broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order descriptive 
psychology as one can find. 
 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an 
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image of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image 
I have in my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his 
picture and `NO' if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the 
photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) 
to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into 
our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking 
of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of representation is 
contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the 
path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) 
that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, 
he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And 
the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I 
have learned to talk, then I do know." Disposition words refer to Potential 
Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, 
emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions 
function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. 
depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. 
Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by 
reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it 
with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
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cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but 
I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to 
thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
180  
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
181  
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**        Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly calls 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
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context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since 
the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - 
Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to 
distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do 
not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences 
and in the brain states), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws, which would have to state all the possible contexts 
–hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. This is a special case of the 
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irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been 
explained many times by Searle, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. 
Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
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1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
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comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ 
(OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—
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(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public 
acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, 
Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature Memories, Remembering: (X was true) 
 
PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True) 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, 
Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, 
Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending 
(Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, 
Desiring, Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As 
(Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
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Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the Standard Social Science 
Model--SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences 
leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded 
as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules 
which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development 
and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions 
of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer 
programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an 
analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
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Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 
for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of ‘thinking’ (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking 
of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like 
all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), 
and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories 
can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for 
such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
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consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) or 
automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 functions 
of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the efforts of 
cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life 
as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) 
the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously 
said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth 
but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes 
itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be 
causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable 
(i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by 
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information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions 
or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated 
by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate 
PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on "Human Nature: The Categorical Framework" 
(HN). 
 
Hacker is the world's leading authority on W and much of his work has been 
dedicated to explaining him so there is inevitably a Wittgensteinian feel to 
much of this book. This is the first of 3 volumes on Human Nature (the second 
The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature has now appeared and the 
third on ethics should follow soon) and its aim is to lay out the classes or 
categories of the psychology of intentionality. The quote from H above gives 
the best brief overview of what needs to be described as I have seen. And this 
description is, as both H and W insist, a conceptual and not scientific one for 
reasons that should be obvious from their work. This is totally at odds with the 
views of many others (most notoriously e.g. Dennett, Carruthers and the 
Churchlands) who think that not only must philosophy explain behavior but 
that it must fundamentally change as science progresses. 
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A capsule summary of what H is getting at here can be gained by looking at the 
various charts and I again suggest comparing them with my table above. Sadly, 
there is no bibliography-a major failing, but this is trivial compared to the lack 
of any serious discussion of the work of John Searle (S)--in my view, next to W, 
the major philosopher of recent times. Since I have referenced S many times 
above and in my other reviews I will not repeat the reasons for this view here. 
Recently there have been some exchanges between the two recorded in 
"Neuroscience and Philosophy" which appeared as a result of H's views 
expressed e.g. in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience which I will 
review soon. Both authors score some points and miss critical ideas in the others 
work. I have noted S's failure to appreciate W before. Hacker is representing 
W's views or at least Wittgensteinian views most of the time so we get as close 
as we ever will to a confrontation between the two geniuses of descriptive 
psychology --W and S. 
 
Though H gives the best characterization of the task of philosophy I have seen 
(see above) nevertheless his comment on p10 makes me note again that it is just 
the descriptive psychology of higher order thought. 
 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who 
totally missed W and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see 
Hacker's paper `PASSING BY THE NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE'S CUL-DE-SAC' 
(though of course Q's deconstruction has been done by many including S). 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes 
and the S2 reasons in Chapter 7, esp. on p226-32 is critical for any student of 
behavior. It is a nearly universal delusion that "cause" is a precise logically exact 
term while "reason" is not but W exposed this many times and so have others, 
but this discussion is the best and most concise I can recall and it is basic to any 
understanding of behavior. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific 
and mathematical concepts. The discussion of mental states vs. dispositions is 
excellent and reminds me that S's continued reference to dispositions as mental 
states and his reference to mental states as representations (actually 
`presentations" in his latest work) with COS, is (in my view) counterproductive. 
Though I accept most of S's ontology and epistemology I don't see the 
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advantage of regarding our seeing an apple as the COS of a perception rather 
than that they are the true only results of the unconscious actions of S1. 
 
The table on p147 and the whole chapter on agency reminds me again of how 
greatly this work would have benefited from the S, S2 notions and S's concepts 
such as Prior Intention, Intention in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR 
etc. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind that `action', `condition', 
`satisfaction',`intention', and even `and', `or', `prior', `true' etc. are all complex 
language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the 
early 30's. 
 
The footnote on p235-6 reminds us that it was Descartes mistake that played a 
major role in laying the dead hand of private language and introspection on 
philosophy. 
 
I see as another failing H's obliviousness (which as noted he shares with S and 
almost all philosophers) to the modern two systems framework and to the full 
implications of W's "radical" epistemology as stated most dramatically in his 
last work `On Certainty', as I have noted in many reviews (and as DMS noted 
in her superb book on OC). This is sad, as I have described how it was W who 
did the first and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody else has 
noticed) and that OC represents a major event in intellectual history. One of the 
numerous places this comes out is p245 in the discussion of doubt where he 
could have noted that `grammar' is another word for the axiomatic true only EP 
of S1. Likewise, with his table on p19 where one kind of `proposition' is listed 
as conceptual truths--i.e., what W called true-only sentences or ideas, the 
axiomatic EP or `grammar' that is the basis for judging. 
 
In spite of what I see as its limitations, this is a unique work of great interest to 
philosophers, psychologists, linguists, AI researchers and many others. One 
hopes that Hacker is able to complete a second edition. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed. (2019). 
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Is there such a thing as pragmatics? -- Review of 
Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics 2nd ed. 
(2009)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Clearly neither I nor anyone will ever read any substantial part of this massive 
tome so I will discuss the one article that interests me most and which I think 
provides the framework necessary for the understanding of all the rest. I refer 
to the one on Ludwig Wittgenstein (W). Even were I to try to discuss others, we 
would not get past the first page as all the issues here arise immediately in any 
discussion of behavior. The differentiation of pragmatics and semantics is 
largely meaningless. It is defensible that one might subtitle this work 
‘Developments of Wittgenstein’s Contextualism’, but of course this term has 
inevitably been corrupted by philosophers. One might then say that pragmatics 
and semantics are parts of or coextensive with epistemology and ontology and 
the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (Searle’s Logical Structure 
of Rationality) or that they describe how we use noises in specific contexts to 
give them meaning --i.e., a true or false (propositional) use which Searle calls 
their Conditions of Satisfaction. Adding the Wittgenstein/Searle work to 
modern research on thinking provides a framework for pragmatics, semantics 
and all other human behavior. 
 
Those who wish a more detailed exposition of the use of Wittgenstein and 
Searle in the description of behavior  and of a modern two systems approach to 
language and behavior may consult my book The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle  2nd ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Clearly neither I nor anyone will ever read any substantial part of this massive 
tome so I will discuss the one article that interests me most and which I think 
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provides the framework necessary for the understanding of all the rest. I refer 
to the one on Ludwig Wittgenstein (W). Even were I to try to discuss others, we 
would not get past the first page as all the issues here arise immediately in any 
discussion of behavior. The article is more or less ok as far as it goes but, as with 
all discussion of W, in my view it does not go nearly far enough. I must 
apologize to those who may read some of my other reviews as they often repeat 
this framework, as it is essential and I cannot assume the reader is familiar with 
it. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook 
of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is 
almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and 
humanities, and even those few who have understood him have not realized the 
extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., 
the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to 
him infrequently but his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, 
though he does not see this. W analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, 
Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but stop short 
of putting him in the center of current psychology and linguistics, where he 
certainly belongs. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and 
correct, all accounts of higher order behavior (e.g., Pragmatics) are describing 
the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, not 
only Pragmatics, but such recently fashionable themes as “Embodied Mind” and 
“Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work (and they do). 
 
The failure of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due 
to the limited attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3rd period works have 
received, but even more to the inability of most to understand how profoundly 
our view of philosophy (which I call the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought-DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in DPHOT 
--which Searle calls the logical structure of rationality- LSR), anthropology, 
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sociology, politics, linguistics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature 
and all of animal behavior alters once we embrace the evolutionary framework. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the second self of slow thinking conscious System 2, which (without 
education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the 
unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of System 1 (Searle’s 
‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent 
article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS 
of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously 
experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115- 117 and my review 
of it. 
 
Before remarking on this book, it is essential to grasp the W/S framework so I 
will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), 
Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal- 
Sharrock(DMS) et. al. It will help to see my reviews of various books by Searle 
such as Philosophy in a New Century (PNC), and Making the Social World 
(MSW), the classics by W such as TLP, PI, and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in 
psychology books, that I will refer to as the Wittgenstein/Searle (W/S) 
framework. To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to imply that it is 
a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human 
psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that 
anyone accurately describing behavior (e.g., language) must be enunciating 
some variant or extension of what W said. Virtually everyone who discusses 
language thinks it essential to mention Pinker, Grice and Chomsky, but few 
realize W’s work was far broader and more penetrating. One would think that 
advanced studies of behavior would all begin with a broad general biologically 
founded framework for describing intentionality (higher order thought, 
language, descriptive psychology, thinking etc.) but sadly this is mistaken so I 
will first present what I consider the minimum essentials. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
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genetically programmed automatisms of S1 from the less mechanical linguistic 
dispositional behavior of S2 and these in turn from the effects of culture (S3). To 
rephrase, all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only 
fast System 1 (S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's 
work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social 
behavior i.e., of ‘we intentionality’, while the later W shows how S2 is based on 
true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and in each of our 
personal histories developed into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science and that 
philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See Blue and Brown Books (BBB) 
p18. Another notable comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” 
the activities of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 
20,000 pages of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is 
not to find the solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only 
a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 years ago that we 
ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior and that these are 
not hints of explanations (BBB p125). 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even 
(Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language 
of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, 
with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in 
action, that language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or the mind, and his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. Many have 
deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view, none better 
than W in BBB p37— “if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, 
though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow 
between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself 
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can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t 
the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, language issues direct 
from the brain and what could count as evidence for an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games 
(LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of 
our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a 
window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts 
about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved 
Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, 
knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his 
later second and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and 
slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our mental life to the 
functioning of language, and the impossibility of private language.  The bedrock 
of our behavior is our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, true only, mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, while the 
evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, testable true or 
false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., 
our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here 
in our language   (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but 
to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1—“the greatest danger  here is wanting to observe 
oneself”). 
 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, 
PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is 
provide the physical basis for our behavior, multiply our language games, and 
extend S2 into S3. The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later 
Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary 
psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of 
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bacteria, which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb 
“Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. And the recent travesty by 
Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF is the prime mechanism 
of evolution by natural selection. 
 
So, as W develops in ‘On Certainty’ (OC), most of our shared public experience 
(culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found 
mistaken without threatening our sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) 
has profoundly different consequences from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary 
fast thinking axioms and not testable propositions (as I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or 
System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking 
Fast and Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the 
framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which 
corresponds to the mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes 
over and over. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all 
our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, 
more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-
self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or 
“inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, 
are conscious, deliberate and propositional, and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), termed Causally 
Self Referential (CSR) by Searle or reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB, and the 
S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and 
which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called 
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transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms and much else here is my idea so 
don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my reviews on Amazon, ArXiv.org, 
ViXra.org, Academia.edu, Philpapers.org, ResearchGate.net, Citeseer, b-ok.org, 
libgen.io   etc.). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers or other behavioral scientists (e.g., 
linguists) the investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized 
psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines 
under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and 
“biases”. Of course these too are language games, so there will be more and less 
useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from 
“pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of 
course he did not use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 
dispositional thinking only, since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur 
without involving much of the intricate network of the “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP) which 
must feedback to S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by 
all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed 
of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) 
of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The 
true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. As he famously said in 
OC 94 — “but I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is the 
inherited background against which I distinguish between   true and false.” 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which typically give rise to the conscious slow thinking of 
S2, which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by feedback into S1, causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in 
targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by   Searle 
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`The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the 
action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is 
not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " 
When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." 
And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it 
is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's aphorisms (p132 in 
Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet and 
like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be 
found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that ` grammar' 
in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT) and that, in spite of his 
frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive   psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning — “speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” -- which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and   not a mental 
state. i.e., as Searle notes in PNC p193 — “the basic intentional relation between 
the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a 
proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, 
and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, 
and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Hence, 
the famous comment by W from PI p217 — “If God had looked into our minds 
he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" 
and “what gives the image its    interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as 
S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) – “what it always comes to in 
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the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish 
that that should happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before 
my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my 
wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied 
if my wish had been satisfied. Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for 
before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM (Theory of Mind), or as I prefer UA 
(Understanding of Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and 
UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of Daniel 
Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has 
no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible 
view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most of the above 
has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the case of 
some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an adequate 
discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts and commonly there 
is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows.  
 
It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent 
volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with 
many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the 
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very distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary-
-that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have 
several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have 
been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking 
about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or 
finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
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Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
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the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**        Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly calls 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since 
the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - 
Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to 
206  
distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do 
not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences 
and in the brain states), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws, which would have to state all the possible contexts 
–hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. This is a special case of the 
irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been 
explained many times by Searle, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. 
Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
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no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
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primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ 
(OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock - DMS) the single most important work 
in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which 
the mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--
Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over 
which no control is possible). 
 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
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with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public 
acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, 
Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature, Memories, Remembering: (X was true). 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature  
 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, 
Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, 
Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending 
(Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, 
Desiring, Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As 
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(Aspects). 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the Standard Social Science 
Model--SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences 
leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
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neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded 
as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules 
which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development 
and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions 
of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer 
programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an 
analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott(1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 
for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
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using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking 
of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like 
all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), 
and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories 
can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for 
such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) or 
automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 functions 
of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the efforts of 
cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life 
as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) 
the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously 
said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
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language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth 
but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes 
itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be 
causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable 
(i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by 
information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions 
or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated 
by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate 
PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
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deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading 
for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are 
Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who have posted most of 
their work free online at www.academia.edu. Baker & Hacker are found in their 
many joint works. The late Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic 
and rather nihilistic interpretation that was ably refuted by Hacker whose 
“Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is free on the net and a 
must read for any student of behavior. 
 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of 
S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of 
scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism --hereafter CDC—my 
acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many others 
pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in the BBB in 
the 30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and 
countless others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made 
clear) S2 in causal terms is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and 
it is not clear that the highly diverse language games of “causality” can ever be 
made to apply-even their application in physics and chemistry is variable and 
often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or 
all of them that made the apple fall and when did the causes start and end)?. But 
as W said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, 
then the activities of the mind lie open before us”. However, I suggest it is a major 
mistake to see W as taking either side as usually stated, as his views are much 
more subtle. One might find it useful to start with my reviews of W, S etc., and 
then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before 
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digging into the literature of causality and the philosophy of science, and if one 
finds it uninteresting to do so then W has hit the mark. 
 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
or linguists have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the 
drastically different uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), 
or of the nature of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on 
such notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and 
computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. They often excel at 
ultrafine dissections of language use but they miss the realities of how sentences 
work in everyday life. It is not merely failing to see the forest for the trees, but 
not seeing the tree because of concentrating on such detailed descriptions of the 
bark (e.g., the late Gordon Baker). 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they 
cite. Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here and so of any real framework 
for behavior. W is easily the most widely discussed modern philosopher with 
about one new book and dozens of articles largely or wholely devoted to him 
every month. He has his own journal “Philosophical Investigations” and I 
expect his bibliography exceeds that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers 
combined and of most behavioral scientists except Chomsky, Pinker and a few 
others. Searle is perhaps next among modern philosophers and Read, etc., are 
very prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks and 
reviews. But CDC, other metaphysicians and most behavioral researchers 
ignore them and the thousands who regard their work as critically important. 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of 
modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has 
cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, 
perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different. But as 
W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his 
supersocratic trialogue form had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted 
in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple 
as pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only 
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be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. 
If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is 
inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box 
could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private language 
that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly 
demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down 
Carruther’s ISA theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories 
which he references. I have explained W’s dismantling of the notion of 
introspection and the functioning of dispositional 
language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston 
and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations” (2004) and my review of it for a nice explanation of Private 
Language and everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues 
as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self. The 
very act of writing, reading and all the language and concepts of anything 
whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- 
contradictory cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact 
on the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person 
point of view is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a third person 
one, but absence of coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. 
Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, 
‘information processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, 
Read, Hacker and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of 
many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and 
hopeless but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like this. 
There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and 
then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with 
human behavior combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious 
automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that 
self, will, and consciousness are illusions, though of course they think they are 
showing us the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the 
valid one. That is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal 
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descriptions of S1. See e.g., my review of Carruther’s recent ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’. 
 
But, if someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly 
mistaken or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be 
described as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ 
so we must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent) but 
irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which should be regarded 
as the point from which to begin and end such discussions. 
 
And, perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant 
and Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-
not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
consider here). We want to understand how the brain (or the universe) does it 
but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of S1 
via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does courtesy of the death of trillions 
of organisms over some 3 billion years. We can describe the world easily but 
often cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ should look like. So, we struggle 
with science and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we 
should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a 
description of what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not 
clear what it would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., 
why qualia exist). As W said, explanations come to an end somewhere. 
 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruthers’ “Opacity 
of Mind” (the major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds of 
others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of our 
higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given a 
quite different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no reasons 
for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary problems by 
trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike us that these 
views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of 
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their adult life promoting them.  
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and more 
remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and 
perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced if we 
face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, embodied 
in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, etc…then it can 
become perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only when one starts, say, 
to  ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human domains (supposedly 
using the non- human-the animal {usually thought of as mechanical} or the 
machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), does it begin 
to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to 
the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push further and further from our reach…the 
very conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard 
problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been given for us to think 
that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded as real. 
 
There is no good reason to think that there should be a science of consciousness, 
or of mind or of society, any more than there need be a science of numbers, or of 
universes or of capital cities or of games or of    constellations or of objects whose 
names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as 
embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as   brains 
with minds ‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science 
can help us bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness 
really is and when it is really present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict 
of criteria, when our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict 
with us. For our machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There 
can be no such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… 
the hard problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a problem has 
even been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive 
indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological satisfaction of 
both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the 
understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, that in 
stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein made 
clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn in language 
219  
and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
 
And many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 82 years ago that 
‘mysteries’ satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can 
see the ‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, 
and that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language(mind) 
in the fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence 
except by repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written 
in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition 
is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” --written almost a century ago in TLP 
5.1361. 
 
And again, so apropos here is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin 
of the philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical 
problems). The first ‘innocent’ step in the discussion is the fatal one as it 
commits us to an incoherent point of view. To paraphrase W, Carruthers talks 
about processes and states but leaves their nature open.  Later we will figure 
them out, but this is what commits us to a particular way of looking at things 
and a solution never materializes. So, he has to deny ‘mind’, ‘self’, ‘will’. 
‘consciousness’ etc. 
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a person 
who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as 
we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all scientific questions 
have been answered, nothing is left to question, and that is itself the answer. And 
central to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to scientism not science) failures 
of CDC et al is his observation that it is a very common mistake to think that 
something must make us do what we do, which leads to the confusion between 
cause and reason. “And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar 
cases are inclined to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it 
in the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, 
because there is an idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And 
this again joins onto the confusion between cause and   reason. 
 
“We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain 
of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
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And likewise, he has commented that the chain of causes has an end and that 
there is no reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ 
oneself by working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of 
being told the answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as 
therapy and ‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout all behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is 
often no hint that there are other points of view—that many of the most 
prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also 
the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, 
reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be 
extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum 
mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that 
nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the universe as a giant 
machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the history of 
pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton in ‘A 
New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, 
behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books 
in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive 
commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W 
realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard working 
through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy 
it is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James 
Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like 
a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘cause’, ‘event’, 
‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in science 
or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in at random 
with many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without sense. Much of 
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academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high comedy (as 
opposed to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., 
comedy dealing with polite society, characterized by sophisticated, witty 
dialogue and an intricate plot-(see Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a 
waste of time-done rightly, it is the best way to spend time. How else can we 
understand our mental life and the higher order thought of System 2--the most 
intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s 
examples describing how our innate psychology uses the testing of System 2 to 
build on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and as societies 
acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on the 
bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive perception and action 
to the amazing edifice of science and culture. The theory of evolution and the 
theory of relativity passed long ago from something that could be challenged to 
certainties that can only be modified, and at the other end of the spectrum, there 
is no possibility of finding out that there are no such things as Paris or 
Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is incoherent. We can say anything but we 
cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though written 
when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant 
as his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy (the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the light, 
after two thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away from 
philosophy and from physics. 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough”—Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is 
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at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
So, this is the general framework I think is essential to all description of higher 
order thought including philosophy, linguistics, pragmatics, semantics, 
psychology, anthropology, law, literature, political science, history, sociology etc. 
It is also clear that the differentiation of these disciplines is somewhat arbitrary, 
especially pragmatics and semantics which are, by and large, meaningless or at 
best useless terms. It is defensible that one might subtitle 
this work ‘Developments of Wittgenstein’s Contextualism’, but of course this 
term has inevitably been corrupted by philosophers. One might then say that 
pragmatics and semantics are parts of or coextensive with epistemology and 
ontology and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (Searle’s 
Logical Structure of Rationality) or that they describe how we use noises in 
specific contexts to give them meaning --i.e., a true or false (propositional) use 
which Searle calls their Conditions of Satisfaction. 
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Review of The Mind’s I by Douglas Hofstadter and 
Daniel Dennett (1981) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A mixed bag dominated by H & D's reductionist nonsense. This is a follow-
up to Hofstadter´s famous (or infamous as I would now say, considering its 
unrelenting nonsense) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is 
concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is 
composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of 
people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the 
contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on the attempts of 
D and H to understand behavior see my review of Hofstadter's  ‘I am a 
Strange Loop’ and other writings. 
 
Much of it is very reductionistic in tone (i.e., " explains " everything in terms 
of physics/math and denies " reality " of psychology) but as Hofstadter 
notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too complex to 
solve (and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how to explain the 
way properties emerge (e.g., water properties from H2 and 02) as you go up 
the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, like holism, 
requires a great deal of faith and in fact is incoherent as one cannot even 
frame it's arguments without presupposing the coherence of higher order 
thought. Additional problems for reductionism are the uncertainty 
principle, chaos (e.g., no way to predict how a pile of sand will fall), the 
logically necessary incompleteness of math (and all thought) and the 
impossibility of matching higher order behaviors (e.g., language) with 
lower order phenomena (e.g., biochemistry), i.e., the combinatorial 
explosion or underdetermination. In sum, though there are many 
interesting comments, like nearly all writing on behavior, this work lacks 
any coherent account of the logical structure of rationality, which I try to 
give in my writings. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
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from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
This book is a very mixed bag, dominated by H & D's reductionist nonsense. 
This is a follow-up to Hofstadter´s famous (or infamous, considering its 
unrelenting nonsense) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is 
concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is 
composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of 
people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the 
contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on the attempts of 
D and H to understand behavior see my review of Hofstadter's  ‘I am a 
Strange Loop’ and other writings.  
 
Much of it is very reductionistic in tone (i.e., " explains " everything in terms 
of physics/math and denies " reality " of psychology), but as Hofstadter 
notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too complex to 
solve (and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how to explain the 
way properties emerge (e.g., water properties from H2 and 02) as you go up 
the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, like holism, 
requires a great deal of faith and in fact is incoherent as one cannot even 
frame it's arguments without presupposing the coherence of higher order 
thought (mind, language, psychology). Additional problems for 
reductionism are the uncertainty principle, chaos (e.g., no way to predict 
how a pile of sand will fall and chaos theory itself has been shown to be 
both undecidable and incomplete), the logically necessary incompleteness 
of math (and all thought) and the impossibility of matching higher order 
behaviors (e.g., language) with lower order phenomena (e.g., biochemistry), 
i.e., the combinatorial explosion or underdetermination. See my other 
writing for discussion of ‘undecidibility’, ‘incompleteness’, ‘emergence’, 
‘reduction’ etc. In sum, though there are many interesting comments, like 
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nearly all writing on behavior, this work lacks any coherent account of the 
logical structure of rationality, which I try to give in my writings. 
 
Like all books - yes I  do mean all, this can be usefully viewed as a 
psychology text, though none of the authors realize this. It is about human 
behavior and reasoning—about why we think and act the way we do. But 
(like all such discussion until recently), none of the ’explanations’ are really 
explanations (and not even descriptions) of what we are interested in 
(higher order behavior of linguistic System 2).  People are not clear about 
separating the ‘mental mechanisms’ involved, which can be 
neurophysiological (System 1 and biochemistry) or psychological (System 
2).  In fact, like most ´explanations` of behavior the texts here and the 
comments by DH and DD are often more interesting for what kinds of things 
they accept (and omit) as ‘explanations’ than for the actual content. As with 
all reasoning and explaining, one now wants to know which of the brain’s
 
inference engines are activated to produce the authors biases and results. It 
is the relevance filters which determine what sorts of things we can accept 
as appropriate data for each inference engine and their automatic and 
unconscious operation and interaction that determines what we can accept 
as an answer. This is standard terminology from evolutionary psychology 
so if that’s not familiar you may wish to do some reading. I recommend 
Buss’s “Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd ed” and the newest 
edition of his text on EP, and Boyer’s “Religion Explained”, which I have 
also reviewed. 
 
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to 
provide full explanations (though following Wittgenstein we should say 
“descriptions”), but an interesting start has been made. Boyer´s  
`Religion Explained` is one of half a dozen books that show what a modern 
scientific description of religion looks like.  Pinker´s `How the mind Works` 
is a good general survey.  
 
We now recognize that art, music, math, language and religion are all 
results of the automatic functioning of the inference engines (System 1) as 
embellished by linguistic System 2 (see my other writings for details). This 
is why we can expect similarities and puzzles and inconsistencies or 
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incompleteness and often, dead ends. It is now the dominant view that the 
brain has no general intelligence, but numerous specialized modules or 
inference engines (System 1 reflexes), each of which works on certain 
aspects of some problem and the results are then added. Hofstadter, like 
everyone, can only generate or recognize explanations that are consistent 
with the operations of his own inference engines, which were evolved to 
deal with such things as resource accumulation, coalitions in small groups, 
social exchanges and the evaluation of the intentions of other persons. It is 
amazing they can produce art or music or math and not surprising that 
figuring out how they themselves work together to produce overall 
intelligence or consciousness or choice is way beyond reach nearly 40 years 
later. 
 
The article on Turing (and many others) left me thinking- ´Oh where is 
Wittgenstein when we need him! ´ Turing attended W´s lectures on the 
foundations of math but he did not understand the most basic points (not 
surprising, as few have even to this day). As W so famously said, decades 
before this book was written--`Philosophy is the battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language`(or we might now 
say by the brain´s inference engines) and it is a battle that H and D have lost. 
Wittgenstein is one of the most original and influential thinkers of all time 
and commented incisively on all the major issues in this book, but there no 
awareness of this in the writings of either of them. He explained in detail 
how the language games of simulation (e.g., Turing test of computer 
thinking), imitation, pretense, belief, etc., are parasitic on innately 
programmed reflexes which then lead to the public acts of knowing and 
understanding. We are told (p94) that we ´believe´ in other minds (try 
disbelieving—e.g., look at your child or even your dog and think ‘this is just 
a robot’, or imagine you step on its foot and it howls and you think it’s doing 
that for the same reason noise comes out of the radio when you turn it on), 
and that we treat others as black boxes--- but only the mentally ill or  autistic 
do that (ask yourself how we know that). It is only computers that we treat 
as black boxes and about which we might have beliefs concerning their 
interior processes. H stopped writing such books after this one until his 
recent disaster ‘I am a Strange Loop’ (see my review), but D continues to 
this day (2019) to produce treatises full of the same basic confusions (as do 
227  
thousands of others).  
 
By far the best philosophical article in the book is John Searle´s famous 
`Minds, Brains and Programs` in which he introduces the Chinese room 
argument, which shows why computer programs don´t think (NOT why 
they cannot ever be designed to think--he continues to point out to this day 
that WE can be regarded as examples of computing devices that think—i.e., 
in my terms the language games of ‘computing’, ‘machine’, ‘think’ etc. can 
be applied to us). DD and DH offer superficial and arrogant criticisms, but 
Searle is now widely regarded as a top living philosopher and the Chinese 
room is probably the most famous new philosophical debate since 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against private language, solipsism, etc. and of 
course Wittgenstein was the first to discuss in detail all these basic language 
games of mind and machine (see e.g., Gefwert,  Proudfoot etc.). It would 
have saved them alot of embarrassment if they had just offered to let Searle 
coedit the book, or at least rebut their comments. 
 
Nagel´s lovely ` What is it like to be a bat` shows that we don´t have any idea 
what an answer is like, nor how to even try to find one.  In this respect, it’s 
quite similar to Searle´s comments on AI--nobody to this day has any idea 
what a program mimicking ’thinking’ would be like, nor even how to go 
about making one and Wittgenstein showed us the subtleties of the 
language game of ‘thinking’ and other dispositional verbs as I describe in 
detail in my recent writings.  
 
 Some say neural nets and fuzzy logic are like the brain, but what is the 
evidence? And again there are just more language games. Searle has made 
similar comments in his criticisms of those like Dennett, who claim to 
explain consciousness (e.g., see `The Mystery of Consciousness`) and the 
same applies to free will, causality, perception etc. So far as I can see, neither 
this book nor GEB, nor any of their others, further the study of mind, in the 
sense of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, in any way.  
See my quotes from P.M.S. Hacker elsewhere for congruent thoughts of the 
most eminent Wittgensteinian. We did not then and do not now (i.e., 25 
years after this book was published) know how to scientifically 
conceptualize thinking (or consciousness, uncertainty, entanglement, 
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wave/particle duality, free will etc.)—i.e., how to play the language games 
using these words, nor even how to recognize what such an ‘explanatory’ 
concept (i.e., a satisfactory language game with clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction--COS) would be. But DD and DH did not get the point then, nor 
subsequently. 
 
DH has new (since GEB) speculations on how music, art, math and 
programs may map onto each other but they don´t   go anywhere. He has 
some new Q & A sessions, so extensively used in GEB, but they leave only 
questions and on the key issue of how programs might be like thinking, 
the only convincing reply is that of Searle--we don´t even know how to 
conceptualize the difference (I would say how to decide to play the 
language games). So, DH winds up just as lost as DD `Maybe, just like 
beauty, the sound `I` denotes nothing at all` (p456). If ´I´ means nothing 
then by the same criteria (refusal to accept the normal meaning—i.e., the 
COS) so do all other words. DD says the Chinese room aims to refute 
materialism and that it fails as an argument because the room is too slow-
-both clearly untrue. And now, after over 40 years of philosophizing (e.g., 
in `Consciousness Explained` and in `Freedom Evolves`) and his most 
recent work ‘From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (2018)’, 
he repeats the same mistakes that Wittgenstein pointed out over 80 years 
ago. 
 
We ought to consider it extremely odd that any philosopher should think 
he can answer empirical questions. Thinking, feeling, perceiving, choosing, 
etc. are phenomena of the world like any others and we can investigate them 
in various ways. But how can anyone investigate them by thinking? A 
philosopher cannot answer questions about genetics, chemistry or physics, 
but when it comes to the realm of mind, consciousness, perception, free will, 
causality, reality, they feel qualified--why? Like all behavior, we now look 
at the operations of the inference engines to see why they make us think like 
this. Is it the operations of the intuitive psychology and social mind engines 
that forces them to deny the reality of the very things they are investigating 
(e.g., thinking, consciousness, choice)? As Wittgenstein often said our 
language lacks clarity so we can say anything but we cannot mean anything 
except in very specific contexts.  
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H makes a glaringly stupid remark --comparing LSD effects to a bullet 
through the brain (p412). By 1981 millions of people had taken LSD and 
there were hundreds of books and thousands of articles and numerous films 
showing that it was precisely its ability to specifically trigger emotions, 
memories, images, intellectual and visual fantasies etc., that gives it such 
great therapeutic power and interest. If he had taken psychedelics it might 
have freed him from wasting his life spouting nonsense.  
 
They attempt (p403) an explanation of mirror reversal, but in spite of this 
and Ned Block´s article (J. Phil p259-77. 1974) and even one by Feynman, I 
think the only complete explanation is that found in the book and article by 
British psychologist Richard Gregory. 
 
Because of the wide range of famous writers represented, this book is still 
well worth reading. Where else can you find Turing, Searle´s Chinese room, 
Nagel’s famous `What is it like to be a bat? ` and several xlnt selections from 
Sci Fi writer Stanislaw Lem? 
 
Perhaps the bottom line here is that 25 years of research in AI and 
programming by tens of thousands of people with billions of dollars have 
failed to produce a program that can perceive and respond in general 
contexts with them abilities of a 3 monthold baby, or a robot with the 
realworld intelligence of an ant, though recently there have been huge 
advances. Cognitive psychology is slowly exposing the inference engines 
that make it possible and one day, probably, we can mimic them with a 
program. Even so, it is not clear we will find it useful to call it thinking. The 
problem is that almost nobody in this book has a clue about how language 
(largely equivalent to mind, as Wittgenstein made clear) works and so they 
just repeat the errors of 2500 years of philosophy. 
 
See my recent review of Ray Kurzweil’s ‘How to Create a Mind’, which 
provides an update on this discussion.   
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Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and 
Myin (2012) (review revised 2019)  
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Probably the leading exponent of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the language games 
of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or 
intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s approach is called ‘Radical 
Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a 
development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, 
cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of Wittgenstein’s 2nd 
and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). 
 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is 
automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see 
Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers). 
To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the 
operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, 
which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of 
Wittgenstein (hereafter W-who was the first to see this and explored it in great 
detail) and Searle (hereafter S-who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in 
his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century, which 
I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal 
behavior and I have already discussed them I won’t dwell on it here. 
 
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing 
behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied 
Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment 
thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally 
constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of 
environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is 
clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but 
likely opaque if you don’t.  Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he 
quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to content” 
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and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to 
knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are 
evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2. 
 
This is classic Hutto high-level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but 
somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before 
encountered his coauthor Myin, so can’t say how much of this text is really due 
to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) 
he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped 
the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive 
and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of 
“information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much 
else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required 
reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for 
him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of 
behavior (i.e., all we can really do as 
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely 
summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking 
of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind.” Yes, and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and 
everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with unmatched clarity in 
his third period works over 60 years ago. 
 
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I 
don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the ‘mind’ works at 
Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful 
activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious 
prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically 
extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture (S3)? 
Beginning and end of story. 
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Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if 
one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though 
this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest an even 
better filter for folly is mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews, and 
reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 
3rd period W as feasible. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I 
try to correct. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted 
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and which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our 
eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
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action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has 
no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying 
neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot 
be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
“Cognitive systems don’t ‘pick up’ or ‘take in’ any informational contents; there 
are no such things as informational contents to take in.”  Hutto RE pxvi 
 
Before commenting in detail on Radicalizing Enactivism (RE) I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) 
and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place any 
commentator on behavior in proper perspective. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (now called System 2) (S2) emerges 
from unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his 
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final extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. 
His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, 
revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed 
by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so 
there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a 
cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). 
 
All of W's and S’s work as a development of or variation on these ideas. Another 
major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need 
to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie all 
behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, 
anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive 
way, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will 
prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order behavior as an 
effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2- 
-see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
Because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only 
ONE human cardiology), anyone accurately describing behavior must be 
voicing some variant or extension of what W and S have said and they should 
be easily translatable into one another. If not, one should be discarded and in 
my view that will rarely be W or S. 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it 
was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest 
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work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a 
stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of 
the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W 
shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved 
into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see 
this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment 
that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are 
thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, 
of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and 
remembering and our reflexive thinking and acting, since these S1 functions are 
always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. I 
claim this is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S 
muddies the waters here because he sometimes refers to dispositions as mental 
states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the language of causality 
just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a 
theory but a description about how language (thinking) works. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking 
the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and 
psychology (but it’s a universal mistake we all make), the impossibility of 
private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like 
‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to 
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be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of the inner resulting 
from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the 
brain. The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 
1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, nonpropositional, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe 
System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make 
no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly, it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and 
later S's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., evolutionary psychology, which are 
traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria and their descendants 
(e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive 
fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
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W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather 
than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one 
person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true-
only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, 
animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true 
only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex 
language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true- only 
Understandings of Agency (UA --a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn 
animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have and 
subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note here, W 
made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 
2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious 
UA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. Although 
the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical 
feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is 
a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples explore this two way 
street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston). 
 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in his last work `On Certainty', are equivalent 
to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the 
framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and 
which corresponds to the mental states of perception (including UOA1) and 
memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless examples. 
One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
239  
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal 
use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false 
(`I know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 
to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
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it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but 
I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to 
thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain 
present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 
500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that 
are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 
500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-
my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the 
stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short term memory 
(working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions 
one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is 
causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-the 
presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same 
words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to 
call the percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public 
COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do 
not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary 
content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences 
and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states 
or the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing 
a red apple’) and this is one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order 
behavior to a ‘system of laws’ which would have to state all the possible 
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contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. And what counts as 
‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy Cartwright). This is a 
special case of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones 
that has been explained many times by Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only “mental states” with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction- Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Dispositions, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), 
Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and 
not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W - ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
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Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of my table 
here in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). This table expands on W’s 
survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from 
his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
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working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action – IA - Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle, e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…”), or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…’) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions 
— (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential 
public acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, 
Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition, and there is no 
language (concept, thought) of “private mental states” for thinking or willing 
(i.e.,no private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will 
acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature  
 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, 
Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, 
Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending 
(Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, 
Desiring, Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As 
(Aspects). 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
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fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do. 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior ((The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social 
Science Model (SSSM)). 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
book The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
I have commented previously on Hutto in my review of his “Wittgenstein and 
the End of Philosophy.” Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the 
language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our 
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personality or intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) 
approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous 
recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied 
Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward 
extension of W’s 2
nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only 
intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best deconstructions I 
know of Dennett’s preposterous claim to be following in W’s footsteps (in fact 
Dennett is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and 
hasn’t a clue about W) and of Fodor’s LOT and other nonsense. But of course, 
one must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett’s book 
says it well “Consciousness Explained Away”. Incidentally, unlike most 
philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the general 
public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of 
course often just proofs and not the final paper) free online at 
www.academia.edu. 
 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is 
automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see 
Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers 
above). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes 
the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary 
psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews 
of Wittgenstein (who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and 
Searle (who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this 
name in his book Philosophy in a New Century which I have also reviewed). 
Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have 
already discussed them I won’t dwell on it here. 
 
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing 
behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied 
Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment 
thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally 
constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of 
environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is 
clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but 
likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he 
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quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to content” 
and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to 
knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are 
evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2. 
 
This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but 
somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before 
encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text is really due 
to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) 
he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped 
the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive 
and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of 
“information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much 
else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required 
reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for 
him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of 
behavior (i.e., all we can really do as philosophers according to W) in more 
mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing 
less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard 
approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.” Yes, and what a pity 
that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid 
it all out with great (and unmatched) clarity in his third period works over 60 
years ago. 
 
And again “By giving pride of place to embodied habits and skills when it 
comes to explaining how sophisticated mentality emerges, REC denies CIC 
accounts of the same. REC’s credo—that ‘we act before we think’ –is an outright 
denial of the CIC thesis that ‘we must think in order to act’” (p12). As noted 
above we are dealing here with the two senses of mentalizing verbs, or as I 
suggest Thinking 1 and Thinking 2. If not identical with CIC, Phenomenology 
is at least quite similar and so one really ought to read Searle’s “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” at this point and of course all of W3 (third period 
W) but there is no hint of this here. Finally, for anyone who still is confused 
“Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways 
of engaging with the world and others—including our basic forms of perception 
and perceptual experience—are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally 
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charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and 
content free. Defending this understanding of basic mentality is the primary aim 
of this book” (p13). 
 
This leads to his accepting Dretske’s idea that experiencing things (i.e., qualia 
such as redness) is (in my terms) a representational function of S2—i.e., 
dispositional (propositional) and hence true or false and conscious and slow, in 
contrast to S1 which is reflexive, non-representational, fast and true only. 
 
Throughout Chap 3 he promotes the fast, automated reflexive behaviors of S1 
(i.e., REC) over the representational, content possessing ones of S2 (i.e., 
instructionalism or intellectualism), but never quite gets around to using this 
common modern terminology. E.G., p49 top and p50 bottom. As always, one 
must be constantly aware of the quite different language games played with 
‘conscious’, ‘cognitive’, reflexive, ‘representation’, ’information’, ’computation’, 
‘subpersonal’, ‘automatic’, ‘contents’, ‘function’, etc., which are typically used 
by both pros and amateurs as if their meanings were uniform and obvious. As 
one digs into the discussion on p59 et seq. it is good to have in mind Searle’s 
lucid differentiations of observer independent intrinsic intentionality and 
functions thatconscious creatures have, vs. observer dependent ascribed 
intentionality and functions which we may attribute to the rest of nature (for a 
capsule summary see my recent review of his Philosophy in a New Century, 
which also delves into the related issues of ‘syntax is not semantics’ and 
‘structure (e.g., regularity) is not syntax’). 
 
Inevitably we run into the multifarious LG’s of ‘information’ (p62 etc.) which 
has drastically different uses and often refers to the true only (not really info 
bearing in the normal sense) non-propositional mechanisms of S1, but is 
commonly taken to mean the true or false content bearing propositional 
statements of S2 which is what he says flat out on p67. Naturally he quotes 
Dretske’s classic book on this. It seems Dretske’s most recent article on info is 
in the 30th Intl. Wittgenstein Symposium, which you can page capture and print 
direct from Amazon or GoogleBooks or maybe find on b-ok.org or libgen.io, 
but it’s got little to say, and the main reason to view that volume is to get 
Rodych’s latest article on W’s mathematics. H&M recommend giving up on info 
as content and adhering to info as covariance so that one can distinguish info 
251  
processing “action oriented representations” (i.e., S2 higher order dispositional 
thought) from info sensitive (i.e., S1 reflexive response). If contentful properties 
can’t be reduced to physical properties then “…the explanatory project of 
naturalism with respect to them would be quite different—it would be to 
discover the set of fundamental bridging laws that explain how contentful 
properties relate to basic physical properties.  That would be the only way to 
solve what we might call the Hard Problem of Content.” Yes, we all want to 
know how S1 (teleosemiotics) gives rise to S2 (teleosemantic intensionality) or, 
to put it another way, mind arises from matter. 
 
They quote Jacobs: “In all of these cases it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the informational relation holds between an indicator and what it indicates (or 
a source) independently of the presence of an agent with propositional 
attitudes”. Mindful of S’s classic discussions, we realize that Jacobs is talking 
about derived intentionality and hence concepts of info that have nothing to do 
with human behavior. So, they are forced to conclude that “There is no naturally 
occurring contentful information that can be “used and fused” to from inner 
representations. Unless we assume that pre-existing contents exist to be 
received through sensory contact, the last thread of the analogy between basic 
cognitive systems and genuinely communications systems breaks down at a 
crucial point. (p70)” 
 
And once again: ”Taking an even stronger line on this holds that the 
interpretative response does all the work. This would surrender any 
commitment to the idea that informational content exists independently of the 
activities of cognitive agents.” (p74) Quite so! And so vanish Fodorian qualms 
about Darwin (p80) and his and Strawson’s Hyperintellectualism (p90). 
That is, no bridge from S1 to S2 at least via info. How about some 
Wittgensteinian therapy here?  
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it.”  Zettel p312 
 
But if we accept that the simple explanations we can give now are the only ones 
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possible, what about philosophy and neurophysiology? Nothing about them—
they will ever long for a completion they cannot attain. At least this is my take 
on things. 
 
And finally: “This is to accept that organisms often act successfully by making 
appropriate responses to objects or states of affairs in ways that are only 
mediated by their sensitive responding to natural signs, where this responding 
does not involve contentfully representing the objects or states of affairs in 
question (p81).” In my words, the automatic unconscious reflexive operation of 
S1 undergirds all behavior. When they note that perceptual experiences (i.e., S1 
mental states) “…do not attribute properties to the world.  Consequently, they 
do not have built in conditions of satisfaction, nor do they possess veridical 
content, possess content that is true or false.” These true only S1 qualities 
ensuing from our axiomatic psychology, and their generation of the higher 
order thought of S2, are exactly what W discoursed upon so brilliantly at the 
end of his life (but it seems H&M, along with everyone else, have no idea). 
 
Not only does the idea that the mental perceptual states of S1 are conceptual 
get the boot, but they might claim that “…the very nature of such perceptual 
content debars the possibility of ever fully or exhaustively capturing its essence 
by means of conceptual descriptive characterization (p97).” Inner states are 
what they are and since there is no private language and no way in the public 
one to describe them in a really satisfying way-- they will always remain 
“qualia”. But I think (and am pretty sure W would take the view) that “stabbing 
pain”, “bright red”, “green apple tree” and “galloping horses” are as good as it 
gets—that is, there is no useful meaning that can ever be given to “exhaustively 
capturing its essence”. As good as H&M are, I am afraid they have fallen into 
the classic philosopher’s trap so beautifully described by W. They reach the 
limits of language, so naturally they want to go beyond them. One can say or 
write anything, but one cannot mean anything. Must it not be either true or false 
that 7432 occurs in the decimal expansion of PI? As W showed, your intuition 
often leads you astray. 
 
Before reading the next few pages on Gauker’s Assumptions and 
nonintensional, nonpropositional, nonconceptual “content” (i.e., S1) it will be 
useful to read Searle’s old paper on unconscious intentionality (Phil Issues 1:45-
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66(1991)) which shows how S1 generates S2 “…the ontology of the unconscious 
is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the 
conscious” as well as Johnston’s classic book ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the 
Inner’ (or at least my review of it), -- especially the material on indeterminacy 
of language. And of course, to the list of those rejecting the propositionality of 
perception one should add W who anticipated them in detail by some 60 years 
and provided in his last period the good news (to balance the bad on p103) that 
S1 is the true-only axiomatic foundation of S2—that is, of all higher order 
behavior and so of course these aliefs are not revisable (p104, 105). And, since 
S1 is prelinguistic, it is hardly surprising that there “…is no conceptual content 
of perception to express” (p100). 
 
They are much exercised in Chap 6 to show that perceptual science, and 
illusions in particular, provide no evidence of representations or content in S1 
and I applaud their conclusion that “…it is not clear what ‘possessing content’ 
really amounts to, or what work it is meant to do that couldn’t be done just as 
easily by assuming that human beings share basic and content-free ways of 
responding directly to certain worldly solicitations and offerings.” That is, S1 is 
automated as modern biology and psychology shows. 
 
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I 
don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the mind works at 
Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful 
activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious 
prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically 
extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture?  Beginning 
and end of story. 
 
Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if 
one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though 
this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest mulling 
over my thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest 
from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible, is an even 
better filter for folly. 
 
His second book with Myin ‘Evolving Enactivism’ appeared in 2017. 
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Review of The Stuff of Thought by Steven Pinker 
(2008) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig 
Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default 
settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the 
functioning of the mind, and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound 
insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed 
as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. There is  only reference 
to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he 
was the most brilliant and original analyst of language. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly 
by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive 
Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us 
hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and 
make the world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our 
psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that 
are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and 
sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things or what we 
know), most of epistemology (how we know), dispositions (believing, thinking, 
judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, 
neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and 
enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral 
deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and 
behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years 
of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of 
intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations 
that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to 
use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is 
evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where 
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Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to the context in which 
words are used = an arena which Wittgenstein pioneered. 
 
Nevertheless, this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth 
reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we were 
thinking of.” Wittgenstein PI p217 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it appears 
to confer a meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM 
revised edition (1978) p141 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set 
it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself 
in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since language 
only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
 “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
I start with these famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (W) because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default 
settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the 
functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound 
insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed 
as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only 
reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most 
unfortunate considering that he was the most brilliant and original analysts of 
language. 
 
Another famous Wittgensteinian dictum is “Nothing is Hidden.” If one dips 
into his work sufficiently, I think he makes it very clear what this means—that 
our psychology is in front of us all the time if we only open our eyes to see it 
256  
and that no amount of scientific work is going to make it clearer (in fact it just 
gets more and more obscure). This is not antirational or antiscientific but it just 
states what he sees as the facts—a soccer game is out on the field –not in our 
head--and we understand perfectly well the motivations, anxieties, stresses and 
disappointments of the players and what effort is required to play and how the 
ball moves when kicked. Immense advances have been made in sports 
physiology, anatomy, bioenergetics, physics math and chemistry. Whole books 
full of equations have been written about how balls move thru the air and 
muscles apply force to move bones; about how muscle movements originate in 
part of the cortex, are mirrored in the brains of others; mountains of literature 
on motivation, personality, brain function and modeling. Has this given us any 
more insight into a soccer game or changed our strategy or our experience of 
playing or watching? 
 
Intentionality (rationality) has been evolved piecemeal from whatever tools 
(genes) animals had to work with and so is full of paradoxes and illusions. Just 
as we see mirages in the desert or read words into sentences that are not there, 
and see animated blobs on a screen “causing” others to move and “helping” or 
“hindering”’, we look for thinking and believing in the head and confuse our 
innate psychological axioms with empirical facts (e.g., regarding math and 
geometry as things we “discover” in the world, rather than invent). 
 
In order for the concept and word “reality” to apply to the results we get from 
the use of differential equations, MRI scanners and particle colliders to a greater 
degree than or in place of apples, rocks and thunderstorms, it would be 
necessary for these recent discoveries to have had the same role in natural 
selection over hundreds of millions of years. It is only survival advantage over 
eons that selected the genes enabling our distant (invertebrate) ancestors to 
begin reacting in useful ways to the sights and sounds of the world and ever so 
slowly to produce brains that could form concepts (thoughts) that eventually 
were verbalized. Science and culture cannot replace or take preference over our 
ancient intentional psychology but merely slightly extends or supplements it. 
But when philosophizing (or doing linguistics!) we are easily misled as context 
is missing and our psychology automatically dissects every situation for the 
causes and the ultimate or lowest level of explanation and we substitute that 
for the gross higher levels because there is nothing in our language rules to 
prevent it. It comes ever so naturally to say we don’t think—our brain does and 
tables are not solid because physics tells us they are made of molecules. But W 
reminded us that our concepts of, and words for, thinking, believing and other 
dispositions are public actions, not processes in the brain, and in what sense are 
molecules solid? Hence, the quote above, which bears repeating, since I see it as 
one of the most fundamental ideas we have to get clear about before we can 
make any progress in the study of behavior. 
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“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set 
it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself 
in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since language 
only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” 
 
Much of W’s writing is examples of the common-sense knowledge that is 
essential to the success of all animal behavior and by and large not only the 
behavioral science but even AI, which cannot succeed without it, has been 
unable to grasp and implement it. Even one of the fathers of AI, Marvin Minsky 
said (in a 2003 Boston Univ. speech) that “AI has been brain dead since the 70’s” 
and lacked common sense reasoning. But his recent book “The Emotion 
Machine” still shows no awareness of the work that W did 75 years ago, and 
this means no awareness of the contextual, intentional, point of view without 
which one cannot hope to grasp how the mind (language) works. 
 
When talking about behavior (i.e., thought or language or action) it is a nearly 
universal mistake to regard the meaning of a word or sentence as attached to it, 
ignoring the infinite subtleties of context, and thus we go astray. Of course, we 
cannot include everything about context, as that would make discussion 
difficult, even impossible, but there is a vast difference between regarding 
meaning as something that can be fully given by a dictionary entry and 
meaning as shorthand for a family of complex uses. Even Klein’s classic book 
‘Time in Language’ (not cited by Pinker) regards  ‘time’ as a family of loosely 
connected uses, though of course he too has no awareness of W, Searle or 
intentionality. 
 
The point of mentioning this is that Pinker shares the reductionistic biases of 
most modern scientists and that this colors his approach to behavior in ways 
that will not be obvious to most readers. As fascinating as his data are and as 
masterful as his writing is, it subtly leads us to what I think is a mistaken picture 
of our psychology—a view that is due to the innate biases of our evolved 
psychology and hence is a universal failing. 
 
Pinker is the Richard Dawkins of psychology—one of the major popularizers of 
science in modern times. Possibly only the late and most unlamented (he was a 
self-serving egomaniac who misled millions with his specious reasoning, 
Neomarxism and blank slateism) Stephan Gould sold more volumes of pop sci. 
It was Pinker’s masterful refutation of the universal delusion that human nature 
is culturally generated (one of Gould’s many delusions) that made his previous 
book ‘The Blank Slate’ a classic and a top choice for most important books of 
the 21st century. Incidentally, there are many put-downs of Gould, including 
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some by Pinker and Dawkins (“he has made tilting at windmills into his own 
personal art form” –as I recall it from a Dawkins review of a Gould tome from 
the Journal ‘Evolution’ a decade or so ago), but I think the best is that of Tooby 
and Cosmides in a letter to the NY Times (search their page or the Times). All 
of these works are intimately connected by the subject of animal behavior, 
evolutionary psychology, and of course ‘The Stuff of Thought”. 
 
Following convention, Pinker discusses Putnam’s famous, but badly flawed, 
twin earth thought experiment (bizarre thought expts. in philosophy were 
essentially invented by Wittgenstein), which claims to show that meaning is not 
in the head, but it was W in the 30’s—i.e., 40 years earlier-- who showed 
decisively that all the dispositions or inclinations (as he called them, though 
philosophers, lacking acquaintance with his work commonly call them by the 
incorrect name of propositional attitudes) including meaning, intending, 
thinking, believing, judging etc. function as descriptions of our actions and not 
as terms for mental phenomena. They cannot be in the head for the same reason 
a soccer game cannot be in the head. Later in life Putnam began to take 
Wittgenstein seriously and changed his tune accordingly. 
 
He makes almost no reference to the large and fascinating literature on 
behavioral automatisms (i.e., most of our behavior! --see e.g., “Experiments 
With People’(2004) or Bargh’s ‘Social Psychology and the Unconscious’ (2007) 
for the older work, and “Dual Process Theories of the Social Mind’ by Sherman 
eta al (2014) and the vast and rapidly expanding literature on implicit 
cognition), which shows that the more you look, the clearer it becomes that 
actions which we regard as results of our conscious choice are not. People 
shown pictures or reading stories of old people tend to walk out of the building 
slower than when given those of young people etc. etc. The well-known placebo 
effect is a variant where the info is consciously input—e.g., in a 2008 study 
eighty-five percent of volunteers who thought they were getting a $2.50 sugar 
pill said they felt less pain after taking it, compared with a 61 percent control 
group. Such effects can be induced subliminally if the price info is input via 
images, text or sound. Presumably the same is true of most of our choices. 
 
This brings us to one of my major gripes about this book—it’s monomaniacal 
obsession with the “meaning” of words rather than their use-- a distinction 
made famous by W in his lectures and some 20 books beginning in the 1930’s. 
Like W’s insistence that we do not explain behavior (or the rest of nature) but 
only describe it, this may seem like a pointless quibble, but, as usual, I have 
found as I reflected on these matters over the years that W was right on the 
mark. He said that a formula which will work most of the time is that the 
meaning of a word (far better to say a sentence) is its use in language—and this 
means its public use in a specified context to communicate info from one person 
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to another (and sometimes to another higher mammal—dogs share a major 
portion of our intentional psychology). I mention this partly because in a 
previous book Pinker accused W of denying that animals have consciousness 
(an extraordinary view that is actually defended by some) because he noted that 
a dog can’t think “perhaps it will rain tomorrow”, but W’s point was the 
unexceptional one that there are many thoughts that we cannot have without 
language and that we have no test for interpreting a dog’s behavior as showing 
that it expected something tomorrow. Even if it used an umbrella and 
invariably got it out of the closet the day before a rain, there is no way to connect 
this to it’s mental state—same for a deaf mute who could not read or write or 
use sign language. This connects to his famous demonstrations of the 
impossibility of a private language and to the fact that dispositions are not in 
the head. W showed how the absence of any public test means that even the 
dog and the mute cannot know what they are thinking—nor can we, because 
dispositions are public acts and the act is the criterion for what we thought—
even for ourself. This is the point of the quote above—neither God nor 
neurophysiologists can see thoughts, beliefs, images, hopes in our brain, 
because they these are terms for acts and neither the vague and fleeting 
epiphenomena we experience, nor the correlates detectable by brain studies, 
function in our life in the same way as do the contextual use of the sentences 
describing these acts. And, regarding animal consciousness, W noted that 
intentional psychology gets a foothold even in a fly—a point marvelously and 
increasingly supported by modern genetics, which shows that many genes and 
processes fundamental to primate behavior got their start at least as early as 
nematodes (i.e., C. elegans) some billion years ago. 
 
Intentional psychology or intentionality (very roughly our personality or 
rationality or higher order thought (HOT) is a very old philosophical concept 
that (unknown to most) was given its modern formulation by Wittgenstein, 
who, in the 20,000 pages of his nachlass, now mostly translated and published 
in some 20 books and several CDROM’s, laid the foundations for the modern 
study of human behavior. Sadly, he was mostly a recluse who did not publish 
for the last 30 years of his life, never really finished writing anything of his later 
work and wrote his brilliant and highly original comments on behavior in a 
style variously termed epigrammatic, telegraphic, oracular, Socratic, obscure 
etc. and all published posthumously over a period of more than 50 years (the 
famous Philosophical Investigations (PI) in 1953 and the most recent-but not 
the last!—The Big Typescript in 2005) and thus, though he was recently voted 
one of the top 5 philosophers of all time, and Philosophical Investigations  the 
most important philosophy book of the 20   century, he is ignored or 
misunderstood by nearly everyone. The feeling I often get is that our 
psychology is a coral reef with most people snorkeling on the surface admiring 
the bumps while Wittgenstein is 20 meters below probing the crevices with 
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scuba gear and flashlight. 
 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors were stuffy academics and his books issued 
mostly from Blackwell with staid academic titles and no explanation 
whatsoever that they can be seen as a major foundation for the modern study 
of evolutionary psychology, personality, rationality, language, consciousness, 
politics, theology, literature, anthropology, sociology, law etc., –in fact 
everything that we say, think and do since, as he showed, it all depends on the 
innate axioms of our evolved psychology which we share to a large extent with 
dogs, and to some extent even with flies and C. elegans. Had his works been 
presented with flashy covers by popular presses with titles like How the Mind 
Works, The Language Instinct, and The Stuff of Thought, much of the 
intellectual landscape of the 20 century might have been different. As it is, 
though he is the major subject of at least 200 books and 10,000 papers and 
discussed in countless thousands more (including Pinker’s How the Mind 
Works), based on the hundreds of articles and dozens of books I have read in 
the last few years, I would say there are less than a dozen people who really 
grasp the significance of his work, as I present it in this and my other reviews.  
However the recent publications of Coliva, DMS and others, and perhaps mine, 
should change this. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
One result of all this (what one philosopher has called “the collective amnesia 
regarding Wittgenstein”) is that students of language including Pinker take 
Grice’s notions such as implicature (which seems just a fancy word for 
implication) and, more recently, relevance theory, as a framework for “the 
relation between words and meaning” (of course W would turn in his grave at 
this phrase, since how can they be separable from their use if one follows his 
meaning is use formula?), but they seem to me feeble substitutes for 
intentionality as described by W and revised and enlarged by Searle and others. 
In any case, Grice is the normal soporific academic, Sperber (a leader in 
relevance theory) tolerable, Pinker engaging and often elegant and even 
poignant, Searle (see esp. ‘Rationality in Action’) is clear, rigorous, and quite 
original (though owing, I think, a very big debt to W,) but too academic for the 
bestseller lists, while Wittgenstein, once you grasp that he is a natural master 
psychologist describing how the mind works, is very demanding, but brilliantly 
original and often breathtaking. Pinker writes masterful prose while 
Wittgenstein writes telegrams, though often moving and poetic ones and on a 
few occasions, he wrote beautiful essays. Pinker can be mined for some gold, 
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lots of iron and some dross while W is mostly gold, a little iron and hardly a 
speck of dross. Pinker is mostly summarizing the work of others (though in 
impeccable style) while W is so original and so bizarre he’s way over most 
people’s heads. I suggest reading Pinker, Searle and Wittgenstein alternately or 
simultaneously with a dash of Sperber, Grice and a few hundred others from 
time to time. 
 
W said that the problem is not to find the answer, but to recognize that which 
is always before us as the answer. That is, our language is (by and large) our 
thought, which is about actual or potential events (including actions by agents 
such as barking, speaking and writing), and that meaning, contra Pinker and a 
cast of thousands, is use, and nothing is hidden (i.e., language is -mostly- 
thought). 
 
The ignorance in many quarters is so complete that even an otherwise 
marvelous recent 358 page book by Wiese on a topic virtually created by 
Wittgenstein (Numbers, Language and the Human Mind—which I see is cited 
by Pinker) there is not a single reference to him! 
 
W mostly emphasizes the different uses of the “same” words” (i.e., a splitter) 
who originally wanted to use the quote “I’ll teach you differences!” as the motto 
of his book PhilosophicaI Investigations. That is, by describing the different 
uses of sentences (the language games), and by modifying the games in thought 
experiments, we remind ourselves of the different roles these games play in life 
and we see the limits of our psychology. But Pinker, again following the 
seductive defaults of our evolved modules and the egregious examples of 
thousands of others, is a lumper who often blurs these differences. E.G., he 
speaks repeatedly of “reality” as though it was a single thing (rather than a 
whole family of uses). He also speaks of reality as something separate from our 
experience (i.e., the classic idealist/realist confusion). 
 
But what test is there for reality? He slips (as do we all) so easily into the 
reductionistic substitution of lower levels for higher ones so we are all inclined 
to dismiss the thinking that we can see (i.e., actions) for processes in the brain, 
which our language (thought) can not possibly be describing, as it evolved long 
before anyone had any idea of brain functions. If Pinker imagines that you are 
not really reading this page (e.g., your retina is being hit with photons bouncing 
off ink molecules etc.) then I respectfully suggest he needs to reflect further on 
the issue of language, thought and reality and I know of no better antidote to 
this toxic meme than immersion in Wittgenstein. 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein brings to mind a comment attributed to Cambridge 
Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him), which 
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ran something like ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would 
be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of Wittgenstein as 
the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was 
likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and 
in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now 
suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality 
who published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often 
mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the 
next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work in 
mostly garbled form diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students 
notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut 
and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the 
margins, underlinings and crossed out words so that many sentences have 
multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into 
pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task 
of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this 
material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with 
prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became 
as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics 
was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his 
work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing 
it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a 
definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract 
and condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that 
he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature 
of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and 
usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; that 
to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people 
who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, 
I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
It seems crushingly obvious that our evolved psychology has been selected to 
match the world to the maximal extent compatible with our genetic and 
energetic resources and that is ALL we can say about reality, and we ALL 
understand this (we LIVE it) but when we stop to think about it, the defaults of 
our universal psychology take over and we start to use the words (concepts) of 
“reality,” “aspects,” “time,” “space,”, “possible,” etc. out of the intentional 
contexts in which they evolved. The following gem comes from biologists (I 
take it from Shettleworth’s superb but neglected book Cognition, Evolution and 
Behavior). 
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“The role of psychology then is to describe the innate features of the minds of 
different organisms which have evolved to match certain aspects of that 
physical external universe, and the way in which the physical universe interacts 
with the mind to produce the phenomenal world.” O’Keefe and Nadel “The 
Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map” 
 
Think of it this way—you can look up a word in the dictionary, but you cannot 
look up a use there, unless there was a video which showed before and after the 
event and all relevant facts about it. The dictionary is like a morgue full of dead 
bodies but we want to study physiology. Here lies “rose” and here “run” and 
here “in” and here “is” and what is missing is life. Add a photo and it’s a little 
better: add a video and lots better: add a long 3D color hires video with sound 
and smell and it’s getting there. 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s description of our public psychology included many 
detailed examples of how the sensations and images in my mind don’t carry 
any epistemic weight even for me. How do I know I am eating an apple? My 
taste and vision might be wrong and how to decide? But if I talk about it or 
write it down and you say “that’s a tasty looking apple” etc. I have an objective 
test. Right and wrong get a foothold here. 
 
W was going to use a quote from Goethe as the motto of PI --“In the beginning 
was the deed.” That is, evolutionarily it was perceptions and actions and then 
memories of them and then thoughts about them and then words voicing the 
thoughts. So, the event is the thing Australopithecus thought about, and natural 
selection for being able to make acoustic blasts, which substituted for them, was 
strong enough to modify our vocal apparatus and suitable control circuitry at a 
fantastic pace, so by early Neanderthal time they were talking a blue streak and 
have not shut up mind or mouth for more than a few minutes since. W 
understood, as few have, the primacy of actions and the irrelevance of our 
thoughts, feelings etc. as the foundations of communication, which is why he is 
often called a behaviorist (i.e., Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner style denial of 
the reality of our mental life, mind, consciousness etc.) but this is patently 
absurd. 
 
It reminds me of the famous description by Plato of the shadows on the cave 
wall vs turning around to see people actually using language—an analogy that 
I never thought of in regard to W and which I was stunned to see a few hours 
later in Pinker’s last chapter. In any case if one considers carefully any case of 
language use, we see that much of our intentional psychology is called into 
play. 
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One can see the ignorance of Wittgenstein in the articles in EEL2 (the Elsevier 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics-2nd ed. (2005) 12,353p- yes that’s 12 
thousand pages in 14 vols and a mere $6000,) which is by far the biggest, and 
one hopes the most authoritative, reference in language studies. 
 
Curiously, Pinker does not have a single reference to it, but you can find it, 
along with nearly all of Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein and thousands of others 
free on the net. 
 
To get a grasp of the basic necessities for AI you might e.g., find it much more 
interesting to read W’s RFM than Minsky’s ‘The Emotion Machine’. Pinker has 
referred to Brown’s famous list of hundreds of universals of human behavior, 
but these are nearly all gross higher level behaviors such as the possession of 
religion, reciprocal altruisms etc. and it large omits hundreds of other 
universals which underlie these. Wittgenstein was the first, and in some cases 
perhaps the only one to date, to point out many of the more fundamental ones. 
However, he did not tell you what he was doing and nobody else has either so 
you will have to puzzle it out for yourself. Most people read first (and often 
nothing else) his Philosophical Investigations but I prefer the more strictly 
mathematical examples in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics or 
his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. If you read with the 
understanding that he is describing the universal axioms of our evolutionary 
psychology which, underlie all our reasoning, then his work makes perfect 
sense and is breathtaking in its ingenuity. 
 
Pinker illustrates how the mind works with the Barbecue Sauce example. There 
are of course a limitless number of others which illustrate our subjective 
probability (often called Bayesian reasoning—though he does not mention this). 
My favorites are Doomsday (see e.g., Bostrum’s book or web page), Sleeping 
Beauty and Newcomb’s problem. Unlike Barbecue, which has a clear solution, 
many others have (depending on your viewpoint) one, none or many. We may 
regard these as interesting, as they show gaps in or limits to our rationality (a 
major theme in Wittgenstein) or (what we have known at least since de Finetti’s 
work in the 20’s) that all probability is subjective, or like the famous liar paradox 
or Godel’s theorems (see my reviews of Hofstadter’s ‘I am a Strange Loop and 
Yanofsky’s ‘Beyond the Limits of Thought’), as trivial demonstrations of the 
limits of our primate mind, though Pinker does not expand on this issue nor 
give more than a few hints at the vast literature on decision theory, game theory, 
behavioral economics, Bayesianism etc. 
 
EEL2 does have a passable short article on W which avoids making too many 
glaring errors, but it totally misses nearly everything of importance, which, if 
really understood, would make the article by far the longest one in the book. 
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Nearly the whole thing is wasted on the Tractatus, which everyone knows he 
totally rejected later and which is extremely confused and confusing as well. 
Hardly anything on his later philosophy and not a word about the two 
searchable CDROM’s which are now the starting point for all W scholars (and 
anyone interested in human behavior) which are now becoming widely 
disseminated freely via the net. There is also nothing here nor in the articles 
about Chomsky, innate ideas , evolution of syntax, evolution of semantics, 
evolution of pragmatics (practically every one of his 20,000 pages has to do with 
novel ideas and examples on these two), schema theory etc., nor about how he 
anticipated Chomsky in studying “depth grammar”, described the problem of 
underdetermination or combinatorial explosion,   nor a word about his 
discovery (repeatedly and in detail—e.g., RPP Vol. 2 p20) some 20 years before 
Wason of the reasons for “glitches” in “if p then q” types of constructions now 
analyzed by the Wason selection tests (one of the standard tools of EP research), 
nor about how his work can be seen as anticipating many ideas in evolutionary 
psychology, about his founding the modern study of intentionality, of 
dispositions as actions, of the epiphenomenality of our mental life and of the 
unity of language, math, geometry, music, art and games, nor even an 
explanation of what he meant by language games and grammar—two of his 
most frequently used terms. W made the change from trying to understand the 
mind as a logical, domain general structure to a psychological idiosyncratic 
domain specific one in the late 20’s but Kahneman got the Nobel for it in 2002, 
for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that they did lab work and 
statistical analysis (though W was a superb experimentalist and quite good at 
math). Of course, one cannot fault the EEL2 too much as it merely follows the 
similar omissions and lack of understanding throughout the behavioral 
sciences. And, I am not bringing this up in the way one might complain about 
the absence of info on ancient Chinese war rockets in a book on rocket engines, 
but because his work is still a virtually untapped mine of behavioral science 
diamonds, and, for my money, some of the most exhilarating and eye opening 
prose I have ever read. Nearly anything he has written could be used as a 
supplementary text or lab manual in any philosophy or psychology class and 
in much of law, mathematics, literature, behavioral economics, history, politics, 
anthropology, sociology and of course linguistics. Which brings us back to 
Pinker. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) – a product of blind selfishness, moderated only 
slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes 
(Inclusive Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by 
giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to 
cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. I doubt this very much 
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(see my review of his ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature).  
 
Pinker is certainly aware of, but says little about the fact that far more about our 
psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that 
are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and 
sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions 
(believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional 
psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g., 
satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and 
behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (including 
game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language 
but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about 
each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book are 
descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how 
it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various ways (i.e., 
know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a 
more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active.  And there is scant 
attention to context which is critical to understanding language and in which 
Wittgenstein was the major pioneer. 
 
Among the countless books not referred to here are Guerino Mazzola’s excellent 
tome investigating the similarity of math and music ‘The Topos of Music’, 
Shulgin’s amazing work probing the mind with psychochemicals ‘Phikal’ and 
‘Tikal’. Many others try to represent mental functions with geometrical or 
mathematical means such as Rott ‘Belief Revision’, Gardenfors various books, 
and of course the massive efforts going on in logic (e.g. the 20 or so Vol 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic) as well as many others edited or written by 
the amazing Dov Gabbay (e.g., ‘Temporal Logic’). Re spatial language-of the 
numerous volumes on the psychology, language or philosophy of space, the 
recent ‘Handbook of Spatial Logic’ (especially fun are Chap 11 on space-time 
and the last Chap. by Varzi) stands out. The point is that these logical, 
geometrical and mathematical works are extensions of our innate axiomatic 
psychology, and so they show in their equations and graphics something about 
the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘function’ of our thoughts (modules, templates, 
inference engines), and so also the shape of those of animals and even perhaps 
of computers (though one has to think of what test would be relevant here!). 
And of course. all the works of Wittgenstein, keeping in mind that he is 
sometimes talking about the most basic prelinguistic or even premammalian 
levels of thought and perception. Of course, many books on AI, robot 
navigation and image processing are relevant as they must mimic our 
psychology. Face recognition is one of our most striking abilities (though even 
crustaceans can do it) and the best recent work I know is ‘Handbook of Face 
Recognition’. Of the numerous books on space/time one can start with Klein’s 
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‘Language and Time’ or McLure’s ‘The Philosophy of Time’. Smith’s ‘Language 
and Time’, Hawley’s ‘How Things Persist’ and Sider’s ‘Four- Dimensionalism’, 
Ludlow’s ‘Semantics, Tense and Time’ , Dainton’s ‘Time and Space’.and ‘Unity 
of Consciousness’, Diek’s ‘The Ontology of Spacetime’ and Sattig’s ‘The 
Language and Reality of Time”. But as one would expect, and as detailed by 
Rupert Read, the language games here are all tangled up and most of the 
discussions of time are hopelessly incoherent. 
 
And also a good but now dated book covering much of relevance with articles 
by Searle and others is Vanderveken’s  ‘Logic, Thought and Action’. 
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Review of The New Science of the Mind by Marc 
Rowlands (2013) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I first offer some 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) 
et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, 
PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology nor philosophy, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
 
As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title. As the quotes 
and comments above and in my other reviews and the books they cover 
indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face in 
describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not 
scientific. This ought to be crystal clear to all, but science envy and almost 
complete oblivion to WSH etc. is a la mode! But as H notes above, the issues 
discussed here are all about language games and have nothing to do with 
science. In fact, as usual, if one translates into plain English there is very little 
of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and better by WS etc. 
countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown Books from 1933-
35). It is not surprising that he makes no significant references to any of the 
above books or persons (the only reference to S is an article from 1958!), though 
in my view they are at the top of the list of the major figures in descriptive 
psychology. 
 
On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal 
level cognitive process can belong to a representational subject. This is the task 
of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we have 
the beautifully clear explanations of WSH, H&M etc., there is no point to 
torturing oneself with the rather aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the 
end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of postmodernist 
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word salad for good measure. A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but 
ultimately exhausting and fruitless. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (Blue Book p18, 1933). 
 
 "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
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(1933) 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
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that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say--- is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is descriptive psychology. 
 
Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) 
et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, 
PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. To serve as an 
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heuristic framework I have generated a table which is very useful but no room 
here (see other reviews such as that of Shoemaker’s Physical Realization). 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of 
logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights 
into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection 
on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined 
foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as 
a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding – 
understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions 
into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the 
two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a 
vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be 
doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms.  He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly describable in 
language, this being possible only with terms that substitute for public behavior 
(the impossibility of private language). He invented truth tables and predicted 
the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter designs which 
anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and 
which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, designed a 
heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist house, 
and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by others.   
He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. He described the psychology behind the Wason test--a 
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fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate 
nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He described 
and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory 
of mind, long before practical computers. He decisively laid to rest skepticism 
and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of 
the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so 
after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker 
who gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case 
that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or 
receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, 
but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one 
believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
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neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul- de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities to 
act), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and 
UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, 
etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that 
attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, 
mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive 
(CSR--earlier called Causally Self Referential by Searle), and the S2 use, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
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Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 
 
which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array 
of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly 
well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 
beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
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as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. 
S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the 
learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions 
that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ 
(TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner 
or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate 
his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
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immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons 
of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is right 
but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the 
inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as `EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence in a context 
that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the 
278  
famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have 
been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments 
that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and 
"...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S 
says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to 
in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish 
that that should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my 
wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some, event stops my 
wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied 
if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long 
for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
 
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS 
and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the 
way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, 
intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the 
COS that I express and which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle 
contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, 
with rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable 
acts. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, 
being misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's 
just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W 
makes clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate 
shared axiomatic psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as 
clear as day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests 
can only be public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the 
Box’. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) and W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection above and in my 
reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that 
the causal relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply 
to S2. 
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W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to 
describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really 
a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything 
except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern 
‘functionalist’, ‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms. See my review of 
Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example. 
 
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact. Unlike other cartoon views of life, 
they are too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and 
it is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Unfortunately, not so with other cartoon theories like SSSM, BS and TPI, widely 
shared by religions, governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history, literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well-known facts, such as that 
personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their 
adoptive siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street. 
Religions big and small, political movements, and economics often generate or 
embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human 
nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, 
wishful thinking and selfishness and help to accelerate the destruction of the 
earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice).  The point is to realize 
that these fantasies are on a continuum and have the same source. All of us are 
born with a cartoon view of life and few ever grow out of it. But the world is 
not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoons collide with 
reality. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
 
Now for some comments on “The New Science of the Mind” (NSM). 
 
As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title. As the quotes 
and comments above and in my other reviews and the books they cover 
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indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face in 
describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not 
scientific. This ought to be crystal clear to all, but science envy and almost 
complete oblivion to Wittgenstein, Searle, Hacker etc. is a la mode! But as H 
notes above, the issues discussed here are all about language games and have 
nothing to do with science. In fact, as usual, if one translates into plain English 
there is very little of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and 
better by WS etc. countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown 
Books from 1933-35—if you don’t see the connection with all this try harder). It 
is not surprising that he makes no significant references to any of the above 
books or persons (the only reference to S is an article from 1958!), though in my 
view they are at the top of the list of the major figures in descriptive psychology. 
 
Rowland wants to discern the precise roles of the 4 E ‘aspects’ of mind 
(Enactive, Embodied, Embedded, Extended see p3) with the aim to show that 
he can combine the Extended and Embodied into the Amalgamated to yield a 
clear theory of mind.  Recall that W insisted that the activities of the mind lie 
open before us and theories or theses must be replaced by descriptions. 
 
Some sections of the book are reasonably successful at describing the nonsense 
that passes as philosophy of mind but there is much aimless wandering and 
many mistakes and confusions, all couched in infelicitous jargon. This will 
hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I 
cannot record more than a few of the comments I made in my two readings of 
this book. Major flaws, common to most writing in the behavioral sciences, are 
the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two selves mode of describing personality 
that W pioneered (though nobody has noticed), the partial (or perhaps 
complete) embracing of the mechanical view of mind, and a failure to be clear 
about nature/nuture issues which the 4 E’s seem eager to fuse. The fast, 
automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the 
slow conscious dispositional thinking, believing and rule following of S2 and 
neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from the arbitrary cultural 
behaviors of S3. 
 
Thus, he is severely limited by failing to note clearly the difference between the 
automatic unconscious ‘rules’ of S1 perception and reflexive actions and the 
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deliberate conscious ‘rules’ of S2 thinking and understanding, both innate, and 
the arbitrary learned S3 rules that constitute the cultural veneer on behavior. S2 
rule following is just dispositional behavior of understanding propositions with 
COS. He says things somewhat like this (e.g., see p116, but not in clear and 
consistent terms and I doubt many will be able to wade thru it with any good 
results. 
 
It fails anywhere to make it clear that thinking, believing etc. are dispositions, 
hence propositional and true or false S2 functions and, like all dispositions, have 
clear meaning due to their public outer Conditions of Satisfaction and not to any 
private internal phenomena. This is another demonstration of the impossibility 
of private language and introspection and contrary to its supposed complexity, 
it is a simple fact that there can be no such thing as a private test to determine 
the truth of any statement. This is the major topic of the fine books by Budd and 
Johnston—the Inner phenomena that we experience vs the Outer behavior that 
constitutes language and social interaction. That is why this can be seen as a 
poor man’s version of W’s Inner and Outer watered down and smothered in 
jargon. If one thinks that where there’s smoke, there’s fire, then please see Hutto 
and Myin’s book for a razor-sharp account of the 4 E’s but someone who 
understands the critical need to differentiate the various LG’s of ‘information’, 
‘representation’, ‘content’ etc. and why none of these can be part of S1. Yes, the 
brain can only express itself via the muscles of mouth, arms and legs and yes, it 
is thus unavoidable that S2 dispositions can only be manifested in public acts 
like speech and movement—that is, in the WS framework they have Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS). “I am driving to Ohio” has to be said and heard and yes 
it needs a car, a road and the cognitive act of driving and if you like you can call 
these these external embodiments, enactive, embedded or extended aspects of 
mind, but exactly what is achieved? It is the most trivial of truisms that our mind 
needs a brain and the brain a body and the body a world but what is useful 
about including the car, the gas, the engine, the road and Ohio as part of 
cognition? Yes, in some sense they are all signs or creations of intentionality 
since created by us, but how about the trees, birds and clouds? Only theists 
could be happy with that. We inherit our genes, biochemistry, physiology, 
anatomy and abilities (e.g., dispositions such as thinking) but not the car in any 
useful sense and certainly not the clouds, and isn’t this the crucial thing? The 4 
E’s and Rowlands’ Amalgamated Mind seem to want to fuse dispositions with 
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intentions and actions and results and the world (see p127-129) and look a lot 
like back door attempts to merge nature and nurture, a return to blank slateism 
and TPI. Not a happy ending. 
 
W destroyed the mechanical or reductionist, computationalist, behaviorist, 
functionalist, Strong AI view of mind (yes, they seem to be different, but the 
mistakes are pretty much the same) and for those who didn’t get it, S, H and 
many others carried on. Nevertheless, these incoherencies continue to dominate 
cognitive science and philosophy. Rowlands says he will mostly avoid 
functionalism, yet if he realized its bankruptcy why bring it up again and again, 
and he tells us p103 that the extended mind (one of the two pillars of his theory) 
is “predicated on a liberal conception of functionalism” and in detail on p100 
and 104 how they go hand in hand. 
 
Rowlands’ discussion of cognitive bloat (p128 etc.) makes reference to S’s 
“underived” content, but his only ref to S’s work is over 50 years old. Since then 
S has called this “intrinsic intentionality” that includes all of S1 and S2 (i.e., all 
cognition) and which contrasts with “derived” or “ascribed” which is ascribed 
by us to machines and other artifacts and events and is of course NOT 
intentionality (cognition or psychology). In this sense animals have only 
intrinsic and not ascribed intentionality. But he seems to get this sense of 
derived mixed up with his sense in which it refers to the personal level S2, as 
opposed to the nonderived or subpersonal level S1 (see p117-19). If you want to 
be really serious about your laptop being asleep and awake, and the car and the 
road being part of the mind, then cognition will extend into the universe, at 
least when doing philosophy, but it will not in this sense (except maybe in 
bizarre, rare, amusing or quite scary cases) enter into nor have any impact at all 
on real life. So, for me the 4 E’s as presented here are just more cartoon views of 
life. 
 
In contrast, the almost mathematically precise Radical Enactivism of Hutto and 
Myin only insists on the fact that S1 blends into the world as our perceptions, 
memories and reflex actions are automatic, unconscious, prelinguistic, 
contentless, informationless and without representation. Only the slow, 
conscious S2 dispositions fed by S1 have information, content and 
representation (COS). If you insist to apply these terms to S1 as well then please 
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differentiate I1, C1, R1, COS1 etc from I2, C2, R2, COS2 etc. for reasons I have 
mentioned above and in many other reviews. 
 
On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal 
level cognitive process can belong to a representational subject. This is the task 
of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we have 
the beautifully clear explanations of WSH, H&M etc., there is no point to 
torturing oneself with the rather aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the 
end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of postmodernist 
word salad for good measure. 
 
A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but ultimately exhausting and fruitless. 
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Endless Incoherence— A Review of Shoemaker's 
Physical Realization (2009)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which 
began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am 
one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the 
message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that it 
never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with 
Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath of fresh air when they 
discuss cognitive science (imagining they are still doing philosophy). As W 
showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal 
and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology. They occur not only in all 
thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. It’s easy to find examples 
in Hawking, Weinberg, Penrose, Green, who of course have no idea they have 
left science and entered metaphysics, that the statement they just made is not a 
matter of fact at all but a matter of conceptual (linguistic) confusion. “Law, 
event, space, time, force, matter, proof, connection, cause, follows, physical”, 
etc., all have clear uses in certain technical contexts, but these blend insensibly 
into quite different uses that have little in common but the spelling. 
 
Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, 
showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how 
our psychology (language) works and with this outline and the references I give 
it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the world in place 
of the metaphysical fantasies. If I were to debate Shoemaker we would never 
get beyond the title. 
 
Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
285  
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for 
bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” Blue Book p18 (1933) 
 
 
“The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one we thought quite innocent.” Wittgenstein, PI p308 
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"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
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its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy (in this context) is descriptive psychology. 
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Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which 
began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am 
one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the 
message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that it 
never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with 
Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath of fresh air when they 
discuss cognitive science (imagining they are still doing philosophy). As W 
showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal 
and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology. They occur not only in all 
thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. It’s easy to find examples 
in Hawking, Weinberg, Penrose, Green, who of course have no idea they have 
left science and entered metaphysics, that the statement they just made is not a 
matter of fact at all but a matter of conceptual (linguistic) confusion. “Law, 
event, space, time, force, matter, proof, connection, cause, follows, physical”, 
etc., all have clear uses in certain technical contexts, but these blend insensibly 
into quite different uses that have little in common but the spelling. 
 
Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, 
showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how 
our psychology (language) works and with this outline and the references I give 
it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the world in place 
of the metaphysical fantasies. If I were to debate Shoemaker we would never 
get beyond the title. As noted above “The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.”  The 
trick is already apparent in the title and if we let that slip the nonsense will 
never stop. "Physical realization" can be taken many ways and most of the time 
it is being used here in very peculiar ones. Likewise, for many other words, and 
W saw these tricks and dissected them in great detail beginning mainly in the 
Blue and Brown Books and continuing for the next 20 years. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
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mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of 
logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights 
into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection 
on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined 
foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as 
a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding – 
understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions 
into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the 
two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a 
vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be 
doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly describable in 
language, this being possible only with terms that substitute for public behavior 
(the impossibility of private language). He invented truth tables and predicted 
the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter designs which 
anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and 
which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, designed a 
heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist house, 
and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by others.  
He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. He described the psychology behind the Wason test--a 
fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate 
nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He described 
and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory 
of mind, long before practical computers. He decisively laid to rest skepticism 
and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of 
the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
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contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so 
after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker 
who gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case 
that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or 
receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, 
but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one 
believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
I will offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and 
Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New 
Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and 
about these two geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS 
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framework. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but 
I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to 
thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
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from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
A detailed explanation of the table is given in my other writings.  
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
Detailed explanations for this table are given in many of my other articles. 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
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of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior (e.g. metaphysics etc) is the 
need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of 
culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only 
fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions or abilities to act), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, 
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slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, 
propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self 
Referential (CSR), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, 
which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way 
home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 
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beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. 
S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the 
learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions 
that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ 
(TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
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countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner 
or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate 
his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons 
of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is right 
but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the 
inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
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no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as `EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence in a context 
that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" 
and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as 
S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes 
to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the 
wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish 
before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops 
my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I 
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should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were 
asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I 
do know." 
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS 
and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the 
way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, 
intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the 
COS that I express and which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle 
contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, 
with rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable 
acts. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, 
being misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's 
just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W 
makes clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate 
shared axiomatic psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as 
clear as day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests 
can only be public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’ as 
noted p191 of WAP. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language 
(‘propositional attitudes’) and 
W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection above and in my reviews of 
Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that the causal 
relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to 
describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really 
a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything 
except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern 
‘functionalist’, ‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms. See my review of 
Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example. 
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact. Unlike other cartoon views of life, 
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they are too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and 
it is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Unfortunately, not so with other cartoon theories like SSSM, BS and TPI, widely 
shared by religions, governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history, literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well-known facts, such as that 
personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their 
adoptive siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street. 
Religions big and small, political movements, and economics often generate or 
embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human 
nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, 
wishful thinking and selfishness and help to accelerate the destruction of the 
earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice).  The point is to realize 
that these fantasies are on a continuum and have the same source. All of us are 
born with a cartoon view of life and few ever grow out of it. But the world is 
not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoons collide with 
reality. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. This is truly sad, but it is absolutely 
scandalous that the same is true of nearly all philosophy texts. 
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Scientism on Steroids: A Review of Freedom Evolves 
by Daniel Dennett  (2003) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But 
the people who say this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because our 
language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same 
questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ´to be´ that looks as if it 
functions in the same way as ´to eat and to drink´, as long as we still have the 
adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of 
a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over 
the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which 
no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a 
longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see the 
‘limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see 
beyond these.``   
 
This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 
years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has 
been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one of them. It is also curious that both 
he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous 
Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but 
Searle more or less got the point and Dennett did not, (though it is stretching 
things to call Searle or Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist 
(though he tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to 
Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be 
reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost, but it left the 
machine.  
 
Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) 
have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, 
intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event (and so 
on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion, but as soon as we leave normal 
life and enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from the environment 
in which language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which the words had 
meaning) chaos reigns. Like most, Dennett lacks a coherent framework - which 
Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this 
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considerably since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail 
what is wrong with Dennett's approach to philosophy, which one might call 
Scientism on steroids. Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--
´Ambition is the death of thought´. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were   the Greeks.  
But the people who say this   don´t understand why it has to be so.  It is because 
our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the 
same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb  ´to  be´ that  looks as if 
it  functions  in the  same way as ´to eat´ and  ´to  drink´,  as  long as we still 
have the adjectives  ´identical´, ´true´,  ´false´,  ´possible´, as long as we continue 
to  talk of a river of time, of  an expanse of space, etc., etc., people  will keep 
stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s 
more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people 
think they can see `the limits of human understanding´, they believe of course 
that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language”.  
 
 “Ambition is the death of thought” 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
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definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we 
thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W PI p308 
 
These quotes are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who redefined philosophy some 
70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out).  Dennett, though he has 
been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one them. It is also curious that both he 
and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians 
(Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle at least partially 
got the point and Dennett did not. Dennett is a hard determinist (though he 
tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose 
famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book 
did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys 
making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed 
in detail. By accident, just before this book, I had read ´´The Minds I´´, which 
Dennett coauthored with Douglas Hofstadter in 1981. They made some bad 
mistakes (see my review), and saddest of all, they reprinted two famous articles 
that pointed the way out of the mess--- Nagel´s `What is like to be a bat?` and 
an early version of John Searle´s Chinese Room argument explaining why 
computers don´t think. 
 
Nagel pointed out that we do not even know how to recognize what a concept 
of a bat´s mind would be like.  Searle similarly explained how we lack a way to 
conceptualize   thinking and how it differs from what a computer does (e.g., it 
can translate Chinese without understanding it). Likewise, we lack a clear test 
for recognizing what counts as good vs bad--or just intelligible-- for many 
philosophical and scientific concepts. Our use of the words consciousness, 
choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, 
happened, event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as 
soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any discussion 
detached from the environment in which language evolved—i.e., the exact 
context in which the words had meaning) chaos  reigns. Wittgenstein was the 
first to understand why and to point out how to avoid this. Unfortunately, he 
died in his prime, his works are composed almost entirely of a series of 
examples of how the mind (language) works, and he never wrote any popular 
books, so understanding of his work is restricted to a very few. 
 
Searle is one of the world´s leading philosophers and has written many 
extremely clear and highly regarded articles and books, some of which have 
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pointed out the glaring defects in Dennett´s work. His review ``Consciousness 
Explained Away´´ of Dennett’s 1991 book `´Consciousness Explained´´ and   his 
book ´´The Mystery of Consciousness´´ are very well -known, and show, in a 
way that is amazingly clear for philosophical writing, why neither Dennett (nor 
any of the hundreds of philosophers and scientists who have written on this 
topic) have come close to explaining the hard problem—i.e., how do you 
conceptualize consciousness. Of course in my view (and Wittgenstein’s) there 
is no ‘hard problem’ only confusion about the use of language.  Many suspect 
we will never be able to ‘conceptualize’ any of the really important things 
(though I think W made it clear that they are mixing up the very hard scientific 
issue with the very simple issue of how to use the word), but it is clear that we 
are nowhere near it now as a scientific issue. My own view is that the scientific 
issue is straightforward as we can see ‘consciousness’ being put together a few 
neurons at a time by evolution and by development. And the ‘concept’ is a 
language game like any others and one just needs to get clear (specify clear 
COS) about how we will use the word. 
 
Dennett has mostly ignored his critics but has favored Searle with vituperative 
personal attacks. Searle has been accused by Dennett and others of being out to 
destroy cognitive psychology which is quite funny, as modern philosophy is in 
the narrow academic sense a branch of cognitive psychology (the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought), and Searle has made it very clear for 30 
years that WE are a good example of a biological machine that is conscious, 
thinks, etc. He just points out that we don´t have any idea how this happens. 
Searle characterizes as ´´intellectual pathology´´, the views of Dennett and all 
those who deny the existence of the very phenomena they set out to explain. 
 
Dennett repeats his mistakes here and leaves his reply to his critics to the 
penultimate page of the book, where we are told that they are all mistaken and 
it is a waste of space to show how!  Unsurprisingly, there is not one reference 
to Wittgenstein or Searle in the entire book. There are however, many references 
to other old school philosophers who are as confused as he is. It is scientism 
writ large—the almost universal mistake of mixing together the real empirical 
issue of science with the issues of how the language is to be used (language 
games) of philosophy. 
 
Like most people, it does not cross his mind that the very inference engines he 
thinks with are forcing him to come to certain conclusions and that these will 
often be quite unconnected with or wrong about the way things are in the 
world. They are a jumble of evolutionary curiosities which do various tasks in 
organizing behavior that were useful for survival hundreds of thousands of 
years ago. Wittgenstein was a pioneer in doing thought experiments in 
cognitive psychology and began to elucidate the nature of these engines and 
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the subtleties of language in the 30´s, and thus he made the sorts of comments 
that this review begins with. 
 
Dennett says (p98) that his view is compatibilism, i.e., that free will (which I 
hope, for coherence, we can equate with choice) is compatible with determinism 
(i.e., that ´´there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future´´--p25).  
He wants to show that determinism is not the same as inevitability. 
 
However, the whole book is smoke and mirrors by means of which choice, in 
the sense we normally understand it, disappears and we are left with ``choice``, 
which is something we cannot choose. Naturally, this echoes the fate of 
consciousness in his earlier book ``Consciousness Explained``. 
 
It is remarkable that, at a time when we are just beginning to reach the point 
where we might be able to understand the basics of how a single neuron works 
(or how an atom works for that matter), that anyone should think they can make 
the leap to understanding the whole brain and to explain its most complex 
phenomena. Please recall the last sentence of Wittgenstein from the opening 
quote: ´´ And what´s more, this satisfies a longing forthe transcendent, because, 
insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human understanding´, they 
believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` The language games are 
highly varied and exquisitely context sensitive so everyone gets lost.  If we are 
very, very careful, we can lay out the language games (e.g., specify the 
Conditions of Satisfaction of various statements using the words consciousness, 
choice, reality, mind etc.) and clarity becomes possible, but Dennett throws 
caution to the winds and we are dragged into the quicksand. 
 
There are at least 3 different topics here (evolution of our brain, choice and 
morality) and Dennett tries vainly to weld them together into a coherent 
account of how freedom evolves from the deterministic crashing of atoms. 
There is, however, no compelling reason to accept that bouncing atoms (or his 
favorite example, the game of life running on a computer) are isomorphic with 
reality. It never occurs to him that unless he exactly specifies a context and so 
the COS (Conditions of Satisfaction—i.e., what makes the statements true or 
false), his statements lack meaning.  He knows that quantum indeterminacy (or 
the uncertainty principle) is a major obstacle to determinism, however defined 
(and has been taken by many as an escape to freedom), but dismisses it due to 
the fact that such events are too rare to bother with. By extension, it’s unlikely 
that any such event will happen now or even in our whole lifetime in our brain, 
so we appear to be stuck with a determined brain (whatever that may be, i.e., 
he never specifies the COS). However, the universe is a big place and it’s been 
around a long time (perhaps ‘forever’) and if even one such quantum effect 
occurs it would seem to throw the whole universe into an indeterminate state. 
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The notion ´´there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future´´ 
cannot be true if at any instant, a quantum indeterminacy can occur--in this case 
there would seem to be infinitely many possible futures. But again, what exactly 
are the COS of this statement? This recalls one of the escapes from the 
contradictions of physics—each instant our universe is branching into infinitely 
many universes. 
 
He correctly rejects the idea that quantum indeterminacy gives us the answer 
to how we can have choice. This obvious idea has been suggested by many, but 
the problem is that nobody has any idea how to specify an exact sequence of 
steps which starts with the equations of physics and ends up with the 
phenomena of consciousness (or any other emergent phenomenon). If so, they 
will definitely win at least one Nobel Prize, for not only will they have 
‘explained’ consciousness, they will have ‘explained’ (or much better 
‘described’ as Wittgenstein insisted) the universal phenomenon of emergence 
(how higher order properties emerge from lower ones). So, they would have to 
solve the ´easy´ problem (to determine the exact state of the brain 
corresponding to some mental state and preferably specify the exact position of 
all the atoms in the brain over time-ignoring uncertainty) and the ´hard´ one 
(what exactly correlates with or produces consciousness or choice etc.?). And 
while they are at it how about also doing the impossible--an exact and full 
solution to the quantum field equations for a brain. It is very well known that 
these equations are uncomputable, even for one atom or a vacuum, as it would 
require an infinite amount of computer time. But infinite will do for one atom 
so maybe a brain will take no longer. It never crosses his mind (nor anyone I 
have seen) that nobody can make clear how an atom ‘emerges’ from electrons, 
neutrons and protons or a molecule emerges from atoms nor cells from 
molecules etc. Yes, there are some equations but if you look carefully you will 
see lots of hand waving and facts that are just accepted as ‘the way things are’ 
and so I think it clearly is the same with consciousness, color, choice, pain 
emerging from bunches of cells.  Of course, after Wittgenstein we realize that 
mixed up with the scientific questions are the philosophical ones—i.e., the 
different uses (meanings, COS) of the words are not kept clear and so the 
discussions are mostly incoherent.  
 
He starts off on the first page appealing to the laws of  physics for  protection  
against fantastic notions such as immaterial souls, but physics is made of 
notions just as fantastic (uncertainty, entanglement, wave/particle duality, 
Schrodinger´s dead/alive cat etc.) and as Feynmann said many times ``Nobody 
understands physics!´´ Many think nobody ever will and I am one of many who 
say there is nothing to ‘understand’ but rather there is just lots of ‘things’ along 
with existence, space, time, matter etc. to accept. There is a limit to what our 
tiny brain can do and maybe we are at that limit now.  
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Even if we create a massive computer that could understand (in some sense) far 
better than we, it is not clear that it could explain to us. Understanding an idea 
requires a certain level of intelligence or power (e.g., holding a certain number 
of things in mind and performing a certain number of calculations/second). 
Most people will never grasp the abstruse math of string theory no matter how 
long they have to do it. And it is not clear that string theory (or any other) makes 
sense as a mathematical (i.e., real) representation of our world.  This requires 
clear COS which I think string theory, the quantum theory of mind etc etc lack.  
So, there is good reason to suppose that our supersmart computer, even if we 
teach it how to think in the ‘same’ sense that we do, will never be able to explain 
really complex things to us. But as always we are need to specify the exact 
context to be able to see the meanings (COS) of the words and most science of 
this sort has no awareness of the problem.  
 
On the first page is one of his favorite quotes, which compares the brain to a 
bunch of tiny robots, and on pg2 he says that we are made of mindless robots. 
But what are the COS for an entity having a mind?  The way the brain (and any 
cell) works is nothing at all like the way robots work and we don´t even know 
how to conceptualize the difference (i.e., we know how robots work but not 
how brains work—e.g., how do they make choices, understand images and 
motives etc.). As I noted above, this was pointed out by Searle 30 years ago but 
Dennett (and countless others) just does not get it. 
 
We are also told on the first page that science will let us understand our freedom 
and give us a better foundation for our morality. So far as I can see, neither 
science nor philosophy, nor religion, has any effect on our understanding of our 
freedom or morality.  Although he discusses the biology of altruism and 
rational choice at length, he never mentions the abundant evidence from 
cognitive psychology that our moral intuitions are built in and demonstrable in 
4 year old children.  Instead, he spends much time trying to show how choice 
and morality come from memories of events and our interaction with others.  
On  pg2 he says our values have little to do with the ‘goals’ of our cells and on 
pg2 to 3 that our personality differences are due to how our ´´robotic teams are 
put together, over a lifetime of growth and experience.`` This is a bald dismissal 
of human nature, of the abundant evidence that our differences are to a large 
extent programmed into our genes and fixed in early childhood, and is typical 
of his constant confused wandering back and forth between determinism and 
environmentalism (i.e., his view that we develop morality over time by 
experience and by thinking aboutmoral issues). But again he mixes scientific 
issues with philosophical ones, i.e., exactly what game are we playing with 
“robot”, “mind”, “determined”, “free” etc.?  Many other sections of the book 
show the same confusion.  Those who don´t know the scientific evidence may 
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wish to read Pinker´s ´ ´The Blank Slate´´, Boyer´s´´Religion Explained´´ and any 
of the hundred or so recent texts, and tens of thousands of articles and web 
pages on personality development, and evolutionary and cognitive psychology. 
 
On pg4 he says bison don´t know they are bison and that we have known we 
are mammals for only a few hundred years. Both show a fundamental lack of 
understanding of cognitive psychology. The cognitive templates for ontological 
categories were evolved, in their original forms, hundreds of millions of years 
ago and animals have the inborn ability to recognize others of their species and 
of other species and classes of animals and plants and objects without any 
learning sufficient to establish categories. Bison know they are like other bison 
and our ancestors knew they were like other mammals and that reptiles were 
different but similar to each other etc.   Cognitive studies have shown these 
types of abilities in very young children. Again are we using “know” in its 
System 1 prelinguistic sense or in its System 2 linguistic one?  See my other 
writings for the utility of the two systems of thought viewpoint.  
 
Of course, it is true that the words ´bison´ and ´mammal´ are recent, but they 
have nothing to do with how our brains work. 
 
On page 5 he attributes postmodernism´s hostility to science as a product of 
´fearful thinking´ but does not speculate why that is. In spite of his acquaintance 
with cognitive psychology he does not see that this is likely due to the fact that 
many science results clash with the feelings normally produced by the 
operation of the inference engines for intuitive psychology, coalition, social 
mind, social exchange, etc. as I discuss elsewhere. 
 
On page 9 he notes that free will is a problem and our attitudes to it make a 
difference, but for whom? Nobody but philosophers. We make choices. What´s 
the problem? One has to step outside life to experience a problem and then 
everything becomes a problem. What are consciousness, pain, yellow, 
intention, matter, quarks, gravity etc.? I doubt that any normal person has ever 
experienced a fundamental change in their interactions with people or their 
decision-making processes due to their thinking about choice. This shows that 
there is something strange about such questions. Wittgenstein shows that the 
language games are different. There are games for language connected with the 
cognitive templates for decisions, or seeing colors etc., and thinking 
philosophically is typically using the words in the wrong context or without 
any clear context (one can call this decoupled), so without clear COS (meaning).   
 
Decoupled modes permit thinking about the past, planning for the future, 
guessing the mental states of others, etc., but if one takes the results in the 
wrong way and starts to think `´John will try to steal my wallet´´, rather than 
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just imagining that John might do it, confusion enters and those who cannot 
turn off the decoupled mode or distinguish it from coupled mode, enter the 
realm of pathology. Some aspects of schizophrenia and other mental illness 
might be seen this way--they lose control of which mode they are in, e.g., not 
being able to see the difference between the motives people have and the 
motives they might have, between one language game and another. 
 
One can then see much of the philosophizing people do as operating in these 
decoupled (counterfactual) modes, but failing to be able to keep in front of them 
the differences from the normal mode. Normal mode—e.g., what is that lion 
doing-- was undoubtedly the first one evolved and decoupled modes--what did 
that lion do last time or what does he intend to do next--evolved later. This was 
probably never a problem for animals--any animal that spent too much time 
worrying about what might happen would not be very successful contributing 
to the gene pool. 
 
 It is interesting to speculate that only when humans developed culture and 
began degenerating genetically, could large numbers of people survive with 
genes that led them to spend alot of time in decoupled modes. Hence, we have 
philosophy and this book, which is mostly about running the decision 
templates in decoupled mode where there are no real consequences except 
earning royalties for putting the results in a book for other people to use to run 
their engines in decoupled mode. Let us alter Wittgenstein´s quote to read: ´´As 
long as there continues to be a verb ´to decide´ that looks as if it functions in the 
same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we continue to talk of freedom of 
action, of saying I wish I had done otherwise, etc., etc., people will keep 
stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.´´ 
 
As with most philosophy books, nearly every page, often every paragraph, 
changes from one type of language game to another, without noticing that now 
one would have to be joking or dreaming or acting in a play or reciting a story, 
etc., and not actually intending anything, nor describing an actual situation in 
the world. On page 10 he says we count on free will for the whole way of 
thinking about our lives, like we count on food and water, but whoever, outside 
philosophy, standing in front of lunch counter full of food, ever thinks how fine 
it is that they have free will so they can pick coke instead of mineral water? Even 
if I want to be a serious compatibilist and try thinking this in decoupled mode, 
I have to exit and enter nondecoupled mode to make the actual choice. Only 
then can I go back to decoupled mode to wonder what might have happened if 
I had not had the ability to make a real choice.  
 
Wittgenstein noted how pretend games are parasitic on real ones (this is not a 
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trivial observation!). The ability to engage in very complex decoupled scenarios 
is already evident in 4 year old children. So, I would say that normally, nobody 
counts on having choice, but rather we just choose. As Wittgenstein made clear 
it is action based on certainty that is the bedrock of our life. See the recent 
writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and my other writings. 
 
On the same page, he shows again that he does not grasp cognitive basics. He 
says we learn to conduct our lives in the conceptual atmosphere of choice, and 
that `´It appears to be a stable and ahistorical construct, as eternal and 
unchanging as arithmetic, but it is not.´´ And on page 13--´´It is an evolved 
creation  of human activity and beliefs´´. The whole thrust of cognitive 
psychology (and Wittgenstein) is that we do NOT (and CANNOT) learn the 
basics of planning, deciding, promising, resenting, etc., but that these are built-
in functions of the inference engines that work automatically and unconsciously 
and start running in very early childhood.  
 
On pg 14 he suggests it’s probable that our having free will depends on our 
believing we have it! Do we believe we see an apple, feel a pain, are happy? The 
language game of belief is very different from that of knowing in the words are 
incoherent (no clear COS) in the way that Dennett often uses them. We can 
believe we have a dollar in our pocket, but if we take it out and look at it we 
can´t meaningfully then say that we still believe it (except as a joke etc.). The 
inference engine can run in decoupled (belief) mode so we can imagine having 
choices or making them, but in life we just make them, and it is only in very 
odd situations we can say that we believe we made a choice. But Dennett is 
saying this is the universal case. If making a choice had any dependence on 
belief than so would everything else-- consciousness, seeing, thinking, etc. If we 
take this seriously (and he says ´the serious problems of free will´) then we are 
getting into trouble and if we actually try to apply it to life, then madness is 
minutes away. He, like all philosophers until recently, had no clue that 
Wittgenstein showed us the way out of this need to ground our actions on 
beliefs by describing the actual basis of knowing which is the ungrounded 
‘hinges’ or automatisms of System 1 thinking in his last work ‘On Certainty’. 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has explained this over the last decade and I have 
summarized her work and incorporated it in my reviews and articles. 
 
On page 65 et seq., he discusses causation, intention and the `informal 
predicates´ that we use to describe atoms etc., but cognitive research has shown 
that we describe all ‘objects’ with a limited number of ontological categories, 
which we analyze with our intuitive physics modules, and that when agents 
(i.e., animals or people or things like them—i.e., ghosts or gods) are involved, 
we use our concepts (engines) for agency, intuitive psychology, social minds, 
etc. to decide how to behave. There is almost certainly no causation module but 
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rather it will involve all of these and other inference engines, depending on the 
precise situation. Discussing possibility and necessity is much easier if one talks 
in terms of the output of our modules for intuitive physics, agency, ontological 
categories etc. Of course, there is no mention here of Wittgenstein´s many 
incisive comments on the language games of causation, intention, deciding, nor 
of Searle´s classic works on Intention and Social Reality. 
 
He spends much time on Ainslie´s book ´Breakdown of Will´, in which is 
discussed the hyperbolic discounting faculties (i.e., inference engines) by which 
we evaluate probable outcomes.   
 
He makes much of the excellent work of Robert Frank on altruism, emotion and 
economics, but the book he cites was 15 years old when this book was 
published. It was Bingham´s idea, amplified by Frank and by Boyd and 
Richardson (1992) that cooperation was greatly stimulated by the evolution of 
means for punishing cheaters.  He suggests these as examples of Darwinian 
approaches that are obligatory and promising.  Indeed, they are, and in fact they 
are standard parts of economic, evolutionary and cognitive theory, but 
unfortunately, he makes little reference to the other work in these fields. All that 
work tends to show that people do not choose but their brains choose for them 
(System 1 fast automatic ‘choices’ vs System 2 slow deliberative ‘choices’).   He 
does not establish any convincing connection between this work and the 
general problem of choice and like nearly all philosophers has no grasp of the 
powerful two systems of thought framework.  
 
Philosophers of all stripes have been hypnotized by their ability to decouple the 
inference engines to play `what if´´ games, loving to put counterintuitive tags 
on ontological categories (i.e., if Socrates was immortal etc.). In this respect, they 
share some elements with primitive religion (see Boyer). This is not a joke, nor 
an insult, but merely points out that once one has a grasp of modern cognitive 
concepts, one sees that they apply thoughout the whole spectrum of human 
activity (and it would be odd if they did not). But as Wittgenstein explained so 
beautifully, the language games and the inference engines of S2 have their 
limits--explanations come to an end--we hit bedrock (S1). But the philosopher 
thinks he can see beyond it and walks out on the water, or as Wittgenstein put 
it, into absolute darkness.  
 
On pg 216 he says that making oneself so that one could not have done 
otherwise is a key innovation in the evolutionary ascent to free will, and that 
we can only be free if we learn how to render ourselves insensitive to 
opportunities. Again, one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear 
COS) for anything, and Dennett does not even begin to clarify the COS. And 
how these ‘abilities’ function (i.e., the games of ‘will’, ‘self’, ‘choice’, ‘cause’ etc.) 
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is never made clear.  Dennett has a penchant for hiding his ideas in a massive 
amount of rather irrelevant text (i.e., he is a true philosopher!).  
 
Again, he gets things backwards, as there is a vast body of very good evidence 
from biology and psychology that we get the feelings that we should behave in 
some way from our inference engines, and these are not provided by some part 
of our conscious self, but by the automatic and unconscious operation of the 
engines. As he notes, hundreds of experiments with the Prisoner´s Dilemma 
and related protocols have shown how easy it is to manipulate people´s choices 
and that their calculations are not conscious and deliberate at all and in fact 
much of modern psychological, sociological and neuroeconomics research is 
devoted to distinguishing the automatisms of S1 from the deliberative thinking 
of S2 and showing how S1 rules. 
 
When the situation is manipulated to make people conscious, they are much 
slower and less reliable (S2). So, there has been constant pressure of natural 
selection to make the engines fast and automatic and inaccessible to deliberate 
thought. 
 
Dennett says `we make ourselves´ so that we could not do otherwise and that 
this is the basis of morality and choice. The evidence is exactly the opposite. Our 
inference engines give us basic moral intuitions and we generally act in accord 
with the results. If we or others do not, we feel guilt, outrage, resentment etc., 
and then cheater genes will invade the population and this is one of the main 
theories as to how a good part of morality evolved. Our genes make us so we 
can´t (mostly) do otherwise, not our will or whatever Dennett thinks can do it. 
We can often choose to do otherwise, but our own intuitions and the knowledge 
of social disapproval usually serve to limit our choices. These intuitions evolved 
in small groups between 50,000 and some millions of years ago.  In the modern 
world, the intuitions are often not to our long-term advantage and the social 
controls weak. This is a prime reason for the inexorable progress into chaos in 
the world. 
 
On pg 225 he finally sneaks in a definition of free will as ´´a complicated snarl 
of mechanistic causes that look like decision making (from certain angles)”. He 
claims that this plays all the valuable roles of free will, but lacks some 
(unspecified) properties possessed by traditional free will. The smoke is thick 
but I am pretty sure one of those unspecified properties is what we understand 
as choice. He insists (top of pg 226) that his naturalistic account of decision 
making leaves plenty of room for moral responsibility, but making ourselves so 
we couldn´t do otherwise does not  describe the way we actually function, nor 
does it leave any room for morality, as that would consist precisely in being 
able to do otherwise. 
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He does not propose any test for deciding if a choice is voluntary or forced and 
I doubt he could do so. Normally if someone asks us to move our hand, we 
know what counts as having a choice, but, typical of philosophers, I expect that 
regardless of whether it moves or not he will count both as evidence for his 
position and of course if everything counts then nothing counts as Wittgenstein 
so trenchantly remarked many times. 
 
At this point he also starts his discussion of Libet´s well known work on 
conscious attention, which is the only part of the book that I felt was worth my 
time. However, Libet’s claim that we make decisions without awareness has 
been debunked many times, by both psychologists and philosophers (e.g., 
Searle and Kihlstrom). 
 
On page 253 et seq., he sneaks in his definition of conscious will—the ´´brains 
user illusion of itself´´´ which has as one of its main roles providing ´´me with 
the means of interfacing with myself at other times``. And ``Illusory or not, 
conscious will is the persons guide to his or her own moral responsibility for 
action. `` He says the trick we need is to see that ``I`´ control what is happening 
inside the ´´simplification barrier´´... ´´where decision making happens´´. 
``Mental events´´ become conscious by ´´entering into memory´´. ´´The process 
of self description... is what we are´´. The crucial thing is that choice is possible 
because the self is distributed over space (the brain) and time (memories). He 
realizes this is going to leave many incredulous (everyone who can follow this 
and really understands the bizarre language games!). ´´I know that many 
people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it seriously.  It seems to them to be 
a trick with mirrors, some kind of verbal slight of hand that whisks 
consciousness, and the real Self, out of the picture just when it was about to be 
introduced.´´ Many will say he took the words out of their mouth, but I would 
say it´s incoherent and that everything we know about consciousness and the 
whole universe (making the obvious extensions of such claims) was gone long 
before we got this far in his tome. And a careful look at the language games 
shows their lack of coherence (i.e., no clear Conditions of Satisfaction as I note 
in my articles). 
 
Like most philsophers and nearly all scientists who wax philosophical, he 
makes fatal mistakes in his first sentences – failure to use language in clear (i.e., 
meaningful) ways and all that follows is a house of cards. 
 
 Wittgenstein stated the issue with his usual aphoristic brilliance so I repeat it 
again. 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
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about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we 
thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W PI p308 
 
On pg 259 he says that culture has made us rational animals! This is a stunning 
denial of human (and animal) nature (i.e., genetics and evolution) coming from 
the person who wrote ´Darwin´s Dangerous Idea´´! 
 
Presumably he is talking about his idea that it is memories spread over space 
(the brain and other people) and time (much like Dawkins’ memes) that give us 
choices and morals and consciousness (line 6 from bottom). He says 
consciousness is a user-interface but it is never made clear who or where the 
user is and how it interfaces with the brain (you will have to suffer through 
´Consciousness Explained’ to find that there is no answer there either). Though 
he makes many references to evolutionary and cognitive psychology, he seldom 
uses any of the terminology that has been current for decades (social mind, 
intuitive psychology, coalitional intuitions etc.) and clearly is not familiar with 
most of the concepts. If he means that we got the fine details of morality from 
culture, that’s ok, but this is the S2 icing on the cake and the S1 cake was baked 
by the genes. 
 
We are also told here that R&D (by which he means evolution here, but other 
things elsewhere) has given us the self and that language creates a new kind of 
consciousness and morality. I am sure that he will get little agreement on this. 
It seems quite clear that consciousness and the basics of morality evolved in 
primates (and earlier) long before spoken language (though it is very 
contentious as to how language evolved from extant capacities in the brain). He 
continues ``morality memes arose by accident some tens of thousands of years 
ago`` which would be OK if he meant the icing on the cake but he clearly means 
the cake! And then he says the point of morality is not the survival of our genes, 
which is an amazing (and totally incorrect) thing to say, even if he was only 
referring to memes. 
 
On pg 260 he claims that because we do not comprehend our ´´bland 
dispositions to cooperate´´, they mean nothing to us, but it is the operation of 
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our templates (i.e., reciprocal altruism promoting inclusive fitness) that is 
everything to us and to every action of all animals. As Dawkins recently noted 
in his comments on E.O Wilson’s disastrous recent work supporting the 
phantasm of ‘group selection’, natural selection is inclusive fitness (see my 
review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’). There is ample evidence that 
if one of our many ‘templates’ is damaged, a person cannot function properly 
as a social being (e.g., autism, sociopathy, sczhizophrenia). I would say it is the 
operation of the templates for intuitive psychology etc., which lead people 
when philosophizing to the counterintuitive views that we do not have 
consciousness and choice.  
 
He also says here that it was one of the major evolutionary transitions when we 
were able to change our views and reflect on reasons for them. This again 
reflects his lack of understanding of evolutionary psychology. I know of no 
evidence that the basic moral intuitions, like all the templates, are accessible to 
consciousness but there is a huge body of work showing the opposite. We may 
decide our cheating was justifiable, or forgive someone else´s cheating, but we 
still know it was cheating (i.e., we cannot change the engine). I suspect my 
ancestors a million years ago had the same feelings in the same situation, but 
what has happened is that there are now lots of other things that may be taken 
as relevant, and that sometimes these will lead me to act contrary to my feelings.  
Another issue is that as culture developed, one had to make many important or 
´moral type` decisions for which the engines were not evolved to give a clear 
answer. 
 
On pg 267 he says that we now replace our `free floating rationales´ (probably 
corresponding to what cognitive psychologists call our templates or inference 
engines) with reflection and mutual persuasion. And on pg 286 he says that it 
is a child´s upbringing --demanding and giving reasons-- that affects moral 
reasoning. Again, he just has no grasp of what has happened in the last 30 years 
of research--the templates are innate S1 automatisms and cannot change with 
reflection or upbringing. We are then told again that consciousness makes 
moral issues available over time to the self, which takes responsibility. It is not 
any more coherent or credible with repetition. 
 
On pg 289 he has a chapter summary which repeats the mistaken notions that 
it is culture that makes it possible to reflect and that choice depends on 
education (memory) and sharing. It´s clear that it is not culture but the inherited 
cognitive structures that make it possible to reflect and to choose and that 
culture determines the acceptable actions and their rewards or punishments. 
On pg. 303 he discusses the classic philosophical barrier between ´ought´ and 
´is´, unaware that our templates solved that problem long ago— i.e., they tell us 
how to feel about situations regarding other people. He also seems to be 
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unaware that there are hundreds of ‘cultural’ universals implanted in our genes 
(e.g. see Pinker’s ´The Blank Slate´) and also of Searle’s classic paper “How to 
derive Ought from Is”.  
 
He often starts into what looks like it’s going to be a good discussion of some 
issues in evolutionary psychology, but invariably wanders off into 
philosophical arcana and winds up with more confusion. This happens on pg. 
261 where he states that concepts like ´praiseworthy´ were shaped over 
millennia by culture, while most would say the basis for such concepts is in the 
genes and each culture only determines the details of acceptable reactions to the 
intuitions its members get from their innate mechanisms. On pg 262 he tries to 
explain how an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) can produce morality. His 
idea here is that genetic `R&D` (i.e., evolution) produces dim understandings 
of morals and then culture (memetics) produces variations and clarifications. I 
would say that we all know, and much research has made clear, that we 
commonly get very clear results from our inference engines and only dimly 
understand in special cases. Culture merely decides what we can do about our 
feelings. 
 
The last part of the book is mostly concerned with moral culpability. He refers 
to the legal classic by Hart and Honore, which I started reading 30 years ago, 
since its authors were deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. Dennett tells us that 
we have control over our own morality and that thinking about morality will 
improve us. But, there seems no justification whatever for this view in this book. 
There is nothing at all here to help anyone escape from the dictates of the 
monkey mind and I am quite sure that when industrial civilization collapses in 
the 22nd century people will be acting as their ancestors did 200,000 years ago. 
It is a defensible point of view that those who manage to escape do so by 
traveling a spiritual path that has no connection with philosophy - and there is 
not a hint of spirituality in this entire book--another telling point considering 
that many mystics have fascinating things to say about the functioning of the 
mind. I find more wisdom about how to be free and moral in any of Osho´s 200 
books and tapes than anywhere in philosophy. 
 
Unsurprisingly, one rarely finds spiritually and morally advanced people 
teaching at universities. There is no sign here, nor in anything he has done, that 
Dennett is morally superior. After 40 years of thinking about morality he 
launches personal attacks on his critics or arrogantly dismisses them. It seems 
clear that, like all of us, he is trapped in the limits of his inference engines. 
 
So, how much opportunity is there to improve our morality? It seems clear (e.g., 
see Pinker´s `The Blank Slate`) that most of our behavior is genetic and the rest 
due to unknown factors in our environment, in spite of the vigorous efforts of 
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parents and religions and political parties. On average, maybe 5% of the 
variation in moral behavior (variations are the only thing we can study) is due 
to our own efforts (culture). The moral choices that matter most today are those 
affecting the fate of the world. But our templates were not evolved to deal with 
overpopulation (except by murder) and climate change (except by moving 
elsewhere and killing any opposition). 
 
How remarkable it would be if just one of the hundreds of millions of educated 
people in the world managed to figure out what consciousness or choice or any 
mental phenomenon really is (i.e., how to describe its neurophysiological 
correlates). And if one did, we would expect them to be a scientist at the cutting 
edge of research using some exotic fMRI equipment and the latest parallel 
processing neural networked fuzzy logic computer etc. And that would only 
mean they specify the neural circuits and biochemistry/genetics. So, they cannot 
answer the questions of philosophy (the language games of the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought). But it needs no answer –like the existence 
of space, time, matter, it’s just the way things are and the philosopher’s job is to 
clarify the language games we can play with these words  But a philosopher or 
physicist just sitting there thinking, coming up with a scientific solution to the 
greatest scientific puzzle there is! And then writing a whole book about it 
without checking with the sceptics first. To return to the quote at the beginning-
-´Ambition is the death of thought´. Indeed--though clearly Wittgenstein was 
thinking of profound thought! 
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Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas 
Hofstadter (2007) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor 
Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless 
philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility 
but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific 
issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language 
games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a 
framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of 
Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
“It might justly be asked what importance Gödel's proof has for our work. For 
a piece of mathematics cannot solve problems of the sort that trouble us. --The 
answer is that the situation, into which such a proof brings us, is of interest to 
us. 'What are we to say now?'--That is our theme. However, queer it sounds, 
my task as far as concerns Gödel's proof seems merely to consist in making clear 
what such a proposition as: ‘Suppose this could be proved’ means in 
mathematics.” Wittgenstein “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” 
p337(1956) (written in 1937). 
 
“My theorems only show that the mechanization of mathematics, i.e., the 
elimination of the mind and of abstract entities, is impossible, if one wants to 
have a satisfactory foundation and system of mathematics. I have not proved 
that there are mathematical questions that are undecidable for the human mind, 
but only that there is no machine (or blind formalism) that can decide all 
number- theoretic questions, (even of a very special kind) .... It is not the 
structure itself of the deductive systems which is being threatened with a 
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brakedown, but only a certain interpretation of it, namely its interpretation as a 
blind formalism.” Gödel "Collected Works" Vol 5, p 176-177. (2003) 
 
“All inference takes place a priori. The events of the future cannot be inferred 
from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. The 
freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known now. 
We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, like that of 
logical deduction. -- The connexion of knowledge and what is known is that of 
logical necessity. (“A knows that p is the case” is senseless if p is a tautology.) 
If from the fact that a proposition is obvious to us, it does not follow that it is 
true, then obviousness is no justification for belief in its truth.” TLP 5.133--
5.1363 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book” p6 
(1933) 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.” Wittgenstein TLP 6.52 (1922) 
 
I have read some 50 reviews of this books (that by quantum physicist David 
Deutsch was perhaps the best) and none of them provide a satisfying 
framework, so I will try to give novel comments that will be useful, not only for 
this book but for any book in the behavioral sciences (which can include ANY 
book, if one grasps the ramifications). 
 
Like his classic Gödel, Escher, Bach: The Eternal Golden Braid, and many of his 
other writings, this book by Hofstadter (H) tries to find correlations or 
connections or analogies that shed light on consciousness and all of human 
experience. As in GEB, he spends a great deal of time explaining and drawing 
analogies with the famous “incompleteness” theorems of Gödel, the 
“recursive” art of Escher and the “paradoxes” of language (though, as with 
most people, he does not see the need to put these terms in quotes, and this is 
the core of the problem). The idea is that their seemingly bizarre consequences 
are due to “strange loops” and that such loops are in some way operative in our 
brain. In particular, they may “give rise” to our self, which he seems roughly to 
equate with consciousness and thinking. As with everyone, when he starts to 
talk about how his mind works, he goes seriously astray. I suggest that it is in 
finding the reasons for this that the interest in this book, and most general 
commentary on behavior lies. 
 
I will contrast the ideas of ISL with those of the philosopher  (descriptive 
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psychologist of higher order thought) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W), whose 
commentaries on psychology, written from 1912 to 1951, have never been 
surpassed for their depth and clarity. He is an unacknowledged pioneer in 
evolutionary psychology (EP) and developer of the modern concept of 
intentionality. He noted that the fundamental problem in philosophy is that we 
do not see our automatic innate mental processes and how these generate our 
language games. He gave many illustrations (one can regard the entire 20,000 
pages of his nachlass as an illustration), some of them for words like “is” and 
“this”, and noted that all the really basic issues usually slip by without 
comment. A major point which he developed was that nearly all of our 
intentionality (roughly, our evolutionary psychology (EP), rationality or 
personality) is invisible to us and such parts as enter our consciousness are 
largely epiphenomenal (i.e., irrelevant to our behavior). The fact that nobody 
can describe their mental processes in any satisfying way, that this is universal, 
that these processes are rapid and automatic and very complex, tells us that 
they are part of the “hidden” cognitive modules (templates or inference 
engines) that have been gradually fixed in animal DNA over more than 500 
million years. Please see my other writings for details. 
 
As in virtually all writing which tries to explain behavior (philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, politics, theology, and even, as 
with H, math and physics), I am a Strange Loop (ISL) commits this kind of error 
(oblivion to our automaticity) continually and this produces the puzzles which 
it then tries to solve. The title of ISL comprises words we all know, but as W 
noted, word uses can be seen as families of language games (grammar) which 
have many senses (uses or meanings), each with its own contexts. We know 
what these are in practice but if we try describing them or philosophizing 
(theorizing) about them, we nearly always go astray and say things that may 
appear to have sense but lack the context to give them sense.  
 
It never crosses Hofstadter’s mind that both “strange” and “loop” are out of 
context and lack any clear sense (to say nothing about “I” and “am”!). If you go 
to Wikipedia, you find many uses (games as W often said) for these words and 
if you look around in ISL you will find them referred to as if they were all one. 
Likewise, for “consciousness”, “reality”, “paradox”, “recursive”, “self 
referential”, etc. So, we are hopelessly adrift from the very first page, as I 
expected from the title. A loop in a rope can have a very clear sense and likewise 
a diagram of a steam engine governor feedback loop, but what about loops in 
mathematics and the mind? H does not see the “strangest loop” of all—that we 
use our consciousness, self and will to deny themselves! 
 
Regarding Gödel’s famous theorems, in what sense can they be loops? What 
they are almost universally supposed to show is that certain basic kinds of 
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mathematical systems are incomplete in the sense that there are “true” 
theorems of the system whose “truth” (the unfortunate word mathematicians 
commonly substitute for validity) or “falsity (invalidity) cannot be proven in 
the system. Though H does not tell you, these theorems are logically equivalent 
to Turing’s “incompleteness” solution of the famous halting problem for 
computers performing some arbitrary calculation. He spends a lot of time 
explaining Gödel’s original proof, but fails to mention that others subsequently 
found vastly shorter and simpler proofs of “incompleteness” in math and 
proved many related concepts. The one he does briefly mention is that of 
contemporary mathematician Gregory Chaitin—an originator with 
Kolmogorov and others of Algorithmic Information Theory-- who has shown 
that such “incompleteness” or “randomness” (Chaitin’s term-- though this is 
another game), is much more extensive than long thought, but does not tell you 
that both Gödel’s and Turing’s results are corollaries to Chaitin’s theorem and 
an instance of “algorithmic randomness”. You should refer to Chaitin’s more 
recent writings such as “The Omega Number (2005)”, as Hofstadter’s only ref. 
to Chaitin is 20 years old (though Chaitin has no more grasp of the larger issues 
here –i.e., innate intentionality as the source of the language games in math-- 
than does H and shares the ‘Universe is a Computer” fantasy as well). 
 
Hofstadter takes this “incompleteness” (another word (conceptual) game out of 
context) to mean that the system is self referential or “loopy” and “strange”. It 
is not made clear why having theorems that seem to be (or are) true (i.e., valid) 
in the system, but not provable in it, makes it a loop nor why this qualifies as 
strange nor why this has any relationship to anything else. 
 
It was shown quite convincingly by Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (i.e., shortly after 
Gödel’s proof) that the best way to look at this situation is as a typical language 
game (though a new one for math at the time)—i.e., the “true but unprovable” 
theorems are “true” in a different sense (since they require new axioms to prove 
them). They belong to a different system, or as we ought now to say, to a 
different intentional context. No incompleteness, no loops, no self reference and 
definitely not strange! W: “Gödel's proposition, which asserts something about 
itself, does not mention itself” and “Could it be said: Gödel says that one must 
also be able to trust a mathematical proof when one wants to conceive it 
practically, as the proof that the propositional pattern can be constructed 
according to the rules of proof? Or: a mathematical proposition must be capable 
of being conceived as a proposition of a geometry which is actually applicable 
to itself. And if one does this it comes out that in certain cases it is not possible 
to rely on a proof.” (RFM p336). These remarks barely give a hint at the depth 
of W’s insights into mathematical intentionality, which began with his first 
writings in 1912 but was most evident in his writings in the 30’s and 40’s. W is 
regarded as a difficult and opaque writer due to his aphoristic, telegraphic style 
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and constant jumping about with seldom and notice that he has changed topics, 
nor indeed what the topic is, but if one starts with his only textbook style 
work—the Blue and Brown Books --and understands that he is explaining how 
our evolved higher order thought works, it will all become clear to the 
persistent. 
 
W lectured on these issues in the 1930’s and this has been documented in several 
of his books. There are further comments in German in his nachlass (some of it 
formerly available only on a $1000 cdrom but now, like nearly all his works, on 
p2p torrents, libgen,io and b-ok.org. Canadian philosopher Victor Rodych has 
recently written two articles on W and Gödel in the journal Erkenntnis and 4 
others on W and math, which I believe constitute a definitive summary of W 
and the foundations of math. He lays to rest the previously popular notion that 
W did not understand incompleteness (and much else concerning the 
psychology of math). In fact, so far as I can see W is one of very few to this day 
who does (and NOT including Gödel! —though see his penetrating comment 
quoted above). Related forms of “paradox” which exercise H (and countless 
others) so much was extensively discussed by W with examples in math and 
language and seems to me a natural consequence of the piecemeal evolution of 
our symbolic abilities that extends also to music, art, games etc. Those who wish 
contrary views will find them everywhere and regarding W and math, they 
may consult Chihara in Philosophical Review V86, p365-81(1977). I have much 
respect for Chihara (I am one of few who have read his “A Structural Account 
of Mathematics” cover to cover) but he fails on many basic issues such as W’s 
explanations of paradoxes as unavoidable and almost always harmless facets of 
our EP. 
 
Years after I did this original review I wrote one on Yanofsky’s ‘Beyond the 
Limits of Thought’ and in the next few paragraphs I repeat here the comments 
on incompleteness I made there. In fact that whole review is relevant, especially 
the remarks on Wolpert. 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and 
full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., 
they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems 
unavoidable that everything derived from it—e.g. physics and math) will be 
“incomplete” also. Afaik the first of these in what is now called Social Choice 
Theory or Decision Theory (which are continuous with the study of logic and 
reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow over 60 
years ago, and there have been many since. Y notes a recent impossibility or 
incompleteness proof in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows 
that what looks like a simple choice stated in plain English has no solution. 
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Although one cannot write a book about everything, I would have liked 
Yanofsky to at least mention such famous “paradoxes” as Sleeping Beauty 
(dissolved by Rupert Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and 
Doomsday, where what seems to be a very simple problem either has no one 
clear answer, or it proves exceptionally hard to find one. A mountain of 
literature exists on Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more 
recent work, but I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. 
Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and 
others have done insightful work, it is only recently that W’s uniquely 
penetrating analysis of the language games being played in mathematics have 
been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on 
Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , 
and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book 
‘There’s Something about Godel ‘, and Rodych ( e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: 
the Newly Published Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments 
about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the 
online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics’ ). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and those with time 
might wish to consult his many other articles and books including the volume 
he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s work is indispensable, but 
only two of a dozen or so papers are free online with the usual search but of 
course it’s all free online if one knows where to look (e.g., libgen.io and b-
ok.org). 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., the use 
by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his 
“notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept 
his argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, 
metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words) 
as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and even 
claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental 
truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about 
how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many 
“revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, 
Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no practical impact whatsoever? 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very 
same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal 
system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, then 
it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same 
meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different 
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system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a 
formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence 
that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all 
arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, 
then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete 
meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics 
based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more 
important, the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some 
of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows 
them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s 
undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there 
cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the 
decidability of paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion 
Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a 
motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W commented 
many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and 
this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. W often 
noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable 
in other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case 
with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system 
(here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used 
in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. 
As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-
systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary 
counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one 
needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, 
‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of 
games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with 
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
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W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
In any case, it would seem that the fact that Gödel’s result has had zero impact 
on math (except to stop people from trying to prove completeness!) should have 
alerted H to its triviality and the “strangeness” of trying to make it a basis for 
anything. I suggest that it be regarded as another conceptual game that shows 
us the boundaries of our psychology. Of course, all of math, physics, and 
human behavior can usefully be taken this way. 
 
While on the topic of W, we should note that another work which H spends a 
lot of time on is Whitehead and Russell’s classic of mathematical logic 
“Principia Mathematica”, primarily since it was at least partly responsible for 
Gödel’s work leading to his theorems. W had gone from Russell’s beginning 
logic student to his teacher in about a year, and Russell had picked him to 
rewrite the Principia. But W had major misgivings about the whole project (and 
all of philosophy as it turned out) and, when he returned to philosophy in the 
30’s, he showed that the idea of founding math (or rationality) on logic was a 
profound mistake. W is one of the world’s most famous philosophers and made 
extensive commentaries on Gödel and the foundations of mathematics and the 
mind; is a pioneer in EP (though nobody seems to realize this); the discoverer 
of the basic outline and functioning of higher order thought and much else, and 
it is amazing that Dennett &H, after half a century of study, are completely 
oblivious to the thoughts of the greatest intuitive psychologist of all time 
(though they have almost 8 billion for company). There is, as some have 
remarked, a collective amnesia regarding W not only in psychology (for which 
his works should be in universal service as texts and lab manuals) but in all the 
behavioral sciences including, amazingly, philosophy. 
 
H’s association with Daniel Dennett (D), another famously confused writer on 
the mind, has certainly done nothing to help him learn new perspectives in the 
nearly 30 years since GEB. In spite of the fact that D has written a book on 
intentionality (a field which, in its modern version, was essentially created by 
W), H seems to have no acquaintance with it at all. Perceptions leading to 
memories, feeding into dispositions (inclinations)(W’s terms, also used by 
Searle, but called “propositional attitudes by others) such as believing and 
supposing, which are not mental states and have no precise duration etc/, are 
momentous advances in understanding how our mind works, which W 
discovered in the 20’s, but with threads going back to his writings before the 
first worldwar. 
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The Eternal Golden Braid is not realized by H to be our innate Evolutionary 
Psychology, now, 150 years later (i.e., since Darwin), becoming a burgeoning 
field that is fusing psychology, cognitive science, economics, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, religion, music (e.g., G. Mazzola’s “The Topos 
of Music”—topos are substitutes for sets, one of the great science (psychology) 
books of the 21st century, though he is clueless about W and most of the points 
in this review), art, math, physics and literature. H has ignored or rejected many 
persons one might regard as our greatest teachers in the realm of the mind—W, 
Buddha, John Lilly, John Searle, Osho, Adi Da (see his “The Knee of Listening”), 
Alexander Shulgin and countless others. The vast majority of the insights from 
philosophy, as well as those from quantum physics, probability, meditation, EP, 
cognitive psychology and psychedelics do not rate even a passing reference 
here (nor in most philosophical writings of scientists). 
 
Though there are some good books in his bibliography, there are many I would 
regard as standard references and hundreds of major works in cognitive 
science, EP, math and probability, and philosophy of mind and science that are 
not there (nor in his other writings). His sniping at Searle is petty and 
pointless—the frustration of someone who has no grasp of the real issues. In 
my estimation, neither H nor anyone else has provided a convincing reason to 
reject the Chinese room argument (the most famous article in this field) that 
computers don’t think (NOT that they cannot ever do something that we might 
want to call thinking— which Searle admits is possible). And Searle has (in my 
view) organized and extended W’s work in books such as “The Construction of 
Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action’-- brilliant summations of the 
organization of HOT (higher order thought—i.e., intentionality)—rare 
philosophy books you can even make perfect sense of once you translate a little 
jargon into English! H, D and countless others in cognitive science and AI are 
incensed with Searle because he had the temerity to challenge (destroy- I would 
say) their core philosophy –the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) almost 
30 years ago and continues to point this out (though one can say that W 
destroyed it before it existed). Of course, they (nearly) all reject the Chinese 
room or simply ignore it, but the argument is, in the view of many, 
unanswerable. The recent article by Shani (Minds and Machines V15, p207- 
228(2005)) is a nice summary of the situation with references to the excellent 
work of Bickhard on this issue. Bickhard has also developed a seemingly more 
realistic theory of mind that uses nonequilibrium thermodynamics, in place of 
Hofstadter’s concepts of intentional psychology used outside the contexts 
necessary to give them sense. 
 
Few realize that W again anticipated everyone on these issues with numerous 
comments on what we now call CTM, AI or machine intelligence, and even did 
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thought experiments with persons doing “translations” into Chinese. I had 
noticed this (and countless other close parallels with Searle’s work) when I came 
upon Diane Proudfoot’s paper on W and the Chinese Room in the book “Views 
into the Chinese Room” (2005). One can also find many gems related to these 
issues in Cora Diamond’s edition of the notes taken in W’s early lectures on 
math “Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 
1934(1976). W’s own “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” covers 
similar ground. One of the very few who has surveyed W’s views on this in 
detail is Christopher Gefwert, whose excellent pioneering book “Wittgenstein 
on Minds, Machines and Mathematics” (1995), is almost universally ignored. 
Though he was writing before there was any serious thought concerning 
electronic computers or robots, W realized that the basic issue here is very 
simple---computers lack a psychology (and even 70 years later we have barely 
a clue how to give them one), and it is only in the context of a being with a fully 
developed intentionality that dispositional terms like thinking, believing etc. 
make sense (have a meaning or clear COS), and as usual he summed it all up in 
his unique aphoristic way “But a machine surely cannot think! --Is that an 
empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is like one 
that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too. Look at the 
word "to think" as a tool.” (Philosophical Investigations p113). Out of context, 
many of W’s comments may appear insipid or just wrong, but the perspicacious 
will find that they usually repay prolonged reflection—he was nobody’s fool. 
 
Hofstadter, in all his writings, follows the common trend and makes much of 
“paradoxes”, which he regards as self references, recursions or loops, but there 
are many “inconsistencies” in intentional psychology (math, language, 
perception, art etc.) and they have no effect, as our psychology evolved to 
ignore them. Thus, “paradoxes” such as “this sentence is false” only tell us that 
“this” does not refer to itself or if you prefer that this is one of infinitely many 
arrangements of words lacking a clear sense. Any symbolic system we have 
(i.e., language, math, art, music, games etc.) will always have areas of conflict, 
insoluble or counterintuitive problems or unclear definitions. Hence, we have 
Gödel’s theorems, the liar’s paradox, inconsistencies in set theory, prisoner’s 
dilemmas, Schrodinger’s dead/live cat, Newcomb’s problem, Anthropic 
principles, Bayesian statistics, notes you can’t sound together or colors you can’t 
mix together and rules that can’t be used in the same game. A set of 
subindustries within Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, 
Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, Law, Political Science etc. and even the 
Foundations of Physics and Math (where it is commonly disguised as 
Philosophy of Science) has arisen which deals with endless variations on “real” 
(e.g., quantum mechanics) or contrived ((e.g., Newcomb’s problem—see 
Analysis V64, p187- 89(2004)) situations where our psychology –evolved only 
to get food, find mates and avoid becoming lunch—gives ambivalent results, or 
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just breaks down. 
 
Virtually none of those writing the hundreds of articles and countless books on 
these issues which appear yearly seem aware they are studying the limits of our 
innate psychology and that Wittgenstein usually anticipated them by over half 
a century. Typically, he took the issue of paradox to the limit, pointing to the 
common occurrence of paradox in our thinking, and insisted that even 
inconsistencies were not a problem (though Turing, attending his classes, 
disagreed), and predicted the appearance of inconsistent logical systems. 
Decades later, dialetheic logics were invented and Priest in his recent book on 
them has called W’s views prescient. If you want a good recent review of some 
of the many types of language paradoxes (though with no awareness that W 
pioneered this in the 1930’s and largely innocent of any grasp of intentional 
context) see Rosenkranz and Sarkohi’s “Platitudes Against Paradox” in 
Erkenntnis V65, p319-41(2006). Appearance of many W related articles in this 
journal is most appropriate as it was founded in the 30’s by logical positivists 
whose bible was W’s Tractus Logico Philosophicus. Of course, there is also a 
journal devoted to W and named after his most famous work— “Philosophical 
Investigations”. 
 
H, in line with nearly universal practice, refers often to our “beliefs” for 
“explanations” of behavior, but our shared psychology does not rest on belief—
we just have awareness and pains and know from infancy that animals are 
conscious, self-propelled agents that are different from trees and rocks. Our 
mother does not teach us that any more than a dog’s mother does and could not 
teach us! And, if this is something we learn, then we might teach a child (or a 
dog) that a bird and a rock are really the same kind of thing (i.e., to ignore innate 
intentional psychology). 
 
W clearly and repeatedly noted the underdetermination of all our concepts 
(e.g., see his comments on addition and the completion of series in Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics), which mandated their becoming innate (ie, 
evolution had to solve this problem by sacrificing countless quadrillions of 
creatures whose genes did not make the right choices). 
 
Nowadays this is commonly called the problem of combinatorial explosion and 
often pointed to by evolutionary psychologists as compelling evidence for 
innateness, unaware that W anticipated them by over 50 years. 
 
Our innate psychology does not rest on “beliefs” when it is clearly not subject 
to test or doubt or revision (e.g., try to give a sense to “I believe I am reading 
this review” and mean (i.e., find a real use in our normal life for) something 
different from “I am reading this review”). Yes, there are always derivative uses 
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of any sentence including this one, but these are parasitic on the normal use. 
Before any “explanations” (really just clear descriptions, as W noted) are 
possible, it has to be clear that the origins of our behavior lie in the axioms of 
our innate psychology, which are the basis for all understanding, and that 
philosophy, math, literature, science, and society are their cultural extensions. 
 
Dennett (and anyone who is tempted to follow him—i.e., everyone) is forced 
into even more bizarre claims by his skepticism (for I claim it is a thinly veiled 
secret of all reductionists that they are skeptics at heart—i.e., they must deny 
the “reality” of everything). In his book “The Intentional Stance” and other 
writings he tries to eliminate this bothersome psychology that puts animals in 
a different class from computers and the ‘physical universe’ by including our 
innate evolved intentionality with the derived intentionality of our cultural 
creations (i.e., thermometers, pc’s and airplanes) by noting that it’s our genes, 
and so ultimately nature (i.e., the universe), and not we that “really” has 
intentionality, and so it’s all “derived”. Clearly something is gravely amiss here! 
One thinks immediately that it must then also be true that since nature and 
genes produce our physiology, there must be no substantive difference between 
our heart and an artificial one we make from plastic. For the grandest 
reductionist comedy in recent years see Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science” 
which shows us how the universe and all its processes and objects are really 
just “computers” and “computation” (which he does not realize are intentional 
concepts having no meaning apart from our psychology and that he has NO 
TEST to distinguish a computation from a noncomputation—i.e., he eliminates 
psychology by definition). 
 
One sees that Dennett does not grasp the basic issues of intentionality by the 
title of his book. Our psychology is not a stance or attribution or posit about 
ourself, or other being’s mental lives, any more than it’s a “stance” that they 
possess bodies. A young child or a dog does not guess or suppose and does not 
and could not learn that people and animals are agents with minds and desires 
and that they are fundamentally different from trees and rocks and lakes. They 
know (live) these concepts (shared psychology) from birth and if they weaken, 
death or madness supervene. 
 
This brings us again to W who saw that reductionist attempts to base 
understanding on logic or math or physics were incoherent. We can only see 
from the standpoint of our innate psychology, of which they are all extensions. 
Our psychology is arbitrary only in the sense that one can imagine ways in 
which it might be different, and this is the point of W inventing odd examples 
of language games (i.e., alternative concepts (grammars) or forms of life). In 
doing so, we see the boundaries of our psychology. The best discussion I have 
seen on W’s imaginary scenarios is that of Andrew Peach in PI 24: p299-
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327(2004). 
 
It seems to me that W was the first one to understand in detail (with due 
respects to Kant) that our life is based on our evolved psychology, which cannot 
be challenged without losing meaning. If one denies the axioms of math, one 
cannot play the game. One can place a question mark after every axiom and 
every theorem derived from them but what is the point? Philosophers, 
theologians and the common person can play at this game as long as they don’t 
take it seriously. Injury, death, jail or madness will come quickly to those who 
do. Try to deny that you are reading this page or that these are your two hands 
or there is a world outside your window. The attempt to enter into a conceptual 
game in which these things can be doubted presupposes the game of knowing 
them—and there cannot be a test for the axioms of our psychology—anymore 
than for those of math (derived, as W showed, from our intuitive concepts) --
they just are what they are. In order to jump there must be some place to stand. 
This is the most basic fact of existence, and yet, it is a remarkable consequence 
of our psychology being automated that it is the hardest thing for us to see. 
 
It is an amusing sight indeed to watch people (everyone, not just philosophers) 
trying to use their intuitive psychology (the only tool we have) to break out of 
the bounds of our intuitive psychology. How is this going to be possible? How 
will we find some vantage point that lets us see our mind at work and by what 
test will we know we have it? We think that if we just think hard enough or 
acquire enough facts we can get a view of “reality” that others do not have. But 
there is good reason to think that such attempts are incoherent and only take us 
further away from clarity and sanity. W said many times in many ways that we 
must overcome this craving for “clarity”, the idea of thought underlaid by 
“crystalline logic”, the discovery of which will “explain” our behavior and our 
world and change our view of what it is to be human. 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
 On his return to philosophy in 1930 he said: 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got 
it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the 
realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already 
there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” 
(Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 and in his 
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Zettel P 312-314 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. ‘We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!” 
 
“This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place 
in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” 
 
Some might also find it useful to read “Why there is no deductive logic of 
practical reason” in Searle’s superb “Rationality in Action” (2001). Just 
substitute his infelicitous phrases “impose conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction” by “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world” and “world 
to mind directions of fit” by “cause originates in the world” and “cause 
originates in the mind”. 
 
Another basic flaw in H (and throughout scientific discourse, which includes 
philosophy, since it is armchair psychology) concerns the notions of 
explanations or causes. We have few problems understanding how these 
concepts work in their normal contexts, but philosophy is not a normal context. 
They are just other families of concepts (often called grammar or language 
games by W and roughly equivalent to cognitive modules, inference engines, 
templates or algorithms) comprising our EP (roughly, our intentionality) but, 
out of context, we feel compelled to project them onto the world and see “cause” 
as a universal law of nature that determines events. As W said, we need to 
recognize clear descriptions as answers which terminate the search for ultimate 
“explanations”. 
 
This gets us back to my comment on WHY people go astray when they try to 
“explain” things. Again, this connects intimately with judgements, decision 
theory, subjective probability, logic, quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
information theory, Bayesian reasoning, the Wason test, the Anthropic 
principle ((Bostrum “The Anthropic Principle” (2002)) and behavioral 
economics, to name a few. There is no space here to get into this rat’s nest of 
tightly linked aspects of our innate psychology, but one might recall that even 
in his pre-Tractatus writings, Wittgenstein commented that the idea of causal 
necessity is not a superstition but the source of superstition. I suggest that this 
seemingly trite remark is one of his most profound –W was not given to 
platitude nor to carelessness. What is the “cause” of the Big Bang or an electron 
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being at a particular “place” or of “randomness” or chaos or the “law” of 
gravitation? But there are descriptions which can serve as answers.  Thus, H 
feels all actions must be caused and “material” and so, with his pal D and the 
merry band of reductionist materialists, denies will, self and consciousness. D 
denies that he denies them, but the facts speak for themselves. His book 
“Consciousness Explained” is commonly referred to as “Consciousness 
Denied” and was famously reviewed by Searle as “Consciousness Explained 
Away”. 
 
This is especially odd in H’s case as he started out a physicist and his father won 
the Nobel prize in physics, so one might think he would be aware of the famous 
papers of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and of von Neumann in the 20’s and 
30’s, in which they explained how quantum mechanics did not make sense 
without human consciousness (and a digital abstraction won’t do at all). In this 
same period others including Jeffreys and de Finetti showed that probability 
only made sense as a subjective (i.e., psychological) method and Wittgenstein’s 
close friends John Maynard Keynes and Frank Ramsey first clearly equated 
logic with rationality, and Popper and others noted the equivalence of logic and 
probability and their common roots in rationality. There is a vast literature on 
interrelationships of these disciplines and the gradual growth of understanding 
that they are all facets of our innate psychology. Those interested might start 
with Ton Sales article in the Handbook of Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. Vol 9 
(2002) since it will also introduce them to this excellent source, now extending 
to about 20 Volumes (all on p2p libgen.io and b-ok.org). 
 
Ramsey was one of the few of his time who was capable of understanding W’s 
ideas and in his seminal papers of 1925-26 not only developed Keynes’ 
pioneering ideas on subjective probability, but also extended W’s ideas from 
the Tractatus and conversations and letters into the first formal statement of 
what later became known as substitutional semantics or the substitutional 
interpretation of logical quantifiers. (See Leblanc’s article in Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. V2, p53- 131(2002)). Ramsey’s premature death, 
like those of W, Von Neumann and Turing, were great tragedies, as each of 
them alone and certainly together would have altered the intellectual climate of 
the 20th century to an even greater degree. Had they lived, they might well have 
collaborated but as it was, only W realized he was discovering facets of our 
innate psychology. W and Turing were both Cambridge professors teaching 
classes on the Foundations of Mathematics—though W from the position that 
it rested on unstated axioms of our innate psychology and Turing from the 
conventional view that it was a matter of logic that stood by itself. Had these 
two homosexual geniuses become intimately involved, amazing things might 
have ensued. 
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I think everyone has these “deflationary” reductionist tendencies, so I suggest 
this is due to the defaults of intuitive psychology modules which are biased to 
assigning causes in terms of properties of objects, and cultural phenomena we 
can see and to our need for generality. Our inference engines compulsively 
classify and seek the source of all phenomena. When we look for causes or 
explanations, we are inclined to look outward and take the third person point 
of view, for which we have empirical tests or criteria, ignoring the automatic 
invisible workings of our own mind, for which we do not have such tests 
(another arena pioneered by W some 75 years ago). As noted here, one of W’s 
takes on this universal “philosophical” problem was that we lack the ability to 
recognize our normal intuitive explanations as the limits of our understanding, 
confusing the untestable and unchallengeable axioms of our System 1 
psychology with facts of the world which we can investigate, dissect and 
explain via System 2. This does not deny science, only the notion that it will 
provide the “true” and “real” meaning of “reality”. 
 
There is a vast literature on causes and explanations so I will only refer to Jeffrey 
Hershfield’s excellent article “Cognitivism and Explanatory Relativity” in 
Canadian J. of Philosophy V28 p505-26(1998) and to Garfinkel’s book “Forms of 
Explanation” (1981). This literature is rapidly fusing with those on 
epistemology, probability, logic, game theory, behavioral economics, and the 
philosophy of science, which seem almost completely unknown to H. Out of 
the hundreds of recent books and thousands of articles, one can start on this 
with Nancy Cartwright’s books, which provide a partial antidote to the 
“Physics and Math Rule the Universe” delusion. Or, one can just follow the 
links between rationality, causality, probability, information, laws of nature, 
quantum mechanics, determinism, etc. in Wikipedia and the online Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for decades (or, with W’s comments in mind, 
maybe only days) before one realizes he got it right and that we do not get 
clearer about our psychological “reality” by studying nature. One way to look 
at ISL is that its faults remind us that scientific laws and explanations are frail 
and ambiguous extensions of our innate psychology and not, as H would have 
it, the reverse. 
 
It is a curious and rarely noticed fact that the severe reductionists first deny 
psychology, but, in order to account for it (since there is clearly something that 
generates our mental and social life), they are forced into camp with the blank 
slaters (all of us before we get educated), who ascribe psychology to culture or 
to very general aspects of our intelligence (i.e., our intentionality is learned) as 
opposed to an innate set of functions. H and D say that self, consciousness, will, 
etc. are illusions—merely “abstract patterns” (the “spirit” or “soul” of the 
Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism). They believe that our “program” can 
be digitized and put into computers, which thereby acquire psychology, and 
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that “believing” in “mental phenomena” is just like believing in magic (but our 
psychology is not composed of beliefs—which are only its extensions-- and 
nature is magical). I suggest it is critical to see why they never consider that 
“patterns” (another lovely language game!) in computers are magical or 
illusory. And, even if we allow that the reductionist program is really coherent 
and not circular (e.g., we are too polite to point out –as do W and Searle and 
many others—that it has NO TEST for it’s most critical assertions and requires 
the NORMAL functioning of will, self, reality, consciousness etc., to be 
understood), can we not reasonably say “well Doug and Dan, a rose by any 
other name smells as sweet!” I don’t think reductionists see that even were it 
true that we could put our mental life in algorithms running in silicon (or--in 
Searle’s famous example—in a stack of beer cans), we still have the same “hard 
problem of consciousness”: how do mental phenomena emerge from brute 
matter? Nearly always overlooked is that one could regard the existence of 
everything as a ‘hard problem’. This would add yet another mystery with no 
obvious way to recognize an answer— what does it mean (why is it possible) 
to encode “emergent properties” as “algorithms”? If we can make sense out of 
the idea that the mind or the universe is a computer (i.e., can say clearly what 
counts for and against the idea), what will follow if it is or it isn’t? 
 
“Computational” is one of the major buzzwords of modern science, but few 
stop to think what it really means. It’s a classic Wittgensteinian language game 
or family of concepts (uses) that have little or nothing in common. There are 
analog and digital computers, some made of blocks or mechanical gears only 
(Babbage etc.), we compute by hand (as is well known, Turing’s first comments 
on this referred to humans who computed and only later did he think of 
machines simulating this), and physicists speak of leaves computing “their” 
trajectory as they fall from the tree, etc. etc. Each game has its own use 
(meaning) but we are hypnotized by the word into ignoring these. W has 
analyzed word games (psychological modules) with unsurpassed depth and 
clarity (see esp. the long discussion of knowing how to continue a calculation 
in the Brown Book), understanding of which should put an end to the 
superstitious awe which generally surrounds this word and all words, 
thoughts, feelings, intuitions etc. 
 
It’s dripping with irony that D wrote a book on the EP of religion, but he cannot 
see his own materialism as a religion (i.e., it’s likewise due to innate conceptual 
biases). Timothy O’Connor has written (Metaphilosophy V36, p436- 448 (2005)) 
a superb article on D’s Fundamentalist Naturalism (though he does not really 
get all the way to the EP point of view I take here), noting that simply accepting 
the emergence of intentionality is the most reasonable view to take. But pastors 
D and H read from the Churchland’s books and the other bibles of CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and exhort one and all to recognize their pc’s 
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and toaster ovens as sentient beings (or at least they soon will be). Pastor 
Kurzweil does likewise, but few attend his sermons as he has filled the pews 
with pc’s having voice recognition and speech systems and their chorus of 
identical synthetic voices shout “Blessed be Turing” after every sentence.  See 
my review of his book “Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? —A 
Review of How to Create a Mind” by Ray Kurzweil (2012) in the next section.  
 
Emergence of “higher order properties” from “inert matter” (more language 
games!) is indeed baffling, but it applies to everything in the universe, and not 
just to psychology. Our brains had no reason (i.e., there are no selective forces 
operative) to evolve an advanced level of understanding of themselves or the 
universe, and it would be too genetically costly to do so. What selective 
advantage could there have been in seeing our own thought processes? The 
brain, like the heart, was selected to function rapidly and automatically and 
only a minute part of its operations are available to awareness and subject to 
conscious control. Many think there is no possibility of an “ultimate 
understanding” and W tells us this idea is nonsense (and if not, then what test 
will tell us that we have reached it)? 
 
Perhaps the last word belongs to Wittgenstein. Though his ideas changed 
greatly, there are many indications that he grasped the essentials of his mature 
philosophy in his earliest musings and the Tractatus can be regarded as the 
most powerful statement of reductionist metaphysics ever penned (though few 
realize it is the ultimate statement of computationalism). It is also a defensible 
thesis that the structure and limits of our intentional psychology were behind 
his early positivism and atomism. So, let us end with the famous first and last 
sentences of his Tractatus, seen as summarizing his view that the limits of our 
innate psychology are the limits of our understanding. “The world is 
everything that is the case.” “Concerning that of which we cannot speak, we 
must remain silent.” 
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Another cartoon portrait of the mind from the 
reductionist metaphysicians--a review of Peter 
Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) (review 
revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems 
theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by 
Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human 
life, but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious 
part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the 
mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls 
the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology 
of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked 
out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by modern reasoning research, I 
show the inadequacies in Carruther’s views, which pervade most discussions 
of behavior, including contemporary behavioral sciences. I maintain that his 
book is an amalgam of two books, one a summary of cognitive psychology and 
the other a summary of the standard philosophical confusions on the mind with 
some new jargon added. I suggest that the latter should be regarded as 
incoherent or as a cartoon view of life and that taking Wittgenstein at his word, 
we can practice successful self therapy by regarding the mind/body issue as a 
language/body issue. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of John Searle 
(S) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) (jointly WS) as I consider S the successor to 
W and one must study their work together. It will help to see my reviews of 
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PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World 
(MSW) and other books by and about these two geniuses, who provide a clear 
description of behavior that I will refer to as the WS framework. Given this 
framework, which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I 
call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), it is 
possible to have clear descriptions of behavior, but it is entirely missing from 
nearly all such discussions. 
 
Even in the works of WS it is not laid out clearly and in virtually all others it is 
only hinted at, with the usual disastrous consequences. I will begin with some 
quotes from W and S. These quotes are not chosen at random but result from a 
decade of study and together they are an outline of behavior (human nature) 
from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. If one understands them, they 
penetrate as deeply as it is possible to go into the mind (largely coextensive with 
language as W made clear) and provide as much guidance as one needs—it is 
then just a matter of looking at how language works in each case and by far the 
best place to find perspicuously analyzed examples of language is in the 20,000 
pages of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency 
is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.”  Wittgenstein The Blue Book 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-
314 
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"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one we thought quite innocent." Wittgenstein, PI para.308 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false."Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted 
and which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our 
eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
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matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and 
maintained in existence by (representations that havethe same logical form as) 
Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the 
explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because 
the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as 
a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no 
further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal 
explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with 
its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
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vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally 
produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents 
something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a 
physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents a 
type of a state of affairs" MSW p74" 
 
...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because 
there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the 
conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true not just 
for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
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mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --
Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions 1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe 
System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no 
sense--see W for many examples and Searle and Hacker ( 3 volumes on Human 
Nature)for disquisitions). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our 
mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of 
Cognitive Psychology. Yes, a cognitive psychologist of the future may be able 
to see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking and 
acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) but S2 
dispositions are only potentially CMS and so not realized or visible. This is not 
a theory but description of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, Carruthers 
(C) and others muddy the waters here because they sometimes refer to 
dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, S, Hacker and 
others show that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher 
order emergent S2 descriptions-- again not a theory but a description of how 
our dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional 
(T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view 
of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is the default 
operation of our evolved psychology (EP) which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly (S2), rather than in the 
automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC `The 
Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical error but 
a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we 
control our life and among the consequences are the inexorable collapse of what 
passes for civilization. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
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possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense as S1 states), 
and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-
only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate 
axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally 
Self Referential (CSR)—i.e., to see a cat makes it true and in the normal case no 
test is possible, and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which 
can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')-
-i.e., they have external, public, testable Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and 
are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later 
Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of 
MSW, which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended 
one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only 
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perception, memory and prior intention (cause originates in the world), while 
S2 refers to propositional (true or false testable) dispositions such as belief and 
desire (cause originates in the mind). 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning 
"In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things 
to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by 
the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that 
we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ` will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Like Carruthers and others, Searle sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
345  
countless times and biology demostrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of 
vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude 
higher for visual information. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous 
utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes or Primary Language Games 
(PLG) of S1, while conscious representations are the dispositional Secondary 
Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the 
most basic statement of how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever 
understood it. 
 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to 
behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve 
our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out 
DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed 
consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
346  
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of 
meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental state. This can be 
seen as another statement of W’s argument against private language (personal 
interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and 
interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or 
private interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously 
Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent referrals to community 
practice into thinking it's just arbitrary public practice that underlies language 
and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are 
only possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the 
background, and it this which underlies all behavior and which is schematized 
in the table. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the later 
W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner experiences, so whatever comes to 
mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading 
and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination,  and there is the 
constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of any test 
makes them inapplicable. Two of W's famous examples used for combatting 
this temptation are playing tennis without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and a tribe that 
had only S2 calculation so `calculating in the head (`S1 calculating') was not 
possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' etc. 
But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss `calculating1' 
as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence 
another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent." That 
is, the first few sentences or often the title commit one to a way of looking at 
things (a language game) which prevents clear use of language in the present 
context. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and this 
means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think 
in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
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with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be interpreted as the logical structure of language, and that in spite of 
his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as 
broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order descriptive 
psychology as one can find. 
 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an 
image of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image 
I have in my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his picture 
and `NO' if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the photo 
matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be 
an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our 
minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI 
p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained 
in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on 
which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that 
"What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether 
I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact 
that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it.  Perhaps I 
should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were 
asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I 
do know." 
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the 
COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on 
the way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, 
intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the 
COS that I express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only 
be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
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table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention InAction 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
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critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
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EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions that can be described as 
Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s)—i.e., one class of reflexes of the 
fast associative unconscious automated System 1, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true 
only mental stateswith a precise time and location) and gradually developed 
the further ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe 
memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-
the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, 
cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public COS), 
representational, true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no 
precise time and are abilities and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, 
Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive 
Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, 
Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. 
My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while 
third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle- C+L p53). 
 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and 
now. This is one way to characterize System 2 –the major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them 
as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S2 dispositions are abilities 
to act (contract muscles producing speech or body movements via S1 at which 
time they become causal and mental states). Sometimes dispositions may be 
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regarded as unconscious since they can become conscious later-Searle - Phil 
Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or Primary Language Games’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the 
normal case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the 
dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I 
KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act—see above quotes from W). 
Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted 
out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and 
are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and 
his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it 
well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few 
--above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic 
book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic 
structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments 
in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC)(written 
in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or DPHOT, and in my view 
the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Basic 
Emotions are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can 
be described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world - S1 is 
only upwardly causal (world to mind direction of fit) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) (is Causally Self Referential—Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in 
which the mind tries to fit the world - S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(mind to world direction of fit). 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions 
with Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) which S calls The Phenomenological 
Illusion (TPI). W understood this and described itwith unequalled clarity with 
hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but 
typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current 
research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try 
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to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, and IntentionsIn Action-IA-Searle) 
plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. 
Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Inclination words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(e.g. belief), or as verbs which describe abilities (agents as they act or might act) 
(e.g., believing) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(actual 
or potential PUBLIC ACTS also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) 
of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language). 
 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology.  
 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
 
MEMORIES: Remembering, Dreaming (S1) 
 
PRFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True) (S2) 
 
CLASS 1: Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, 
Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and 
abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a 
special class), Seeing As (Aspects),  
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-- Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, 
Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged 
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to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of 
behavior. 
 
ALL WORDS ARE PARTS OF COMPLEX LANGUAGE GAMES (THOUGHTS LEADING TO ACTIONS) 
HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE 
TYPE OF EVENT.  
 
We drive a car but also own it, see it, see its photo, dream about it, imagine it, 
expect it, remember it. The social interactions of humans are governed by 
cognitive modules— roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be 
taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the 
broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences 
when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding 
functions or of the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is 
then coextensive in evolution, development and individual action with 
preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive 
modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding 
by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) 
via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, 
physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster andmore efficient. 
Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities and 
they are algorithmatized by Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
(however defined) which create and require consciousness, will and self and in 
normal human adults all dispositions are purposive, require public acts (e.g., 
language), and commit us to relationships (called Desire Independent Reasons 
for Action- DIRA by Searle) in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
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expected utility— sometimes called-controversially-Bayesian utility 
maximization) via dominance and reciprocal altruism and impose Conditions 
of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction - Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts - muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, 
sports etc.).  The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911 (“The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 P895 cf Z P464), 
and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 
1960’s. Much of our S2 intentionality admits of degrees or kinds (principally 
language games). As W noted, inclinations (e.g. thinking) are sometimes 
conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language 
games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. There are 
at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the 
dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—non-rational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 
and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP2 129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like 
all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) is not a mental state, and 
contains no information until it becomes a public act (realizes a COS) in speech, 
writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can 
have information (meaning-COS) when they are manifested in public actions 
via S2, for only then do they have any meaning (consequences) even for 
ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon. Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. The 
common term TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called (UA-Understanding 
ofAgency).  
 
Intentionality is the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for 
normal intuitive rational or non-rational speech and action but I give it as a 
synonym for dispositions as it’s still widely used by those unfamiliar with W 
and S. The efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. 
by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how 
the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than 
we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
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genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life 
as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) 
the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously 
said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. 
 
Language was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of 
resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar functions automatically and 
is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have 
multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs such as ‘I believe’ 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my 
mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the usual sense of those 
words (W). “I believe its raining”, “I believed it was raining”, “he believes its 
raining”, “he will believe its raining,”, “I believe it will rain” or “he will think 
it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that 
intend to convey information (or misinformation) and so have COS which are 
their truth (or falsity) makers. 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by DMS in her paper in 
Philosophical Psychology in 2000) are typical of much of our behavior as they 
bridge S1 and S2 which interact in both directions most of our waking life. 
 
Perceptions, Memories, some Emotions and many “Type 1 Dispositions” are 
better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, non-reflective, NON-
Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, 
algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after 
Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on “The Opacity of Mind” (OM). 
 
By the time I finished the first page of the preface, I realized this book was just 
another hopeless mess (the norm in philosophy). He made it clear that he had 
no grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses 
of ‘I know I’m awake’, ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’) nor 
the nature of dispositions (which he calls by the misleading and obsolete term 
‘propositional attitudes’) and was basing his ideas about behavior on such 
notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and the 
computational description of mind, which were laid to rest by W ¾ of a century 
ago and by S and many others since. But I knew most books on human behavior 
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are just as confused and that he was going to give a summary of recent scientific 
work on the brain functions corresponding to higher order thought (HOT), so I 
kept on. 
 
Before I read any book in philosophy or cognitive science, I go to the index and 
bibliography to see whom they cite and then try to find some reviews and 
especially an article in BBS since it has peer feedback, which is generally highly 
informative. As noted above, W and S are two of the most famous names in this 
field but in the index and bibliography I found only 3 trivial mentions of W and 
not one for S or Hacker—surely the most remarkable achievement of this 
volume. As expected, several reviews from philosophical journals were useless 
and the BBS responses to his précis of this book appear devastating--though, 
characteristically (with the exception of one mention of W) -- they too are 
clueless about WS. More remarkable, though he includes many references as 
recent as 2012, the 2009 BBS article is not among them and, so far as I can recall, 
he does not provide substantive responses to its criticisms in this book. 
Consequently, the powerful WS inspired LSR framework is totally absent and 
all the confusions it has cleared away are abundant on nearly every page. If you 
read the above and my other reviews and then the BBS article (readily available 
free on the net) your view of this book (and most writing in this arena) will 
likely be quite different. Of course, the major defect of BBS is apparent--- the 
commenters get only a one page comment and no reply, while the authors get 
a long article and a long reply, so it always appears that they prevail. It is clear 
however that C’s ISA theory, like most (all?) philosophical theories is a shape 
shifter which alters to “explain” every objection. Thus, the line between a 
meaningful theory (actually a description) tied to facts, and a vague notion that 
“explains” nothing, blurs. Of course, C often says that his theory “predicts” 
such and such observation, but this appears to occur after the fact and of course 
the opposing theories shape shift as well. A powerful theory predicts things 
which nobody was expecting and even the opposite of what they were 
expecting. We are also reminded of W’s constant injunctions to stick to 
describing the facts and avoid otiose “explanations”. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted 
in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as clear 
as day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only 
be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. 
If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is 
inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box 
could contain a different thing or it could even be empty. So, there is no private 
language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not 
publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down 
Carruther’s (C’s) ISA theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ 
360  
theories which he references and a huge # of other books and articles. I have 
explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of 
Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that the causal 
relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
Regarding ISA, many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ 
but in my view none better than W in BBB p37 —, “if we keep in mind the 
possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, 
the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. 
For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just 
such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophical theories have no practical 
impact whatsoever- the real role of philosophy being to clear up confusions 
about how language is being used in particular cases (W). Like various ‘physical 
theories’ but unlike other cartoon views of life (i.e., the standard religious, 
political, psychological, sociological, biological, medical, economic, 
anthropological and historical views of most people), it is too cerebral and 
esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that 
even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Likewise, with other 
academic ‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social Science or Blank Slate 
Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history and 
literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, and 
sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing cartoons that 
ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic 
that reinforce our superstitions (our innately inspired psychological defaults), 
and help to lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social 
practice and institution which are there to facilitate replication of genes and 
consumption of resources). The point is to realize that these are on a continuum 
with philosophical cartoons and have the same source. All of us could be said 
to have various cartoon views of life when young and only a few ever grow out 
of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ in this book, 
substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others 
believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, the COS are the test 
of what is being thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s 
raining’, ‘I believe you believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise 
for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), namely that it’s raining. This is 
the critical fact to keep in mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of 
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dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’) which C promotes. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), 
who seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the 
use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard 
reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading and all the 
language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness 
and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just a cartoon of life 
without any value whatsoever, which one could probably say of most 
philosophical accounts of behavior. The WS framework has long noted that the 
first person point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but 
this is no problem for the cartoon view of life. Likewise, with the description of 
brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc, -- 
all well debunked countless times by WS, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many 
others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear “representation”, for which 
I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) of representing (i.e., the same 
form as for all dispositional nouns and their verbs) is by far the best. That is, the 
‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the COS that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett) thinks he is an expert on W, having studied 
him early in his career and decided that the private language argument is to be 
rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his 
work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. 
“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really 
saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a 
fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one can also point to 
real behaviorism in C in its modern ‘computationalist’ form. WS insist on the 
indispensability of the first person point of view while C apologizes to D in the 
BBS article for using “I” or “self”. This is in my view the difference between an 
accurate description of language use and the use one can imagine in a cartoon. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to 
characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and 
many others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed 
D in various writings,  and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let us 
recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the 
point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is captivatedby ‘theorizing’ (i.e., 
chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers with 
specific language games, preferring experiments and observations that are 
quite difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the BBS responses), and 
which in any case have no relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior 
(e.g., exactly how do they fit into the Intentionality Table). One book C praises 
as definitive (Memory and the Computational Brain) presents the brain as a 
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computational information processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and 
repeatedly annihilated by S and others. In the last decade, I have read 
thousands of pages by and about W and it is quite clear that C does not have a 
clue. In this he joins a long line of distinguished philosophers and scientists 
whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, 
Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam etc. (though Putnam began to see the light 
later). They just cannot see that most philosophy is grammatical jokes and 
impossible vignettes—a cartoon view oflife. 
 
Books like this that attempt to bridge two levels of description are really two 
books and not one. There is the description (not explanation, as W made clear) 
of our language and nonverbal behavior and then the experiments of cognitive 
psychology. “The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have 
the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by."(W PI p232), C et al are enthralled by science and just 
assume that it is a great advance to wed metaphysics to neuroscience and 
experimental psychology, but WS and many others have shown this is a 
mistake. Far from making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it 
makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, 
Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such 
memorable accounts of behavior without any experimental science whatsoever. 
Of course, like politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut up so this 
will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The bottom line has to be 
what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest the 
philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to 
those of WS, are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and 
consciousness are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are meaningless 
having no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive science have 
any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other 
animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into 
physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the many 
criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and physiology 
may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others often do, C 
does not reveal his real gems til the very end, when we are told that self, will, 
consciousness (in the senses in which these words normally function) are 
illusions (supposedly in the normal sense of this word). Dennett had to be 
unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., not 
explaining at all and in fact not even describing), but amazingly C also admits 
it at the beginning, though of course he thinks he is showing us these words do 
not mean what we think and that his cartoon use is the valid one. 
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One should also see Hacker’s criticisms of cog sci with replies by S and Dennett 
in "Neuroscience and Philosophy” and well explored in Hacker’s books 
"Human Nature"(3 volumes) and "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" 
(see my reviews of HN V1). It is remarkable that virtually nobody in all the 
behavioral disciplines (in which I include literature, history, politics, religion, 
law, art etc as well as the obvious ones) ever states either their logical 
framework or what it is that they are trying to accomplish and what role 
language analysis and science play, so all those interested in behavior might 
consider memorizing Hacker’s lovely summary of what philosophy (DPHOT) 
aims to do and how this relates to scientific pursuits. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or 
receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, 
but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one 
believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). 
Of course, I would add that it is the study of our evolved psychology, of 
DPHOT, and the contextual sensitivity of language (W’s language games). It is 
not trivial to state these facts as it is quite rare to find anyone who grasps the 
big picture and even my hero’s such as Searle, Priest, Pinker, Read, etc. fall 
embarrassingly short when they try to define their professions. 
 
There have long been books on atomic physics and physical chemistry but there 
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is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea), nor that chemistry 
will absorb biochemistry nor that it in turn will absorb physiology or genetics, 
nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, sociology, 
etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact that they are 
different levels of description with entirely different concepts, data and 
explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerful, and we just cannot 
resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation vs the 
‘vagueness’ of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. 
 
Reductionism thrives in spite of the incomprehensibility (lack of application to 
our normal scale of space, time and life) of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and the incompleteness 
and algorithmic randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my review of 
Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) and its irresistible pull tells us it is due 
to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air from W: “For the 
crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a 
requirement.” PI p107. And once again W from the Blue Book- “Philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” It is 
hard to resist throwing down most books on behavior and rereading W and S. 
Just jump from anything to e.g. these quotes  from his PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-         
138_239-309.html. 
 
I suggest viewing the question of mind as essentially the same as all the ‘deep’ 
philosophical questions. We want to understand the ‘reality’ perceived by S1, 
but S2 is not programmed for it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious 
machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t know but our DNA does courtesy of the 
death of trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. So, we struggle with 
science and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind (i.e., of brain), 
knowing that even should we arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we 
would just have a description of what exact  neuronal pattern corresponds to 
seeing red or making a choice and an “explanation” of why it is not possible 
(not intelligible). 
 
It is obvious to me after reading tens of thousands of pages of philosophy that 
the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where 
ordinary language morphs into special uses, both deliberately and 
inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy 
and other behavioral disciplines). Using special jargon words (e.g., 
intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no philosophy 
police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what they mean are 
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interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and dense it’s often 
painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to embrace his terminology 
and I believe he makes a few major mistakes, while W is hands down the 
clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is doing, and nobody has 
ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement of the 
mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and diagnosed 
and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore 
him and biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and 
millions of articles and most religious and political organizations (and until 
recently most of economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life. 
But the world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the 
cartoon views of life collide with reality and universal blindness and selfishness 
bring about the collapse of civilization over the next two centuries (or less). 
 
I hesitate to recommend C’s writings to anyone, as the experienced ought to 
have about the same perspective I do, and the naïve will be wasting their time. 
Either read philosophy or cognitive science and avoid the amalgams. 
 
Among the endless books and articles available, I commend the 3 volumes on 
Human Nature edited by Carruthers (yes, the same), the 3 on Human Nature 
written by Hacker, the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd Ed, and my 
reviews of W/S, Hutto, DMS, Hacker et al. and their original books. Finally, I 
suggest that if we accept W’s equation of language and mind and regard the 
‘mind/body problem’ as the ‘language/body problem’ it may help achieve his 
therapeutic aim. 
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What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, 
Computable and Incomplete mean? A Review of 
Godel's Way: Exploits into an undecidable world by 
Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da 
Costa 160p (2012) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, 
incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach 
these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues 
which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical 
issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated 
observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used 
intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which 
need to be decided by looking at how we actually use words in particular 
contexts. When we get clear about which language game we are playing, these 
topics are seen to be ordinary scientific and mathematical questions like any 
others. Wittgenstein’s insights have seldom been equaled and never surpassed 
and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years ago when he dictated the Blue 
and Brown Books. In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a 
finished book—this is a unique source of the work of these three famous 
scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and 
philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert 
(see below or my articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on universal computation, and among his 
many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
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In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—this 
is a unique source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been 
working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a 
century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my articles on 
Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) since they 
wrote on universal computation, and among his many accomplishments, Da 
Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s results 
are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years and he has documented them in many 
books and articles. His coauthors from Brazil are less well known in spite of 
their many important contributions. For all the topics here, the best way to get 
free articles and books on the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, 
academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, philpapers.org, libgen.io or b-ok.org, 
where there are millions of preprints/articles/books on every topic (be warned 
this may use up all your spare time for the rest of your life!). 
 
As readers of my other articles are aware, in my view there are two basic issues 
running throughout philosophy and science which have completely different 
solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the 
world that need to be investigated observationally, and philosophical issues as 
to how language can be used intelligibly, which need to be decided by looking 
at how we actually use certain words in particular contexts and how these are 
extended to new uses in new contexts. Unfortunately, there is almost no 
awareness that these are two different tasks and so this work, like all scientific 
writing that has a ‘philosophical’ aspect, mixes the two with unfortunate 
results. And then there is scientism, which we can here take as the attempt to 
treat all issues as scientific ones and reductionism which tries to treat them as 
physics and/or mathematics. Since I have noted in my reviews of books by 
Wittgenstein (W), Searle and others, how an understanding of the language 
used in what Searle calls the Logical Structure of Reality (LSR) and I call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), along with the 
Dual Process Fremework (the Two Systems of Thought) helps to clarify 
philosophical problems, I will not repeat the reasons for that view here. 
 
Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just 
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another of our symbolic systems that may result in public testable actions-i.e., 
if meaningful it has COS), it seems inescapable that thinking (dispositional 
behavior having COS) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements 
and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded 
as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this 
‘randomness’ (another group of language games) shows there are limitless 
theorems that are ‘true’ but unprovable—i.e., ‘true’ for no ‘reason’. One should 
then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect 
“grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations attainable in that 
domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He wrote 
many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work 
concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of 
language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are 
the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of 
mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and 
full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., 
they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems 
unavoidable that everything derived from it by using higher order thought 
(system 2 or S2) to extend our innate axiomatic psychology (System 1 or S1) into 
complex social interactions such as games, economics, physics and math, will 
be “incomplete” also. 
 
The first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory 
(which are continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and philosophy) 
was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 63 years ago, and there have been 
many since such as the recent impossibility or incompleteness proof by 
Brandenburger and Kreisel (2006) in two-person game theory. In these cases, a 
proof shows that what lookslike a simple choice stated in plain English has no 
solution. There are also many famous “paradoxes” such as Sleeping Beauty 
(dissolved by Rupert Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and 
Doomsday, where what seems to be a very simple problem either has no one 
clear answer, or it proves exceptionally hard to find. A mountain of literature 
exists on Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent 
work, but I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although 
Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have 
done insightful work in explaining W, it is only recently that W’s uniquely 
penetrating analysis of the language games being played in mathematics and 
logic have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a 
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Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and 
Wittgenstein’s Reasons’ , and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes 
Paraconsistent Sense’ , and Rodych ( e.g., ‘Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly 
Published Remarks’ and ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about 
Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein’). Berto is one of the best recent 
philosophers, and those with time might wish to consult his many other articles 
and books including the volume he co- edited on paraconsistency. Rodych’s 
work is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online (but 
see b-ok.org and also his online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles). 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use 
by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for W’s 
“notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept 
W’s argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, 
metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words) 
as metamathematics, undecidability and incompleteness, accepted by millions 
(and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal 
fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding 
that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as 
illusions a la Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchland’s etc.), they have no practical 
impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not 
possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but 
undecidable, in a formal system… and demonstrably true (under the 
aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the meta-
system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning 
of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for 
a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but 
decided in a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject 
both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the 
Platonic consequence that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths 
can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical 
sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be 
incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical 
arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is 
more important, the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with 
some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency 
allows them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s 
undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there 
cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the 
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decidability of paraconsistent arithmetics harmonizes with an opinion 
Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a 
motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W commented 
many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions (from 
which results follow necessarily and algorithmically), and this is utterly 
different from empirical matters where one applies a test (the results of which 
are unpredictable and debatable). W often noted that to be acceptable as 
mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must 
have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s 
Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano 
Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, 
unlike all the ‘rest’ of Peano Arithmetic, it cannot be used in the real world 
either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-
systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary 
counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one 
needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, 
‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of 
games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with 
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and makes many 
other penetrating comments (see Rodych and Floyd). Of course, the same 
remarks apply to all forms of logic and any other symbolic system. 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, 
W was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility 
of inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments 
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about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many others 
were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against W. Some may 
feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in ‘Godel’s Way’ we only want 
to understand ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ (in quotes because part of the 
problem is regarding them as ‘systems’) and why these ‘paradoxes’ and 
‘inconsistencies’ arise and how to dispose of them. But I claim that is exactly 
what I have done by pointing to the work of W. Our symbolic systems 
(language, math, logic, computation) have a clear use in the narrow confines of 
everyday life, in what we can loosely call the mesoscopic realm--the space and 
time of normal events we can observe unaided and with certainty (the innate 
axiomatic bedrock or background as W and later Searle call it). But we leave 
coherence behind when we enter the realms of particle physics or the cosmos, 
relativity, math beyond simple addition and subtraction with whole numbers, 
and language used out of the immediate context of everyday events. The words 
or whole sentences may be the same, but the meaning is lost (i.e., to use Searle’s 
preferred term, their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) are changed or opaque). 
It looks to me like the best way to understand philosophy may be to enter it via 
Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on W, so as to understand the subtleties of 
language as it is used in math and thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds 
may be dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing 
Turing’s model, bringing it back down to the everyday and drawing out the 
anthropomorphic command- aspect of Turing’s metaphors.” 
 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) 
where it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, 
“number” ,”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS 
context), and hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise 
for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”. As W noted frequently, do the 
“inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics cause 
any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases 
of contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known but 
math goes on anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) 
paradoxes in language and in the ”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” 
(groups of complex LG’s) of mathematics as well. 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different 
LG’s (meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle” “object” , ”inside”, 
“outside”, “next”, “simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” ,”question”, 
“answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, “future”, “problem”, “logic”, “ontology”, 
“epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”,“prove”, “strange”, “normal”, 
“experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, “dimension”, 
“complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, ”mathematics”, 
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“number”, “physics”, “cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, “reason”, 
“still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, “meta—“, 
“self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, “sentence” and even (in 
some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, “if…then”, “follows” etc. 
 
As W noted, most of what people (including many philosophers and most 
scientists) have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw 
material. Chaitin, Doria, and Da Costa join Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, 
Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in repeating 
the mistakes of the Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with 
science. I suggest quick antidotes via my reviews and some Rupert Read such 
as his books ‘A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among 
the Sciences’, or go to academia.edu and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s 
Conjuring Trick’ and ‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of Searle as 
feasible, but at least his most recent such as ‘Philosophy in a New Century’, 
‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’, ‘Making the Social World’ and 
‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or at least my reviews) and his recent volume 
on perception. There are also over 100 youtubes of Searle, which confirm his 
reputation as the best standup philosopher since Wittgenstein. 
 
A major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between game 
theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision 
theorists and others, all of whom have been publishing for decades closely 
related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, uncomputability, and 
incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is the recent proof by Armando Assis 
that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a 
zero-sum game between the universe and an observer using the Nash 
Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave 
function. Godel was first to demonstrate an impossibility result and (until 
Chaitin and above all Wolpert— see my article on his work) it is the most far 
reaching (or just trivial/incoherent), but there have been an avalanche of others. 
As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was the famous General 
Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which 
he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now 
Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably 
consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ 
preferences into group preferences) can give sensible results. The group is 
either dominated by one person and so GIT is often called the “dictator 
theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was 
titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like this:” 
It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; 
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Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those 
familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many related 
constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it 
(and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career 
path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) 
among legions of publications. 
 
Another recent famous impossibility result is that of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all 
these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind), which 
shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just 
logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs 
that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. But 
note W’s characterization of ‘thinking’ as a potential action with COS, which 
says they don’t really have a meaning (use), like Chaitin’s infinity of apparently 
well-formed formulas that do not actually belong to our system of mathematics. 
“Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is 
wrong” seems unexceptionable and multiple layers of ‘recursion’ (another LG) 
have been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century 
at least, but B&K showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these 
beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for 
one person or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., they grade into Arrow, 
Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc.). For a good technical paper from among the 
avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv 
which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it 
is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to 
Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofsky’s 
(Y’s) paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed 
points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386,2003. 
 
Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum 
computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent 
Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’(2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK 
and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes 
Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and 
Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
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stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can 
be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an 
inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with computational powers greater 
than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first 
serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this 
subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various 
versions of these proofs over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer 
reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA 
journals and has gotten news items in major science journals, few seem to have 
noticed, and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision 
theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
W’s prescient grasp of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism and 
paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer science 
(though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently suggested the 
necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. “Any mathematical 
theory presented in first order logic has a finite paraconsistent model.” Berto 
continues: “Of course strict finitism and the insistence on the decidability of any 
meaningful mathematical question go hand in hand. As Rodych has remarked, 
the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is dominated by his ‘finitism and his view 
[…] of mathematical meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to 
which ‘[only] finite logical sums and products (containing only decidable 
arithmetic predicates) are meaningful because they are algorithmically 
decidable.’”. In modern terms this means they have public conditions of 
satisfaction (COS)-i.e., can be stated as a proposition that is true or false. And 
this brings us to W’s view that ultimately everything in math and logic rests on 
our innate (though of course extensible) ability to recognize a valid proof. Berto 
again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., the working mathematician’s) 
notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of decidability meant to him simply 
lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein believed that everything had to be 
decidable in mathematics…Of course one can speak against the decidability of 
the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s results themselves. But one may 
argue that, in the context, this would beg the question against 
paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both Wittgenstein and the 
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paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the standard view on the 
other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the notion of proof and 
its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that the naïve notion 
of proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of consistency, which is 
exactly what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument call into 
question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the consistency of the 
relevant system is precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that 
its non-triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem 
too—including its own predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory” 
[As Graham Priest noted over 20 years ago]. 
 
This brings to mind W’s famous comment. 
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but 
it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say 
about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of 
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” PI 234 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in 
common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is 
totally current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has 
considered these matters.  The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to mind. 
His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book Award for 
Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 
400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real 
issues and repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. 
His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen 
Dennett as his muse), but, as these views are vacuous and unconnected to real 
life, he continues to do excellent science. 
 
Once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have 
meaning in specific human contexts— that is, as Searle has emphasized, they 
are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe 
apart from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor 
process anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or the universe 
compute. 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one, i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. 
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Virtually all scientists and most philosophers, do not get that there are two 
distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (both families of Language 
Games). There are those that are matters of fact about how the world is—that 
is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False ) states of affairs 
having clear meanings (COS)—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are 
those that are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe 
these states of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate 
person with little or no resort to the facts of science, though of course there are 
borderline cases where we have to decide. Another poorly understood but 
critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, inferring, 
understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true or false 
statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star 
shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing 
that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by 
the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. 
in which there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no COS) 
and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives its 
inputs from S1). 
 
This two systems approach is now a standard way to view reasoning or 
rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of which 
science and math are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing 
literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or science. 
A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use 
language to carry out actions—see W and S) is ‘Human Reasoning and 
Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of its 
limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the broad structure of 
intentional psychology), is (as of early 2015) the best single source I know. There 
are endless books and papers on reasoning, decision theory, game theory etc. 
and many variants of and some alternatives to the two systems framework, but 
I am one of a rapidly increasing number who find the simple S1/S2 framework 
the best one for most situations. The best recent book on reason from the dual 
systems approach is Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind (2014) edited by 
Sherman et al. and Manktelow et al ‘The Science of Reason’ (2011) is also 
indispensable. 
 
What is only now coming to the fore, after millennia of discussion of reasoning 
in philosophy, psychology, logic, math, economics, sociology etc., is the study 
of the actual way in which we use words like and,’ but, or, means, signifies, 
implies, not’, and above all ‘if’ (the conditional being the subject of over 50 
papers and a book (‘IF’) by Evans, one of the leading researchers in this arena. 
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Of course, Wittgenstein understood the basic issues here, likely better than 
anyone to this day, and laid out the facts beginning most clearly with the Blue 
and Brown Books starting in the 30’s and ending with the superb ‘On Certainty’ 
(which can be viewed as a dissertation on what are now called  the two systems 
of thought), but sadly most students of behavior don’t have a clue about his 
work. 
 
Yanofsky’s book (The Outer Limits of Reason) is an extended treatment of these 
issues, but with little philosophical insight. He says math is free of 
contradictions, yet as noted, it has been well known for over half a century that 
logic and math are full of them—just google inconsistency in math or search it 
on Amazon or see the works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency 
or paraconsistency, and if we follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s 
suggestion to avoid incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a 
common feature and a major research program in geometry, set theory, 
arithmetic, analysis, logic and computer science. Y on p346 says reason must be 
free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” has different uses and they 
arise frequently in everyday life, but we have innate mechanisms to contain 
them. This is true because it was the case in our everyday life long before math 
and science. Until very recently only W saw that it was unavoidable that our 
life and all our symbolic systems are paraconsistent and that we get along just 
fine as we have mechanisms for encapsulating or avoiding it. W tried to explain 
this to Turing in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics, given at 
Cambridge at the same time as Turing’s course on the same topic. 
 
Now I will make a few comments on specific items in the book. As noted on 
p13, Rice’s Theorem shows the impossibility of a universal antivirus for 
computers (and perhaps for living organisms as well) and so is, like Turing’s 
Halting theorem, another alternative statement of Godel’s Theorems, but unlike 
Turing’s, it is rarely mentioned. 
 
On p33 the discussion of the relation of compressibility, structure, randomness 
etc. is much better stated in Chaitin’s many other books and papers. Also of 
fundamental importance is the comment by Weyl on the fact that one can 
‘prove’ or ‘derive’ anything from anything else if one permits arbitrarily 
‘complex’ ‘equations’ (with arbitrary ‘constants’) but there is little awareness of 
this among scientists or philosophers. As W said we need to look at the role 
which any statement, equation, logical or mathematical proof plays in our life 
in order to discern its meaning since there is no limit on what we can write, say 
or ‘prove’, but only a tiny subset of these has a use. ‘Chaos’, ‘complexity’, ‘law’, 
‘structure’, ‘theorem’, ‘equation’, ‘proof’, ‘result’, ‘randomness’, 
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‘compressibility’ etc.are all families of language games with meanings (COS) 
that vary greatly, and one must look at their precise role in the given context. 
This is rarely done in any systematic deliberate way, with disastrous results. As 
Searle notes repeatedly, these words have intrinsic intentionality only relevant 
to human action and quite different (ascribed) meanings otherwise. It is only 
ascribed intentionality derived from our psychology when we say that a 
thermometer ‘tells’ the temperature or a computer is ‘computing’ or an 
equation is a ‘proof’. 
 
As is typical in scientific discussion of these topics, the comments on p36 (on 
omega and quasi-empirical mathematics) and in much of the book cross the line 
between science and philosophy. Although there is a large literature on the 
philosophy of mathematics, so far asI know, there is still no better analysis than 
that of W’s, not only in his comments published as ‘Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics’ and ‘Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics’, but throughout the 20,000 pages of his nachlass (awaiting a new 
edition on CDROM from OUP ca. 2020 but much online now -see e.g., Pichler 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Math, like logic, 
language, art, artefacts and music only have a meaning (use or COS in a context) 
when connected to life by words or practices. 
 
Likewise, on p54 et seq. it was W who has given us the first and best rationale 
for paraconsistency, long before anyone actually worked out a paraconsistent 
logic. Again, as W pointed out many times, it is critical to be aware that not 
everything is a ‘problem’, ‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘proof’ or a ‘solution’ in the same 
sense and accepting something as one or the other commits one to an often 
confused point of view. 
 
In the discussion of physics on p108-9 we must remind ourselves that ‘point’, 
‘energy’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘infinite’, ‘beginning’, ‘end’, ‘particle’, ’wave’, 
‘quantum’ etc. are all typical language games that seduce us into incoherent 
views of how things are by applying meanings (COS) from one game to a quite 
different one. 
 
So, this book is a flawed diamond with much value, and I hope the authors are 
able to revise and enlarge it. It makes the nearly universal and fatal mistake of 
regarding science, especially mathematics, logic and physics, as though they 
were systems—i.e., domains where “number”, “space”, “time”, “proof”, 
“event”, “point”, “occurs”, “force”, “formula” etc. can be used throughout its 
“processes” and “states” without changes in meaning—i.e., without altering the 
Conditions of Satisfaction, which are publicly observable tests of truth or falsity. 
And when it’s an almost insuperable problem for such truly clever and 
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experienced people as the authors, what chance do the rest of us have? Let us 
recall W’s comment on this fatal mistake. 
 
“The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and 
states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more 
about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of 
looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn 
to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has 
been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)” PI p308 
 
While writing this article I came upon Dennett’s infamous ‘damning with faint 
praise’ summary of W’s importance, which he was asked to write when Time 
Magazine, with amazing perspicacity, choose Wittgenstein as one of the 100 
most important people of the 20th century. As with his other writings, it shows 
his complete failure to grasp the nature of W’s work (i.e., of philosophy) and 
reminds me of another famous W comment that is pertinent here. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say--- is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
Chaitin is an American and his many books and articles are well known and 
easy to find, but Da Costa (who is 89) and Doria (79) are Brazilians and most of 
Da Costa’s work is only in Portuguese, but Doria has many items in English. 
You can find a partial bibliography for Doria here 
http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html and of 
course see their Wikis. 
 
The best collections of their work are in Chaos, Computers, Games and Time: 
A quarter century of joint work with Newton da Costa by F. Doria 132p(2011), 
On the Foundations of Science by da Costa and Doria 294p(2008), and 
Metamathematics of science by da Costa and Doria 216p(1997), but they were 
published in Brazil and almost impossible to find. You will likely have to get 
them through interlibrary loan or as digital files from the authors, but as always 
try libgen.io and b-ok.org. 
 
381  
There is a nice Festschrift in honor of Newton C.A. Da Costa on the occasion of 
his seventieth birthday edited by Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco 
Antonio Doria. (2000) which is an issue of Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1-
2 (2000), also published as a book, but the book is in only 5 libraries worldwide 
and not on Amazon. 
 
See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social 
Sciences: The Significance Of Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and 
Wuppuluri and Doria (Eds.), "The Map and the Territory: Exploring the 
foundations of science, thought and reality" (2018). 
 
Another relevant item is New trends in the foundations of science : papers 
dedicated to the 80th birthday of Patrick Suppes, presented in Florianópolis, 
Brazil, April 22-23, 2002 by Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; 
Newton C da Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), which is 
vol. 154 # 3 of Synthese, but again the book is in only 2 libraries and not on 
Amazon. 
 
Brazilian studies in philosophy and history of science: an account of recent 
works by Decio Krause; Anto ̂nio Augusto Passos Videira; has one article by 
each of them and is an expensive book but cheap on Kindle. Though it is a 
decade old, some may be interested in “Are the Foundations of Computer 
Science Logic-dependent?” by Carnielli and Doria, which says that Turing 
Machine Theory (TMT) can be seen as ‘arithmetic in disguise’, in particular as 
the theory of Diophantine Equations in which they formalize it, and conclude 
that ‘Axiomatized Computer Science is Logic-Dependent’. Of course, as 
Wittgensteinians, we want to look very carefully at the language games (or 
math games), i.e., the precise Conditions of Satisfaction (truthmakers) resulting 
from using each of these words (i.e., ‘axiomatized’, ‘computer science’, and 
‘logic- dependent’). Carnielli and Agudello also formalize TMT in terms of 
paraconsistent logic, creating a model for paraconsistent Turing Machines 
(PTM’s) which has similarities to quantum computing and so with a quantic 
interpretation of it they create a Quantum Turing Machine model with which 
they solve the Deutsch and Deutsch-Jozsa problems. 
 
This permits contradictory instructions to be simultaneously executed and 
stored and each tape cell, when and if halting occurs, may have multiple 
symbols, each of which represents an output, thus permitting control of unicity 
versus multiplicity conditions, which simulate quantum algorithms, preserving 
efficiency. 
 
Doria and Da Costa also proved (1991) that chaos theory is undecidable, and 
382  
when properly axiomatized within classical set theory, is incomplete in Gödel’s 
sense. 
 
The articles, and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, Fredkin, 
Wolfram et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through computation’ 
(2011) is a stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but again lacking 
awareness of the philosophical issues, and so often missing the point. Chaitin 
also contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied 
Cognition’ (2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture of scientific 
insight and philosophical incoherence, and as usual nobody is aware that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) provided deep and unsurpassed insights into the 
issues over half a century ago, including Embodied Cognition (Enactivism). 
 
Finally, I would like to mention the work of physicist/philosopher Nancy 
Cartwright whose writings on the meaning of natural ‘laws’ and ‘causation’ are 
indispensable to anyone interested in these topics. 
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Wolpert, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, 
incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits of 
computation, a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty 
principle and the universe as computer—the ultimate 
theorem in Turing Machine Theory (revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the 
universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a 
single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. 
They make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to 
provide what may be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and 
seemingly provide insights into impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of 
computation, and the universe as computer, in all possible universes and all 
beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things, a non- quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. There are obvious 
connections to the classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and 
Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program (and thus no device) can 
generate a sequence (or device) with greater complexity than it possesses. One 
might say this body of work implies atheism since there cannot be any entity 
more complex than the physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian 
viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., 
truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’with limitless time/space and 
energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’, nor find a 
certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ 
(all these being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
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John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the 
universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a 
single citation and so I present this very brief article. Wolpert proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can 
be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an 
inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with computational powers greater 
than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first 
serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this 
subject on a sound scientific footing.  Although he has published various 
versions of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer 
reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA 
journals and has gotten news items in major science journals, few seem to have 
noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision 
theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work 
can be seen as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning 
the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not 
how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular 
physical laws or computational structures in establishing the physical limits of 
inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, observation 
and control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about 
385  
being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or 
present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation 
or control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be 
so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the 
“monotheism theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, 
the device can even be the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a 
physical analog of incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one 
self-referential device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe 
proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique 
(unlike algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and only one 
version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to 
say this is that one cannot have two physical inference devices (computers) both 
capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or that 
the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary 
computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference engines, there are 
always binary valued questions about the state of the universe that cannot even 
be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a computer that can predict 
an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the 
condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it 
cannot process information (though this is a vexed phrase, as many including 
John Searle and Rupert Read note) faster than the universe. 
 
 The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to 
be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, 
quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of 
light. The inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be 
nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well 
aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., 
concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, 
in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no reference to him 
and another remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by 
Yanofsky in his recent comprehensive book ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ (see 
my review). Wolpert says he shows that ‘the universe’ cannot contain an 
inference device that can ‘process information’ as fast as it can, and since he 
shows you cannot have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present 
or future state can never be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, 
known or copied. He also proved that no combination of computers with error 
correcting codes can overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical 
importance of the observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar 
conundrums of physics, math and language. As noted in my other articles I 
think that definitive comments on many relevant issues here (completeness, 
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certainty, the nature of computation etc.) were made long ago by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and here is one relevant comment of Juliet Floyd on Wittgenstein:  
 
”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on 
any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In 
that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not 
essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed 
and insofaras it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). 
Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. 
Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game 
and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules 
and of the humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation 
above is conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an order given 
to a human being...”   The parallels to Wolpert are obvious. 
 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only 
have meaning (i.e., are transitive (Wittgenstein) or have COS--Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)) in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has 
emphasized, they are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically 
intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite 
and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our 
laptop or the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already 
crossed your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction 
and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to 
computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. Wolpert 
notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s incompleteness 
theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social science 
analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s 
theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness 
(incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic 
systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, 
random or incomplete statements and situations. Since we can view each of 
these domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our psychology 
work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not 
“complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of 
Language Games in Wittgenstein’s terms) shows there are limitless theorems 
that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able 
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to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense 
that do not describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these 
puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue 
of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, 
“incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math and logic, 
and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I 
know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so perhaps to 
philosophy. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can 
be seen as versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has 
been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. 
K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other 
than calculative rationality”. 
 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of 
papers and hundreds of books. And this seemingly abstruse work of Wolpert’s 
may have implications for all rationality. Of course, one must keep in mind that 
(as Wittgenstein noted) math and logic are all syntax and no semantics and they 
have nothing to tell us until connected to our life by language (i.e., by 
psychology) and so it is easy to do this in ways that are useful (meaningful or 
having COS) or not (no clear COS). 
 
Finally, one might say that many of Wolpert’s comments are restatements of the 
idea that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) 
with greater complexity than it possesses. There are obvious connections to the 
classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the 
notion that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) 
with greater complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work 
implies atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the 
physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is 
meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a 
‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’ with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine 
whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can find a certain way to show that a 
given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex 
language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
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Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson 
Yanofsky 403p (2013)  
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 
from a unified perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I 
indicate that the difficulty with such issues as paradox in language and math, 
incompleteness, undecidability, computability, the brain and the universe as 
computers etc., all arise from the failure to look carefully at our use of language 
in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate issues of scientific 
fact from issues of how language works. I discuss Wittgenstein's views on 
incompleteness, paraconsistency and undecidability and the work of Wolpert 
on the limits to computation. To sum it up: The Universe According to 
Brooklyn---Good Science, Not So Good Philosophy. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
Alvy's Mom responding to his being depressed because the universe is 
expanding — “What has the universe got to do with it? You're here in Brooklyn! 
Brooklyn is not expanding!” 
 
This famous Woody Allen joke makes a profound point about the context 
sensitivity of language that applies throughout philosophy and science. It’s 
funny because it is obvious that the meaning of “expanding” in the two cases is 
quite different. Brooklyn might expand if the population increases or the city 
annexes outlying land, but the universe is said to expand due to cosmic 
telescopes that show a red shift indicating that stars are receding from each 
other or to measurements of matter density etc. Different meanings (language 
games) (LG’s) were famously characterized by the Austrian-British philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) as the central problem of philosophy and shown to 
be a universal default of our psychology. Though he did this beginning with 
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the Blue and Brown Books (BBB) in the early 30’s, left a 20,000 page nachlass, 
and is the most widely discussed philosopher of modern times, few understand 
him. 
 
To Yanofsky’s (Y’s) credit, he has given much attention to philosophy and even 
quotes W a few times but without any real grasp of the issues. It is the norm 
among scientists and philosophers to mix the scientific questions of fact with 
the philosophical questions of how language is being used and, as W noted, — 
‘Problem and answer pass one another by’. Yanofsky (a Brooklyn resident like 
many of his friends and teachers) has read widely and does a good job of 
surveying the bleeding edges of physics, mathematics and computer science in 
a clear and authoritative manner, but when we come to the limits of scientific 
explanation and it’s not clear what to say, we turn to philosophy. 
 
Philosophy can be seen as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
or as the study of the contextual variations of language used to describe 
cognition or intentionality (my characterizations), or the study of the logical 
structure of rationality (LSR)(Searle). Regarding LSR, Berkeley philosopher 
John Searle (S) is one of the best since W and his work can be seen as an 
extension of W.  I have reviewed many books by them and others and together 
these reviews constitute a skeletal outline of higher order thought or 
intentionality, and so of the foundations of science. 
 
It is common for books and papers to betray their limitations in their titles and 
that is the case here. “Reason” and “limits” are complexes of language games. 
So, I should stop here and spend the whole review showing how Y’s title reveals 
the deep misunderstanding of what the real issues are. I knew we were in for a 
rough time by p5 where we are told that our normal conceptions of time, space 
etc., are mistaken and this was known even to the Greeks. This brings to mind 
W: “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that 
we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the 
Greeks… at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing 
up…And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in 
so far as people think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, they 
believe of course that they can see beyond these. - CV (1931)” and also "The 
limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence…” So, I would say we just have to analyze the different types of 
language games. Looking deeper is essential but surrendering our prior use is 
incoherent. 
 
Think about what is implied by “The Outer Limits of Reason”. “Outer”, 
“Limits” and “Reason” all have common uses, but they are frequently used by 
390  
Y in different ways, and they will seem “quite innocent”, but this can only be 
discussed in some specific context. 
 
We are using the word “question” (or “assertion”, “statement” etc.) with utterly 
different senses if we ask “Does 777 occur in the decimal expansion of Pi?” than 
if we ask “Does 777 occur in the first 1000 digits of the decimal expansion of 
Pi?” to use one of W’s examples.  In the latter case it’s clear what counts as a 
true or false answer but in the former it has only the form of a question. On p10 
we find a group of “statements” which have quite different meanings. The first 
three are definitions and one could understand them without knowing any facts 
about their use—e.g., X cannot be Y and not Y. 
 
Y recommends the documentary “Into the Infinite” but actually it cannot be 
viewed unless you are in the UK. I found it free on the net shortly after it came 
out and was greatly disappointed. Among other things it suggests Godel and 
Cantor went mad due to working on problems of infinity—for which there is 
not a shred of evidence— and it spends much time with Chaitin, who, though 
a superb mathematician, has only a hazy notion about the various philosophical 
issues discussed here. If you want a lovely whirlwind “deep science” 
documentary I suggest “Are We Real?” on Youtube, though it makes some of 
the same mistakes. 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. 
Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does not get that 
there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., Language 
Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about how the 
world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False) 
states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --COS) in 
Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are those that 
are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe these states 
of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person 
with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another poorly understood but 
critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, inferring, 
understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true or false 
statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star 
shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing 
that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by 
the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. 
in which there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no COS) 
and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives its 
inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to view 
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reasoning or rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, 
of which science, math and philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and 
rapidly growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of 
behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually 
reason (i.e., use language to carry out actions—see Wittgenstein and Searle) is 
‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen 
(2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and 
the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of mid 2016) the best single 
source I know. 
 
Regarding “incompleteness” or “randomness” in math, Y’s failure to mention 
the work of Gregory Chaitin is truly amazing, as he must know of his work, 
and Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s 
results are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years. 
 
Likewise, one sees nothing about unconventional computing such as those with 
membranes, DNA etc., that have no logic gates and follow the biological 
patterns of “information processing”. The best way to get free articles and books 
on the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, 
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, researchgate.net, or philpapers.org, libgen.io and b-ok.org 
where there are millions of free preprints, papers and books on every topic (be 
warned this may use up all your spare time for the rest of your life!). 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and 
full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., 
they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems 
unavoidable that everything derived from it—e.g. physics and math) will be 
“incomplete” also. Afaik the first of these in what is now called Social Choice 
Theory or Decision Theory (which are continuous with the study of logic and 
reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 65 years 
ago, and there have been many since. Y notes a recent impossibility or 
incompleteness proof in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows 
that what looks like a simple choice stated in plain English has no solution. 
 
Although one cannot write a book about everything, I would have liked Y to at 
least mention such famous “paradoxes” as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by 
Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where 
what seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it 
proves exceptionally hard to find one. A mountain of literature exists on 
Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but I 
think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, 
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Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done 
insightful work, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the 
language games being played in mathematics have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., 
‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto 
(e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , and ‘Wittgenstein on 
Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book ‘There’s Something 
about Godel ‘, and Rodych ( e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published 
Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about Wittgenstein’, 
‘New Remarks by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the online Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’ ). 
Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and those with time might wish to 
consult his many other articles and books including the volume he co-edited on 
paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s work is indispensable, but only two of a 
dozen or so papers are free online with the usual search but it’s probably all free 
online if one knows where to look. 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., the use 
by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his 
“notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept 
his argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, 
metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words) 
as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and even 
claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental 
truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about 
how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many 
“revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, 
Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no practical impact whatsoever? 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very 
same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal 
system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, then 
it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same 
meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different 
system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a 
formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence 
that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all 
arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, 
then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete 
meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics 
based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more 
important, the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some 
of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows 
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them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s 
undecidability result: there are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there 
cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the 
decidability of paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion 
Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a 
motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W commented 
many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and 
this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. W often 
noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable 
in other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case 
with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system 
(here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used 
in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. 
As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-
systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary 
counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one 
needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, 
‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of 
games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with 
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, 
W was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility 
of inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
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Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments 
about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many others 
were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against W. Some may 
feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in “The Limits of Reason” we 
only want to understand science and math and why these paradoxes and 
inconsistencies arise and how to dispose of them. But I claim that is exactly what 
I have done by pointing to the work of W and his intellectual heirs. Our 
symbolic systems (language, math, logic, computation) have a clear use in the 
narrow confines of everyday life, of what we can loosely call the mesoscopic 
realm-- the space and time of normal events we can observe unaided and with 
certainty (the innate axiomatic bedrock or background). But we leave coherence 
behind when we enter the realms of particle physics or the cosmos, relativity, 
math beyond simple addition and subtraction with whole numbers, and 
language used out of the immediate context of everyday events. The words or 
whole sentences may be the same, but the meaning is lost. It looks to me like 
the best way to understand philosophy is enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s 
work on W, so as to understand the subtleties of language as it is used in math 
and thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds may be dissolved. As Floyd 
notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, bringing it back 
down to the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic command-aspect 
of Turing’s metaphors.” 
 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) 
where it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, 
“number”, ”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS 
context), and hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise 
for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”.  As W noted frequently, do the 
“inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics cause 
any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases 
of contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known but 
math goes on anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) 
paradoxes in language which Y discusses, but he does not really understand 
their basis, and fails to make clear that self-referencing is involved in the 
”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” (groups of complex LG’s) of 
mathematics as well. 
 
Another interesting work is “Godel’s Way” (2012) by Chaitin, Da Costa and 
Doria (see my review). In spite of its many failings—really a series of notes 
rather than a finished book—it is a unique source of the work of these three 
famous scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, 
math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by 
Wolpert (see below) since they wrote on universal computation and among 
his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer on paraconsistency.  Chaitin 
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also contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied 
Cognition’ (2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture of insight and 
incoherence and as usual, nobody is aware that W can be regarded as the 
originator of the position current as Embodied Cognition or Enactivism. Many 
will find the articles and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, 
Fredkin, Wolfram et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through 
computation’ (2011) a stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but 
lacking awareness of the philosophical issues and so mixing science (fact 
finding) with philosophy (language games).  See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits 
Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social Sciences: The Significance Of Godel's 
Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and Wuppuluri and Doria (Eds.), "The 
Map and the Territory: Exploring the foundations of science, thought and 
reality" (2018). 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different 
LG’s (meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle”, “object”, ”inside”, 
“outside”, “next”, “simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” 
,”question”, “answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, “future”, “problem”, “logic”, 
“ontology”, “epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”, “prove”, “strange”, 
“normal”, “experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, 
“dimension”, “complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, 
”mathematics”, “physics”, “cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, 
“reason”, “still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, 
“meta—“, “self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, “sentence” and 
even (in some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, “if…then”, 
“follows” etc. 
 
To paraphrase W, most of what people (including many philosophers and most 
scientists) have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw 
material. Yanofsky joins Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, 
Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in repeating the mistakes of the Greeks 
with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with science. As antidotes, I suggest 
my reviews and some Rupert Read, such as his books ‘A Wittgensteinian Way 
with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the Sciences’, or go to academia.edu 
and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and ‘Against Time 
Slices’ and then as much of S as feasible, but at least his most recent such as 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese 
Philosophy’,‘Making the Social World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ 
(or my reviews if time is short) and his recent volume on perception. There are 
also over 100 youtubes of Searle which confirm his reputation as the best 
standup philosopher since Wittgenstein. 
 
Y does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is expanding 
396  
rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, 
philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom have been publishing 
for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, 
uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more ‘bizarre’ (i.e., not so if 
we clarify the language games) is the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the 
relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum 
game between the universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from 
which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel was 
first to demonstrate an impossibility result and (until Wolpert) it is the most far 
reaching (or just trivial/incoherent) but there have been an avalanche of others. 
As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was the famous General 
Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which 
he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now 
Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably 
consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ 
preferences into group preferences) can give sensible results. The group is 
either dominated by one person and so GIT is often called the “dictator 
theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was 
titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like this:” 
It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; 
Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those 
familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many related 
constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it 
(and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career 
path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) 
among legions of publications. 
 
Y mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) 
for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these 
impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) which shows 
that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just 
logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs 
that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. “Ann 
believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong” 
seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) has been assumed in 
argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but they 
showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there 
is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for 1 or multiplayer 
decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). 
For a good technical paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get 
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Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which takes us back to the liar 
paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is about “interactive forms of 
diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and 
Godel. Many of these papers quote Y’s paper “A universal approach to self-
referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 
2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum 
computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent 
Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations’ 
(2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and related 
paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and 
Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. For a 
good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can 
be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an 
inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with computational powers greater 
than that of a Turing Machine.” 
 
He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. 
Although he has published various versions of these over two decades in some 
of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-
81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major 
science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent 
books on physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a 
reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, 
since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
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cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning 
the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not 
how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular 
physical laws or computational structures in establishing the physical limits of 
inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, observation 
and control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about 
being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or 
present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation 
or control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be 
so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the 
“monotheism theorem”). 
 
Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the 
entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of 
incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one self-referential 
device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain 
type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic 
information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can 
be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one 
cannot have two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being 
asked arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or that the universe 
cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary computational 
task, or that for any pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary 
valued questions about the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at 
least one of them. One cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary 
future condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the condition is 
from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it cannot process 
information (though this is a vexed phrase as S and Read and others note) faster 
than the universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is 
computing do not have to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the 
laws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even 
for an infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to be spatially 
localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire 
universe. He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, 
Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of 
”information processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their writings 
make no reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none of the 
above are mentioned by Yanofsky either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that 
can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a 
perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never 
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be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also 
proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can 
overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the 
observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, 
math and language that concern Y. Again cf. Floyd on W: ”He is articulating in 
other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus 
generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any purported 
listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on any particular 
notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In that sense, 
Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not essentially 
diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofar 
as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s 
arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. [The parallels to 
Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly invokes the 
notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday 
conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every 
line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an instruction or 
command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” 
 
W’s prescient viewpoint of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism 
and paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer 
science (though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently 
suggested the necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. “Any 
mathematical theory presented in first order logic has a finite paraconsistent 
model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and the insistence on the 
decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go hand in hand. As 
Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is dominated by 
his ‘finitism and his view […] of mathematical meaningfulness as algorithmic 
decidability’ according to which ‘[only] finite logical sums and products 
(containing only decidable arithmetic predicates) are meaningful because they 
are algorithmically decidable.’” In modern terms this means they have public 
conditions of satisfaction-i.e., can be stated as a proposition that is true or false. 
And this brings us to W’s view that ultimately everything in math and logic 
rests on our innate (though of course extensible) ability to recognize a valid 
proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., the working 
mathematicians) notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of decidability 
meant to him simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein believed that 
everything had to be decidable in mathematics…Of course one can speak 
against the decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s 
results themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both 
Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the 
400  
notion of proof and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this 
that the naïve notion of proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of 
consistency, which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent 
argument call into question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the 
consistency of the relevant system is precisely what is called into question by 
Wittgenstein’s reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic 
avoids Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second 
Theorem in the sense that its non-triviality can be established within the theory: 
and Tarski’s Theorem too—including its own predicate is not a problem for an 
inconsistent theory “[As Priest noted over 20 years ago]. Prof. Rodych thinks 
my comments reasonably represent his views, but notes that the issues are quite 
complex and there are many differences between he, Berto and Floyd. 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in 
common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is 
totally current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has 
considered these matters. The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to mind. 
His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book Award for 
Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 
400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real 
issues and repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. 
His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen 
Dennett as his muse), but, as these views are vacuous and unconnected to real 
life, he continues to do excellent science. 
 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only 
have meaning in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, 
they are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The 
universe apart from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot 
compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or 
the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already 
crossed your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction 
and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to 
computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. Wolpert 
notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s incompleteness 
theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social science 
analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s 
are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness 
(incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic 
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systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, 
random or incomplete statements and situations. Since we can view each of 
these domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our psychology 
work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not 
“complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) 
shows there are limitless theorems that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for 
no reason. One should then be able to say that there are limitless statements that 
make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations 
attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s 
views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole 
of his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context 
sensitivity of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd 
and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations 
of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can 
be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has 
been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. 
K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other 
than calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, 
the subject of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
On p19 Yanofsky says math is free of contradictions, yet as noted, it has been 
well known for over half a century that logic and math (and physics) are full of 
them—just google inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the 
works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if 
we follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s suggestion to avoid 
incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature and a 
major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and 
computer science. Y returns to this issue other places such as on p346 where he 
says reason must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” has 
different uses and they arise frequently in everyday life but we have innate 
mechanisms to contain them. This is true because it was the case in our 
everyday life long before math and science 
 
Regarding time travel (p49), I suggest Rupert Read’s “Against Time Slices” in 
his free online papers or “Time Travel-the very idea” in his book “A 
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Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes.” 
 
Regarding the discussion of famous philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn on 
p248, those interested can see the work of Rupert Read and his colleagues, most 
recently in his book “Wittgenstein Among the Sciences” and while there, you 
may make a start at eliminating the hard problem of consciousness by reading 
“Dissolving the hard problem of consciousness back into ordinary life” (or his 
earlier essay on this which is free on the net). 
 
It is in the last chapter “Beyond Reason” that philosophical failings are most 
acute as we return to the mistakes suggested by my comments on the title. 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or false) 
and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That is, there 
are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth or falsity. 
“Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are not clear, 
and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It is a matter of 
fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make the 
observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but 
it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind 
and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs scientific or mathematical 
investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in which this 
language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic terms and it 
is only their (lack of a clear) context which is puzzling. E.g, the “self-referential” 
paradoxes on p344 arise because the context and so the COS are unclear. 
 
On p140 we might note that 1936 was not actually “long” before computers 
since Zeus in Germany and Berry and Atanasoff in Iowa both made primitive 
machines in the 30’s, though these pioneers are quite unknown to many in the 
field. I saw some of Zeus’s  in the Deutsches Museum in Munich while the B & 
A machine was reconstructed from his design recently at Iowa State University, 
where they worked. 
 
Wittgenstein discussed the philosophical aspects of computers some years 
before they existed (see Gefwert, Proudfoot etc.). 
 
On p347, what we discovered about irrational numbers that gave them a 
meaning is that they can be given a use or clear COS in certain contexts and at 
the bottom of the page our “intuitions” about objects, places, times, length are 
not mistaken- rather we began using these words in new contexts where the 
COS of sentences in which they are used were utterly different. This may seem 
a small point to some, but I suggest it is the whole point. Some “particle” which 
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can “be in two places” at once is just not an object and/or is not “being in places” 
in the same sense as a soccer ball, i.e., like so many terms its language games 
have clear COS in our mesoscopic realm but lack them (or have different and 
commonly unstated ones) in the macro or micro realms. 
 
Regarding his reference on p366 to the famous experiments of Libet, which have 
been taken to show that acts occur before our awareness of them and hence 
negate will, this has been carefully debunked by many including Searle and 
Kihlstrom. 
 
It is noteworthy that on the last page of the book he comments on the fact that 
many of the basic words he uses do not have clear definitions, but does not say 
that this is because it requires much of our innate psychology to provide 
meaning, and here again is the fundamental mistake of philosophy. “Limit” or 
“exist” has many uses but the important point is-- what is its use in this context. 
“Limit of reason” or “the world exists” do not (without further context) have a 
clear meaning (COS) but “speed limit on US 15” and “a life insurance policy 
exists for him” are perfectly clear. 
 
Regarding solipsism on p369, this and other classical philosophical ‘positions’ 
were shown by W to be incoherent. 
 
And finally, why exactly is it that quantum entanglement is more paradoxical 
than making a brain out of proteins and other goop and having it feel and see 
and remember and predict the future?  
 
Is it not just that the former is new and not directly present to our senses (i.e., 
we need subtle instruments to detect it) while animal nervous systems have 
been evolved to do the latter hundreds of millions of years ago and we find it 
natural since birth? I don’t see the hard problem of consciousness to be a 
problem at all, or if one insists then ok, but it’s on all fours with endless others 
–why there is (or what exactly is) space, time, red, apples, pain, the universe, 
causes, effects, or anything at all. 
 
Overall an excellent book provided it is read with this review in mind. 
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Review of The Inflationary Universe by Alan Guth 
358 p (1997) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is one of the best popular cosmology books ever written and Guth is now 
a top physics Professor at MIT. He tells the extremely complex story of inflation 
and related areas of particle physics in such an absorbing style that it reads like 
a detective novel-in fact, it is a detective novel-how he and others found out 
how the universe started! The interweaving of his personal story and that of 
many colleagues along with their photos and many wonderfully clear diagrams 
allows just the right amount of relaxation from the intensity of the physics. In 
places the style reminds one of Watson´s famous book ``The Double Helix``. He 
tells how his work on magnetic monopoles and spontaneous symmetry 
breaking led to the discovery of the inflationary theory of the very early 
universe (ca. 10 to the minus 35 seconds!). 
 
Along the way you will learn many gems that should stay with you a long time 
such as: the observed universe(e.g., everything the Hubble telescope etc. can see 
out to ca. 15 billion light years when the universe began) is likely just a 
vanishingly tiny part of the entire inhomogeneous universe which is about 10 
to the 23rd times larger; the big bang probably took place simultaneously and 
homogeneously in our observed universe; there probably have been and will 
continue to be an infinite number of big bangs in an infinite number of 
universes for an infinite time; when a bang happens, everything(space, time, all 
the elements) from the previous universe are destroyed; the stretching of space 
can happen at speeds much greater than the speed of light; our entire observed 
universe lies in a single bubble out of an endless number so there may be 
trillions of trillions just in our own entire(pocket) universe(and there may be an 
endless number of such); none of these infinite number of universes interact-i.e., 
we can never find out anything about the others; each universe started with its 
own big bang and will eventually collapse to create a new big bang; all this 
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implies that the whole universe is fractal in nature and thus infinitely regresses 
to ever more universes(which can lead one to thinking of it as a giant hologram); 
disagreements between the endless(hundreds at least) variations of inflation are 
sometimes due to lack of awareness that different definitions of time are being 
used; some theories suggest that there was a first big bang but we can never 
find out what happened before it; nevertheless it appears increasingly plausible 
that there was no beginning but rather an eternal cycle of the destruction and 
creation, each being the beginning of spacetime for that universe; to start a 
universe you need about 25g of matter in a 10 to minus 26cm diameter sphere 
with a false vacuum and a singularity(white hole). 
 
He deliberately spends little time on the endless variants of inflation such as 
chaotic, expanded and supernatural inflation or on dark matter´, 
supersymmetry and string theory, though they were well known at the time as 
you can find by reading other books such as Michio Kaku´s `Hyperspace` (see 
my review) and countless others. Of course, much has happened since this book 
appeared but it still serves as an excellent background volume so cheap now 
it’s free for the cost of mailing. 
 
 
This is one of the best popular cosmology books ever written and Guth is now 
(2016) a top physics Professor at MIT. He tells the extremely complex story of 
inflation and related areas of particle physics in such an absorbing style that it 
reads like a detective novel--in fact, it is a detective novel--how he and others 
found out how the universe started! 
 
The interweaving of his personal story and that of many colleagues along with 
their photos and many wonderfully clear diagrams allows just the right amount 
of relaxation from the intensity of the physics. In places the style reminds one 
of Watson´s famous book ``The Double Helix``. He tells how his work on 
magnetic monopoles and spontaneous symmetry breaking led to the discovery 
of the inflationary theory of the very early universe (ca 10 to minus 35 seconds!). 
 
Along the way you will learn many gems that should stay with you a long time 
such as: the observed universe (e.g., everything the Hubble telescope etc. can 
see out to ca. 15 billion light years when the universe began) is likely just a 
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vanishingly tiny part of the entire inhomogeneous universe which is about 10 
to the 23rd times larger; the big bang probably took place simultaneously and 
homogeneously in our observed universe; there probably have been and will 
continue to be an infinite number of big bangs in  an infinite number of 
universes for an infinite time; when a bang happens, everything(space, time, all 
the elements) from the previous universe are destroyed; the stretching of space 
can happen at speeds much greater than the speed of light; our entire observed 
universe lies in a single bubble out of an endless number so there may be 
trillions  of trillions  just in our own  entire(pocket) universe(and there may be 
an endless number of such); none of these infinite number of universes 
interact—i.e., we can never find out anything about the others; each universe 
started with its own big bang and will eventually collapse to create a new big 
bang; all this implies that the whole universe is fractal in nature and thus 
infinitely regresses to ever more universes(which can lead one to think of it as 
a giant hologram); disagreements between the endless (hundreds at least) 
variations of inflation are sometimes due to lack of awareness that different 
definitions of time are being used; some theories suggest that there was a first 
big bang but we can never find out what happened before it; nevertheless it 
appears increasingly plausible that there was no  beginning  but rather an 
eternal cycle of the destruction  and creation, each being the beginning of 
spacetime for that universe; to start a universe you need about 25g of matter in 
a 10 to minus 26cm diameter sphere with a false vacuum and a singularity 
(white hole). 
 
Regardless of all this we still want to know how and why it all started even if 
this question seems to make no sense and he notes that Tryon speculated long 
ago that quantum fluctuations could give rise to our universe instantly any time 
from the very beginning (e.g., 10 to minus 35 seconds) to this instant, complete 
with our particle accelerators and Guth with his ``memories`` of inventing 
inflation! The probability is incredibly small, but as there may be an infinite 
amount of time and space even the improbable becomes certain! Of course, 
those familiar with my writing will recognize the we are dealing with a group 
of ill defined (unclear conditions of satisfaction) language games here and as 
we clarify them the mysteries will disappear. The physicist Vilenkin extended 
Tryon´s idea in a mathematically well-defined way, giving a quantum 
description of general relativity that shows that the universe (spacetime) can 
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arise from nothing. It seems this is based on the fact that one of the possible 
geometries of the universe is an empty one with no points in which quantum 
tunnels to a nonempty state which then inflates. Inflation requires only a false 
vacuum and some mechanism to produce baryons and is independent of and 
GUTs. Even Einstein´s infamous cosmic constant has reappeared as the energy 
density in the vacuum--which is a very complex state in which particles and 
antiparticles are appearing (from the vacuum!), annihilating one another, and 
disappearing at an enormous rate. When you get to the most advanced (basic) 
theory, it is utter chaos, with only thin threads of observation from accelerators 
and astronomical instruments linking it the universe. 
 
Hawking came up with perhaps the most outrageous theories of the beginning-
-a set of equations in which (at 10 to minus 43 sec) the concepts of space and 
time dissolve into quantum ambiguity. The universe just is and can inflate from 
there: i.e., the famous Hartle- Hawking quantum wave function where 
spacetime has no initial boundary with quantum fluctuations(randomness) 
determining the probability of every possible outcome (all possible universes). 
This implies that the universe must be, because nothingness is impossible, but 
then why are there laws of physics? 
 
Strings are an alternative to quantum fluctuations but they are even harder to 
connect to reality. It is their mathematical elegance (so elegant that we have to 
develop more complex math before it can evolve further!) and power (24 
dimensional geometry!) that makes them irresistible. One gets the impression 
that String Theory could explain any possible universe and indeed, that is one 
of the major problems--the equations have millions of solutions and which one 
is for our universe!? (if you want to know about this see my review of Kaku's ' 
Hyperspace' ). 
 
Guth gets into a very interesting discussion of what ´nothing´ and ´beginning´ 
mean but he has no idea about Wittgenstein and language games. In fact, the 
last chapter (Epilogue) is the most speculative and for many probably the most 
interesting part of the book and is (like much of modern physics for most 
people) almost indistinguishable from science fiction--incredible special effects, 
but it lacks a plot, character development, a beginning and an end! 
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Nobody knew in 1997 that the universe was expanding at an increasing rate but 
due to the endless variations on the theory and the high degree of arbitrariness 
and virtually limitless nature of possible assumptions, I doubt it will consitute 
a problem for very long. Likewise with the various theories about how space 
itself is expanding, not just the matter in it. 
 
Cosmology and particle physics are intimately connected and since we have 
probably reached the limit in cost for accelerators (the world´s entire GDP 
would not be near enough to build one that could get remotely near the 10 to 
the 19th BEV required to examine events at the Planck length) the next few years 
may see the end of input to cosmology from the bottom end. The top end--
mostly outer space instruments- are less costly and will likely yield new info 
for a few decades yet -but the coming collapse of civilization will likely put an 
end to them as well by mid-century. So, it seems we may have another 50 years 
to evolve our GUTs (Grand Unified Theories) and our cosmology and `know 
the mind of God`(Hawking). 
 
He does not spend alot of time in philosophical digressions but I think most 
would agree that our psychology (e.g., the cognitive templates or inference 
engines) severely limits the kinds of theories we can produce. Perhaps one day 
computers will generate many (an infinite number?) of advanced theories but 
we probably will not be able to understand most of them. One needs a certain 
level of brain power to understand something and ours was evolved about a 
million years ago to get food, find mates and manipulate other monkeys. Just 
as a truck needs a certain horsepower to haul a load up a hill, a brain must have 
a certain calculating ability to understand an idea or an algorithm and it seems 
probable to me that our computers will soon produce many beyond our reach. 
It occurs to me that if the universe is a giant computer (as many have 
theorized—e,g., Wolfram most recently in ``A New Kind of Science``) then we 
hope that it uses some kind of algorithm that we can understand -and prove 
with our math. But if so, maybe only our computers will be able to understand 
it or communicate with it! Also since the ‘incompleteness’ theorems of Godel 
and  Chaitin show that there  are an infinite number of well-formed algorithms 
that we cannot, even in principle ever prove or disprove (and no computer can 
do it either), it occurs to me that it is possible that the algorithms of  the  
universal computer may  be among those, and in that case even our most 
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advanced computers may never prove all the algorithms of the universal 
computer— i.e., the universe) and so it will forever remain as physics is now, 
with some laws that cannot be connected to the others and some the truth of 
which will be always undecidable.  
 
Perhaps Chaitin´s omega number (giving the limits of math) may someday tell 
us something about the ability of computers (our most advanced future one vs 
the universe) to prove each other’s algorithms. Perhaps it is consistent with one 
of the endless versions of inflation that each universe has a different algorithm 
or that the algorithms change with time (and they have already used such ideas 
as gravity changing with time). However, the notions of incompleteness, limits 
to computation, undecidability are complex language games which I have 
commented on extensively in my other reviews and articles so I will not repeat 
it here. 
 
He deliberately spends little time on the endless variants of inflation such as 
chaotic, expanded and supernatural inflation or on dark matter´, 
supersymmetry and string theory, though they were well known at the time as 
you can find by reading other books such as Michio Kaku´s `Hyperspace` 
published in 1994 (see my review). Of course, much has happened since this 
book appeared but it still serves as an excellent background volume so cheap 
now it’s almost free. 
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Review of Hyperspace by Michio Kaku 359p (1994)  
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
"There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns 
of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact" Mark Twain-Life on the 
Mississippi 
 
This is a lovely book full of fascinating info on the evolution of physics and 
cosmology. Its main theme is how the idea of higher dimensional geometry 
created by Riemann, recently extended to 24 dimensions by string theory, has 
revolutionized our understanding of the universe. Everyone knows that 
Riemann created multidimensional geometry in 1854 but it is amazing to learn 
that he also was a physicist who believed that it held the key to explaining the 
fundamental laws of physics. Maxwell´s equations did not exist then and 
Riemann´s untimely death at age 39 prevented his pursuit of these ideas. Both 
he and his British translator Clifford believed that magnetic and electric fields 
resulted from the bending of space in the 4th dimension- more than 50 years 
before Einstein! The fourth dimension became a standard subject in the popular 
media for the next 50 years with several stories by HG Wells using it and even 
Lenin wrote about it. The American mathematician Hinton had widely 
publicized his idea that light is a vibration in the 4th spatial dimension. 
 
Amazingly, physicists and most mathematicians forgot about it and when 
Einstein was looking for the math needed to encompass general relativity 60 
years later, he had never heard of Riemannian geometry. He spent 3 years 
trying to find the equations for general relativity and only after a math friend 
told him about Riemann was he able to complete his work. Riemann´s 
equations with four dimensional metric tensors describing every point in space 
were incorporated almost unchanged into relativity. And on and on it goes. 
Since this review, I have written a great deal on the language games of math 
and science, uncertainty, incompleteness, the limits of computation etc., so 
those interested should find them useful since this volume, like most science, 
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frequently wanders across the line into philosophy (scientism). 
 
 
There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns 
of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.  Mark Twain --Life on the 
Mississippi 
 
This is a lovely book full of fascinating info on the evolution of physics and 
cosmology. Its main theme is how the idea of higher dimensional geometry 
created by Riemann, recently extended to 24 dimensions by string theory, has 
revolutionized our understanding of the universe. 
 
Everyone knows that Riemann created multidimensional geometry in 1854 but 
it is amazing to learn that he also was a physicist who believed that it held the 
key to explaining the fundamental laws of physics. Maxwell´s equations did not 
exist then and Riemann´s untimely death at age 39 prevented his pursuit of 
these ideas. Both he and his British translator Clifford believed that magnetic 
and electric fields resulted from the bending of space in the 4th dimension--
more than 50 years before Einstein! The fourth dimension became a standard 
subject in the popular media for the next 50 years with several stories by HG 
Wells using it and even Lenin wrote about it. The American mathematician 
Hinton had widely publicized his idea that light is a vibration in the 4th 
spatialdimension.  Amazingly, physicists and most mathematicians forgot 
about it and when Einstein was looking for the math needed to encompass 
general relativity 60 years later, he had never heard of Riemannian geometry. 
He spent 3 years trying to find the equations for general relativity and only after 
a math friend told him about Riemann was he able to complete his work. 
Riemann´s equations with four dimensional metric tensors describing every 
point in space were incorporated almost unchanged into relativity. 
 
String theory can be said to date from 1919 when an obscure mathematician 
named Kaluza added the ten components of Einstein`s gravitational field with 
the 4 components of Maxwell´s electromagnetic fields and time to get the 15 
components of a 5 dimensional field. He even produced the idea that the 5th 
spatial dimension is a sphere smaller than an atom (i.e., too small to be 
measured) -- which remains a fundamental idea in string theory´s 10 
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dimensions. In 1936 the mathematician Oscar Klein postulated that the 5th 
dimension has the Planck length (10 to minus 33cm) which is indeed far too 
small to measure by any forseeable means (it requires an accelerator of 10 to the 
19th BEV) and this, with  the arrival in 1925  of quantum theory and the 
uncertainty principle pushed the geometry based Kaluza-Klein and, to some 
extent, even relativity theory  into the  background for nearly 60 years. 
 
 
In quantum theory, the different forces are created by the exchange of different 
quanta and no geometry is used. This led to the Yang-Mills field, QED, QCD 
and the Standard Model of particle physics which is: all matter is quarks and 
leptons which interact by the exchange of different types of quanta as described 
by the Maxwell and Yang-Mills equations. Veneziano and Suzuki discovered 
the basis for string theory in 1968 when they used Euler´s beta functions to 
describe the strong interactions of subatomic particles. In 1970 two Japanese 
scientists used the idea of vibrating   strings to expand on it. It is now halfway 
through the book and Kaku describes how he invented the first field theory of 
strings. Then it was shown that string theory is self-consistent only in 10 and 26 
dimensions and research nearly stopped for 10 years. 
 
Then in 1984 Green and Schwarz showed that super string theory was the only 
self-consistent theory of quantum gravity. Edward Witten became interested in 
the higher dimension geometric equations in physics in 1982 when he realized 
that gravity was impossible in quantum field theory but inevitable in the 5th 
dimension. In 1985, he used the highl- advanced math of cohomology theory to 
derive a field theory of strings. This led eventually to the use of some of the 
most advanced (and previously unrelated) fields of math known to describe the 
26 dimensional space of counterclockwise vibrations of heterotic string theory, 
and in some sense, the explanation of everything. Then things stalled again 
because millions of potential solutions to the equations are known, but which 
one describes only our universe; i.e., which one gives the correct field  theory  
of strings (FTS) defined in our 4 dimensions? Nobody knows how to solve the 
equation using nonperturbative methods and it is often stated that we need 
more advanced math, i,e., math that does not yet exist. Almost everything 
known in particle physics has used perturbative methods. 
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One of the major problems is that nobody knows why string theory works—
i.e., what is the underlying geometric or physical principle that makes it 
relevant and allows all of physics to be incorporated into the 10 (when 
condensed) dimensions of string theory? It is the only quantum theory that 
requires a fixed number of dimensions.   Another bizarre result is that it has to 
use the modular functions invented  some 60 years before by the self-taught 
Indian math prodigy Ramanujan, who as a teenager reinvented much of 
modern math in his head. One of his bizarre modular functions contains a term 
raised to the 24th power and this is exactly the number of vibrational modes 
needed (24 plus 2 for spacetime or generalized in the FTS it´s 8 plus 2 or 10). 
The symmetries of the subatomic realm (i.e., particles) become the result of the 
curling up of the higher dimensional spaces. 
 
Meanwhile, the standard model of physics was evolving but it has even more 
arbitrary assumptions than the inflationary theory of the big bang (Kaku says 
little about inflation but see my review of Guth´s book The Inflationary 
Universe). So, GUTs (Grand Unified Theories) appeared and faded to be 
supplanted by supersymmetry (based on bizarre supernumbers) which 
integrated fermions and bosons with their spins. This led (1976) to the lovely 
gauge theory of supergravity in which all particles have superpartners 
(sparticles). 
 
Using an 11 dimensional version of the Klein-Kaluza theory to describe the 11 
dimensional supergravity field allows the incorporation of matter (i.e., quarks 
and leptons). But sparticles were never found and supergravity turned out to 
be non-renormalizable  (i.e., it led to infinities) so SG died. 
 
 
Then came hypersurfaces described by complex numbers, on which the wave 
functions of the particles vibrate, thus acquiring the symmetries of the 
hyperspheres.  So if you then apply the Kaluza-Klein theory for 4 plus N 
dimensions and split up its metric tensor , you get   everything--the  Einstein   
equations for gravity, the Yang-Mills equations for strong and weak forces, and 
the Maxwell equations for the electromagnetic fields. Amazingly, it turns out 
that not only had Klein described the Yang-Mills field in 1938 (25 years before 
Yang and Mills--and they got the Nobel Prize for it!) but Y-M is now based on 
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quantum theory which had killed interest in Kaluza-Klein for  almost 60 years!!! 
 
This brings us back to Edward Witten (whom some regard as the successor to 
Einstein) and superstring theory, in which matter is now the harmony of 
extremely small vibrating strings which can fuse and break up.  It accounts for 
almost everything and is the first quantum theory of gravity with finite 
quantum corrections. In spite of its highly abstract nature, lack of any 
experimentally verifiable predictions, lack of a unique solution for our 
universe- it has millions of solutions (orbifolds), many(all?) of which could have 
properties that might make our universe impossible- and any rational 
explanation for why it works (i.e. no conceptual framework uniting gravity and 
quantum theory), it has a compelling, almost religious appeal for many 
physicists because, starting only from geometry and the condition that strings 
move self consistently in spacetime we get magnetism, electricity, spacetime, 
general relativity, Klein-Kaluza, supergravity, the standard model and the 
Grand Unified Theory--it binds matter,energy and spacetime. String theory 
does not however, predict or explain the properties of particles nor the 
paradoxes of quantum mechanics, uncertainty and entanglement (Bell´s 
theorem). 
 
Though I don´t think Kaku says this anywhere, it is so general and so powerful 
that one gets the feeling that it could explain anything in any possible universe 
and in that case, it does not really explain anything at all--it becomes the 
mathematical equivalent of `God made it that way`. So, it may eventually begin 
to lose its appeal as a final explanation (as it has for many physicists). 
 
 
So, we still can ask the same question as Kaluza in 1919--where is the 5th 
dimension? -- and still pursue the same answer given by Klein in 1926. 
 
Quantum theory and quantum tunneling explainthe apparent violation of the 
conservation of energy shown by radioactive decay.  It might explain the 
sudden appearance of a 4 and a 6 D universe from a 10D one. 
 
Because the false vacuum of a 10D universe was unstable we assume, but 
cannot prove, that it quantum tunneled to a lower energy state, breaking 
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symmetry and creating a true vacuum in 4D space. But if it is not the true 
vacuum then one day a small bubble may appear and enlarge at the speed of 
light until it destroys our universe. Our 4D universe can curl up in 4 ways but 
a 10D one can curl up in millions of ways.  So, to find the right one, we need to 
solve the field theory of strings using the theory of phase transitions--the most 
difficult problem in quantum theory. 
 
In 1994, the heterotic string theory of David Gross (one of the four Princeton 
physicists known as the Princeton string quartet) showed that the quantum unit 
of gravity emerges as the smallest vibration of a closed string. 
 
Since the laws of physics break down at the very small distances and large 
energies of the big bang, we need a string theory with 10 dimensions that breaks 
into 6 plus 4 to create twin universes of which the 6 is an orbifold too small to 
observe. Kaku says that only 10D superstring theory can explain what happens 
before the big bang but of course Valenkin and Hawking and others have 
alternatives. (see my review of Guth). 
 
 
Even in the string theory of the big bang, a small piece of the universe must 
inflate by a factor of 10 to the 50th, so apparently, all of inflation is included. It 
has been frequently theorized that black holes may be tunnels in spacetime to 
other universes. But it appears we don´t know if black holes really pinch off 
hyperspheres of spacetime in which light is trapped. 
 
Along with its untestability and lack of any conceptual foundation, a further 
problem is that the math is so general that it has millions of solutions(orbifolds) 
which include all of physics (General relativity, Grand Unified Theories etc,) 
and there is no way to decide which one of them describes our universe. Some 
(or all?) of the solutions have properties that might make life, or even our 
universe, impossible. One cannot simply put a computer to work to decide 
which solution is right for our universe for the same reasons one cannot solve 
quantum tunneling etc.--infinite time is required. 
 
Though neither Kaku nor anyone else I have read has said so, it seems that the 
math of 26 D geometry is so powerful that it could describe any possible 
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universe. In this case, it is understandable why it lacks a conceptual foundation 
as it has no special relation to our universe. Anything expressible as an 
algorithm or number can be derived from anything else by writing the 
appropriate algorithm or codec, so the rules of chess, Avogadro´s number, the 
dimensions of the great pyramid and the dynamics of ant colonies are 
deriveable too. 
 
 
One of the things that makes many think math is out there in the universe rather 
than in here in our minds. Naively, one could say that the structure of the 
universe makes, our mind so is it a surprise that our thoughts (e.g., 
mathematics) mirror the universe? The debate on the ‘unreasonable 
effectiveness of mathematics (Wigner) continues but to me it is just another 
group of confusions about which language games we are playing (see my other 
articles). For a recent excellent article by an engineer (though of course with no 
clue about Wittgenstein or language games) see Derek Abbott ‘The reasonable 
ineffectiveness of mathematics’ Vol. 101, 0018-9219 _ 2013 IEEE No. 10, October 
2013 | Proceedings of the IEEE 2147-2153. 
 
The compelling way in which pure math yields physical results is illustrated by 
the discovery of a mathematician who was just looking for another solution to 
the equations of general relativity. By assuming a black hole rotates, Roy Kern 
in 1963 found a solution and thus an exact representation of black holes. They 
will collapse into a ring so that objects approaching from the top or bottom will 
experience a finite curvature (gravity) so it might be able to get to the mirror 
universe which exists on the ‘other side` of spacetime. But, at this density of 
mass- energy, general relativity breaks down and quantum effects probably 
dominate so maybe we can find an answer with string theory.  Likewise, with 
time travel. 
 
 
By making various assumptions about the universe one can come up with many 
different solutions to relativity. In 1949 Godel (he of Incompleteness Theorem 
fame) showed that if one assumes the universe rotates, time can bend in a circle 
or CTC (Closed Timelike Circle). It turns out that van Stockum had derived a 
CTC solution in 1936 (pointed out by cosmologist Frank Tipler, who recently 
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became infamous for his book ‘proving’ the existence of God from physics) and 
many have done so since Godel, usually using black holes or an expanding 
universe. It is now realized that there are an infinite number of such 
`pathological` solutions to the equations of general relativity. It appears that all 
CTC will violate causality. As one of the principal founders of quantum 
cosmology, Hawking proposed that wormholes could be used to enter other 
universes.  Ever daring, he used quantum theory to treat the entire universe as 
a quantum particle represented by a wave function which will be large for our 
universe but small for others. 
 
Assuming they are connected by wormholes, Sidney Coleman summed the 
contributions of an infinite series of universes, to show that if the cosmological 
constant (CC) is zero then the wave function is large (i.e., high probability). If 
the CC is not zero, then that universe has zero probability (i.e., the effect of an 
infinite number of parallel universes is to keep CC zero in ours), which means 
the CC cancels to one part in 10 to the 100th! 
 
Acting on a request from Carl Sagan, Thorne et al (1985) discovered 
`transversible wormholes` --the first ones that were actually feasible in the sense 
that a human might actually survive using them. It seems theoretically possible 
to create one using the negative energy (i.e., less than in a vacuum) of the 
Casimir effect (a quantum effect thought to occur everywhere all the time) in 
which particle-antiparticle pairs appear and self-annihilate at very high rates. 
 
Godel showed that math is ‘incomplete’ (see my articles for a Wittgensteinian 
analysis of this) and physicists have shown that quantum theory, chaos theory 
etc. are also ‘incomplete’ (e.g., Schrodinger´s cat is dead and alive at the same 
time) but the string theory of quantum gravity has an equation (wave function) 
for the entire universe and there is no longer an observer and an observed 
because it is a 10 dimensional theory and so renormalizable. However, the 
cosmic wave function is a composite of all possible universes so indeterminacy 
remains. The smallest quantum unit is the space of all possible universes, in 
some of which the cat is dead and some alive. Quantum theory and string 
theory seem very reductionistic, but one equation for the universe seems as 
holistic as it´s possible to get! 
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Superstring theory (SST) has stretched math to its limits and needs more 
advanced math to evolve. Physics needs the self-consistent structures of math 
so it combines topology and the Reimannian geometry of general relativity (ie, 
groups of quantum field theories) to eliminate the infinities (i.e., renormalize) 
of the quantum theory of gravity. 
 
It seems to me that the most complex products of the brain--SST and topology, 
are recursive to quantum field theory and the behavior of particles and the 
entire universe.  Though Kaku does not discuss incompleteness, we know that 
math is proven (Godel, Chaitin, etc.) to be forever necessarily incomplete -  i.e., 
infinitely many well- formed theorems in any mathematical system can never 
be proven to be true or false.  Then, since math and physics are now fused at 
the highest level (Superstring theory), the one can create a language game in 
which there is a nontrivial sense in which physics and the whole universe and 
the  mind are  ‘incomplete’  as well. What is the significance if many laws of 
physics in some possible universes (or ours) and/or many thoughts in our brain 
are never to be consistent with or derivable from the others? Or rather there is 
no significance or many views or concepts (language games) of ‘significance’. 
 
String theory unites physics with many of the most advanced and formerly 
separate areas of math--SuperLie and Kac-Moody algebras, modular functions, 
finite groups, algebraic topology, Riemannian geometry and cohomology 
theory. But it remains without a conceptual basis, so we are left to wonder if 
there is anything other than powerful math that unites quantum theory and 
gravitation. 
 
Kaku does not dwell on the problem of emergence, but physical scientists can 
rarely resist reductionism. However, the quantum field equations are so 
difficult that they cannot be solved for one atom and not even for a vacuum. 
They require an infinite time to compute. One only finds out the emergent 
properties of things that result from combining smaller things by seeing what 
they are like after the fact--whether they are quarks making a proton, molecules 
making cells, or stars making a universe. One also has uncertainty and chaos.  
We have no way to determine in what way and when a pile of sand will 
collapse.  Physics has to wait for the results at the micro (subatomic particles) 
and macro (cosmological observations) scales before advancing and it is full of 
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uncertainty and bizarre phenomena. Also, there seems to be no way we can 
ever test SST (the theories change constantly but the bottom line is that we will 
never be able to do experiments at the requisite energy (10 to the 19th BEV) –
i.e., the Planck length (10 to -33cm)) So, physics and even math (incompleteness, 
etc.) seem to be just as empirical and ‘unsolvable’ as biology (consciousness, 
free will) and we must accept the ‘uncertainty’ of our most advanced  concepts 
as we do that of our everyday life. 
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Review of Religion Explained-- The Evolutionary 
Origins of Religious Thought by Pascal Boyer (2002) 
(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to 
speed on evolutionary psychology, you should first read one of the numerous 
recent texts with this term in the title. One of the best is "The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed by Buss. Until about 15 years ago, 
´explanations´ of behavior have not really been explanations of mental 
processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless descriptions of what 
people did and what they said, with no insight into why. We might say that 
people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, receive his (or her or their) 
blessings, etc., but none of this describes the relevant mental processes, so we 
might say they are explanations in much the same way that it explains why an 
apple drops to the ground if we say its because we released it, and it's heavy-
there is no mechanism and no explanatory or predictive power. This book 
continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior which has been 
almost universally ignored and denied by academia, religion, politics and the 
public (see Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slatè`). His statement (p3) that 
it is meaningless to ask if religion is genetic is mistaken as the percentage of 
variation of any behavior due to genes and environment can be studied, just as 
they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). The title should be 
"Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of Primitive Religion", since he 
does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., satori, enlightenment etc.) which 
are by far the most interesting phenomena and the only part of religion of 
personal interest to intelligent, educated people in the 21st century. Reading 
this entire book, you would never guess such things exist. Likewise, for the 
immense field of drugs and religion. It lacks a framework for rationality and 
does not mention the dual systems of thought view which is now so productive. 
For this I suggest my own recent papers. Nevertheless, the book has much of 
interest, and in spite of being dated is still worth reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
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John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
“God is dead and man is free” Nietzsche 
 
“This very body the Buddha, this very earth the lotus paradise” Osho 
 
´´I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, so that nothing 
is spoken. Clearly, then, the essence of religion can have nothing to do with 
what is sayable´´ Wittgenstein 
 
When this book appeared, it was a pioneering effort, but now there are endless 
discussions of this topic and so I will give a sufficiently detailed and accurate 
summary that only specialists will need to read it. You can get a quick summary 
of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to speed on evolutionary 
psychology you should first read one of the numerous recent texts with this 
term in the title. The best are “The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology” 2nd 
ed (2015) and The 5th ed. of Evolutionary Psychology by Buss, readily available 
free on the net. 
 
Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´´ of behavior have not really been 
explanations of mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless 
descriptions of what people did and what they said, with no insight into why. 
We might say that people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, receive 
their blessings, etc., but none of this describes the relevant mental processes, so 
we might say they are explanations in much the same way that it explains why 
an apple drops to the ground if we say it’s because we released it and it’s heavy-
-there is no mechanism and no explanatory or predictive power. 
 
This book continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior 
which has been almost univerally ignored and denied by academia, religion, 
politics and the public (see Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slate``). His 
statement (p3) that it is meaningless to ask if religion is genetic is mistaken as 
the percentage of variation in any behavior due to genes and environment can 
be studied, just as they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). 
 
The title should be ´´Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of 
Primitive Religion´´ since he does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., 
satori, enlightenment etc.) which are by far the most interesting phenomena and 
the only part of religion of personal interest to intelligent, educated people in 
the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would never guess such things 
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exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and religion. How and why do 
entheogens trigger the inference engines and what role have they played in 
religion and life for the last million years? There is a huge mine of info on drugs 
and behavioral templates, but you won´t find even a clue here. You can start 
with the recent books ´ ´Entheogens and the Future of Religion” and ´ ´Buddhism 
and Psychedelics´´ or you can read my friend Alexander Shulgin’s amazing 
probing of the ´cognitive templates in PHIKAL and TIKAL, available, as almost 
everything now, free on the net. One of the most unusual of the drug probes is 
ketamine, described by many, most notably in “Journeys into the Bright World” 
by Altounian and Moore, Jansen in “Ketamine” and in probably the most 
detailed account of a single entheogenic drug by a single user in the last two 
chapters of John Lilly´s ´´The Scientist``. Lilly, almost single handedly the 
founder of dolphin research, was a generation or more ahead of nearly 
everyone on many topics and he also probed his own mind with LSD and 
isolation tanks. See his `Simulations of God` (1975 and my review of it) for his 
speculations on Mind, God and Brain and more aspects of the spiritual and 
mental not touched upon by Boyer. Also for recent heroic self therapy with 
entheogens see ‘Xenolinguistics’ by Slattery and ‘DMT & My Occult Mind’ by 
Khan.  
 
There is also virtually nothing here about the relation between physical and 
mental states. The practice of the many forms of yoga was highly advanced 
thousands of years ago. Its primary aim was to trigger spiritual states with body 
energy and the reverse. There is an immense literature and hundreds of millions 
have practiced it. The best personal account I know of by a mystic detailing the 
interaction of the mental and physical via yoga is found in `The Knee of 
Listening` by Adi Da (see my review). Interwoven with the spellbinding 
account of his spiritual progress are the details of his work with the shakti 
energy of yoga (e.g., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 of the 1995 edition--
preferable to the later ones). These few pages are worth more than a whole shelf 
of yoga books if you want to get to the heart of the mind/body relation in 
spirituality. 
 
Zen and other practices probe the brain´s templates with meditation and tricks. 
Boyer does not understand that the major religions (and countless minor ones) 
were started by persons who broke the mold—i.e., somehow blocked or evaded 
some templates to destroy much of the ego and to discover aspects of their mind 
normally hidden. It is not hard to see why full blown enlightenment is rare, as 
those who have it stop behaving like monkeys (i.e., fighting, deceiving, 
reproducing, accumulating) and this would be heavily selected against. One 
might say those who achieved it are the only ones who became fully human 
(i.e., Jesus, Adi Da, Mohammed, Buddha, Mahavira, Rumi, Osho and 1000 or so 
others we know of). It seems Boyer has no personal experience with meditation, 
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entheogens and higher consciousness (e.g., see pages 317, 320-324) so he clearly 
does not treat all of religion. This is again evident (p32) when he says religion 
has no origin or clear explanation which is curious as he provides exactly this. 
Of course, this is true in a sense of the primitive religions he discusses, but 
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, etc., have very clear origins and explanations in 
the enlightenment of Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed etc. He is mistaken (p308) in 
his belief that Eastern religion is mostly about ritual, rather than personal 
experience and inner states and that it got such ideas from Western philosophy 
(3000 years ago!).  
 
Amazingly, he rejects William James´s notion that religion is a result of the 
experiences of exceptional individuals that are subsequently degraded by the 
masses (p310). James is clearly right and Boyer is again, only thinking of 
primitive religion. Perhaps the best personal account of the various states of 
samadhi, enlightenment, etc. is Adi Da´s book--`The Knee of Listening` but by 
far the best source for personal accounts by an enlightened master are the 
numerous books, audios and videos by Osho, all free on the net. 
 
Witnessing one´s thoughts is one of the commonest techniques of beginning 
meditators in many different traditions. Further progress fuses the perceiver 
and perceived (all is one). One wonders how this relates to the templates—do 
they enter consciousness, does spiritual change open new neural connections 
or close some? Cognitive psychology has barely started on this, but is would be 
interesting to see PET or fMRI on an enlightened person or one in a samadhi 
state with good controls and has been done. Though he is right that many 
experiences are of some agent, advanced states have been described in a vast 
literature which shows they typically have no thoughts, no mind, no person, no 
god. This would seem to be the ultimate in decoupling System 2 templates in a 
functional person. 
 
For supernatural types of religious concepts to evolve and survive, they should 
belong to one of the basic ontological categories or templates (plant, tool, 
natural object, animal, person etc.) which the brain uses to organize perception 
and thought. These are commonly given counterintuitive properties such as 
prescience, telepathy, immortality, abilility to hear one’s words or read one’s 
thoughts, ability to heal or confer great power etc. Good supernatural concepts 
usually allow all inferences not specifically barred by the violation of 
intuition—i.e., a god will have all human properties but does not age or die. 
The huge number of religious concepts is contained in this short list of 
templates. It is the counterintuitive nature of the concepts that makes them easy 
to remember and to transmit to others and this seems to by one reason why 
supernatural concepts are a central part of nearly all religions. Supernatural 
concepts interact with other types of templates such as intuitive psychology, 
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intuitive physics, structure function and goal detection. If it activates physics, 
goal detection, intuitive psychology and intentional use, then it will be a 
human-like being with superhuman properties. This is standard cognitive 
psychology and counterintuitive parts are added on for religious use. There is 
abundant evidence that brain areas that are activated when we do something 
are also activated when we see someone else doing a similar thing (mirror 
neurons). It is feasible that this is correlated with the need to join in and the 
satisfaction from participating in the rituals integral to society (sports, politics, 
music etc.) and religion. 
 
There is also evidence that seeing other people’s emotions activates the same 
areas as our own. Our theory of mind (i.e., of other people’s mental life-- 
intuitive psychology which I prefer to call Understandingof Agency -UA) 
seems not to be one inference engine, but the sum of many and, as more 
research is done, more modules will be discovered. Another critical feature of 
inference engines is that they often run in decoupled (counterfactual or 
imaginary) mode while we consider the past or the future. This starts quite early 
as shown by the common presence of imaginary playmates in children, their 
ability to grasp stories and TV, and he notes that research seems to show that 
children who create playmates seem to be better at grasping other people’s 
mental states and emotions. The point in this context is that it seems quite 
natural to ascribe humanlike characteristics to spirits, ghosts, gods, etc. when 
there is no evidence at all for their actual presence. 
 
The innate inference engines are automatic as they have to be fast and not 
distract us (i.e., they are System 1 but sadly he fails to use the two systems 
framework here—see my papers for this). The mind was not evolved as an 
explanation machine and before the recent rise of science, nobody ever tried to 
explain why our foot moves when we walk, an apple falls to the ground, we get 
hungry or angry or why we experience or do anything. Only bizarre or cosmic 
occurrences like lightning or sunrise needed a cause. Our intuitive psychology 
and agency templates also prompted us to ascribe good and bad luck to some 
agent. Much of this may sound speculative but now that EP (evolutionary 
psychology) is a major paradigm, the evidence of such innate S1 functions in 
early childhood and infancy is mounting rapidly. 
 
Supernatural agents (including deceased ancestors) are treated by intuitive 
psychology as intentional agents, by the social exchange system (a part of or 
variant on the cost/benefit systems) by the moral system as witnesses to moral 
actions, and by the person-file system as individuals. Since all these systems can 
operate in decoupled mode, there is no need to consider whether these agents 
really exist. They are driven by relevance, by the richness of inferences that 
result and by the ease with which they can be remembered and communicated. 
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The templates are highly tuned to gather info, get cooperation and calculate 
benefits in a very rapid, subconscious and normally error-free way, while 
conscious reason is slow and fallible. In modern times, the ego has time to waste 
on debate, explanation, and interpretation in endless attempts to deceive and 
manipulate others for personal gain. With large, mobile populations and fast 
communication the results of our social exchange, evaluation of trust, cheater 
detection and other templates are often useless and self-destructive. Strategic 
info (that which passes the relevance filters) activates the engines related to 
social interaction and our knowledge of what info others have is a critical part 
of the social mind. The supernatural agents typically have perfect knowledge. 
Though he does not seem to mention it, powerful people often come to have 
some of the characteristics of supernatural agents and so people will start to 
respond to them as to gods. Aliens, UFO´s, new age mysticism, astrology, 
fantasy and sci-fi draw great attention due to activation, and often possess 
agents with strategic info. However, hundreds of millions have followed 
charismatic leaders with false strategic info (i.e., quasi-supernatural agents) to 
their deaths (The Branch Davidians of Waco, Communism, Nazism, Vietnam, 
Jonestown, George Bush, Comet Kahoutek etc.). 
 
Social interactions require a social mind—i.e., mental systems that organize 
them. Like most behavior, it is only recently that it was generally realized that 
we needed built-in mechanisms to do this. Strategic information is whatever 
activates the social mind. Our theory of mind (UA) tells us to what agents this 
info is also available. It is common to attribute to supernatural agents the ability 
to fully access info that would normally be partly or totally unavailable to 
others. 
 
All the engines must have some kind of relevance filter so that they are not 
constantly activated by trivia. We have taxonomies that tell us how to group 
things in ways relevant to their behavior or properties in the world now called 
System 1 (S1), and we then use our more recently evolved slow deliberate 
linguistic System 2 (S2) when there is time. We expect large catlike things with 
big teeth and claws to be predators and not herbivores. Spirits fit human 
taxonomy and automatically have needs and desires, likes and dislikes and will 
thus give rewards and punishments and all any culture has to do is specify what 
these are. Those concepts giving the richest inferences with the least effort have 
been selected into S1.  
 
A common viewpoint is given by relevance theory, which tries to determine 
how and why some ‘concepts’ (i.e., the language games of System 2) are more 
easily transmitted. Presumably, concepts which trigger engines (S1 ‘concepts’) 
more intensely or frequently, or more different engines, will be superior.  So, 
we may have many language games that are easier to remember and apply, 
427  
rather than because they make sense or are more useful in some way than 
others. This may help to explain the existence of many concepts or practices that 
seem arbitrary or stupid, or which make life more difficult and applies to all of 
culture, not just to religion. 
 
Nearly all religions have full access agents—i.e., they know all or nearly all 
about us and Boyer distinguishes 3 classes--divine brutes with little or no access 
but which nevertheless have power, Aquinas agents which know everything 
and full strategic agents which have access to all the strategic or important info. 
He says that this may account for our interest in knowing other person’s 
religious ideas or in converting them to ours. Only in this way can we 
understand how they may behave and interact. 
 
Agents that are aware of and able to affect our social interaction are richer in 
inferences, and so are easier to mentally represent and remember and thus 
enjoy a great advantage in cultural transmission. Thus, we can now say that 
religion does not create or even support morality, but that our built in moral 
intuitions (i.e., the fast automatic prelinguistic mental reflexes of S1) make 
religion plausible and useful.   Likewise, our mechanisms to explain good and 
bad luck makes their connection with supernatural agents simple. And since 
we share our moral system and our information with them, it is natural to 
expect they will enforce our attitudes. 
 
Recipcrocal altruism and cheating are central parts of human behavior. To show 
passionate feelings and honesty that are genuine (difficult to fake) is of great 
social (and genetic) value. This can be reinforced by religion as one would 
choose to cooperate with such persons rather than with rational calculators who 
may change their mind or cheat anytime their inference engines calculate that 
it is in their best interests. This system also requires that cheaters be punished, 
even when the cheating has minimal social cost. One common group of 
religious concepts are those that make cheating immoral. The mechanism is 
feelings (e.g., the rapid S1 reflexes of anger, jealousy, resentment, confusion) 
rather than the slow rational cogitation of S2.  This may sound strange but it has 
been shown not only in monkeys but in lower animals.  Yes there are endless 
elaborations of cheating in modern society but like all our behavior it is built on 
genetics and S1..We feel that it is wrong for someone to steal another’s money 
rather than needing to sit down and think--well if he takes that money, then 
maybe he will take mine or he will have some future advantage over me etc. 
Perhaps here is one place that guilt enters in order to make the socially 
(genetically) destructive practice of cheating less appealing. This takes us into 
the huge literature on cheaters and cooperators, hawks and doves and 
pretenders and into reciprocal altruism and game theory.  Keep in mind that 
‘true altruism’ or group selection is clearly a fantasy as I have detailed in my 
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review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’. So, like all behavior, religion 
evolved because it had survival value for individuals. 
 
Many types of commitment gadgets have evolved which tend to ensure 
cooperation--keeping track of reputation, legal or quasi-legal binds (contracts), 
strong passions, compulsive honesty, resentment and need to punish cheaters. 
Cooperation gadgets are built in also--moral intuitions, guilt, pride, 
gratefulness, hostility. In contrast to the nearly universal idea that moral realism 
(that behavior itself has a specific moral value that does not depend on one’s 
viewpoint) is only developed by adults or is given by religion, it is now clear 
that this appears in 3 and 4 year olds and changes little with age. Methods have 
now been developed to study infants and in late 2007 a study appeared in 
Nature which showed that they can distinguish helper from non- helper objects 
and there has been lots of work on humans and other animals since. Of course, 
intuitive morality will often give the wrong results for adults in the modern 
world, as may all of our S1 reflexes in many contexts. 
 
Most of the basics of what has formerly been regarded as culture, is now known 
or suspected to be inherited. Pinker lists hundreds of different aspects of human 
societies that are universal and thus good candidates. One can compile a very 
long list of religious concepts that we don´t need to be taught---spirits 
understand human thoughts, emotions and intentions and differentiate 
between wishes or images and reality etc. 
 
It seems that the only feature of humans that is always projected onto gods, 
spirits, ghosts, etc, is a mind much like our own. Intuitive psychology applies 
to intentional agents in general (i.e., persons, animals and anything that appears 
to move in pursuit of its own goals). Intuitive physics is probably also 
composed of many subsegments and must be connected with the intentionality 
module –e.g., when a lion is chasing an antelope, we know that if it changes 
course, the lion will probably do so. One would expect that detecting such 
agents was a very ancient evolutionary priority and even 500 million years ago 
a trilobite that lacked such genes would soon be lunch. As more behavioral 
genes are mapped we are finding the same or similar ones in fruitflies, just as 
we have for other genes such as the ones controlling body segmentation and 
immunity, and great strides in this direction have been made since this book 
appeared. Just search Drosophila behavior. 
 
Like our other concepts, religious ones are often vague and their use 
idiosyncratic due to the fact that they result from the unconscious functioning 
of inference engines (S1) as elaborated upon by the vagaries of culture. We 
cannot say precisely even what simple words mean, but we know how to use 
them. Just as Chomsky discovered depth grammar, one might say that 
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Wittgenstein   discovered depth semantics. 
 
Wittgenstein was the first (and still one of the few) who understood that what 
philosophy—which I term the descriptive psychology of higher order thought- 
(and all attempts to understand behavior) was struggling with was first and 
foremost these built-in S1 functions that are inaccessible to conscious thought. 
Though I have never seen it stated, it seems reasonable to regard him as a 
pioneer in cognitive and evolutionary psychology. 
 
Boyer takes a new view of death also. Corpses have properties that make 
supernatural concepts relevant apart from our need for comfort and this part of 
religion may be less about death than about dead bodies. They produce a 
dissociation between the animacy, intuitive psychology and person ‘file 
systems’. We see such dissociation in autism and odd neurological states such 
as Capgras syndrome. 
 
He sees this as another way that culture makes use of salient gadgets (events, 
objects etc.) which are highly relevant and grab the attention of the inference 
engines. And since this book appeared, evidence continues to accumulate that 
genes create culture to a much greater extent than most people (including 
scholars) ever imagined. It has its own field—implicit cognition. 
 
Nobody ever thinks to inquire as to the motives if a rock that falls and hits us, 
but we always do if it comes from the hand of a person. Even a very young child 
knows this, due to its intuitive psychology, agency, animism and other engines. 
These engines (genes, reflexive behaviors) must, in their orginal forms, be 
hundreds of millions of years old. A carboniferous era dragonfly differentiated 
between animate and inanimate objects and calculated the trajectory of its prey. 
 
Religion originally worked in an atmosphere of perpetual fear. Inference 
engines evolved to find mates and food and shelter and avoid death, hence the 
approach to the gods as a powerless supplicant and the use of appeasement 
rituals and offerings (as we would to a person). Our danger avoidance is highly 
imperfect in the modern world due to guns, drugs and fast transport (cars, skis). 
Everywhere in the world you can see people walking or riding bicycles in the 
streets just a step away from speeding vehicles, even though at least a million a 
year are run down. 
 
He says (p40) that memes (Dawkins famous cultural analog of the gene) are not 
a very good concept for cultural transmission since ideas are changed by each 
person, while genes remain the same. However, what about media—i.e., film, 
TV, print, email?  They can replicate more precisely than genes. These are now 
the prime means for transmitting and checking the validity of memes, not just 
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what someone says. In any case, genes are not perfect either. Just as there is a 
phenotype corresponding to the genotype, there is a phene corresponding to 
the meme. 
 
Why do we invoke supernatural agents for good and bad luck? They activate 
our social exchange systems and since we regard them as having strategic info 
they can control what happens. 
 
It occurs to me that perhaps there is such great opposition to genetic 
explanations for behavior because people feel anyone who accepts this will 
automatically reject the social exchange and other templates and will always 
cheat. Or perhaps they fear the intuitive psychology will no longer work. And 
it calls their attention to The Phenomenological Illusion (the illusory feeling we 
have that our behavior is due to conscious decisions- see my other writings). 
 
Social rituals are examples of what psychologists have termed precautionary 
rules and these commonly include concerns about pollution, purification rituals 
(activation of the contagion system), contact avoidance, special types of 
touching, special attention to boundaries and thresholds, rule violations, use of 
certain numbers of bright colors, symmetrical arrays and precise patterns, 
special sounds or music, special dance and other movements, etc. All these 
trigger certain groups of templates, create satisfying feelings, and are 
commonly coupled to religious concepts, and to politics, sports, hunting and 
agriculture, marriage, child rearing, music, art, folklore, literature etc. 
 
The agency detecting systems (e.g., predator and prey detection) are biased for 
over-detection—i.e., they do not need to see a lion or a person to be activated, 
but only a footprint or a sound of the right kind. Based on very little info, these 
systems then produce feelings and expectations about the agents’ nature and 
intentions. In the case of supernatural agencies our intuitive psychology 
templates are also activated and generally produce a person-like entity plus the 
counterintuitive features, but their precise characteristics are generally left 
vague. 
 
The attaching of a counterintuitive tag (e.g., rising from the dead) to an agent 
(e.g., Jesus) or other ontological category makes it easy to remember and a good 
candidate for religion. 
 
All these modules are inherited but of course a baby does not have them fully 
developed and only with time and a `normal` environment will they emerge. 
 
I read this shortly before reading Ken Wilber´s ´´Sex, Ecology and Spirituality´´ 
and could see on nearly every page how outdated and empty are most of the 
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works which Wilber is discussing. A large part of Wilbur´s book and of the 
hundreds he analyzes on religion, psychology and philosophy are now archaic. 
However, Wilbur has written many books of great interest on spirituality and 
it is sad that Boyer does not even reference him-- but neither does he reference 
drugs, Wittgenstein, meditation, yoga, satori or enlightenment in his index! 
 
One might say that the Nobel peace prize is given to those who are best at 
encouraging us to extend coalitions to include other outgroups or even other 
countries or the whole world. Or, one might say they get the prize for efforts to 
turn off the `cheater detector` or social exchange templates which require that 
only those who reciprocate are included in one´s group and given access to 
resources (which most of the world´s poor clearly cannot do). 
 
He gives a brief summary of some of the self-deceptive inferences which play a 
role in religion as in all of life--consensus, false consensus, generation effect, 
memory illusions, source monitoring defects, confirmation bias and cognitive 
dissonance. Like the other templates, these gave very good results 100,000 years 
ago, but with life in the fast lane, they can now prove fatal for individuals and 
for the world. Coalitional intuitions and essence concepts are delineated as 
critical parts of human behavior. Humans automatically form groups and show 
hostility to persons not in the group and wholly undeserved friendship to those 
in the group (coalitional intuitions), even when the group is composed of total 
strangers.  This relates to operation engines such as cost/benefit and calculation 
of reliability mentioned before. Essences are the concepts we use to describe our 
feelings (intuitions) about coalitions and other social categories (e.g., hierarchies 
and dominance). Although these mechanisms evolved in small groups, 
nowadays these are commonly operating with people to whom we are not 
closely related, so they often give false results. Stereotyping, racism and its 
accompaniments (i.e., arbitrary (or not so arbitrary) set distinctions) are 
probably the results of the operation of coalitional intuitions built into our 
brains, rather than stereotyping being an S2 psychological function and the 
coalitions with their exclusion, dominance, and antipathy being the results. 
These engines may well explain the `social magic` that forms and guides 
societies. 
 
He suggests that one might explain fundamentalism as a natural reaction to the 
common violation of coalitional thinking in modern societies. Freedom to act as 
one chooses and in direct opposition to others in the same community creates 
strong and often violent feelings in those without the education or experience 
to deal with diversity and change. They often want public and spectacular 
punishment to assuage their feelings. Fundamentalism may best be explained 
as attempts to preserve hierarchies based on coalitions, when these are 
threatened by easy defection or inattention. These are functioning in all people 
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all the time, but they come to the surface mainly when there is a situation that 
creates some special threat (i.e., modern life). Of course, as always, we need to 
keep in mind that the ultimate source and payoff for all behavior is in the genes. 
 
Though he says little about it, the notions of ontological S1 categories and 
counterintuitive tags that `stick´ to them also go far to explain magic, the 
paranormal, folklore, mythology, folk medicine, astrology, theology, miracle 
workers, demonic and angelic possession, the arts, and formerly even much of 
science. Rituals act as snares for thought. Our contagion templates are powerful 
activators of behavior and it is natural to include many purification rituals in 
religion. They also make use of our planning systems, which we can see in 
extreme form in obsessive compulsive disorder. There is preoccupation with 
colors, spaces, boundaries, movements and contact. Salient gadgets are 
incorporated. We have a powerful need to imitate others. 
 
Rituals activate our undetected hazard systems. Sacrificial offerings to the 
unseen agents make use of our social exchange systems. Our coalitional 
intuitions are satisfied by group rites and marriage. The `naive sociology` of the 
common man extends into much philosophy, sociology, theology, 
anthropology, psychology, economics, politics and is the result of our attempts 
to make sense of our own behavior but this is the result of the automatic and 
unconscious functioning of our templates. Thus, much of culture seems 
magical-- hence the term `social magic`. Inevitably, naive sociology is weak, so 
rituals and belief systems emphasize the benefits of cooperation and the costs 
of cheating or defection. The rituals and gadgets stimulate memory and satisfy 
the contagion system. Participation signals cooperation and the gods and spirits 
are optional. So, templates lead to religion which leads to doctrines and not the 
reverse. 
 
I think he goes seriously astray when discussing science vs. religion (p320). He 
says it is wrong to talk about religion as a real object in the world (whatever 
that might be), but of course the external and internal (mental) phenomena can 
be studied as well as any other, and he shows in this book that religion is a 
branch of cognitive psychology. He says there is no science as such, and we 
know that he means it´s complex, but then there is no religion, law, sports, auto 
racing or anything at all, as such. He objects to `pop theology` which says 
religion makes the world more beautiful or meaningful or that it addresses 
ultimate questions, but all religion addresses the ultimate questions and tries to 
make the world meaningful and less ugly. In addition, what I call `advanced 
religion` --i.e., the way it starts in the no-minds of Jesus, Buddha, Osho etc.-- 
has a quite different take on the world than the primitive religion he discusses 
in this book (e.g., see the 200 books and DVD´s of Osho at Oshoworld.com or 
on p2p etc., or see Wilber, Adi Da etc.). Again, on p 327 he thinks there is no 
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religious center in the brain and though this is probably true for primitive 
religion, it seems more likely that there are centers (networks of connections) 
for the experiences of satori and enlightenment and maybe for entheogens too. 
He also thinks (p321) that science is less natural and more difficult than religion, 
but in view of the huge number of scientists and the facts that nearly everyone 
is able to absorb science in grade school, and that there have probably been less 
than 1000 enlightened persons in all of human history, it seems clear that the 
situation is quite the reverse for advanced spirituality. It is vastly less difficult 
to become a botanist or a chemist than to dissolve one´s ego! Natural selection 
will clearly eliminate higher consciousness genes, but the rational calculus of 
science is quite consistent with gathering resources and producing children. Of 
course, the problem is that he is again fixated on primitive religion. 
 
He sums it up by saying (p 135) that religious activities activate inference 
systems that ‘govern our most intense emotions, shape our interaction with 
other people, give us moral feelings and organize social groups`. Of course, 
these have nothing to do with satori or enlightenment! He notes that religious 
ideas are parasitic upon our intuitive ontology (i.e., they are relevant). They are 
transmitted successfully due to mental capacities that evolution has already 
created. As with other behaviors, religion is a result of aggregate relevance—
i.e., the sum of the operation of all the inference engines. Thus, religious 
concepts and behavior are present not because they are necessary or even 
useful, but because they easily activate our templates, are easy to remember and 
transmit, and so they survive over time. He gives a final summary (p326) of 
``The Full History of all Religion (ever)`` as follows (of course it leaves out 
`advanced religion (spirituality, mysticism)`). Among the millions of things 
people discussed were some which violated our intuitions and this made them 
easier to remember and transmit. Those that were about agents were especially 
salient as they activated rich domains of possible inferences such as those about 
predators and intuitive psychology. Agents with counterintuitive properties, 
especially ability to understand and affect human behavior or the world were 
strongly transmitted. They became connected with other strange and somewhat 
counterintuitive events such as death and feelings about the continued presence 
of the dead. Somehow rituals arise and become associated with the powerful 
supernatural agents. Some persons will be more skilled at conducting such 
rituals and guiding the interactions with the spirits. Inevitably they will create 
more abstract versions and start to acquire power and wealth. However, people 
will continue to have their own inferences about religion. 
 
He notes that religion owes much to the probably recent (in hominoid 
evolution) appearance of the decoupling ability and it occurs to me that one 
might regard entheogenic drug experiences, satori and enlightenment as the 
ultimate in decoupling--no past, no future, and not even a present-- no here, no 
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there, no me, no you and all is one thing and illusory. The other key transition 
in evolution is posited to be the ability to accept the violation of intuitive 
expectations at the level of ontological domains (i.e., the classes of things--
plants, people, moving things etc.). He regards these capacities as leading to the 
invention of religion (and of course much else) but it´s clear that Buddha, Jesus 
and Osho went quite a bit further. He rejects the idea that religious thoughts 
made minds more flexible and open (rather they became susceptible to certain 
concepts that activated the inferences of agency, predation, morality, social 
exchange, death etc.), but something made us susceptible also to the 
entheogens, satori and enlightenment and this is as flexible and open as people 
can be and remain sane. So it is clear that much remains to be discovered about 
spirituality and religion and the progress in understanding behavior will bring 
this about.  
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Review of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality by Ken Wilber 
2nd ed 851p (2001) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really needs 
a glossary!), heavily academic work has become a best seller in the world of the 
educated. One has to be dedicated to learn the jargon and then plow through 
551 pages of text and 238 pages of notes. Meanwhile, we are told time and again 
that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a 
deconstructive and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of 
religion, philosophy and the behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual 
point of view—i.e., without the worst of decon, pm and NAM jargon, rabid 
egalitarianism and anti-scientific anti-intellectualism. 
 
He analyzes in some detail the various world views of philosophy, psychology, 
sociology and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws with (mostly) 
care and brilliance, but most of the sources he analyzes are of almost no 
relevance today.  They use terminology and concepts that were already 
outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago. One has to slog 
thru endless pages of   jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, Kant, Emerson, 
Jung   et.al. to get to the pearls. 
 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and 
obsolete jargon. 
 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and 
most writing on human behavior).  Painful because it´s so tortured and 
confusing, and then again when you realize how simple it is with modern 
psychology and philosophy. The terminology and ideas are horrifically 
confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in his sources). 
 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though most 
of the authors did not realize it. It is about human behavior and reasoning-about 
why we think and act the way we do and how we might change in the future. 
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But (like all such discussion until recently) none of the explanations are really 
explanations, and so they give no insight into human behavior. Nobody 
discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like describing how a car works 
by discussing the steering wheel and metal and paint without any knowledge 
of the engine, fuel or drive train. In fact, like most older ´explanations` of 
behavior, the texts quoted here and the comments by Wilber are often more 
interesting for what kinds of things they accept (and omit!) as explanations, and 
the kind of reasoning they use, than for the actual content. 
 
If one is up on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, most of 
this is archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike—e.g., see my 
review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not understand 
that the basics of religion and ethics-- in fact all human behavior, are 
programmed into our genes. A revolution in understanding ourselves was 
taking place while he was writing his many books and it passed him by. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
´Anything that can be said can be said clearly` Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
`Heaven and Earth are inhumane--they view the myriad creatures as straw 
dogs` TaoTe Ching 
 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really needs 
a glossary!), heavily academic work has become a best seller in the world of the 
educated. One has to be dedicated to learn the jargon and then plow through 
551 pages of text and 238 pages of notes. Meanwhile, we are told time and again 
that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though most 
of the authors did not realize it.  It is about human behavior and reasoning-
about why we think and act the way we do and how we might change in the 
future. But (like all such discussion until recently) none of the explanations are 
really explanations and so they gave no insight into human behavior. Nobody 
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discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like describing how a car works 
by discussing the steering wheel and metal and paint and the wheels without 
any knowledge of the engine or drive train. In fact, like most older 
´explanations` of behavior, the texts quoted here and the comments by Wilber 
are often more interesting for what kinds of things they accept (and omit!) as 
explanations, and the kind of reasoning they use, than for the actual content. 
 
As with all reasoning and explaining one now wants to know which of the 
brains inference engines are activated to produce the results and how fast 
thinking automated prelinguistic system 1 (S1) and slow thinking deliberative 
linguistic system 2 (S2) are involved and what is the Logical Structure of 
Rationality that explains (or rather describes as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. 
It is the relevance filters (the reflexive processes) of S1 which determine what 
sorts of things that can be input as appropriate data for each engine and their 
automatic and unconscious operation and interaction that determines what our 
brain will  pass on to S2 for higher order expression in language. 
 
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to provide 
full explanations (descriptions) but an interesting start has been made. Boyer´s 
`Religion Explained` is a good place to see what a modern scientific explanation 
of human behavior looks like as of 2002 (though it completely misses 
enlightenment!).  Pinker´s `How the mind Works` is a good general survey and 
his `The Blank Slate` (see my reviews) by far the best discussion of the heredity-
environment issue in human behavior. They do not ‘explain’ all of intelligence 
or thinking but summarize what is known. See several of the recent texts (i.e., 
2004 onwards) with evolutionary psychology in the title (above all  "The 
Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed by Buss) or the web for further 
info. 
 
We now recognize that the bases for art, music, math, philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, language and religion are found in the automatic functioning of 
templates or inference engines of S1. This is why we can expect   similarities 
and puzzles and inconsistencies or incompleteness and often, dead ends as 
without careful probing by experiments or philosophical (linguistic) analysis it 
is invisible to us (‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ of Searle). The brain has no 
general intelligence but numerous specialized modules, each of which works 
on certain aspects of some problem and the results are then added, resulting in 
the feelings which lead to behavior.   Wilber, like everyone, can only generate 
or recognize explanations that are   consistent with the operations of his own 
inference engines, which were evolved to deal with such things as resource 
accumulation, coalitions in small groups, social exchanges and the evaluation 
of the intentions of other persons. It is amazing they can produce philosophy 
and science, and not surprising that figuring out how they work together to 
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produce consciousness or choice or spirituality is way beyond reach. 
 
Wilber is a bookworm and he has spent decades analyzing classic and modern 
texts. He is extremely bright, has clearly had his own awakening, and also 
knows the minutiae of Eastern religion as well as anyone. I doubt there are more 
than a handful in the world who could write this book. However, this is a classic 
case of being too smart for your own good and his fascination with intellectual 
history and his ability to read, analyze and write about hundreds of difficult 
books has bogged him down in the dead past. 
 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a 
deconstructive and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of 
religion, philosophy and the behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual 
point of view—i.e., without the worst of decon, pm and NAM jargon, anti-
scientific anti-intellectualism, and the oppressive rabid Neomarxist Third 
World Supremacist Egalitarianism that is destroying America and the world by 
handing power over to the low class rabble in the West and to the Jihadists and 
the Seven Sociopaths who run China.  
 
Boyer points out (p20), when fear and poverty give way to security and wealth, 
the results of the inference engines change and you find religion changing from 
appeasement rituals for the powerful gods in a hostile universe to self 
empowerment and control in a benevolent one (i.e., New Age Mysticism etc.). 
 
He analyzes in some detail the various world views of philosophy, psychology, 
sociology and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws with (mostly) 
care and brilliance, but most of the sources he analyzes are of questionable 
relevance today. They use terminology and concepts that were already 
outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago.  One has to slog 
thru endless pages of   jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, Kant, Emerson, 
Jung et.al. to get to the pearls. He immerses himself in Freud and the 
psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams (eg, p92), though most now   regard 
these as merely quaint artifacts of intellectual history. 
 
If one is up to date on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, 
most of this is archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike--eg, see 
my review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not 
understand that the basics of religion and ethics-- in fact all human behavior, 
are programmed into our genes. A revolution in understanding ourselves was 
taking place while he was writing his many books and it largely passed him by, 
though I have not read his latest works. 
 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and 
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most writing on human behavior).  Painful because it´s so tortured and 
confusing and then again when you realized how simple it is with modern 
psychology and philosophy. The terminology and ideas are horrifically 
confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in his sources). 
We now think in terms of cognitive templates which evolved about 100,000 
years ago (in most cases several hundreds of millions of years earlier in their 
original forms). They operate automatically, are not accessible to consciousness 
and there is abundant evidence that they severely limit the behaviorial options 
for individuals and for society. His new preface notes one such study, but the 
book needs a total rewriting. 
 
There is an enormous resistance in us to accepting ourselves as part of nature, 
and in particular, any gene based explanations of behavior, in spite of the fact 
that all our behavior, like all of our physiology, is at its roots gene based. Like 
all our thinking, these feelings are due to the operation of the cognitive 
templates, so perhaps it is the conflict between biological explanations and our 
automatic intuitive psychology or social mind systems that is responsible (the 
obviousness of our linguistic conventions and culture and the opacity of our 
automatisms which Searle has called ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’). These 
genetic systems have operated for hundreds of thousands or millions of years 
and the new data from science is telling us the results of their operations (our 
feelings   about what to do) are often wrong in our complex  modern world. 
There is a huge research program in social, economic and political behavior 
from this new viewpoint. 
 
Some jargon you will need is on pg X of the new preface where you find that 
the constantly used vision-logic is postformal cognition or network-logic or 
integral-aperspectival (all points of view are equal and must be considered). He 
also states the postmodern manifesto here: all views equal, dependent on 
limitless contexts, and merely interpretations. As he notes in great detail, this 
puts one on the slippery slope leading to much irrational and incoherent rant 
and there are very basic flaws in it. Nevertheless, it virtually took over US and 
European universities for several decades and is far from dead, having 
transformed itself into Neomarxist Third World Supremacist Egalitarianism. 
You will also need his definition of eros from p528. 
 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and 
obsolete jargon. On p52 there is a quote from Jakobson which can be replaced 
by `the inference engines for psychology and language develop as we mature´; 
and paragraphs from Jantsch (p58) which say that evolution is evolution and 
cells are cells and (p71) the environment changes as organisms evolve. There is 
a quote from Foucault to open Book Two (p327) which, translated from 
deconstructese, says `knowledge helps to understand the world`. 
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There is a long quote (p60-61) from Rupert Sheldrake which, when it is 
intelligible at all, says things that translate as ´proteins are proteins´ and ´cells 
are cells´. There are numerous linguistic disasters from Habermas (e.g., if you 
have time to waste, try figuring out the quotes on p77 or 150), but some are 
actually translatable, such as those on p153-4, which say that people have 
morals, so society has laws and language evolved so society evolved. And lots 
of this from Wilber himself, as on p109 where he spends most of the page to say 
most mutations and recombinations fail and the surviviors are compatible with 
their evirons. In spite of his acquaintance with Searle´s work, he is often 
confused about consciousness. He says (p117-8) that we can regard whatever 
we want as conscious, but clearly, once we leave the realm of animals that have 
eyes and a brain and walk around, it becomes a joke. Likewise, he is on very 
thin ice when discussing our interior and the need to interpret the minds of 
others. This is very far off the mark if one knows some Searle, Wittgenstein and 
cognitive psychology (see my other writings). Likwise with the `explanations´ 
of Wolf on p742 which are wrong for the same reasons that ´explanations´ of 
consciousness are wrong. It must be true that mind and spirit are based in 
physics (at least there is no intelligible alternative) but we don´t know how to 
conceptualize this or even how to recognize such a concept (i.e., the language 
games or Conditions of Satisfaction are unclear). Many suspect we will never 
understand this but rather its just a matter of accepting how things are and 
likewise with the fundamentals of the universe (eg, see my review of Kaku´s 
`Hyperspace` and Dennett). 
 
His notes (p129) that cultural studies have made little headway but neither he 
nor his sources understand that they lacked any framework to do so and 
typically because they embraced the sterile idea of the blank slate. They want 
to be factual, even scientific, but they constantly veer off into fantasy. He 
delineates the integration of art, science and morality as the great task of 
postmodernism and he and others go to immense lengths to make connections 
and organize it all into a coherent plan for thinking and living. However, I 
cannot see any really useful sense in which this is possible. Life is not a game of 
chess.  Even in the limited realm of art or morality it is not at all clear that there 
is anything other than that these are parts of human experience which draws 
them together, i.e., genes make brains and unconscious automatic System 1 
rules. One can put paintings and sculpture and clothing and buildings and stick 
figures in an art book but is this really getting us anywhere? Please see my 
reviews for details on how to describe behavior using the modern two systems 
of thought and a logical structure for rationality. Boyer (see my review) shows 
in detail how religion is due to a complex of brain systems that serve many 
different functions which evolved long before there was anything like religion. 
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The brain has numerous templates that take in data, organize it and relate it 
realtime to other data, but they each serve a specific purpose and those 
purposes are not ART, MORALITY, RELIGION, and SCIENCE. 
 
Cognitive psychology shows that we have many modules working 
simultaneously to produce any behavior and that we relate to people in many   
ways for many reasons.  One basic function is coalitional intuition.  This gives 
us feelings that guide our entrance into groups and our interactions with other 
groups. We automatically and immediately overestimate the qualities of those 
in our group even if it´s composed of randomly chosen total strangers we met 
five minutes before. Likewise, we immediately underestimate the good 
qualities of those in other groups, and always we heavily favor those who 
closely genetically related (kin selection or inclusive fitness which are other 
names for natural selection).  
 
This and many other automatisms guide and commonly rule individual 
behavior, groups, nations and the world, but hardly anyone had a real 
understanding of this until quite recently. So, it is not surprising that almost all 
of his sources from Plato to Kant to Habermas have been wandering around in 
the dark and that Wilber is frantically running from one to the other with a 
flashlight trying to help them find their way out of the woods.   
 
He notes (p199) that the only serious global social movement to date was 
Marxism but thinks its fatal flaw was reductionism.  It seems far more cogent   
to note that, like virtually all of   modern society (and most of his sources and 
to a significant extent this book), it denied (or ignored or failed to understand) 
human nature and basic biology. Nobody seems to notice that most social 
institutions and ideals, (including equality and democracy) have this same flaw. 
Debate on human nature, the environment and the future is endless, but reality 
is an acid that will eat through all fantasy. To paraphrase Lincoln, you can fool 
some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time but you 
can´t fool mother nature anytime.  The mob is programmed to accumulate 
resources and replicate their genes, and this means the collapse of civilization. 
Neomarxism, Diversity, Democracy, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity,  
Social Justice, and Human Rights are the means to this end and nothing can 
resist.  
 
He details intellectual history (philosophy, psychology, religion, ecology, 
feminism, sociology, etc) and shows where nearly everyone went too far in the 
direction of Ascent (to the spirit or religious life only) or Descent (to science, 
materialism, reductionism or Flatland). He trys to show how to heal the rifts by 
combining sense and soul (spiritual and material life, science and religion, 
internal and external, individual and social).  Everything is related   to 
442  
everything else (holons in holarchies--ie, things in nested hierarchies—see   
p26,135 for his definition). 
 
The Age of Enlightenment denied the the spirit, the individual and the interior 
life, but developed art, morals and science and led to democracy, feminism, 
equality and ecology.  This reductionism compressed the intellect and the spirit 
into the Flatland of science, rationality and materialism.  He sees the loss of the 
spiritual point of view with the Age of Enlightenment as the major factor 
responsible for the malaise of modern times, but `true spirituality` or`advanced 
religion`--my terms--(i.e., the quest for enlightenment), as opposed to ` primitive 
religion` (everything else-see Boyer) was always rare. It is advanced religion he 
sees as the panacea, but it is primitive religion that the masses understand, and 
it too has only materialistic goals (money, power and all else serving to replicate 
genes). 
 
He understands that Jesus was a mystic in the same sense as Buddha and many 
others, and that what was to become the Catholic church largely destroyed his 
mystical aspects and the personal search for enlightenment- e.g., Gnosticism, in 
favor of primitive religion, priests, tithes and a structure seemingly modeled on 
the Roman army (p363). But, for the early Christian church, as for most religion, 
the cognitive templates were servants of the genes and enlightenment was not 
on the menu. Jesus was not a Christian, he had no bible, and he did not believe 
in a god any more than did Buddha. We have Christianity without the real 
intelligence of Jesus and this, as he explains in detail, is one cause of the West´s 
extended stay in Flatland.  I am not a Christian nor even a theist but it is one of 
the saddest things in history that the enlightened master who was to serve as 
the model of spirituality for the West had his vision of personal enlightenment 
destroyed and distorted by his own followers (but of course they are not really 
HIS followers). See the Gnostics and the Nag Hammadi manuscripts and above 
all Osho’s discourses on the Gospel of Thomasfrom these. 
 
Like everyone until recently, the many authors he discusses lacked any real 
explanation for human behavior. It rarely occurred to them to ask why we have 
such ideas and behavior and the few who did had no coherent solution. 
 
Though he has read some of John Searle´s superb philosophy, and has passing 
references to research in cognitive psychology, it is amazing that he could do 20 
years research in philosophy without studying Wittgenstein, religion without 
reading Osho and watching his videos, and psychology without Buss, Tooby, 
Cosmides et al.  Much of cognitive and evolutionary   psychology was only 
published in journals at the time he was writing and Wilber has almost no 
references to journals. But Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of 
modern times, and Osho the most famous spiritual teacher. It is remarkable that 
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although he spends much time in his books discussing the intellectual aspects 
of therapy (Freud, Beck, Maslow etc) and clearly understands that the spiritual 
path is the ultimate therapy, he totally ignores Osho, who had the most 
advanced   therapeutic community in history functioning worldwide for the last 
30 years. Osho never wrote a thick book containing a theory of human behavior, 
though his 200 books and many videos,all free online, explain it as beautifully 
and clearly as has ever been done. 
 
Though he tries hard to heal the world, Wilber spends too much time in the airy 
realms of intellectual debate.  As a postmodernist, and holist new age mystic, 
he wants to unite art, morality and science, but science gets the short straw. As 
in some of his other books (e.g., A Brief History of Everything- see my review), 
by far the worst mistakes he makes (along with nearly all his sources and most 
of the planet) are ignoring and misunderstanding basic biology.  This is 
apparent thoughout the book. He starts chapter 7 with a quote from Aurobindo, 
who had the same failing. They have no grasp of the fact that the eugenic effects 
of evolution are driven by natural selection and when society became firmly 
established, this ceased and it´s been totally dysgenic ever since.   Genetic 
engineers have been at work and they have released on a helpless world the 
most horrifically destructive mutant imaginable. Society is the engineer and we 
are that mutant.  If one gets the big picture, preoccupation with the possible 
destructive effects of GMOs (genetically modified organisms) -- other than 
ourselves-- is simply stupid and is perhaps a result of the operation of the 
contagion templates discussed by Boyer. That is, the potential destructive effect 
of all the GMOs we will ever make is unlikely to approach what humans have 
already done themselves. 
 
He says (p 508, p519) that Darwin does not explain evolution, supposedly well 
known before him, and accuses him of `massive obscurantism´ (he should be 
saying this about most of his sources!). The truth is that nothing in human 
behaviour or the world or the universe makes sense except in the light   of 
evolution and no person did more to make this clear than Darwin. The work 
before him was little more than idle speculation and did not even approach a 
serious scientific treatment. This is why it had NO EFFECT on   science or 
society, as opposed to Darwin’s complete transformation of them. 
 
Of course, Darwin did not know genetics nor plate tectonics, and modern 
Neodarwinism adds many refinements, but it shows a total misunderstanding 
of science and history to say that this invalidates or diminishes his 
contributions. Wilber is clearly sliding sideways into the Creationist camp and 
one can only speculate as to which of his inference engines produce this. He 
shows in many places that he has a poor grasp of genetics and evolution.  E.g., 
on p561--as Dawkins has so patiently explained, the unit of evolution is the 
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gene, and none of the other things Wilber mentions work as a genetic unit. 
Though he lists `The Selfish Gene` in his bibliography, it´s clear he has not 
understood it, and it´s over 40 years old. Dawkins has written half a dozen 
superb works since and there are hundreds of others. 
 
Wilber seems to have an allergy to good biology books--most of those he quotes 
are very old and others are classics of confusion. He wastes a page (p51) on the 
idea (mostly due to the Noemarxist pseudoscientist Gould and his coauthor 
Eldredge) of punctuated evolution, which is of very little interest. Gould loved 
to make a big fuss about his `discoveries` and his energy got him alot of airtime, 
but when all was said and done, he had nothing new to say and dragged 
millions into his own confusions (as Dawkins, Conway Morris and many others 
have noted). Yes, evolution is sometimes faster but so what? Sometimes it rains 
a little, sometimes a lot.  If you zoom in, in time or space, you always see more 
detail, and if you zoom out it starts to look the same.  Gould was also 
responsible for the `spandrels of San Marcos` debacle and, with his Neomarxist 
colleagues Lewontin and Rose, for endless insipid attacks on `determinist 
biology`, including the scandalous verbal and physical assaults on E.O Wilson 
(who, unlike themselves, made numerous major contributions to biology, 
though he recently disgraced himself—see my review of his ‘The Social 
Conquest of Earth’). Modern research (e.g., see Pinker and Boyer) makes it clear 
that Wilson was right on the money regarding evolution, except for his 
unfortunate recent embrace of ‘group selection’. 
 
It is quite careless to say (p775) that there is no single pregiven world. Perhaps 
he only means we ought to be multicultural, egalitarian etc., but if there really 
were none, then how can we live and communicate? This is the ugliness of 
postmodernism creeping in. A large dose of Wittgenstein and cognitive 
psychology is an appropriate cure. Neither Wilber nor Derrida nor Foucault 
(nor most people) understand that there MUST be a single point of view or life 
would be impossible. This single point of view, resident in our genes, is integral 
to how we think and behave and largely dictates the vagaries of philosophy, 
politics and religion. The cognitive templates of S1 that underlie   language, 
thought and our perception of reality logically must be the same   and the 
evidence for this is overwhelming. Even the smallest changes, even one gene 
gone wrong, and you have autism, imbecility or schizophrenia. 
 
The brute fact that Wilber (and most of the world) largely ignores, is that there   
are 7.8 billion (11 billion or so by 2100) sets of selfish genes carrying out their 
programs to destroy the earth. They are an acid that will eat through any 
intellectual conclusions, egalitarian fanatasies and spiritual rebirths. 
Selfishness, dishonesty, tribalism and shortsightedness are not due to accidents 
of intellectual or spiritual history.  He says that the lack of spirit is destroying 
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the earth, and though there is this aspect to things, it is much more   to the point 
to say that it is selfish genes that are responsible. Likewise, he says `Biology is 
no longer Destiny`, but it is an easily defensible point of view that the reverse 
is far more likely. The attempt to understand history in terms of ideas ignores 
biology and denies human nature.  Selfish genes always live in Flatland and 
less than 1000 people in all of human history have escaped   the tyranny of the 
monkey mind into enlightenment. 
 
Most of chapter 6 on myth and magic is outdated, confused or just wrong. To 
give just a few examples, we now understand that most of a child´s 
psychological and social development is built in and does not have to be learned 
(eg, pg 233-4). The child does not have to deconstruct anything--the inferences 
engines do it all (p260). Joseph Campbell is quoted extensively and he too was 
clueless about how we develop and how to explain the differences and 
similarities in cultures (p245-50). E.g., Campbell says mythology can only lay 
claim to childhood, but a look around the world shows how false this is and a 
reading of Boyer’s ‘Religion Explained’ (see my review) tells why. His 
discussion of thinking about the nonfactual on pg 279 to 80 is now often referred 
to as running the inference engines in decoupled or counterfactual mode. To his 
contorted comments in the middle of pg 560 (and finally....) I want to say 
`explanation ends with the templates! P580-4 and 591-3 are so full of dubious 
and plain wrong statements I don´t even want to begin but suggest that Wilber 
and the reader start with Searle´s ` The Mystery of Consciousness` or better with 
almost any one of my reviews of Searle or Wittgenstein. Time and again, it is 
clear he shares the lack of a scientific viewpoint with most of his sources. What 
info or procedures can solve the questions of consciousness or of any social 
science and philosophical theories? How do you recognize an answer when you 
see it? He and they go on for pages and whole books without ever having any 
idea (e.g., see my review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves). 
 
On p702- bottom- he talks about the fulcrum driving development, but if one 
understands templates, the logical structure of rationality and the two systems 
of thought (and I mean here and elsewhere the entire corpus of cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology) then one either needs to rewrite this or eliminate it. 
Ditto for most of pgs 770-77. The tortured prose on pg 771-2 is only saying that 
the templates (S1 reflexes) are probed by drugs or other input but not changed 
and that nobody knows (in a way they can clearly convey) what these are. The 
background or intersubjective worldspace is the templates and they develop 
very early in children and then stay fixed for life. The deliberate destruction of 
Jesus` mysticism has created a powerful bias against higher consciousness in 
the West. Though he does not understand or discuss enlightenment, Boyer 
gives the basis for understanding how and why this happened. 
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Wilber embraces a simple utilitarianism (greatest good for greatest number)—
i.e., the greatest depth for he greatest span (p334). This basic principle of much 
philosophy, religion and economics has serious problems and is probably 
unworkable. Which people should we make happy and how happy and when 
(i.e., now or in the future)?  On what basis do we distribute   resources now and 
how much do we save for the future population, and who decides and how to 
enforce this? He calls upon our Basic Moral Intuition (ie, the operation of our 
templates, as we now know), but our BMI is not really to help others but to help 
ourselves and our close relatives (inclusive fitness), and the few thousand (or 
let´s be very optomistic and say few million) who are spritually advanced do 
not run the world and never will. The BMI-- eg, social exchange, coalitional 
intuitions, intuitive psychology, etc, evolved to serve our own interests (not 
those of the  group--if, like Wilber, you think this way please read some of 
Dawkin´s books or my recent review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’) 
and in any case is hopelessly at sea in the modern world with it´s advanced 
education, instant communications, firearms, mood altering drugs, clothes and 
cosmetics, a huge and mobile population and vanishing  resources. 
 
Instead of the intellectual or spiritual approach Wilber takes to history, others 
take ecological, genetic or technogical approaches (eg, Diamond’s ´Guns, 
Germs and Steel´ or Pinkers ´The Blank Slate´).  In the long run, it appears that 
only biology really matters and we see daily how overpopulation is 
overwhelming all attempts to civilize the masses.  The democracy and equality 
which Wilber values so highly are means created by selfish genes to facilitate 
their destruction of the planet. In spite of the hope that a new age is dawning 
and we will see the biological and psychic evolution of a new human, the fact 
is that we are the most degenerate species there ever was and the planet is 
nearing collapse. The billions of years of eugenics (natural selection) that thrust 
life up out of   the slime and gave us   the amazing ability to write and read  
books like this is now over. There is no longer selection for the healthier and 
more intelligent and in fact they produce a smaller percentage of the children 
every year.  Nature does not tolerate physical and mental aberrations but 
society encourages them. Our physical and mental peak was probably 
CroMagnon man or maybe even Neanderthals (who had larger brains (yes, I 
know they seem not to have contributed more than a few percent of our DNA) 
about 100,000 years ago. It seems plausible that only genetic engineering and 
an enlightened oligarchy can save us. See my essay Suicide by Democracy.  
 
He thinks (eg, p12 etc.) that it is our fractured world view (i.e., denial of the 
spirit) that is responsible for our ecological catastrophes and preoccupation 
with material goods, but this is another example of the denial of human nature. 
Nobody views heart conditions or Alzheimer disease as due to a fractured 
world view, but few seem to have any problem thinking you can change the 
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fundamentals of behavior just by education or psychological manipulation. 
Modern science refutes this view conclusively (see Pinker, Boyer etc).  The 
intuitive psychology templates tell us that we can manipulate the behavior of 
others, but these templates were evolved hundreds of thousands to millions of 
years ago, and they often fail to give correct   results in modern contexts. Nearly 
every parent thinks they can profoundly influence the adult character (patience, 
honesty, irritability, depression, persistence, compulsiveness etc.) of their 
children in spite of clear evidence to the contrary (e.g., Pinker). 
 
He thinks that animal rights people are illogical and excessive when they value 
animals over humans and likewise with those who value the environment over 
people´s needs. This may be logical in his system but of course humans are 
typically (and often reasonably) illogical. In any case, if we always put human 
needs first, then it is surely the end of peace, tranquility, beauty and sanity. 
 
Wilber defends Piaget, but like him he shows many places that he does not 
understand that the child does not have to learn the important things--they are 
built in and it only has to grow up. There seems to be no evidence that any of 
our templates, i.e., S1 change with time one we mature. The things that we learn 
are mostly trivial in comparison (i.e., even a computer can learn them!). 
 
His sources are mostly lost in confusion and jargon but he is brilliant and if one 
bothers to read his explanations and translate Wilberspeak into English, it 
usually makes sense.   On pg 545- 7 he explains holonic ecology.  Here is a 
translation. All organisms have value in themselves and are related to all others 
in the ecosystem and we must wake up spiritually. There is a web of life (i.e., 
Gaia or ecosystem) and all have intrinsic value, but higher organisms have more 
value, which requires a spiritual point of view. Neither the spiritual or scientific 
approach works alone (i.e., dualism is bad). 
 
Translated, it loses most of it´s appeal but it is not fair to deny the poetry and 
majesty of his vision. But, this does not excuse him from writing clearly. Opacity 
is a nearly universal characteristic of the books he treats here. However, when 
Katz wrote a book denigrating mysticism Wilber took the time to do a 
`Searleian` analysis to show how incoherence has passed for scholarship (p629-
31).  Unfortunately, he does not continue this throughout the book and uses the 
jargon-laden incoherence of Habermas and others to explain other vague or 
incoherent texts (e.g., using Habermas instead of Searle or Wittgenstein or 
cognitive psychology to explicate Emerson p633). 
 
In the USA, some 120 million (about 250 million by 2100) third world refugees 
from unrestrained motherhood are now the most powerful single force for 
destruction, having easily displaced fundamentalist European Christians. But 
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all lowclass people are united in being against (or at least unwilling/unable to 
practice) population control and for environmental devastation in order to 
maximize the number of and resource use by their genes (though lacking any 
insight into this of course).  This was a rational survival strategy when it was 
fixed in the genes millions of years ago, but it is suicidal now. The spiritual 
rebirth he talks about is not that of the “diverse” or the lower classes anywhere. 
 
His view is that it is the poor and ignorant who are the major environmental 
problem and that this is somehow due to our Flatland approach, so if we just 
wake up, get spritual and help them out this will solve it. However, the rich 
destroy as much as 20 times more than the poor per capita and the third world 
will pass the first in C02 production about 2025. But there is nothing noble about 
the poor—they are only the rich in waiting. 
 
Everyone is part of the problem and if one does the math (vanishing resources 
divided by increasing population) it´s clear that the worldwide collapse of 
industrial society and a drastic reduction in population will happen and its only 
a matter of how and when (2150 is a good guess). Like so many, he suggests 
living lightly on the earth, but to live (and above all, to reproduce), is to do harm 
and if reproduction remains a right then it´s hard to see any hope for the future. 
As is politically correct, he emphasizes rights and says little about 
responsibilities.   It is a reasonable view that if society is to accept anyone as 
human, they must take responsibility for the world and this must take 
precedence over their personal needs. It is unlikely that any government will 
implement this, and equally unlikely that the world will continue to be a place 
any civilized person will wish to live in (or be able to). 
 
I present here a table of rationality which I have worked out over the last 10 
years.  The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two 
systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which 
can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind(LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
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System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle 
and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or 
COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s PriorIntentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
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The most profound spiritual autobiography of all 
time? - a review of "The Knee of Listening" by Adi Da 
(Franklin Jones) (1995) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American 
mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says 
`The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be 
true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on 
spirituality, and this is one of the greatest. Certainly, it is by far the fullest and 
clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have ever seen. Even if you 
have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human psychological 
processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, 
yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human 
possibilities. I describe it in some detail and compare his teaching with that of 
the Contemporary Indian mystic Osho. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
  
There are many editions of the spiritual autobiography of the unique American 
mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The first edition was 1972 and new editions 
with more material and much advertising about the group continue to appear. 
The latest one I have seen (2004) is about 3 times the size and weight of the 1995 
editon I prefer, as the hundreds of pages of new material are opaque prose and 
advertising. So, I recommend one of the earlier paperpack editions such as the 
1995 one to which my page citations refer. 
 
453  
A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American 
mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says 
`The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be 
true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on 
spirituality, and this is one of the greatest ones. Certainly, it is by far the fullest 
and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have ever seen. Even if 
you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human psychological 
processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, 
yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human 
possibilities. 
 
As I have read and experienced alot in various religious traditions, I naturally 
compare his writings with those of others, particularly with the great Indian 
mystic Osho. Though they clearly agree on the major points of how to proceed 
on the path, letting go of the attachment to the spiritual quest etc, their styles 
are vastly different. Both are highly intelligent and well read (Osho could speed 
read and read a huge number of books) and were at home in the spiritual 
literature of the major religious traditions. However, like so much of the 
spiritual literature, most of Da´s books are essentially unreadable as he 
struggles to express in language the ineffable realms of the enlightened mind. 
Even in this, by far his most readable book, he often veers off into pages of 
opacity as he tries to explain the unexplainable. A great pity he seems never to 
have read Wittgenstein –the greatest natural psychologist of all time—who 
showed that we must abandon the attempts at explanation and accept 
descriptions of our innate psychological functions in language, which is the 
mind. 
 
Osho by contrast is the clearest, most jargon free expositor of the spiritual life 
who has ever lived. He wrote very little and nearly all of his more than 200 
books are transcriptions of spontaneous talks he gave-- with no notes or 
preparation. They are nonetheless unexcelled masterpieces of spiritual 
literature. His amazing àutobiography` (actually compiled after his death) has 
been published by St. Martins and the full version, as well as all his books (many 
also available on DVD), are available online many places. Unfortunately, he has 
very little to say about the exact details of his spiritual progress. 
 
As Da lived most of his later life in seclusion on an island in Fiji, it was not easy 
to get to hear him but the Dawn Horse Press sells a few videos on their web 
page. Da is not a very engaging or facile speaker, unlike Osho who is by turns 
amusing, shattering and hypnotic. But, as both of them understand, it´s what 
the master is and not he says that is important. 
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Both of them were utterly honest and uncompromising in their life and 
teachings and Da omits nothing of relevance, including his youthful adventures 
with sex and drugs as well as his exposure to LSD, psilocybin and mescaline as 
a volunteer in government experiments. However, as with many or perhaps all 
of those destined to become enlightened, he was different from birth and 
experienced the Shakti energy (which he calls the Bright) from childhood.  And, 
when he entered college, he said his primary interest was to discover what 
living beings are and what is living consciousness.  Clearly not your typical 
freshman. 
 
A major problem in describing advanced spiritual states is that no criteria or 
language for them exists in common discourse so mystics have to try to bend 
language in mostly vain attempts to capture their experiences. It is far worse 
than trying to describe seeing to a congenitally blind person since they at least 
have the cognitive structures and experience of the world. But mystics are quite 
rare and most of them have left little or no description of their mental states. 
 
Unlike Osho, who rejected miracles, paranormal phenomena and all the other 
nonsense that commonly accompanies religion, Da seems to lack any science 
background at all and embraces precognition (p120), reincarnation 
(p555),`meditating` other persons, living on air (p287) etc., and regards the 
phenomena that I would say are happening in his brain as being `out there`. 
From comments included in newer editions it is clear that many of his disciples 
believe he can perform miracles like stopping a raging forest fire at their 
California retreat. Nevertheless, most of the time he is amazingly levelheaded, 
going thru over a decade of stress and psychic terrors that would drive most 
from the spiritual path. Millions of years of evolution have solidified the ego 
and it does not leave peacefully. 
 
Interwoven with the spellbinding account of his spiritual progress are the 
details of the mind’s interaction with the body, described in the East in terms of 
various forms of Yoga (eg., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 in the 1995 edition I 
recommend). These few pages are worth more than a whole shelf of yoga books 
if you want to get to the heart of the mind/body relation in spirituality. 
 
Unlike most who have become enlightened, he had a thorough grounding in 
Christian practice and made a major effort to become a protestant, and then 
Greek Orthodox minister.  Even years later, after he was far along the path with 
Muktananda, he had an amazing and totally unexpected series of visitations 
from Mary and Jesus that went on for weeks (p 301-3 et seq.). 
Regarding drugs, as is nearly universal among spiritual teachers, he notes that 
although they may remove certain barriers at times, they do not provide a 
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shortcut to understanding. However, nearly everyone is now aware that they 
put many on the path to higher consciousness throughout human history, 
especially in the last few decades. 
 
He describes in detail the many stages in his ego death or self realization (eg, 
p72-4, 198-200, 219,20, 238-9, 245, 249, 258-9, 281, 355-65, 368-72, 406). Along the 
way, he realized the ultimate disutility of all practices and all traditions (337-9) 
including yoga (281-3), which are all attached to seeking and goals, ultimately 
winding up in the present.  He discovered, as have many others, that seeking 
and meditation became obstacles and gave them up for devotion to his guru 
Muktananda (p420-22). His detailed accounts of his interactions with the 
famous Swami Muktananda and his ultimate realization of his limitations are 
of rare insight and honesty. He constantly encounters his attachment to his ego 
(Narcissus-- eg, p108-110) and asks himself--`Avoiding Relationship? ` by 
which he seems to mean avoiding the divine or ego death by preoccupation 
with spiritual seeking. 
 
After enlightenment, he teaches the ´only by me revealed and given Way of the 
heart`, finding all other paths to be `remedial` and ´egoic´ and merely pursuing 
God or reality (p359 +), but after a careful reading of this and several other 
books I never got any idea what that way consists in. Undoubtedly being in his 
presence helps alot but in other places he has complained about the fact that his 
disciples just won´t let it happen and one wonders if even one has been able to 
follow him. Of course, the same considerations apply to all traditions and 
teachers and though some of Osho´s friends (he disavowed the master/disciple 
relationship) have claimed enlightenment, nobody of his status has emerged. It 
looks like you have to have the right genes and the right environment and a 
very advanced and preferably enlightened guru to stimulate you. I suspect that 
the time has passed when an enlightened one could start a movement that 
transforms much of the world. The world desperately needs higher 
consciousness and I hope that someone comes up with an easier way very soon, 
but I think it’s quite unlikely. 
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Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our 
real selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- A 
review of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the hidden 
determinants of human behavior –author’s official 
authoritative edition’ 412p (2012)(original edition 
1995)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out 
due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the 
“truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the 
person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known 
is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and 
psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, 
sounds, touch, odors, ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out their true 
feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle 
reading) to do “paranormal science”. 
 
Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in 
response to increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in response 
to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware that there is a 
long established and vast ongoing research effort in social psychology referred 
to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of 
‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle tone (infrequently used) 
social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most frequently 
verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying 
from seconds to months after the stimulus. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, 
take the results to mean we are automatons who learn and act largely without 
awareness via S1 (automated System 1) and many others such as Kihlstrom and 
Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2 (deliberative 
System 2). Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding 
“automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was when Wittgenstein described the 
reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. Nevertheless, 
this book is an easy read and some therapists and spiritual teachers may find it 
of use. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out 
due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the 
“truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the 
person being tested believes it but, whether it is really true! How could any sane 
person believe this? As a person with over 50 years adult experience with 
science, psychology, philosophy, religion and life I do not find it at all credible 
that it is even highly reliable about the person’s beliefs and there is no chance 
of getting to know reality this way. What is well known is that people will show 
automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about 
anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, people. So, 
muscle reading to find out their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it 
as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) to do “paranormal science”. 
 
Kinesiology, also known as human kinetics, is the study of human 
movement. Kinesiology studies physiological, mechanical (muscle tone), and 
psychological mechanisms as indices of people’s mental and physical status 
and often uses movement exercises as therapy. However, Hawkins (without 
saying so) is using the term to refer to a very narrow application of 
kinesiology—the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in response 
to increases in cognitive load (i.e., mention of some person, event or object), 
which causes the subject to be distracted by intellectual or emotional issues, 
thus decreasing the muscle tension and causing the arm to drop in response to 
the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. Hawkins seems unaware that there 
is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in social psychology 
referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that 
his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle tone (actually 
infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response 
and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations 
at times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. 
 
It was just by chance that I read Hawkins book after reading several books and 
dozens of recent papers on implicit cognition and was greatly surprised that he 
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uses it as a key to the universe--i.e., the ‘ultimate nature of reality’ and I am sure 
the hundreds of active researchers would be equally amazed. I relate his 
spiritual practice to contemporary work on implicit cognition. 
 
A major issue in most contemporary research on implicit social cognition is the 
degree to which it is automatic (‘unconscious’) and what constitutes ‘evidence’ 
for this. Hundreds of papers and dozens of books have appeared in just the last 
few years with massive confusion and often acrimonious debates. Many, such 
as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are automatons who learn 
and act largely without awareness via S1 and many others such as Kihlstrom 
and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2. 
 
Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is 
still as chaotic as it waswhen Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility 
and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. 
 
Often the issue is stated by researchers and philosophers in terms of System 1 
and System 2 functioning --a very useful, even indispensable division of 
behavior (intentionality) into our primitive reptilian automated, nonreflective 
S1 and our higher cortical primate conscious deliberative functions of S2. As 
noted in my other reviews, this division was pioneered by philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the 1930’s, though nobody has realized it. 
 
I am quite familiar with mediation and the phenomena of enlightenment (see 
my review of Adi Da’s autobiography ‘The Knee of Listening’) and am willing 
to accept Hawkins’ claim to be in this rarefied group (it is often said that we 
know of less than 1000 enlightened persons in all of human history). I can also 
accept that he may have been a very effective ‘therapist’ who helped many 
persons and clearly, he is highly intelligent. This does not make me accept his 
many questionable or clearly false statements about the facts of the world. I am 
also (on the basis of a lifetime of study of science and philosophy) very skeptical 
about the relevance of chaos, attractors, complexity theory, computation, etc. to 
the study of human behavior (see my reviews and books on academia.edu, 
philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org, libgen.io, b-ok.org, Amazon etc.), 
claims which are often made by scientists as well. Implicit cognition research 
involves the usual horrific mixing of factual true or false scientific issues about 
causal brain functions (the S1 mind), with those about how language works (i.e., 
the mind, which as Wittgenstein showed us ¾ of a century ago, is public 
behavior --the S2 mind)—other topics I have covered extensively in my reviews. 
 
So, Hawkins makes much of his muscle reading and I’m sure it often works 
well but there is a major logical error here. Regardless of what it says about the 
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beliefs of the person being tested, it clearly says nothing whatever about the 
world itself. So, I respect Hawkins and his therapeutic work but, with the vast 
array of approaches to spiritual and emotional healing, there are lots of choices. 
And it is one thing to be treated by an enlightened master-whose very presence 
(or even the thought of them) can be galvanizing, and quite another to be 
treated by an ordinary person. By far the best source of books, audios and 
videos of an enlightened master at work are those of Osho (Bhagwan Shree 
Rajneesh) which are available to buy or free on the net on various sites. He 
therapized thousands at a time on occasion and created the most remarkable 
therapeutic community of all time around him. Though he is gone, his 
therapists still practice worldwide, and his works can be transformative. 
 
Hawkins has other books which have many favorable reviews so those deeply 
interested may consult them. 
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Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the 
Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard 
Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and 
Civilization. A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield 
‘SuperCooperators’(2012)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes --not only an 
outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals 
who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, 
or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for political expedience. Sadly, he 
is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant and 
arrogant attack on science motivated at least in part by the religious fervor of 
his Harvard colleagues. It shows the vile consequences when universities 
accept money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by big names 
that they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific 
methodology, how math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and even 
what attitudes to religion and generosity are appropriate as we inexorably 
approach the collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes--not only an 
outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals 
who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, 
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or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for of political expedience. Sadly, 
he is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant 
and arrogant attack on science motivated at least in part by the religious fervor 
of his Harvard colleagues. It shows the vile consequences when universities 
accept money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by big names 
that they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific 
methodology, how math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and even 
what attitudes to religion and generosity are appropriate as we inexorably 
approach the collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
I found sections in ‘Conquest’ with the usual incisive commentary (though 
nothing really new or interesting if you have read his other works and are up 
on biology in general) in the often-stilted prose that is his hallmark, but was 
quite surprised that the core of the book is his rejection of inclusive fitness 
(which has been a mainstay of evolutionary biology for over 50 years) in favor 
of group selection. One assumes that coming from him and with the articles he 
refers to published by himself and Harvard mathematics colleague Nowak in 
major peer reviewed journals like Nature, it must be a substantial advance, in 
spite of the fact that I knew group selection was nearly universally rejected as 
having any major role in evolution. 
 
I have read numerous reviews on the net and many have good comments but 
the one I most wanted to see was that by renowned science writer and 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. Unlike most by professionals, which 
are in journals only available to those with access to a university, it is readily 
available on the net, though apparently, he decided not to publish it in a journal 
as it is suitably scathing. 
 
Sadly, one finds a devastating rejection of the book and the most acerbic 
commentary on a scientific colleague I have ever seen from Dawkins-- 
exceeding anything in his many exchanges with late and unlamented 
demagogue and pseudoscientist Stephan Jay Gould. Although Gould was 
infamous for his personal attacks on his Harvard colleague Wilson, Dawkins 
notes that much of ‘Conquest’ reminds one uncomfortably of Gould’s frequent 
lapses into "bland, unfocussed ecumenicalism". The same is more or less true of 
all Wilson’s popular writing including his most recent book ‘The Meaning of 
Human Existence’—another shameless self-promotion of his discredited ideas 
on Inclusive Fitness (IF). 
 
Dawkins points out that the notorious 2010 paper by Nowak, Tarnita and 
Wilson in Nature was almost universally rejected by over 140 biologists who 
signed a letter and that there is not one word about this in Wilson's book. Nor 
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have they corrected this in the subsequent 4 years of articles, lectures and 
several books. There is no choice but to agree with Dawkin's trenchant comment 
"For Wilson not to acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the great 
majority of his professional colleagues is--it pains me to say this of a lifelong 
hero --an act of wanton arrogance." In view of Nowak’s subsequent behavior 
one must include him as well. I feel like one of the stunned people one sees on 
TV being interviewed after the nice man next door, who has been babysitting 
everyone's children for 30 years, is exposed as a serial killer. 
 
Dawkins also points out (as he and others have done for many years) that 
inclusive fitness is entailed by (i.e., logically follows from) neo- Darwinism and 
cannot be rejected without rejecting evolution itself. Wilson again reminds us 
of Gould, who denounced creationists from one side of his mouth while giving 
them comfort by spewing endless ultraliberal Marxist-tinged gibberish about 
spandrels, punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary psychology from the 
other. The vagueness and mathematical opacity (to most of us) of the 
mathematics of group or multilevel selection is just what the soft-minded want 
to enable them to escape rational thinking in their endless antiscientific rants, 
and (in academia) postmodernist word salads. 
 
Worse yet, Wilson's ‘Conquest’ is a poorly thought out and sloppily written 
mess full of nonsequiturs, vague ramblings, confusions and incoherence. A 
good review that details some of these is that by graduate student Gerry Carter 
which you can find on the net. Wilson is also out of touch with our current 
understanding of evolutionary psychology (EP) (see e.g., the last 300 pages of 
Pinker's ‘The Better Angels of our Nature’). If you want a serious book length 
account of social evolution and some relevant EP from  an expert see ‘Principles 
of Social Evolution’ by Andrew F.G. Bourke, or a not quite so serious and 
admittedly flawed and rambling account but a must read nevertheless by 
Robert Trivers—'The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in 
Human Life’ and older but still current and penetrating works such as ‘The 
Evolution of Cooperation’: Revised Edition by Robert Axelrod and ‘The Biology 
of Moral Systems’ by Richard Alexander. 
 
After reading this book and its reviews, I dug into some of the scientific articles 
which responded to Nowak and Wilson and to Van Veelen’s critiques of the 
Price equation upon which they heavily relied. The reviews noted that it has 
always been clear that the math of group or multilevel selection reduces to that 
of inclusive fitness (kin selection) and that it is not logically possible to select 
for behavior that does not benefit the genes that are unique to the actor and its 
immediate relatives. To put it bluntly, ‘altruistic’ behavior is always selfish in 
the end in the sense that it increases survival of the genes in the altruist. This to 
me is obvious from daily life and any scientists who claim otherwise have 
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clearly lost their way. Yes, it does happen in the weirdness of modern life (i.e., 
so unlike the stone age society in which we evolved) that one sometimes sees a 
person give their life to protect a nonrelated person, but clearly, they will not 
do it again and (provided its done before they replicate) any tendency to do it 
will not be inherited either. Even if they have already replicated they will on 
average leave behind fewer descendants than if they held back. This guarantees 
that any genetic tendency for ‘true altruism’- i.e., behavior that decreases one’s 
genes in the population-- will be selected against and no more than this very 
basic logic is needed to grasp evolution by natural selection, kin selection and 
inclusive fitness—all the mathematical niceties serving only to quantitate things 
and to clarify strange living arrangements in some of our relatives (e.g., ants, 
termites and mole rats). 
 
The major focus of the group selectionist’s (‘groupies’) attack was the famous 
Extended Price Equation that has been used to model inclusive fitness, 
published by Price about 40 years ago. The best papers debunking these attacks 
that I have found are those of Frank and Bourke and I will start with a few 
quotes from Frank ‘Natural selection. IV. The Price equation’ J. EVOL. BIOL. 25 
(2012) 1002–1019. 
 
“The critics confuse the distinct roles of general abstract theory and concrete 
dynamical models for particular cases. The enduring power of the Price 
equation arises from the discovery of essential invariances in natural selection. 
For example, kin selection theory expresses biological problems in terms of 
relatedness coefficients. Relatedness measures the association between social 
partners. The proper measure of relatedness identifies distinct biological 
scenarios with the same (invariant) evolutionary outcome. Invariance relations 
provide the deepest insights of scientific thought…Essentially, all modern 
discussions of multilevel selection and group selection derive from Price 
(1972a), as developed by Hamilton (1975). Price and Hamilton noted that the 
Price equation can be expanded recursively to represent nested levels of 
analysis, for example individuals living in groups… All modern conceptual 
insights about group selection derive from Price’s recursive expansion of his 
abstract expression of selection… A criticism of these Price equation 
applications is a criticism of the central approach of evolutionary quantitative 
genetics. Such criticisms may be valid for certain applications, but they must be 
evaluated in the broader context of quantitative genetics theory…[and in a 
quote from Price … ‘Gene frequency change is the basic event in biological 
evolution. The following equation…which gives frequency change under 
selection from one generation to the next for a single gene or for any linear 
function of any number of genes at any number of loci, holds for any sort of 
dominance or epistasis, for sexual or asexual reproduction, for random or 
nonrandom mating, for diploid, haploid or polyploid species, and even for 
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imaginary species with more than two sexes’…]… Path (contextual) analysis 
follows as a natural extension of the Price equation, in which one makes specific 
models of fitness expressed by regression. It does not make sense to discuss the 
Price equation and path analysis as alternatives… Critiques of the Price 
equation rarely distinguish the costs and benefits of particular assumptions in 
relation to particular goals. I use van Veelen’s recent series of papers as a proxy 
for those critiques. That series repeats some of the common misunderstandings 
and adds some new ones. 
 
Nowak recently repeated van Veelen’s critique as the basis for his commentary 
on the Price equation (van Veelen, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; van Veelen et al., 
2010; Nowak& Highfield, 2011; van Veelen, 2011; van Veelen et al., 2012… This 
quote from van Veelen et al. (2012) demonstrates an interesting approach to 
scholarship. They first cite Frank as stating that dynamic insufficiency is a 
drawback of the Price equation. They then disagree with that point of view and 
present as their own interpretation an argument that is nearly identical in 
concept and phrasing to my own statement in the very paper that they cited as 
the foundation for their disagreement… The recursive form of the full Price 
equation provides the foundation for all modern studies of group selection and 
multilevel analysis. The Price equation helped in discovering those various 
connections, although there are many other ways in which to derive the same 
relations… Kin selection theory derives much of its power by identifying an 
invariant informational quantity sufficient to unify a wide variety of seemingly 
disparate processes (Frank, 1998, Chapter 6). The interpretation of kin selection 
as an informational invariance has not been fully developed and remains an 
open problem. Invariances provide the foundation of scientific understanding: 
‘It is only slightly overstating the case to say that physics is the study of 
symmetry’ (Anderson, 1972). Invariance and symmetry mean the same thing 
(Weyl, 1983). Feynman (1967) emphasized that invariance is The Character of 
Physical Law. The commonly observed patterns of probability can be unified 
by the study of invariance and its association with measurement (Frank & 
Smith, 2010, 2011). There has been little effort in biology to pursue similar 
understanding of invariance and measurement (Frank, 2011; Houle et 
al.,2011).” 
 
I hope it is becoming clear why I chose the title I did for this article. To attack 
the Price equation and inclusive fitness is to attack not only quantitative 
genetics and evolution by natural selection, but the universally used concepts 
of covariance, invariance and symmetry, which are basic to science and to 
rationality. Furthermore, the clearly voiced religious motivation of Nowak 
invites us to consider to what extent such Christian virtues as true (permanently 
genetically self-diminishing) altruism and the brotherhood of man (woman, 
child, dog etc.) can be part of a rational program for survival in the near future. 
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My take is that true altruism is a luxury for those who don’t mind being 
evolutionary dead ends and that even in it’s ‘make believe’ inclusive fitness 
version, one will be hard pressed to find it when the wolf is at the door (i.e., the 
likely universal scenario for the 11 billion in the next century). 
 
There is much more in this gem, which goes into exquisite logical and 
mathematical detail (and likewise his many other papers-you can get all 7 in 
this series in one pdf) but this will give the flavor. Another amusing episode 
concerns tautology in math. Frank again: ‘Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van 
Veelen et al. (2012) believe their arguments demonstrate that the Price equation 
is true in the same trivial sense, and they call that trivial type of truth a 
mathematical tautology. Interestingly, magazines, online articles and the 
scientific literature have for several years been using the phrase mathematical 
tautology for the Price equation, although Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van 
Veelen et al. (2012) do not provide citations to previous literature. As far as I 
know, the first description of the Price equation as a mathematical tautology 
was in the study of Frank (1995).’ 
 
Unlike Frank, Lamm and others, the ‘groupies’ have not shown any 
understanding of the philosophy of science (the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought, as I like to call it) in these recent books and articles, nor 
in any of Wilson’s numerous popular books and articles over the last half 
century, so I would not expect them to have studied Wittgenstein (the most 
penetrating philosopher of mathematics) who famously remarked that in math 
‘everything is syntax, nothing is semantics’. Wittgenstein exposes a nearly 
universal misunderstanding of the role of math in science. All math (and logic) 
is a tautology that has no meaning or use until it is connected to our life with 
words. Every equation is a tautology until numbers and words and the system 
of conventions we call evolutionary psychology are employed. Amazingly 
Lamm in his recent excellent article ‘A Gentle Introduction to The Price 
Equation’ (2011) notes this: 
 
“The Price equation deals with any selection process. Indeed, we can define 
selection using it. It says nothing in particular about biological or genetic 
evolution, and is not tied to any particular biological scenario. This gives it 
immense power, but also means that it is quite possible to apply it incorrectly 
to the real world. This leads us to the second and final observation. The Price 
equation is analytic [true by definition or tautologous]. It is not a synthetic 
proposition [an empirical issue as to its truth or falsity]. We derived it based on 
straightforward definitions, and universal mathematical principles. The 
equation simply provides a useful way of interpreting the meaning of the 
straightforward definitions we started from. This however is not the case once 
you put the equation into words, thereby interpreting the mathematical 
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relationships. If you merely say: _I define 'selection' to be the covariance blah 
blah blah, you might be safe. If you say: _the covariance blah blah blah is 
selection, you are making a claim with empirical content. More fundamentally, 
the belief that the rules of probability theory and statistics, or any other 
mathematical manipulation, describe the actual world is synthetic.” 
 
In this regard, also recommended is Helantera and Uller’s ‘The Price Equation 
and Extended Inheritance’ Philos Theor Biol (2010) 2: e101.  
 
“Here we use the Price Equation as a starting point for a discussion of the 
differences between four recently proposed categories of inheritance systems; 
genetic, epigenetic, behavioral and symbolic. Specifically, we address how the 
components of the Price Equation encompass different non-genetic systems of 
inheritance in an attempt to clarify how the different systems are conceptually 
related. We conclude that the four classes of inheritance systems do not form 
distinct clusters with respect to their effect on the rate and direction of 
phenotypic change from one generation to the next in the absence or presence 
of selection. Instead, our analyses suggest that different inheritance systems can 
share features that are conceptually very similar, but that their implications for 
adaptive evolution nevertheless differ substantially as a result of differences in 
their ability to couple selection and inheritance.” 
 
So, it should be clear that there is no such thing as sidestepping the Price 
equation and that like any equation, it has limitless applications if one only 
connects it to the world with suitable words. 
 
As Andy Gardner put it in his article on Price (Current Biology 18#5 R198)  
(Also see his ‘Adaptation and Inclusive Fitness’ Current Biology 23, R577–R584, 
July 8, 2013) 
 
“Such ideas were rather confused until Price, and later Hamilton, showed that 
the Price equation can be expanded to encompass multiple levels of selection 
acting simultaneously (Box 2). This allows selection at the various levels to be 
explicitly defined and separated, and provides the formal basis of group 
selection theory. Importantly, it allows the quantification of these separate 
forces and yields precise predictions for when group-beneficial behavior will 
be favoured. It turns out that these predictions are always consistent with 
Hamilton’s rule, rb – c > 0. 
 
Furthermore, because kin selection and group selection theory are both based 
upon the same Price equation, it is easy to show that the two approaches are 
mathematically exactly equivalent, and are simply alternative ways of carving 
up the total selection operating upon the social character. Irrespective of the 
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approach taken, individual organisms are expected to maximize their inclusive 
fitness — though this result follows more easily from a kin selection analysis, 
as it makes the key element of relatedness more explicit.” 
 
Consequently, to have the ‘groupies’ attacking the Price equation is bizarre. 
And here is Bourke’s recent summary of inclusive fitness vs ‘groupism’: 
(haplodiploid and eusocial refer to the social insects which provide some of the 
best tests). 
 
“Recent critiques have questioned the validity of the leading theory for 
explaining social evolution and eusociality, namely inclusive fitness (kin 
selection) theory. I review recent and past literature to argue that these critiques 
do not succeed. Inclusive fitness theory has added fundamental insights to 
natural selection theory. These are the realization that selection on a gene for 
social behaviour depends on its effects on co-bearers, the explanation of social 
behaviours as unalike as altruism and selfishness using the same underlying 
parameters, and the explanation of within-group conflict in terms of non-
coinciding inclusive fitness optima. A proposed alternative theory for eusocial 
evolution assumes mistakenly that workers’ interests are subordinate to the 
queen’s, contains no new elements and fails to make novel predictions. The 
haplodiploidy hypothesis has yet to be rigorously tested and positive 
relatedness within diploid eusocial societies supports inclusive fitness theory. 
The theory has made unique, falsifiable predictions that have been confirmed, 
and its evidence base is extensive and robust. Hence, inclusive fitness theory 
deserves to keep its position as the leading theory for social evolution.” 
 
However inclusive fitness (especially via the Extended Price Equation) explains 
much more than ant society, it explains how multicellular organisms came into 
being. 
 
“The third insight of inclusive fitness theory is the demonstration that conflict 
between members of a society is potentially present if they are unequally 
related to group offspring, since differential relatedness leads to unequal 
inclusive fitness optima. From this has sprung an understanding of an immense 
range of kin-selected conflicts, including conflicts within families and eusocial 
societies and intragenomic conflicts that follow the same underlying logic. The 
corollary of this insight is that societies are stable to the extent that the inclusive 
fitness optima of their members coincide. This in turn provides the rationale for 
the entire ‘major transitions’ view of evolution, whereby the origin of novel 
types of group in the history of life (e.g. genomes within cells, multicellular 
organisms and eusocial societies) can be explained as the result of their 
previously independent constituent units achieving a coincidence of inclusive 
fitness optima through grouping. From this standpoint, a multicellular 
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organism is a eusocial society of cells in which the members of the society 
happen to be physically stuck together; the more fundamental glue, however, 
is the clonal relatedness that (barring mutations) gives each somatic cell within 
the organism a common interest in promoting the production of 
gametes…Nowak et al. argued that their perspective assumes a ‘gene-centred 
approach’ that ‘makes inclusive fitness theory unnecessary’. This is puzzling, 
because entirely lacking from their perspective is the idea, which underpins 
each of inclusive fitness theory’s insights, of the gene as a self-promoting 
strategist whose evolutionary interests are conditional on the kin class in which 
it resides…In their model of the evolution of eusociality, Nowak et al. deduced 
that the problem of altruism is illusory. They wrote that ‘There is no paradoxical 
altruism that needs to be explained’ because they assumed that potential 
workers (daughters of a colony-founding female or queen) are ‘not independent 
agents’ but rather can be seen ‘as “robots” that are built by the queen’ or the 
‘extrasomatic projection of [the queen’s] personal genome’. If this claim were 
correct, then only the queen’s interests would need to be addressed and one 
could conclude that worker altruism is more apparent than real. But it is 
incorrect, for two reasons. One is that, as has repeatedly been argued in 
response to previous ‘parental manipulation’ theories of the origin of 
eusociality, the inclusive fitness interests of workers and the mother queen do 
not coincide, because the two parties are differentially related to group 
offspring. The second is that worker behaviours such as eating of the queen’s 
eggs, egg-laying in response to perceived declines in queen fecundity, sex-ratio 
manipulation by destruction of the queen’s offspring and lethal aggression 
towards the queen all demonstrate that workers can act in their own interests 
and against those of the queen. In the light of this proven lack of worker 
passivity, workers’ reproductive self-sacrifice is paradoxical at first sight and 
this is the genuine problem of altruism that inclusive fitness theory has solved. 
(c) Alternative theory of eusocial evolution Nowak et al. [38] presented an 
‘alternative theory of eusocial evolution’ (as alluded to in §2b), backed up by a 
‘mathematical model for the origin of eusociality’. However, these do not 
represent true alternative theories, either alone or in combination, because they 
do not make any points or predictions that have not been made within inclusive 
fitness theory” 
 
 Speaking of various steps in a scheme suggested by Nowak et al, Bourke says: 
 
“These steps constitute a reasonable scenario for the origin and elaboration of 
insect eusociality, but neither the sequence of steps nor the individual elements 
differ substantially from those that have been proposed to occur within the 
inclusive fitness framework…The alternative theory of eusocial evolution of 
Nowak et al. also exhibits two important weaknesses. To begin with, by 
allowing groups to form in multiple ways in step (i) (e.g. subsocially through 
470  
parent–offspring associations but also by any other means, including ‘randomly 
by mutual local attraction’), their scenario ignores two critical points that are 
inconsistent with it but consistent with inclusive fitness theory. First, the 
evidence is that, in almost all eusocial lineages, eusociality has originated in 
social groups that were ancestrally subsocial and therefore characterized by 
high within-group relatedness. Second, the evidence is that the origin of 
obligate or complex eusociality, defined as involving adult workers irreversibly 
committed to a worker phenotype, is associated with ancestral lifetime parental 
monogamy and hence, again, with predictably high within-group 
relatedness…In sum, Nowak et al. make a case for considering the effect of the 
population-dynamic context in which eusocial evolution occurs. But their 
alternative theory and its associated model add no fundamentally new 
elements on top of those identified within the inclusive fitness framework and, 
relative to this framework, exhibit substantial shortcomings…More 
fundamentally, as has long been recognized  and repeatedly stressed , the 
haplodiploidy hypothesis is not an essential component of inclusive fitness 
theory, since Hamilton’s rule for altruism can hold without the relatedness 
asymmetries caused by haplodiploidy being present. Highlighting the status of 
the haplodiploidy hypothesis to criticize inclusive fitness theory therefore 
misses the target. It also overlooks the fact that all diploid eusocial societies 
identified since the haplodiploidy hypothesis was proposed have turned out to 
be either clonal or family groups and so, as predicted by inclusive fitness theory, 
to exhibit positive relatedness. This is true of ambrosia beetle, social aphids, 
polyembryonic wasps, social shrimps and mole-rats. It is even true of a newly 
discovered eusocial flatworm. In short, the diploid eusocial societies, far from 
weakening inclusive fitness theory, serve to strengthen it…More broadly, the 
theory uniquely predicts the absence of altruism (involving lifetime costs to 
direct fitness) between non-relatives, and indeed no such cases have been found 
except in systems clearly derived from ancestral societies of relatives.  Finally, 
inclusive fitness theory is unique in the range of social phenomena that it has 
successfully elucidated, including phenomena as superficially dissimilar as the 
origin of multicellularity and the origin of eusociality, or intragenomic conflicts 
and conflicts within eusocial societies. Overall, no other theory comes close to 
matching inclusive fitness theory’s record of successful explanation and 
prediction across such a range of phenomena within the field of social 
evolution. The challenge to any approach purporting to replace inclusive fitness 
theory is to explain the same phenomena without using the insights or concepts 
of the theory…Recent critiques of inclusive fitness theory have proved 
ineffective on multiple fronts. They do not demonstrate fatal or unrecognized 
difficulties with inclusive fitness theory. They do not provide a distinct 
replacement theory or offer a similarly unifying approach. They do not explain 
previously unexplained data or show that explanations from inclusive fitness 
theory are invalid. And they do not make new and unique predictions. The 
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latest and most comprehensive critique of inclusive fitness theory, though 
broad-ranging in the scope of its criticism, suffers from the same faults. 
Certainly, relatedness does not explain all variation in social traits. In addition, 
the long-standing message from inclusive fitness theory is that particular 
combinations of non-genetic (e.g. ecological) and genetic factors are required 
for the origin of eusociality. Nonetheless, relatedness retains a unique status in 
the analysis of eusocial evolution because no amount of ecological benefit can 
bring about altruism if relatedness is zero.” 
Andrew F. G. Bourke ‘The validity and value of inclusive fitness theory’ Proc. 
R. Soc. B 2011 278, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.1465 14 September (2011) 
 
 
One thing rarely mentioned by the groupies is the fact that, even were ‘group 
selection’ possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in 
most contexts) to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples of 
true altruism in nature –the fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if 
we understand evolution) tells us that its apparent presence in humans is an 
artefact of modern life, concealing the facts, and that it can no more be selected 
for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One might also benefit from 
considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) mentioned by groupies--
cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) genetically 
identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 trillion cell clone-- but we all born with 
thousands and perhaps millions of cells that have already taken the first step 
on the path to cancer and generate millions to billions of cancer cells in our life.  
If we did not die of other things first, we (and perhaps all multicellular 
organisms) would all die of cancer. Only a massive and hugely complex 
mechanism built into our genome that represses or derepresses trillions of 
genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions of cells a second, keeps 
the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One might take this to imply 
that a just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any planet 
in any universe is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it 
otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that are universal and inescapable, 
or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness is a law of physics. 
 
In a bizarre twist, it was apparently such thoughts that drove Price (creator of 
the Price equation and a devout Christian) to suicide. Regarding the notion of 
‘theory’, it is a classic Wittgensteinian language game—a group of uses loosely 
linked but having critical differences. 
 
When it was first proposed, evolution by natural selection was indeed highly 
theoretical, but as time passed it became inextricably linked to so many 
observations and experiments that its basic ideas were no longer any more 
theoretical than that vitamins play critical roles in human nutrition. For the 
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‘Theory of Deity’ however it is not clear what would count as a definitive test. 
Perhaps the same is true of String Theory. 
 
Many besides groupies note the pleasant nature of much human interaction and 
see a rosy future ahead-- but they are blind. It is crushingly obvious that the 
pleasantry is a transient phase due to abundant resources produced by the 
merciless rape of the planet, and as they are exhausted in the next two centuries 
or so, there will be misery and savagery worldwide as the (likely) permanent 
condition. Not just movie stars, politicians and the religious are oblivious to 
this, but even very bright academics who should know better. In his recent book 
‘The Better Angels of Our Nature’ one of my most admired scholars Steven 
Pinker spends half the book showing how we have gotten more and more 
civilized, but he seems never to mention the obvious reasons why--the 
temporary abundance of resources coupled with massive police and military 
presence facilitated by surveillance and communication technologies. As 
industrial civilization collapses, it is inevitable that the Worst Devils of Our 
Nature will reappear. One sees it in the current chaos in the Middle East, Latin 
America and Africa, and even the world wars were Sunday picnics compared 
to what’s coming. Perhaps half of the 12 billion then alive will die of starvation, 
disease and violence, and it could be many more.  See my ‘Suicide by 
Democracy’ for a brief summary of doomsday. 
 
Another unpleasant fact about altruism, generosity and helping, virtually never 
mentioned, is that if you take a global long-term view, in an overcrowded world 
with vanishing resources, helping one person hurts everyone else in some small 
way. Each meal, each pair of shoes create pollution and  erosion and use up  
resources, and when you add 7.8 billion of them together (soon to be 11) it is 
clear that one person’s gain is everyone else’s loss. Every dollar earned or spent 
damages the world and if countries cared about the future they would reduce 
their GDP (gross destructive product) every year. Even were groupism true this 
would not change. 
 
The facts that Wilson, Nowak et al have, for four years, persisted in publishing 
and making extravagant claims for grossly inadequate work is not the worst of 
this scandal. It turns out that Nowak’s professorship at Harvard was purchased 
by the Templeton Foundation—well known for its pervasive sponsorship of 
lectures, conferences and publications attempting to reconcile religion and 
science. Nowak is a devout Catholic and it appears that a large gift to Harvard 
was contingent on Nowak’s appointment. This made him Wilson’s colleague 
and the rest is history. 
 
However, Wilson was only too willing as he had long shown a failure to grasp 
Evolutionary theory—e.g., regarding kin selection as a division of group 
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selection rather than the other way around. I noticed years ago that he co-
published with David Wilson, a longtime supporter of group selection, and had 
written other papers demonstrating his lack of understanding. Any of the 
groupies could have gone to the experts to learn the error of their ways (or just 
read their papers). The grand old men of kin selection such as Hamilton, 
Williams and Trivers, and younger bloods like Frank, Bourke and many others, 
would have been happy to teach them. But Nowak has received something like 
$14 million in Templeton grants in a few years (for mathematics!) and who 
wants to give that up? He is quite outspoken in his intent to prove that the 
gentleness and kindness of Jesus is built into us and all the universe. Jesus is 
conveniently absent, but one can guess from the qualities of other enlightened 
ones and the history of the church that the real story of early Christianity would 
come as a shock. Recall that the bible was expurgated of anything that did not 
meet the party line (e.g., Gnosticism -check out the Nag-Hammadi 
manuscripts). And in any case, who would record the harsh realities of daily 
life? 
 
Almost certainly, the Nowak, Tarnita, Wilson paper would never have been 
published (at least not by Nature) if it had been presented by two average 
biologists, but coming from two famous Harvard professors it clearly did not 
get the peer review that it should have. 
 
Regarding Nowak and Highland’s book ‘SuperCooperators’ I will let Dawkins 
do the honors: 
 
I have read the book by Nowak and Highfield. Parts of it are quite good, but 
the quality abruptly, and embarrassingly, plummets in the chapter on kin 
selection, possibly under the influence of E O Wilson (who has been consistently 
misunderstanding kin selection ever since Sociobiology, mistakenly regarding 
it as a subset of group selection). Nowak misses the whole point of kin selection 
theory, which is that it is not something additional, not something over and-
above ‘classical individual selection’ theory. Kin selection is not something 
EXTRA, not something to be resorted to only if ‘classical individual selection’ 
theory fails. Rather, it is an inevitable consequence of neo-Darwinism, which 
follows from it deductively. To talk about Darwinian selection MINUS kin 
selection is like talking about Euclidean geometry minus Pythagoras’ theorem. 
It is just that this logical consequence of neo-Darwinism was historically 
overlooked, which gave people a false impression that it was something 
additional and extra. Nowak’s otherwise good book is tragically marred by this 
elementary blunder. As a mathematician, he really should have known better. 
It seems doubtful that he has ever read Hamilton’s classic papers on inclusive 
fitness, or he couldn’t have misunderstood the idea so comprehensively. The 
chapter on kin selection will discredit the book and stop it being taken seriously 
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by those qualified to judge it, which is a pity. 
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/new-book-shows-that-
humans-are-genetically-nice-ergo-jesus/ 
 
A scathing review of ‘SuperCooperators’ also appeared from eminent game 
theorist/economist/political scientist (and Harvard alumnus) Herbert Gintis 
(who recounts the Templeton scandal therein), which is quite surprising 
considering his own love affair with group selection— see the review of his 
book with Bowles by Price www.epjournal.net – 2012. 10(1): 45-49 and my 
review of his most recent volume ‘Individuality and Entanglement’(2017). 
 
Regarding Wilson’s subsequent books, ‘The Meaning of Human Existence’ is 
bland and likewise confused and dishonest, repeating several times the 
groupies party line four years after its thorough debunking, and ‘A Window on 
Eternity’- is a meagre travel journal about the establishing of a national park in 
Mozambique. He carefully avoids mentioning that Africa will add 3 billion in 
the near future (the official UN projection), eliminating all of nature along with 
peace, beauty, decency, sanity and hope. 
 
In the end, it is clear that this whole sad affair will be only the tiniest bump on 
the road and, like all things which exercise our attention now, will soon be 
forgotten as the horrors of unrestrained motherhood and the subjugation of the 
world by the Seven Sociopaths who rule China will bring society crashing 
down. But one can be sure that even when global warming has put Harvard 
beneath the sea and starvation, disease and violence are the daily norm, there 
will be those who insist that it is not due to human activities (the opinion of half 
the American public currently) and that overpopulation is not a problem (the 
view of 40%), there will be billions praying to their chosen deity for a rain of Big 
Macs from the sky, and that (assuming the enterprise of science has not 
collapsed, which is assuming a lot) someone somewhere will be writing a paper 
embracing group selection. 
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Review of Human Nature-- Sandis and Cain eds. 
(2012) 
 
          Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Like most writing on human behavior, these articles lack a coherent framework 
and so I hesitate to recommend this book to anyone, as the experienced ought 
to have about the same perspective I do, and the naïve will mostly be wasting 
their time. Since I find most of these essays obviously off the mark or just very 
dull, I can't generate much enthusiasm for commenting on them, so after 
providing what I consider a reasonable precis of a framework (see my other 
articles for an expanded version) I provide cursory comments on the various 
articles. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by 
calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, 
for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental 
methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method 
makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; 
though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was 
the very one we thought quite innocent." Wittgenstein, PI para.308 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
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correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it 
is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." 
Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions." 
Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, 
not curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the 
problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just 
in virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? 
...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
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already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." 
Searle PNC p165 -171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the 
exception of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form 
of Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as 
a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action...The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field 
of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system 
of desire- independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond 
the reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate 
phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of 
meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... 
the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it 
turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have 
the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases 
that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW 
p11-13 
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"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain 
by identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system 
actually works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the 
attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim 
that programs provide causal explanations of cognition... There is just a 
physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real physical and 
physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a New 
Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive 
science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this 
difference by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' 
can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the 
computational model of vision...in the sense of `information' used in 
cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an information 
processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional 
and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, 
that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of 
human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at 
once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the 
speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the 
utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level it is a physical object like any other. At another level it 
has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
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"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed 
according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. 
This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions."PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of 
finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something 
that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said 
everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! .... This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an 
explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give 
it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try 
to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy 
in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, MSW and other books by these two 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of behavior that I will refer to as 
the WS framework. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate 
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the genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All 
study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and 
slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), 
but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, 
anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense-- see W for 
many examples and Searle and Hacker (Human Nature)for good 
disquisitions on this). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into 
our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto 
of Cognitive Psychology. A cognitive psychologist of the future my be able 
to see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking 
and acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) 
while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not a theory but 
description of our grammar. S, Carruthers (C) and others muddy the waters 
here because they sometimes refer to dispositions as mental states as well, 
but as W did long ago, S, Hacker and others show that the language of 
causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions--
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again not a theory but a description of how language (thinking) works.  
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--
it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the 
automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC 
`The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical 
error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the 
illusion that we control our life and the consequences are almost certain 
collapse of civilization during the next 150 years. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W 
discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Reflexive (CSR—earlier called Causally Self Referential by 
Searle), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can 
be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')-
-i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has 
revolutionized psychology, economics and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
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System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving 
much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 
activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing 
about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world 
in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded 
during personal development into a wide array of automatic universal 
cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the 
basic structure of behavior. 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) of PI 
need a whole action while those of IAA only a partial one. He makes clear 
(e.g., p34) that PI are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in 
IA which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-referential 
(CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and 
desires and other dispositions which have COS but don't cause them) it is 
essential that they figure in bringing about (causing) their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of MSW, 
which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I 
have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true- 
only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 
true-only perception, memory and prior intention, while S2 refers to 
dispositions such as belief and desire. 
484  
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content 
and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto 
and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from 
MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of 
satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions 
(`will') are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only 
axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and intentions-in- action, we try to match 
how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that 
belief, desire (and imagination-- desires time shifted and decoupled from 
intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later 
evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS originating 
in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language 
and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as 
intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection 
with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the 
future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each 
other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural 
relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we consciously control 
everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate 
our life S has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 
3rd period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of 
System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
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structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the 
same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life 
must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. 
Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no 
evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several 
orders of magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to 
the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that 
spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes of S1, while 
conscious representations(R1) are the dispositional Secondary Language 
Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the most 
basic statement of how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever 
understood it. 
 
Thus, I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as 
follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., 
desires displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), 
which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or 
later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would 
restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the 
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short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously 
create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted 
extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), which 
produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology who thinks a bit can 
see that this view is not credible. 
Here is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason 
operates: We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., 
desires displaced in space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), 
which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or 
later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness-IF (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related). 
 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, 
S notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act 
of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental 
state. This can be seen as another statement of his argument against private 
language (personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with 
rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts-
-no private rules or private interpretations either. And one must note that 
many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's 
frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary 
public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes 
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clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate 
shared psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the 
later W and, lacking the S1, S2, S3 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one 
can understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the 
domination of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner experiences, so 
whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack.  
Similarly, with reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a 
combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 
processes where the lack of any test makes them inapplicable. Two of W's 
famous examples used for combatting this temptation are playing tennis 
without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so 
`calculating in the head (`S1 calculating') was not possible. `Playing' and 
`calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are disposition 
words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before one really 
ought to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' etc. But we 
are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss `calculating1' as 
a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence 
another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent."  
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and 
this means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W:  
" When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind 
in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's 
lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought 
and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might 
note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as `EP' and that in 
spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order 
descriptive psychology as one can find. 
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Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an 
image of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the 
image I have in my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his 
picture and `NO' if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the 
photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS 
that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had 
looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we 
were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that 
should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish 
is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if 
my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long 
for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." Disposition 
words refer to PE's which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental 
states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that 
I express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
I have had to cut the background info to a minimum, so those wishing for 
more please consult my many other reviews on W, S, Hutto, Johnston, etc., 
and especially the recent work of DMS and Hacker and of course much of 
the recent work of the psychologists and social psychologists on 
automatisms. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
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which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but 
I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to 
thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought 
(LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the 
classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle).   
 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 
by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******    (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
A detailed explanation of the table is given in many of my other articles.  
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
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at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
 
Now for some cursory comments on "Human Nature." 
 
First, we can take it as given that modern humans did not exist until their 
evolution from other hominoids as recently as 50k years, or perhaps several 
times longer depending on one's view of the evidence on the emergence of 
language. Take away language and most of S2 and culture are not possible, 
as we can see in very young children, animals and the genetically deficient 
or brain damaged. Secondly, given the above WS framework, and the fact 
of evolution driven by inclusive fitness, there is, for me at least, very little 
of interest in nearly all discussion of society, politics, religion, history, ethics, 
and much else in this book or anywhere. If you don't understand the two 
systems in evolutionary perspective, the impossibility of private language, 
the way dispositional language works, the axiomatic nature of behavior, 
and the automaticity of behavior including deontology, it's just not possible 
to grasp social behavior or the language games that can be played with the 
term "Human Nature". 
 
In my view, very very few people have this comprehensive vision and of 
those in this volume only Hacker approaches it. He is the leading authority 
on W and one of the very few who actually puts W into practice. I have read 
him before and this essay is brilliant, as far as it goes, but he tends to 
preciousness (as another philosopher characterized him) and so can be a bit 
tedious. The criticisms he makes here of cognitive science are also well 
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explored in his books "Human Nature" and "Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience" and further explained and criticized in "Neuroscience and 
Philosophy (see my reviews). By and large I find him close to the mark but 
I think he exaggerates the actual damage the sloppy use of language by 
cognitive scientists can do. Since I have made detailed comments on these 
topics in my other reviews I will not repeat them here. Also, since I find most 
of these essays obviously off the mark or just very dull, I can't generate much 
enthusiasm for commenting on them. 
 
Some of the papers try to decide what if anything is really unique or 
essential to us. Those unfamiliar with philosophy might be incredulous--
isn't it obvious! But this is just the normal case--we know but we can't 
precisely say, just as we can't say what exactly makes something an apple 
or a splash. But philosophers want to try anyway. I suggest you should see 
this question as essentially the same as all philosophical questions. We want 
to understand how S1 does it but S2 is not up to it. It's all (or mostly) in the 
unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don't know but our DNA 
does courtesy of the death of trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. 
Thanks! So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the 
mechanisms of mind, knowing (as I think most of those who have really 
thought about it carefully would agree) that even should we arrive at 
"complete" knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a description of 
what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red and an "explanation" of 
why its red is not possible. 
 
 
Glock I know well from his other writings and again think that if he would 
just read WS carefully (or better read my reviews) he could rate 5 stars 
instead of 3. Hinzen is bright but ranges too wide and too shallow and there 
is little in him really useful to a comprehensive understanding of human 
nature. Those with little knowledge of human genetics may find Crow 
interesting but of course it barely scratches the surface of an immense 
subject. Clack has some mildly interesting comments, but for me 
psychoanalysis is a very dead horse and no amount of beating will make it 
stand up. 
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I hesitate to recommend this book to anyone, as the experienced ought to 
have about the same perspective I do, and the naïve will mostly be wasting 
their time. Among the endless books and articles available, I commend the 
3 volumes on Human Nature edited by Carruthers, the Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology, my reviews of WS, Hutto, DMS, Hacker et all, and 
any good recent texts on human genetics and evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
496  
Review of “Are We Hardwired? by Clark & Grunstein 
Oxford (2000) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, 
in spite of being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. They start with 
twin studies which show the overwhelming impact of genetics on behavior. 
They note the increasingly well-known studies of Judith Harris which extend 
and summarize the facts that shared home environment has almost no effect on 
behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as different from their 
stepbrothers and sisters as people chosen at random. One basic point that they 
(and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail to note is that the hundreds 
(thousands depending on your viewpoint) of human behavioral universals, 
including all the basics of our personalities, are 100% determined by our genes, 
with no variation in normals. Everyone sees a tree as a tree and not a stone, 
seeks and eats food, gets angry and jealous etc. So, what they are mostly talking 
about here is how much environment (culture) can affect the degree to which 
various traits are shown, rather than their appearance. 
 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing to 
note that we and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and that 
attempts to defeat natural selection with medicine, agriculture, and civilization 
as a whole, are disastrous for any society that persists. As much as 50% of all 
conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end in early spontaneous abortion, 
nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural culling of defective 
genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and makes society 
possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will destroy the world 
before dysgenics has a chance. 
 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
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from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, 
in spite of being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. 
 
They start with twin studies which show the overwhelming impact of genetics 
on behavior. They note the increasingly well-known studies of Judith Harris 
which extend and summarize the facts that shared home environment has 
almost no effect on behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as 
different from their stepbrothers and sisters as people chosen at random. There 
is lots of impact on personality (ca 50% of variation) from early environment, 
presumably peer interaction, TV etc., but we really don’t know. 
 
They summarize the genetics of behavior in the earliest true animals, the 
protozoa, and note that many of the genes and mechanisms underlying our 
behavior are already present. There is strong selective advantage to identifying 
the genes of one’s potential mates and even protozoa have such mechanisms. 
There is data showing that people tend to pick out mates with different HLA 
types but the mechanism is obscure. They present various lines of evidence that 
we communicate unconsciously with pheromones via the vomeronasal organs 
and not mediated by smell neurons. 
 
One chapter reviews the biology of the nematode C. elegans, noting the fact that 
it shares many mechanisms and genes with protozoa and with us due to the 
extreme conservativism of evolution. Some human genes have been inserted 
into it with apparent preservation of their function in us. 
 
Moreover, they show what seem to be mechanisms of long term and short term 
memory controlled by genes in a fashion similar to that in higher organisms. 
 
They note the general similarity of the nonvisual cryptochome mediated 
regulation of circadian rhythms in yeasts and fruitflies to those in higher 
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animals and even to those in plants. It has been shown that both cry-1 and cry-
2 cryptochrome genes are present in fruit flies, mice and humans and that the 
photoreceptor system is active in many body cells other than the retina, and 
researchers have even been able to trigger circadian rhythms from light shined 
on our leg! 
 
After a brief survey of work on the famous slug Aplysia and the cAMP and 
Calmodulin systems, they review the data on human neurotransmitters. The 
chapter on aggression notes the impulsive aggression of low serotonin mice and 
the effects on aggressive behavior of mutations/drugs that effect the chemistry 
of nitric oxide— recently, to the amazement of all, identified as a major 
neurotransmitter. 
 
In a chapter on consumption, they recount the now well-known story of leptin 
and its role in regulation food intake. Then a summary of the genetics of sexual 
behavior. 
 
One basic point that they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail 
to note is that the hundreds (thousands depending on your viewpoint) of 
human behavioral universals, including all the basics of our personalities, are 
100% determined by our genes, with no variation in normals. Everyone sees a 
tree as a tree and not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets angry and jealous etc. So, 
what they are mostly talking about here is how much environment (culture) can 
affect the degree to which various traits are shown, rather than their 
appearance. 
 
There are also highly active fields studying human behavior which they barely 
mention— evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology, parts of sociology, 
anthropology and behavioral economics—which are casting brilliant lights on 
behavior and showing that it is to a large extent automatic and unconscious 
with little voluntary awareness or control. The authors bias towards biology is 
a huge defect. 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing to 
note that we and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and that 
attempts to defeat natural selection with medicine, agriculture, and civilization 
as a whole, are disastrous for any society that persists. As much as 50% of all 
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conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end in early spontaneous abortion, 
nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural culling of defective 
genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and makes society 
possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will destroy the world 
before dysgenics has a chance. 
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Boring, antiscientific, antirational, creationist trash: A 
Review of Adapting Minds- Evolutionary Psychology 
and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature by David 
Buller (2006) 
 
    Michael Starks  
 
     ABSTRACT 
 
I bought this thinking anything from Bradford books and MIT must be good. 
Instead it's a boring, stupid, incompetent, antiscientific and antirational piece of 
closet creationist trash. Heads should roll at Bradford for this atrocity! If you 
must then start by reading the last chapter first as he conceals a frank statement 
of his anti- rationality til the end. I made detailed notes on it as I thought it was 
a serious work of science and was going to do a long page by page refutation 
but why bother! The praise from some Science and Nature reviewers shows 
they did not read it and/or have as little understanding of behavior as Buller. 
The positive comments from the jacket by Sterelny, Wilson, Sober and Caporael 
are due to the fact that they all share Buller's retro antirational blank slate views 
that human nature is due to our culture and the delusion of group selection (see 
my review of Wilson's The Social Conquest of Earth). The first part of the book 
is dull repeats of basic biology cribbed from intro texts and unrelieved by 
photos or drawings. Along the way, there are some incredibly bizarre takes on 
the use of language and scientific method. Then you find an attempt to refute 
some well-known studies of stepchild abuse. As you get to the end he lets his 
anti-science and anti-rationality out in the open, telling us that regardless of 
whether our behavior is innate we should not investigate it! 
 
 The fact that our brain is no different from our other organs and it's functions 
a product of genes and evolution continues to be resisted or just ignored not 
only by academics but by the general public. Nevertheless, the basics of our 
behavior are as innate as our heartbeat and detailed evidence (for those who 
have trouble with the obvious) is all around us everywhere we look once our 
eyes are opened-just watch people doing anything or turn on the tv (or see the 
huge and rapidly growing scientific literature). Novices can start with Pinker's 
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"The Blank Slate" but there are now dozens of good popular and scientific books 
on evolutionary psychology and hundreds of articles in the literature of 
philosophy, psychology, economics etc. The articles in Buss's The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology 2nd ed. and the 5th ed of his EP text, and some at the end 
of Gazzinaga's The Cognitive Neurosciences 4 are good starting points for the 
serious reader., and science are all manifestations of our innate psychology 
(with the minor extensions we call culture and civilization), you can look almost 
anywhere in literature or life to study our adapted mind except here. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
I bought this thinking anything from Bradford books and MIT must be good. 
Instead it's a boring, stupid, incompetent, antiscientific and antirational piece of 
closet creationist trash. Heads should roll at Bradford for this atrocity! If you 
must then start by reading the last chapter first, as he conceals a frank statement 
of his anti- rationality until the end. I made detailed notes on it as I thought it 
was a serious work of science and was going to do a long page by page 
refutation, but why bother! The praise from some Science and Nature reviewers 
shows they did not read it and/or have as little understanding of behavior as 
Buller. The positive comments from the jacket by Sterelny, Wilson, Sober and 
Caporael are due to the fact that they all share Buller's retro antirational blank 
slate views that human nature is due to our culture. The first part of the book is 
dull repeats of basic biology cribbed from intro texts and unrelieved by photos 
or drawings. Along the way there are some incredibly bizarre takes on the use 
of language and scientific method. Then you find an attempt to refute some 
well-known studies of stepchild abuse. He may have a minor point here that 
they have some statistical flaws. Worth a short article in a professional journal 
but hardly a book. As you get to the end he lets his anti-science and anti-
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rationality out in the open, telling us that regardless of whether our behavior is 
innate we should not investigate it! The fact that our brain is no different from 
our other organs and it's functions a product of genes and evolution continues 
to be resisted or just ignored not only by academics but by the general public. 
 
Nevertheless, the basics of our behavior are as innate as our heartbeat and 
detailed evidence (for those who have trouble with the obvious) is all around 
us everywhere we look once our eyes are opened--just watch people doing 
anything or turn on the tv (or see the huge and rapidly growing scientific 
literature). Novices can start with Pinker's "The Blank Slate" but there are now 
dozens of good popular and scientific books on evolutionary psychology and 
hundreds of articles in the literature of philosophy, psychology, economics etc. 
The articles in Buss's The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd ed. and the 
5th ed of his EP text, and some at the end of Gazzinaga's The Cognitive 
Neurosciences 4 are good starting points for the serious reader., 
 
Once you realize that psychology, philosophy, history, politics, art, music, 
anthropology, literature, economics, sociology, law, and science are all 
manifestations of our innate psychology (with the minor extensions we call 
culture and civilization), you can look anywhere to study our adapted mind, 
including your own home and office. 
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Review of The Science of Marijuana by Leslie 
Iverson 283p (2000) 
 
    Michael Starks 
 
   ABSTRACT 
 
One should start by putting things in perspective. There are about 400,000 
yearly USA deaths due to tobacco, 100,000 each to alcohol and prescription 
drugs and about 7600 to aspirin and other OTC painkillers. Worldwide we can 
expect that the figures will be about 10 million for tobacco, 2.5 million each for 
others and about 200,000 for aspirin and OTC painkillers. If you calculated the 
lifetime risks of death or injury from using marijuana, it is probably comparable 
to that of driving ten km and significantly less than that of putting on a pair of 
skis. In addition, the young people who comprise the majority of the users are 
heavy risk takers, a very high percentage of whom have personality disorders. 
There are about 60 million schizophrenics and the same number of manic 
depressives in the world. When you add the depressives, schizotypal disorders, 
anorexics, alcoholics etc. it is clear that perhaps a billion people have major 
mental problems, nearly half of all those are in the prime drug taking ages. In 
addition, nearly all of us have periodic mood swings, medical problems and 
personal crises. A large percentage of the population will likely show memory 
deficits and other problems. Nevertheless, if any such effects appear in 
marijuana users they will almost certainly be ascribed to the drug. In reality, is 
not clear that anyone has ever had serious permanent mental problems due to 
casual recreational marijuana use alone, and its potential medical benefits are 
enormous. It has a long and remarkable history as a highly effective and safe 
medicine in many societies. Nevertheless, the federal government has chosen 
to ignore medical advice and legal opinion and classify it as a dangerous drug 
with no recognized medical value and the governments of many other countries 
have followed along like trained dogs. On the whole, this is an excellent book 
as Iverson has done his homework and tries to be impartial. Overall the book is 
much saner than most of the time from the medical establishment but it is out 
of date and needs to be rewritten to address the criticisms above and to take 
note of the huge changes in social and medical status recently. 
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One should start by putting things in perspective. There are about 400,000 
yearly USA deaths due to tobacco, 100,000 each to alcohol and prescription 
drugs and about 7600 to aspirin and other OTC painkillers. 
Worldwide we can expect that the figures will be about 10 million for 
tobacco, 2.5 million each for others and about 200,000 for aspirin and OTC 
painkillers. If you calculated the lifetime risks of death or injury from using 
marijuana, it is probably comparable to that of driving ten km and 
significantly less than that of putting on a pair of skis. 
 
In addition, the young people who comprise the majority of the users are 
heavy risk takers, a very high percentage of whom have personality 
disorders. There are about 60 million schizophrenics and the same number 
of manic depressives in the world. When you add the depressives, 
schizotypal disorders, anorexics, alcoholics etc. it is clear that perhaps a 
billion people have major mental problems, nearly half of all those are in 
the prime drug taking ages. In addition, nearly all of us have periodic mood 
swings, medical problems and personal crises. A large percentage of the 
population will likely show memory deficits and other problems. 
 
Nevertheless, if any such effects appear in marijuana users they will almost 
certainly be ascribed to the drug. In reality, is not clear that anyone has ever 
had serious permanent mental problems due to marijuana and its potential 
medical benefits are enormous. It has a long and remarkable history as a 
highly effective and safe medicine in many societies. Nevertheless, the 
federal government has chosen to ignore medical advice and legal opinion 
and classify it as a dangerous drug with no recognized medical value and 
the governments of many other countries have followed along like trained 
dogs. 
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On the whole, this is an excellent book as Iverson has done his homework 
and tries to be impartial. Nevertheless, some of the biases nearly universal 
in scientific and government circles are still evident. For example, on page 
174 he states that the use of cannabis for mood disorders and sleep is 
obsolete because of the availability of Prozac, Valium and sleeping 
pills. However, the very well-known downsides to the medical drugs (days 
to weeks before they act, inability of patient to titrate the dose, common 
major and often fatal side effects, serious and frequent bad interactions with 
other drugs and alcohol, often addictive, high cost, patients commonly 
overdose, frequent failure to be fully effective, suicides, accidental 
poisoning of children, mental clouding, etc.) are not mentioned. 
Cannabinoids in contrast act immediately, are almost nontoxic, easily 
titratable, have few known interactions, often produce pain reduction, 
should be very low cost, are usually effective, have no serious or fatal side 
effects, essentially nonaddictive, overdose unlikely, almost impossible to 
commit suicide with, and highly unlikely to be life threatening if they get 
into children´s hands). Also with some experience, a large percentage of 
patients will come to enjoy the usually moderate but often useful, side 
effects (stimulation of appetite and sociability, increased enjoyment of 
music, facilitation of sex, pain reduction, boredom reduction, etc.). 
 
All of these facts have been known for a long time and it is primarily the 
lunatic opposition of the US government (and its imitators) that has 
prevented cannabinoids from becoming major medicinals. However, the 
fact that marijuana had to be either smoked or taken as pills, which took a 
long time to act, were absorbed irregularly, and could not be easily titrated 
by doctor or patient, was also a major impediment. Since this book was 
written, GW Pharmaceuticals (which spent some $42 million in a few years 
just for marketing) and others have introduced throat sprays, inhalers and 
high tech sublingual metering devices (that can even keep track of doses 
and times and send the data to remote medical centers) that largely 
overcome these problems. These advances, coupled with the vast amount 
of research on the brain´s natural (endogenous) cannabinoid agonists and 
antagonists and receptors is rapidly revolutionizing the science of 
cannabinoids and will almost certainly lead to the introduction of many into 
mainstream medicine (much to the chagrin of the government and other 
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antidrug groups which have long insisted cannabis has no medical use). In 
addition, the opposition to the cultivation and use of cannabis varieties used 
for hemp (which has little or no THC) should gradually cease. This is critical 
as hemp is a very environmentally friendly plant which can replace much 
of the nonfriendly wood, paper, cotton, and synthetics industries and is 
useful for food and oil as well. 
 
The eagerness of the US and European governments to fund research 
showing the bad effects of marijuana has led to a major industry employing 
hundreds of scientists and their assistants and resulting in dozens of books 
and reports and several thousand articles over the last 40 years. Almost all 
this work is irrelevant to the issue of whether marijuana, as used by most 
persons, has any substantive negative effects. Iverson is mostly objective but 
errs sometimes—e.g., in citing the book of Solowij as showing negative 
effects of marijuana smoking on memory. Solowij, like virtually all such 
studies on bad effects of cannabinoids and psychedelics on humans, has 
major flaws (e.g., no good controls) which render the conclusions useless. 
There are also other studies which show little or no negative memory effects 
from above-normal levels of chronic use. Of course, most people do not 
have a high chronic intake, nor do they take large amounts of alcohol and a 
very wide variety of legal and illegal drugs (often intravenously) over long 
periods. The subjects in such studies are preselected for long term heavy use 
and are essentially uncontrolled for abuse of other drugs and alcohol and 
there are no real control groups (e.g., persons who are identical in their drug 
and medical history and long term mental stability--or lack thereof--whose 
only difference is that they have not smoked marijuana every day for many 
years). Making such careful investigations of the subjects and finding a 
good control group would be difficult, but without this such studies are 
useless. 
 
 
Iverson follows the normal course when discussing the sociology of 
psychoactive drug use indicating that alcohol introduces most persons to 
drugs, but he ignores coffee, tea, and other caffeine beverages which are, 
incidentally, immensely more destructive than marijuana and probably 
exceed tobacco and alcohol. In the case of caffeine drinks the damage is not 
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to health but from the destruction of vast areas of forest for growing, the 
chemicals used for growing, the huge loss of topsoil annually, the use of 
energy and pollution generated to manufacture and distribute them and 
their containers etc. Of course, the similar costs apply for tobacco and 
alcohol and should be added to their health effects when assessing social 
costs. 
 
All things considered, the damage caused by marijuana (and other 
psychedelics) is so trivial in comparison that is not worth mentioning. Like 
many, he does not see that it is the government´s policy and not the drugs 
that are the danger to society. The huge amounts of money spent to 
suppress marijuana and the approx. 500,000 arrests a year in the US alone 
are a total waste of time and socially counterproductive. Of course, the 
retards in the government are only there because they are put into office by 
the retards who vote for them. Let us get down to the basics of monkey 
psychology here--any kind of significant activity which is not currently 
regulated activates the control (and perhaps the contamination) templates 
in the brain and leads to the compulsion to suppress it. Bush and the DEA, 
and billions of others, feel that it´s only right and just to manipulate and 
abuse anyone as this is what their inference engines tell them to do. 
Unfortunately, these engines were evolved about a million years ago and 
are completely self-destructive in the 21st century. This is standard 
cognitive psychology so if it seems odd to explain things this way please 
read up a little. 
 
He notes that there are more than 100,000 deaths each year in Britain alone 
due to tobacco and alcohol each but does not then note that this means they 
do more damage in Britain alone every day than marijuana and all the 
psychedelics have done in the entire world since the beginning of recorded 
history. Tens of thousands die and millions suffer serious effects every year 
from aspirin and other OTC painkillers, antibiotics, NSAIDS etc. Anyone 
who doubts can easily find the statistics on the net. In contrast, one has to 
look hard and be very noncritical to find a handful of possible yearly deaths 
and injuries due to cannabinoids and psychedelics. Mostly they have 
multiple drugs in their systems, there is no test done for alcohol, no 
investigation of preexisting disease and the majority are indistinguishable 
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from the much larger number who die at raves from heatstroke. 
 
Not only are cannabinoids amazingly nontoxic but government supported 
studies of rats and mice given heavy daily doses of THC for two years 
showed a dramatic drop in various kinds of cancer! In addition, a study of 
heavy daily marijuana users who smoked it for average 19 years showed 
decreased asthma and emphysema relative to controls! Of course, it is only 
recently and with great reluctance that the government has started to 
sponsor research that may show desirable effects.  He cites one study that 
claimed to show an increase in injuries in smokers but it lacked any good 
controls and so is useless. 
 
Likewise, his preoccupation (reflecting the official views of course) with the 
modest psychological dependency of some smokers seems totally absurd in 
comparison with the massive addiction and habituation to alcohol, tobacco, 
caffeine and hundreds of medical drugs which have a high incidence of 
major side effects, morbidity and mortality almost totally lacking with 
marijuana. 
 
A cynic might say that the US government concentrates on suppressing 
marijuana and psychedelics because 200 years of eroding the constitution 
and the bill of rights has led to such total fascist control that there are few 
other things left to suppress. 
 
He also makes the statement that LSD has no medical use. He does not 
mention that doctors and therapists have been forbidden to use 
psychedelics by the police states for some 40 years in spite of a vast and clear 
literature showing they have unique medical applications. 
 
 
A large and rapidly expanding number of analogs and derivatives of both 
marijuana-derived and endogenous (e.g., anandamide) cannabinoids are 
proving to be even more effective than the THC which is the major active 
constituent of natural cannabis. One can expect to see cannabinoids that act 
faster and more effectively, with fewer side effects and also antagonists to 
them that will rapidly terminate their action (though there has been limited 
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research and Iverson does not discuss this). 
 
Overall the book is much saner than most from the medical establishment 
but it is already out of date and needs to be rewritten to address the 
criticisms above. 
510  
A Review of Ecstasy: the complete guide   Judith 
Holland Editor 454p (2001) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
One should start by putting things in perspective. The following 
background is necessary not only for all studies of psychoactive drugs, but 
for all studies of human behavior. Each year there are about 400,000 USA 
deaths due to tobacco (lung cancer, emphysema, cardiac disease etc.), 
100,000 each to alcohol and prescription drugs, and about 7600 to aspirin 
and other OTC painkillers. Worldwide we can expect that the figures will 
be about 10 million for tobacco, 2.5 million each for others and about 200,000 
for aspirin and OTC painkillers. There may be 1 million people in the world 
with fetal alcohol syndrome (severe brain damage due to maternal 
drinking) and it is the leading cause of mental retardation in most countries. 
There are also perhaps 15 million people who have fetal alcohol effect (lesser 
degrees of brain damage) with about 200,000 born every year. I suspect this 
is a gross underestimate. None of the psychedelics nor cannabis are known 
to produce fetal injury or brain damage when taken in normal amounts. All 
things considered, if you calculated the lifetime risks of death or injury from 
taking ecstasy, LSD or marijuana, it is probably comparable to that of 
driving ten km and significantly less than that of putting on a pair of skis.  
 
In addition, the young people who comprise the vast majority of the users 
are heavy risk takers, a very large percentage of whom have personality 
disorders. There are about 60 million schizophrenics and the same number 
of manic depressives in the world. When you add the depressives, 
schizotypal disorders, anorexics, alcoholics etc. it is clear that perhaps a 
billion people have major mental problems, nearly half of all those are in 
the prime drug taking ages. In addition, nearly all of us have periodic mood 
swings, medical problems and personal crises. 
 
Based on various data in this book and elsewhere, it appears that about 20 
million people will take something like 200 million pills of ecstasy each year. 
A 2016 report said there were 12 deaths related to ecstasy at raves in the 
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USA from 2006 to 2016. If you read the coroner’s reports, these seem to be 
due to drinking too much or too little water and usually to taking large 
amounts of other drugs and/or alcohol while standing or dancing all day in 
the sun in temperatures over 100 degrees. Some of the people had prior 
medical conditions, though these are rarely investigated or reported. Deaths 
from alcohol use and from heatstroke without drug use are common, and 
provide the essential control groups for judging the extra danger from 
ecstasy, but nobody thinks to report them in any such study or news story 
I have ever seen. All things considered, ecstasy deaths (like those for 
marijuana and other psychedelics) are extremely rare and seldom if ever 
due to the direct toxicity of ecstasy alone --the psychedelics in general 
having some the widest margins between the effective and the toxic doses 
of any drugs in medicine. 
 
The fact is there was enough data to prove the psychedelics were safe and 
therapeutically effective 40 years ago (i.e., 1976). If they were available on 
prescription with the same general indications as other psychoactives (e.g., 
Prozac, Elavil, Valium, etc.), most of the black market and adulterated drugs 
would quickly fade away. 
 
It is not clear that any mentally stable person has ever had serious 
permanent mental problems solely due to taking ecstasy (though they often 
have serious permanent benefits) and its potential as a therapeutic agent are 
enormous. It has a long and remarkable history as a highly effective and 
safe therapeutic adjunct. Nevertheless, as with many other psychedelic 
drugs, the federal government has chosen to ignore medical advice and 
legal opinion and classify it with heroin as a Schedule 1 drug with no 
recognized medical value and the governments of many other 
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countries have followed along like trained dogs. 
 
This book aims to provide accurate information on all aspects of MDMA 
(ecstasy) and it accomplishes this quite well. 
 
 
 
 
One should start by putting things in perspective. The following 
background is necessary not only for all studies of psychoactive drugs, but 
for all studies of human behavior. Each year there are about 400,000 USA 
deaths due to tobacco (lung cancer, emphysema, cardiac disease etc.), 
100,000 each to alcohol and prescription drugs, and about 7600 to aspirin 
and other OTC painkillers. Worldwide we can expect that the figures will 
be about 10 million for tobacco, 2.5 million each for others and about 200,000 
for aspirin and OTC painkillers. There may be 1 million people in the world 
with fetal alcohol syndrome (severe brain damage due to maternal 
drinking) and it is the leading cause of mental retardation in most countries. 
There are also perhaps 15 million people who have fetal alcohol effect (lesser 
degrees of brain damage) with about 200,000 born every year. I suspect this 
is a gross underestimate. None of the psychedelics nor cannabis are known 
to produce fetal injury or brain damage when taken in normal amounts. All 
things considered, if you calculated the lifetime risks of death or injury from 
taking ecstasy, LSD or marijuana, it is probably comparable to that of 
driving ten km and significantly less than that of putting on a pair of skis.  
 
In addition, the young people who comprise the vast majority of the users 
are heavy risk takers, a very large percentage of whom have personality 
disorders. There are about 60 million schizophrenics and the same number 
of manic depressives in the world. When you add the depressives, 
schizotypal disorders, anorexics, alcoholics etc. it is clear that perhaps a 
billion people have major mental problems, nearly half of all those are in 
the prime drug taking ages. In addition, nearly all of us have periodic mood 
swings, medical problems and personal crises. 
 
Based on various data in this book and elsewhere, it appears that about 20 
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million people will take something like 200 million pills of ecstasy each year. 
A 2016 report said there were 12 deaths related to ecstasy at raves in the 
USA from 2006 to 2016. If you read the coroner’s reports, these seem to be 
due to drinking too much or too little water and usually to taking large 
amounts of other drugs and/or alcohol while standing or dancing all day in 
the sun in temperatures over 100 degrees. Some of the people had prior 
medical conditions, though these are rarely investigated or reported. Deaths 
from alcohol use and from heatstroke without drug use are common, and 
provide the essential control groups for judging the extra danger from 
ecstasy, but nobody thinks to report them in any such study or news story 
I have ever seen. All things considered, ecstasy deaths (like those for 
marijuana and other psychedelics) are extremely rare and seldom if ever 
due to the direct toxicity of ecstasy alone --the psychedelics in general 
having some the widest margins between the effective and the toxic doses 
of any drugs in medicine. 
 
The fact is there was enough data to prove the psychedelics were safe and 
therapeutically effective 40 years ago (i.e., 1976). If they were available on 
prescription with the same general indications as other psychoactives (e.g., 
Prozac, Elavil, Valium, etc.), most of the black market and adulterated drugs 
would quickly fade away. 
 
It is not clear that any mentally stable person has ever had serious 
permanent mental problems solely due to taking ecstasy (though they often 
have serious permanent benefits) and its potential as a therapeutic agent are 
enormous. It has a long and remarkable history as a highly effective and 
safe therapeutic adjunct.  Nevertheless, as with many other psychedelic 
drugs, the federal government has chosen to ignore medical 
advice and legal opinion and classify it with heroin as a Schedule 1 drug 
with no recognized medical value and the governments of many other 
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countries have followed along like trained dogs. 
 
This book aims to provide accurate information on all aspects of MDMA 
(ecstasy) and it accomplishes this quite well. 
 
The authors mostly try very hard to be fair and balanced in their approaches 
and are mostly experts in the field.  They caution about the difficulty of 
applying the data on animals to humans but they often do not go far enough 
in emphasizing the probable irrelevance of the animal data to humans. E.G., 
in the chapter on risks, not only do most of the animals get large amounts 
intravenously, but there are no good control data. We need to see what 
happens with the same animals with the same routes and relative doses 
with a variety of commonly used medicines (e.g., antidepressants, mood 
elevators, asthmatics, appetite depressants, cold medicines, OTC pain pills 
etc. etc. Will they, as one suspects, show similar changes in their brain 
chemistry, memory, blood flow etc.? Nobody knows as the government 
sponsored studies almost never test them. We can only guess from scattered 
data in other studies which often show the same kinds of changes.  
 
Consequently, if we applied the same criteria used for Prozac, Elavil, aspirin 
etc. we would either have to outlaw nearly all the drugs in current medical 
use or legalize all the psychedelics. However, the government has no 
interest in being rational, fair or even sane and certainly none in allowing 
us the freedoms supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
Wanting badly to err on the side of caution, several of the authors 
repeatedly warn (e.g., p111) of the possibility of subtle long term damage, 
yet they seem unconcerned by some half century of massive long term use 
of antidepressants, amphetamines, etc. to say nothing of alcohol, caffeine 
and nicotine. And only one bothers to mention (p 139) that a half century of 
studies on chronic users (often intravenous and multidrug abusers) of the 
closely related amphetamine and methamphetamine have failed to show 
evidence of Parkinsonism. And let us keep in mind that about 99% of all the 
MDMA (ecstasy) fans use it only a few times in their lives in low oral doses. 
The same is true of most other psychedelics and so it seems likely that the 
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only long term behavioral effects in the vast majority of users will be some 
increase in insight, less rigid personalities, broader interests in art, music, 
religion and a generally happier life. 
 
The young people who comprise the vast majority of the users are heavy 
risk takers, a very high percentage of whom have personality disorders. 
There are about 60 million schizophrenics and the same number of manic 
depressives in the world. When you add the depressives, schizotypal 
disorders, anorexics, alcoholics etc. it is clear that perhaps a billion people 
have major mental problems - nearly half of all those are in the prime drug 
taking ages. In addition, nearly all of us have periodic mood swings, 
medical problems and personal crises. In addition, as some of the authors 
note (and as Holland often interjects in her editorial notes) the ecstasy users 
are usually taking other drugs before, during and after their Ecstasy (and 
marijuana and other psychedelic experiences). These include, almost 
universally, alcohol, tobacco and caffeine (which are almost always 
ignored) as well as cocaine, amphetamine and methamphetamine, 
ketamine, dextromethorphan, asthmatics, and a wide variety or uppers, 
downers and prescription mood altering agents including birth control pills 
and Viagra, to say nothing of the steroids that have been in wide use in 
professional athletes in all sports (with the frequent appearance of new ones 
difficult or impossible to detect). Yet as Holland and others note, these other 
drugs are usually not mentioned and a really good drug screen on the users 
appearing in clinics or used in studies is seldom done. The point of all this 
is that the claim that ecstasy is dangerous is not correct (and other 
psychedelics are mostly the same). It´s probable that skiing kills and injures 
more people in one season (most in car accidents!) or tobacco or alcohol in 
one day, than all psychedelics combined have done since the beginning of 
recorded history. Thus, the demonizing of them does not correspond with 
reality. In fact, since more than 99% of all media on MDMA is negative, it 
would be reasonable and desirable to remove all the comments on possible 
negative effects from this book and publish it as MDMA: miracle medicine 
for the 21st century! 
Billions of dollars have been spent on studies and programs aimed at 
showing that psychedelics are bad and almost nothing on their many 
positive effects. In fact, most of the world has (naturally) followed the 
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poorly educated, deeply repressed, conservative Christians who control the 
US Govt. in outlawing, for over 40 years, any medical use and any research 
that might show benefits! Only recently has this begun to change. The vast 
amount of practical experience with their benefits cannot even be published 
and the tens (maybe hundreds) of millions who have had major positive 
experiences cannot talk about them. It’s clear as day that the only serious 
problem with ecstasy is that it is new and it triggers the control and maybe 
the contamination templates in the monkey mind. 
 
The evidence presented here shows that MDMA is very safe, rarely 
illusionogenic (though most authors follow the common practice of calling 
visual effects hallucinations, which they definitely are not). 
 
Hallucinations-e.g., seeing and hearing persons who are not there- are 
characteristic of schizophrenia, toxic psychoses, belladonoids (e.g. datura), 
and dissociative anesthethics (PCP, ketamine). They are so rare with 
psychedelics that one suspects that nearly all such cases are due to 
preexisting psychosis. MDMA probably belongs (with a variety of other 
drugs invented by Shulgin) in a new class called entactogens. These are 
unique in that in addition to catalyzing positive emotions and bonding, they 
are rapidly acting, nonsedating anxiolytics (decrease anxiety), anaesthetics 
(pain killers) and antidepressants (which take days or weeks to act in 
comparison with minutes for MDMA!) with remarkably few and mild side 
effects (in dramatic contrast with nearly all medical drugs which have 
severe side effects that are often fatal). 
 
There is along chapter devoted to the toxicity data on rats and monkeys 
usually dosed intravenously and chronically with huge amounts and to 
reports on chronic, high dose often IV multiple drug abusers, probably with 
a high incidence of preexisting mental and physical problems. Only 
Holland´s desire for completeness justifies the inclusion of such data in this 
book. It has about as much relevance to the occasional oral use by the vast 
majority of MDMA users as the study of chronic alcoholics has to the 
description of a dinner party where 2 people consume a bottle of wine. 
 
Jansen (p87, 89) is afraid of this self-medication at home and especially at 
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raves (massive all day and/or night music events) without a therapist but 
probably well over 300 million people in the last 50 years have taken some 
2 billion trips with LSD, MDMA, MDA, mescaline, peyote, amanita, 
psilocybin mushrooms, ketamine and many other psychedelics with 
amazingly little evidence of negative effects. And of course, syrian rue, 
amanita muscaria, peyote and other cacti, pitruri, datura, ayahuasca and 
countless other plants have been consumed in hundreds of societies for 
thousands and likely for tens of thousands of years, giving rise to much of 
our art, music and religion, with hardly a trace of tradition regarding bad 
effects, which people were usually quick to notice and avoid. And, as Jansen 
(the author of an excellent recent book on ketamine) notes, with rare 
exceptions, nobody writes up for journals, or sends to the media, reports of 
positive effects. 
 
One way to look at the really big picture is to call on our modern knowledge 
of cognitive and evolutionary psychology which tells us that the 
foundations of human behavior are the result of the mechanical, 
unconscious functioning of the inference engines or templates that were 
evolved hundreds of thousands of years ago (or millions or tens or 
hundreds of millions depending on one´s point of view) to enable small 
bands of primates to survive long enough to reproduce. These templates 
take in all the info from the eyes, ears, etc. and memory and produce feelings 
or intuitions about how one should behave to optimize survival. However, 
templates for control, predator avoidance, contamination, etc. which were 
so rational in a small group on the African savanna (or in the trees a few 
million years earlier) are totally irrational and even suicidal now. 
Relentlessly, and in agonizing slow motion, 7.6 billion (11 billion by 2100) 
people are following the dictates of their templates while the biosphere and 
what passes for civilization collapses around them. The poorly educated, 
devious, power mad, repressed and unconscious persons who gravitate to 
positions of power in government, military, religion, industry and academia 
are orchestrating the end of the world while their like-minded 
overpopulation generating constituents cheer wildly. It is these people and 
not the psychedelic users who are the dangerous criminals. 
 
Ecstasy and other psychedelics, preferably combined with various kinds of 
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meditation and other physical and mental therapies have a major potential 
to help people to break free from the automatisms that have guided 
behavior for millions of years. Billions of people need these medicines to 
avoid a lifetime of suffering and unhappiness and often, suicide. Let us hope 
that they hold the answer, as there does not seem to be any other, and let us 
hurry--time is running out. 
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Review of Listening Into the Heart of Things: on 
MDMA and LSD by Samuel Widmer 302p (1997) 
(Translation of German Edition of 1989) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
   ABSTRACT 
 
This is an early volume from a much-respected psychedelic psychotherapist. 
He has written several other books since this one but until recently none of his 
books were on Amazon and still you can only find a German edition and a 
Spanish one (from 1993) but no English one (except a couple used copies). This 
is sad since these drugs have enormous therapeutic potential but afaik 
government suppression still prevents their use. The most interesting and 
readable parts are the case histories of drug therapy, especially his own-e.g., on 
pages 114, 166 and 178. Though a very advanced therapist compared to many, 
he is far from finished with his intellectual growing up and clings to his 
psychoanalytic background even though he often mentions its extreme 
shortcomings. The often painfully awkward text is full of insights from his own 
therapeutic voyages and those of his patients interspersed with psychoanalytic 
nonsense. 
 
Part of the awkwardness may be due to bad translation from the German but 
the lack of a rational spiritual framework is a major problem (as with most 
therapy-or most life for that matter) that he only occasionally seems to 
recognize. He also sometimes veers off into the ozone-e.g., after many pages of 
sensible dialog he can opine that varicose veins and cancer are a result of the 
splitting of a psychosis (p99)! He quotes Zen and Sufi stories, Krishnamurti and 
Al Ghazali and even Castenada (seemingly unaware of his exposure as a fraud 
20 years ago!), yet he seems oblivious to the fact that meditation is the most 
powerful therapy there is and to the presence around him in his own country 
and all over the globe of the most diverse and effective therapeutic community 
that has ever existed-that of the students of the great Indian mystic (ie, 
psychotherapist) Osho. What a great pity! He could have learned so much and 
advanced his therapy so far. But like most people he deliberately or 
unconsciously avoids anything which might wake him up too much. It's 
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possible however that he just avoids mentioning Osho as he's radical enough to 
trigger the control templates in the monkey brain and enlightenment has the 
power to change one's whole life and not just put a bandaid on as other 
therapies usually do. Widmer refers repeatedly to the great LSD therapy 
pioneer Stanislav Grof, whose writings are one of the first that the interested 
reader may want to consult. Also, anyone who has a serious interest in 
psychedelic therapy should read Myron Stolaroff´s " The Secret Chief "-an 
account of the most remarkable clandestine therapist of this type of all time. It 
tells the story of the late Leo Zeff, who helped thousands to find themselves 
with the skilled and varied use of a wide variety of psychedelics. As the book 
is hard to find you may wish to read the info on Zeff on the web. In addition 
the clinical chapters in the excellent Ecstasy :the complete guide by J. 
Holland(2001) and her web page www.drholland.com (and elsewhere on the 
net) provide a broad framework and guide to therapy that is lacking here. A 
lovely book to add to any drug or therapy library, if you can find it. 
 
 
 
 
The most interesting and readable parts are the case histories of drug therapy, 
especially his own-- e.g., on pages 114, 166 and 178. Though a very advanced 
therapist compared to many, he is far from finished with his intellectual 
growing up and clings to his psychoanalytic background even though he often 
mentions its extreme shortcomings. The often painfully awkward text is full of 
insights from his own therapeutic voyages and those of his patients 
interspersed with psychoanalytic nonsense. Part of the awkwardness may be 
due to bad translation from the German but the lack of a rational spiritual 
framework is a major problem (as with most therapy-- or  most life for that 
matter) that he only occasionally seems to recognize. He also sometimes veers 
off into the ozone--e.g., after many pages of sensible dialog he can opine that 
varicose veins and cancer are a result of the splitting of a psychosis (p99)! 
 
He quotes Zen and Sufi stories, Krishnamurti and Al Ghazali and even Carlos 
Castenada (seemingly unaware of his exposure as a fraud 20 years ago!), yet he 
seems oblivious to the fact that meditation is the most powerful therapy there is 
and to the presence around him in his own country and all over the globe of the 
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most diverse and effective therapeutic community that has ever existed--that of 
the students of the great Indian mystic (i.e., psychotherapist) Osho. What a great 
pity! He could have learned so much and advanced his therapy so far. But like 
most people he deliberately or unconsciously avoids anything which might 
wake him up too much. It’s possible however that he just avoids mentioning 
Osho as he’s radical enough to trigger the control templates in the monkey brain 
and enlightenment has the power to change one’s whole life and not just put a 
bandaid on as other therapies usually do. 
 
Widmer refers repeatedly to the great LSD therapy pioneer Stanislav Grof, 
whose writings are one of the first that the interested reader may want to 
consult. Also, anyone who has a serious interest in psychedelic therapy should 
read Myron Stolaroff´s “The Secret Chief” --an account of the most remarkable 
clandestine therapist of this type of all time. It tells the story of the late Leo Zeff, 
who helped thousands to find themselves with the skilled and varied use of a 
wide variety of psychedelics. As the book is hard to find you may wish to read 
the info on Zeff on the web. In addition, the clinical chapters in the excellent 
Ecstasy: the complete guide by J. Holland (2001 see my review) and her web 
page www.drholland.com (and elsewhere on the net) provide a broad 
framework and guide to therapy that is lacking here. 
 
It is well known that since he experimented with MDMA (“ecstasy”) it 
became a common club drug used by millions for its relatively mild 
distortions of reality and its strong tendency to open up emotions—quite 
unlike LSD, mescaline or psilocybin in these respects. 
Widmer realized via these drugs, as many do via meditation, that it is the mind 
that is everyone’s problem. For most educated moderns, psychoanalysis is 
totally obsolete and his insistence on doing psychedelic therapy in this context 
is most sad. Other therapeutic contexts, including that of any of the wide variety 
of meditations seem much more likely to give results. 
 
The chapters end with poetic passages describing his lovely environment 
(presumably the Swiss Alps) that feel as though they are written by a different 
person. He also has many nice full page, full color paintings in the book. He 
says repeatedly that the drugs produce rapid breakthroughs that would not 
happen with conventional therapy, but then says other places that they would 
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happen anyway (e.g., with Helga´s therapy on pg 15)! Most experienced 
psychedelic therapists would agree that conventional therapies will not achieve 
the majority of the breakthroughs given by psychedelic therapy and there is a 
substantial older literature but of course governments have vigorously 
suppressed psychedelic research until permitting limited trials very recently. 
Talking therapies, and especially psychoanalysis, are so slow and expensive 
that few have the time and money for them and everyone suffers (and many 
die) while waiting for a cure. In any event, it’s clear that all conventional 
therapies (with some possible exceptions) only put a bandaid on the problems 
(though it may be a good one) and only meditation, with or without psychedelic 
medication, has the power to dissolve the ego and all the problems 
permanently. It is not an easy path, (and perhaps not possible for most) but 
neither is any other, and even a few steps can help alot. 
 
He has written several other books since this one but until recently none of his 
books were on Amazon and still you can only find a German edition and a 
Spanish one (from 1993) but no English one (except a couple used copies) and 
they seem not to be on the ‘free book’ sites either. This is sad since these drugs 
have enormous therapeutic potential but government suppression still prevents 
their use so underground therapists and self-therapy are the only routes. 
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A very brief review of the life and work of 
neuroscientist, physician, psychoanalyst, inventor, 
animal rights activist and pioneer in dolphins, 
isolation tanks and psychedelics John C Lilly 1915-
2001. 
 
Michael Starks 
 
Abstract 
 
Lilly was one of the greatest scientists and pioneers on the limits of human 
possibility, but after his death a collective amnesia has descended and he is now 
almost forgotten. His Wiki is good but inevitably incomplete so here are a few 
missing details and viewpoints on his life along with brief comments on this 
particular book.  The best  site is http://www.johnclilly.com/ 
 
 
 
Lilly was one of the greatest scientists and pioneers on the limits of human 
possibility of modern times, but after his death a collective amnesia has 
descended, and he is now almost forgotten. 
 
Lilly was a generation (or more) ahead of his time. He is almost single-
handedly responsible for the great interest in dolphins (which led to the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act in the USA and helped to found the animal 
rights movement). In 1958, he noted that the brains of elephants and 
cetaceans were larger than ours, that we should not abuse them and that it 
was one our most important projects to communicate with them. He 
invented sensory isolation tanks (at NIMH in 1954) and used them 
extensively with and without powerful psychoactive drugs at a time when 
it was thought that either the brain would shut down or one would go 
insane if external stimuli were eliminated. 
 
He created methods for implanting electrodes in mammal brains and was 
planning to do it to himself. He was one of the first to make serious use of 
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computers in bioscience research and created the hardware and software to 
make the first attempts to communicate with dolphins. He self-
experimented with dangerous physiological investigations in high altitude 
medicine for the military during WW2, took LSD with dolphins and movie 
stars, submitted himself to the rigors of Arica training, and taught classes at 
Esalen. He was the first one to investigate the bizarre psychedelic ketamine, 
and his results (published in the two last chapters of his book ` The Scientist`) 
are still the best data on the dose/effect relation of any psychedelic on one 
person. And all this happened before most of us were born! 
 
He had courage, honesty and integrity that is rare anywhere and almost 
nonexistent in science. His goal was to find the ultimate truth about 
everything and he went about as far as anyone ever has. He had little 
patience with the stupid and hypocritical games one has to play to fit into 
monkey society. Of course, the reaction of the establishment was 
predictable. He left the NIMH and was never given any government or 
academic support for the last 35 years of his life. His paper and comments 
at a conference on sensory deprivation were removed from the published 
version. He was not invited to government sponsored symposia on 
dolphins (he had refused to help develop them as weapons), though he 
clearly knew more about them than anyone in the world. 
 
He liked to live and work on the edge and few could keep up with him, as 
this book makes clear. If you have read some of his other books it will be 
much easier going. He was a pioneer in consciousness research and pushed 
the boundaries of our understanding of who we are and what we might 
become. Among other things he catalogs here the various states reached by 
drugs, meditation, and isolation, tries to determine their significance, and 
suggests how to use them. 
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As a result of all his research, especially his months of continuous hourly 
injections of ketamine, he became convinced that our ordinary reality was 
not the only one. During his trips, he was often in communication with 
members of a civilization 1000 years in the future. We all allow ourselves 
such experiences every time we watch a sci fi movie and sometimes it leaves 
us more than just amused, but when anyone meditates or takes a drug to do 
it we tend to discount the results. Lilly however, took it all seriously, and 
parts of this book explain why. Whatever our mind produces -- by any 
means --only happens because our brains are programmed by our genes to 
make it possible. So, it´s at least plausible that any of these routes inward 
reveal fundamental aspects of what´s possible for us in the future, or even 
for some other species elsewhere in the universe. If you find his scientifically 
based viewpoints irrational, consider that most people believe without 
evidence (really with abundant evidence to the contrary) in good and bad 
luck, in super beings living in space who rule the earth, in a place in 
spacetime where dead people go, in stars millions of light years away 
influencing their lives, and in ghosts, angels, witches, and gods that come to 
earth to inhabit statues that read our thoughts and violate all the laws of 
physics, chemistry and biology in order to help us personally. 
 
He describes his tank work (and lots more) in The Dyadic Cyclone, The 
Center of the Cyclone, and in Programming and Metaprogramming in the 
Human Biocomputer (1967) and other books and papers. 
 
His book Simulations of God is a plea to examine your beliefs with an open 
mind. 
 
He defines metabeliefs as those about belief systems. He says that our 
simulations of reality (with meditation, isolation, drugs, computers) can 
provide access to other realities which may include the future, the past, or 
extraterrestrial. He refers to metaprograms as learning tools (symbols, 
programs, languages, ideas, models) which our central programs (mind or 
part of it) runs all the time. Cognitive psychology did not really exist at the 
time he was most active and now we would likely call the central programs 
cognitive templates, modules or inference engines. 
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He refers to self-metaprograms (or essences) as parts of the mind that 
program our experiences. 
 
Though he carried out an exhausting and dangerous program of self-
experimentation with psychedelics (what many now call entheogens), he 
does not believe they are a final or complete path to higher consciousness. 
Yes, as I reflect on this, I note that tens of millions have successfully explored 
their cognitive templates with psychedelics while meditation alone may 
have generated a few hundred thousand satoris and probably less than 100 
living mystics. It is also clear that psychedelics have led millions to 
meditation. He mentions the very psychedelic Revelations of St. John and 
understands that Jesus taught revelation from within—i.e., the same sort of 
self-transcendence as Taoism and Buddhism. He discusses how we use 
drugs, sex, money, groups, war etc. as substitutes for God. God as 
compassion, science, consciousness or superspace (the then current 
concepts of cosmology are explained and he imagines the universe 
collapsing and being reborn--very contemporary!). He discusses god in here 
vs god out there but notes that if it’s out there then it’s a puzzle where math 
comes from. His experiences make him doubt that death is the end. 
 
He was very open to all ideas and his desire to consider all points of view 
makes some parts of his books rambling and a bit incoherent. He crams so 
many ideas on each page that there is easily enough in each to form the core 
of ten books or a lifetime of research and personal exploration. Among the 
blizzard of mind boggling ideas are: war is the result of a future civilization 
using us for war games; we are god simulating himself, our interstellar 
rockets find intelligent machines that follow us back to earth and take over; 
government sponsored meditation classes, computers that control and 
monitor all communication and take control of civilization, our genes 
generate the illusion that we live in a certain and determinate universe; we 
are simulated by God or vice versa. 
 
Though he must have crossed paths countless time with Indian mystics and 
Buddhists, strangely, he was most influenced by an obscure American 
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mystic named Franklin Merrell- Wolff—another remarkable figure now 
almost totally lost in time. 
 
Lilly was an extremely bright and highly rational person yet he became 
convinced of the reality of his extraterrestrial membership in a future 
civilization and he went into a 6 week depression after a ketamine trip in 
which they showed him the collapse of the universe. 
 
It was clear to him that the phenomena of the mind were capable of scientific 
study but this was quite heretical 40 years ago. What a great pity that he 
never delved into Wittgenstein’s philosophy nor became acquainted with 
Osho! 
 
Some of his books like “The Scientist” end with reprints of some of his 
papers and poems. The best site is http://www.johnclilly.com.  
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The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of our 
Nature—a review of Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better 
Angels of Our  Nature: Why Violence Has 
Declined’(2012)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so 
pages, the last 300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's 
known about behavior to social changes in violence and manners over time. The 
basic topic is: how does our genetics control and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) 
which explains much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly 
everyone) lacks a clear framework for describing the logical structure of 
rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred term) which I prefer to call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). He should have 
said something about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting people 
and the planet, since these are now so much more severe as to render other 
forms of violence nearly irrelevant. Extending the concept of violence to include 
the global long term consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and 
having a grasp of the nature of how evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will 
provide a very different perspective on history, current events, and how things 
are likely to go in the next few hundred years. One might start by noting that 
the decrease in physical violence over history has been matched (and made 
possible) by the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by 
people's destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people 
most of the time) is often distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s 
biology that matters. See my recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of 
Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s ‘SuperCooperators’ here and on the net for 
a brief summary of the vacuity of  ‘true altruism’(group selection), and the 
operation of kin selection and the uselessness and superficiality of describing 
behavior in cultural terms. 
 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. 
What really matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase 
in population and resource destruction (due to medicine and technology and 
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conflict suppression by police and military). About 200,000 more people a day 
(another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month), the 6 tons 
or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year –about 1% of the world’s total 
disappearing yearly, etc. mean that unless some miracle happens the biosphere 
and civilization will largely collapse during next two centuries, and there will 
be starvation, misery and violence of every kind on a staggering scale.  People's 
manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no relevance 
unless they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't see how that 
is going to happen. There is no space for arguments, and no point either (yes 
I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few comments as though they were facts. Don't 
imagine I have a personal stake in promoting one group at the expense of 
others. I am 78, have no descendants and no close relatives and do not identify 
with any political, national or religious group and regard the ones I belong to 
by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of 
things, women are as violent as men when one considers the fact that women's 
violence (like most of that done by men) is largely done in slow motion, at a 
distance in time and space and mostly carried out by proxy -by their 
descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children regardless of 
whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from breeding 
is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are the 
reproductive bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their offspring 
richly deserve whatever misery comes their way and (with rare exceptions) the 
rich and famous are the worst offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill Gates or J.K 
Rowling and each of their kids may destroy 50 tons of topsoil each per year for 
generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his may destroy 1 ton. 
If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome to Hell 
on Earth"(WTHOE). 
 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if 
civilization is to stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human 
Rights. Nobody gets rights without being a responsible citizen and the first 
thing this means is minimal environmental destruction. The most basic 
responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to produce them. A 
society or a world that lets people breed at random will always be exploited by 
selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific it's not 
worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as primary, to 
their descendants one can say with confidence "WTHOE". 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
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of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so 
pages, the last 300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's 
known about behavior to social changes in violence and manners over time. The 
basic topic is: how does our genetics control and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) 
which explains much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly 
everyone) lacks a clear framework for describing the logical structure of 
rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred term) which I prefer to call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). Mostly the 
criticisms given by others are nit-picking and irrelevant and, as Pinker has said, 
he could not write a coherent book about "bad things", nor could he give every 
possible reference and point of view, but he should have said at least something 
about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting people and the planet, 
since these are now so much more severe as to render other forms of violence 
irrelevant. 
 
Extending the concept of violence to include the global long-term consequences 
of replication of someone’s genes, and having a grasp of the nature of how 
evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide a very different perspective on 
history, current events, and how things are likely to go in the next few hundred 
years. One might start by noting that the decrease in physical violence over 
history has been matched (and made possible) by the constantly increasing 
merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by people's destruction of their own 
descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people most of the time) is often 
distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s biology that matters. See 
my recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ and Nowak and 
Highfield’s ‘SuperCooperators’ for a brief summary of the vacuity of altruism 
and the operation of kin selection and the uselessness and superficiality of 
describing behavior in cultural terms. 
 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. 
What really matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase 
in population and resource destruction (due to medicine and technology and 
conflict suppression by police and military). About 200,000 more people a day 
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(another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month), the 6 tons 
or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year etc. mean that unless some 
miracle happens the biosphere and civilization will largely collapse in the next 
two centuries and there will be starvation, misery and violence of every kind 
on a staggering scale. 
 
People's manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no 
relevance unless they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't 
see how that is going to happen. There is no space for arguments, and no point 
either (yes, I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few comments as though they were 
facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in promoting one group at the 
expense of others. I am 75, have no descendants and no close relatives and do 
not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard the ones 
I belong to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of 
things, women are as violent as men when one considers the fact that women's 
violence (like most of that done by men) is largely done in slow motion, at a 
distance in time and space and mostly carried out by proxy -by their 
descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children regardless of 
whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from breeding 
is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are the 
reproductive bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their offspring 
richly deserve whatever misery comes their way and (with rare exceptions) the 
rich and famous are the worst offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill Gates or 
J.K.Rowling and each of their kids may destroy 50 tons of topsoil each per year 
for generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his may destroy 1 
ton. If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome to 
Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). 
 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if 
civilization is to stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human 
Rights. Nobody gets rights (i.e., privileges) without being a responsible citizen 
and the first thing this means is minimal environmental destruction. The most 
basic responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to produce them. 
A society or a world that lets people breed at random will always be exploited 
by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific it's 
not worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as primary, 
that's fine and to their descendants one can say with confidence "WTHOE". 
 
"Helping" has to be seen from a global long term perspective. Almost all "help" 
that's given by individuals, organizations or countries harms others and the 
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world in the long run and must only be given after very careful consideration. 
If you want to hand out money, food, medicine, etc., you need to ask what the 
long term environmental consequences are. If you want to please everyone all 
the time,  again to your descendants I say "WTHOE". 
 
Dysgenics: endless trillions of creatures beginning with bacteria-like forms over 
3 billion years ago have died to create us and all current life and this is called 
eugenics, evolution by natural selection or kin selection (inclusive fitness). We 
all have "bad genes" but some are worse than others. It is estimated that up to 
50% of all human conceptions end in spontaneous abortion due to "bad genes". 
Civilization is dysgenic. This problem is currently trivial compared to 
overpopulation but getting worse by the day. Medicine, welfare, democracy, 
equality, justice, human rights and "helping" of all kinds have global long term 
environmental and dysgenic consequences which will collapse society even if 
population growth stops. Again, if the world refuses to believe it or doesn't 
want to deal with it that's fine and to their (and everyone’s) descendants we can 
say "WTHOE". 
 
Beware the utopian scenarios that suggest doomsday can be avoided by 
judicious application of technologies. As they say you can fool some of the 
people all of the time and all of the people some of the time but you can't fool 
mother nature any of the time. I leave you with just one example. Famous 
scientist Raymond Kurzweil (see my review of ‘How to create a Mind’) 
proposed nanobots as the saviors of humankind. They would make anything 
we needed and clean every mess. They would even make ever better versions 
of themselves. They would keep us as pets. But think of how many people treat 
their pets, and pets are overpopulating and destroying and becoming dysgenic 
almost as fast as humans (e.g. domestic and feral cats alone kill perhaps 100 
billion wild animals a year). Pets only exist because we destroy the earth to feed 
them and we have spay and neuter clinics and euthanize the sick and unwanted 
ones. We practice rigorous population control and eugenics on them 
deliberately and by omission, and no form of life can evolve or exist without 
these two controls—not even bots. And what's to stop nanobots from evolving? 
Any change that facilitated reproduction would automatically be selected for 
and any behavior that wasted time or energy (i.e., taking care of humans) would 
be heavily selected against. What would stop theAI controlled bots program 
from mutating into a homicidal form and exploiting all earth's resources 
causing global collapse? There is no free lunch for bots either and to them too 
we can confidently say "WTHOE". 
 
This is where any thoughts about the world and human behavior must lead an 
educated person but Pinker says nothing about it. So, the first 400 pages of this 
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book can be skipped and the last 300 read as a nice summary of EP 
(evolutionary psychology) as of 2011. However, as in his other books and nearly 
universally in the behavioral sciences, there is no clear broad framework for 
intentionality as pioneered by Wittgenstein, Searle and many others. I have 
presented such a framework in my many reviews of works by and about these 
two natural psychological geniuses and will not repeat it here. 
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The Dead Hands of Group Selection and 
Phenomenology -- A Review of Individuality and 
Entanglement by Herbert Gintis 357p (2017)(review 
revised 2019) 
    
    Michael Starks 
 
       ABSTRACT 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books 
with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he 
makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the 
centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. 
Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his 
previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals in 
biology in the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article 
‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation 
bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and 
Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and 
Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike Nowak, Gintis does 
not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong desire to 
generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the 
(near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology and blank 
slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and 
other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe 
behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior is an 
evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself (according to 
his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten corpse of 
group selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories he has 
generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, 
like Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just 
blinds him to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the norm in 
science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture and Value 
“There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
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It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases 
its own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group 
selection. Furthermore, it has been well known and often demonstrated that 
group selection just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as 
Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution by natural selection. Like 
Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 years and still has not 
grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, read and 
understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my article. It is 
mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to accomplish this 
in nearly half a century. 
 
I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm in 
academia as special cases of the near universal failure to understand human 
nature that are destroying America and the world. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books 
with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he 
makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the 
centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. 
Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his 
previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals in 
biology in the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article 
‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation 
bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and 
Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and 
Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike Nowak, Gintis does 
not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong desire to 
generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the 
(near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology and blank 
slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
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Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and 
other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe 
behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior is an 
evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself (according to 
his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten corpse of 
group selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories he has 
generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, 
like Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just 
blinds him to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the norm in 
science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture and Value 
“There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases 
its own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group 
selection. Furthermore, it has been well known and often demonstrated that 
group selection just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as 
Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution by natural selection. Like 
Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 years and still has not 
grasped it, but after the Wilson scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, 
read and understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my 
article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to 
accomplish this in nearly half a century. 
 
In the years after the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper was published in Nature, 
several population geneticists recounted chapter and verse on the subject, again 
showing conclusively that it is all a storm in a teacup. It is most unfortunate that 
Gintis, like his friends, failed to ask a competent biologist about this and regards 
as misguided the 140 some well known biologists who a signed a letter 
protesting the publication of this nonsense in Nature. I refer those who want 
the gory details to my paper, as it’s the best account of the melee that I am aware 
of.  For a summary of the tech details see Dawkins Article ‘The Descent of 
Edward Wilson’ http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/edward-
wilson-social-conquest-earth-evolutionary-errors-origin-species.  As Dawkins 
wrote ‘For Wilson not to acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the 
great majority of his professional colleagues is—it pains me to say this of a 
lifelong hero —an act of wanton arrogance’. Sadly, Gintis has assimilated 
himself to such inglorious company. There are also some nice Dawkins 
youtubes such as https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. 
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Gintis has also failed to provide the behavioral framework lacking in all the 
social sciences. One needs to have a logical structure for rationality, an 
understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory), of the 
division between scientific issues of fact and philosophical issues of how 
language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid reductionism and 
scientism, but he, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, like 
them, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, 
while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, 
concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have 
value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as eminent 
philosopher John Searle likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness (intentionality, 
behavior) is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s 
(the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his 
successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering 
this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two 
systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which 
can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR- Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
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(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings.   
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
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context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
Gintis starts making dubious, vague or downright bizarre claims early in the 
book. It begins on the first page of the overview with meaningless quotes from 
Einstein and Ryle. On pxii the paragraph beginning ‘Third Theme’ about 
entangled minds needs rewriting to specify that language games are functions 
of System 2 and that’s how thinking, believing etc. work (what they are), while 
the Fourth Theme which tries to explain behavior as due to what people 
‘consciously believe’ is right. That is, with ‘nonconsequentialism’ he’s trying to 
‘explain’ behavior as ‘altruistic’ group selection mediated by conscious 
linguistic System 2. But if we take an evolutionary long term view, it’s clearly 
due to reciprocal altruism, attempting to serve inclusive fitness, which is 
mediated by the unconscious operation of System 1. Likewise, for the Fifth 
Theme and the rest of the Overview. He favors Rational Choice but has no idea 
this is a language game for which the exact context must be specified, nor that 
both System 1 and System 2 are ‘rational’ but in quite different ways. This is the 
classic error of most descriptions of behavior, which Searle has called The 
Phenomenological Illusion, Pinker the Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides 
‘The Standard Social Science Model’ and I have discussed it extensively in my 
other reviews and articles. As long as one does not grasp that most of our 
behavior is automated by nonlinguistic System 1, and that our conscious 
linguistic System 2 is mostly for rationalization of our compulsive and 
unconscious choices, it is not possible to have more than a very superficial view 
of behavior, i.e., the one that is nearly universal not only among academics but 
politicians, billionaire owners of high tech companies, movie stars and the 
general public. Consequently, the consequences reach far beyond academia, 
producing delusional social policies that are bringing about the inexorable 
collapse of industrial civilization. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary 
for America and the World’. It is breathtaking to see America and the European 
democracies helping citizens of the third world destroy everyone’s future. 
 
 
On pxiii one can describe the ‘nonconsequentialist’ (i.e., apparently ‘true’ 
altruistic or self- destructive behavior) as actually performing reciprocal 
altruism, serving inclusive fitness due to genes evolved in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., that of our  very distant 
ancestors), which stimulates the dopaminergic circuits in the ventral 
tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, with the resulting release of dopamine 
which makes us feel good—the same mechanism that appears to be involved in 
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all addictive behavior from drug abuse to  soccer moms. 
 
And more incoherent babble such as “In the context of such environments, there 
is a fitness benefit to the ‘epigenetic transmission’ of such ‘information’ 
concerning the ‘current state’ of the ‘environment’, i.e., transmission through 
non-genetic ‘channels’. This is called ‘cultural transmission’” [scare quotes 
mine]. Also, that ‘culture’ is ‘directly encoded’ in the brain (p7), which he says 
is the main tenet of gene-culture coevolution, and that democratic institutions 
and voting are altruistic and cannot be explained in terms of self-interest (p17-
18). The major reason for these peculiar views does not really come out until 
p186 when he finally makes it clear that he is a group selectionist. Since there is 
no such thing as group selection apart from inclusive fitness, it’s no surprise 
that this is just another incoherent account of behavior—i.e., more or less what 
Tooby and Cosmides famously termed The Standard Social Science Model or 
Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’. 
 
What he calls ‘altruistic genes’ on p188 should be called ‘inclusive fitness genes’ 
or ‘kin selection genes’. Gintis is also much impressed with the idea of gene-
culture coevolution, which only means that culture may itself be an agent of 
natural selection, but he fails to grasp that this can only happen within the 
context of natural selection (inclusive fitness). Like nearly all social scientists 
(and scientists, philosophers etc.), it never crosses his mind that ‘culture’, 
‘coevolution’,’ symbolic’,’ ‘epigenetic’, ‘information’, ‘representation’ etc., are 
all families of complex language games, whose COS (Conditions Of 
Satisfaction, tests for truth) are exquisitely sensitive to context. Without a 
specific context, they don’t mean anything. So, in this book, as in most of the 
literature on behavior, there is much talk that has the appearance of sense 
without sense (meaning or clear COS). 
 
His claim on pxv, that most of our genes are the result of culture, is clearly 
preposterous as e.g., it is well known that we are about 98% chimpanzee. Only 
if he means those relating to language can we accept the possibility that some 
of our genes have been subject to cultural selection and even these merely 
modified ones that already existed—i.e., a few base pairs were changed out of 
hundreds of thousands or millions in each gene. 
 
He is much taken with the ‘rational actor’ model of economic behavior. but 
again, is unaware that the automaticities of S1 underlie all ‘rational’ behavior 
and the conscious linguistic deliberations of S2 cannot take place without them. 
Like many, perhaps the vast majority of current younger students of behavior, 
I see all human activities as easily comprehensible results of the working of 
selfish genetics in a contemporary context in which police surveillance and a 
temporary abundance of resources, gotten by raping the earth and robbing our 
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own descendants, leads to relative temporary tranquility. In this connection, I 
suggest my review of Pinker’s recent book—The Transient Suppression of the 
Worst Devils of Our Nature—A Review of The Better Angels of Our Nature’.  
 
Many behaviors look like true altruism, and some are (i.e., they will decrease 
the frequency of the genes that bring them about – i.e, lead to the extinction of 
their own descendants), but the point which Gintis misses is that these are due 
to a psychology which evolved long ago in small groups on the African plains 
in the EEA and made sense then (i.e., it was inclusive fitness, when everyone in 
our group of a few dozen to a few hundred were our close relatives), and so we 
often continue with these behaviors even though they no longer make sense 
(i.e., they serve the interests of unrelated or distantly related persons which 
decreases our genetic fitness by decreasing the frequency of the genes that made 
it possible). This accounts for his promoting the notion that many behaviors are 
‘truly altruistic’, rather than selfish in origin (such as in sect. 3.2). He even notes 
this and calls it ‘distributed effectivity’ (p60-63) in which people behave in big 
elections as though they were small ones, but he fails to see this is not due to 
any genes for ‘true altruism’ but to genes for reciprocal altruism (inclusive 
fitness), which is of course selfish. Thus, people behave as though their actions 
(e.g., their votes) were consequential, even though it is clear that they are not.  
E.g., one can find on the net that the chances of any one person’s vote deciding 
the outcome of an American presidential election is in the range of millions to 
tens of millions to one. And of course, the same is true of our chances of winning 
a lottery, yet our malfunctioning EEA psychology makes lotteries and voting 
hugely popular activities. 
 
He also seems unaware of the standard terminology and ways of describing 
behavior used in evolutionary psychology (EP). E.g., on pg. 75 Arrow’s 
description of norms of social behavior are described in economic terms rather 
than as EP from the EEA trying to operate in current environments, and at the 
bottom of the page, people act not as ‘altruistic’ punishers (i.e., as ‘group 
selectionists’) but as inclusive fitness punishers. On p 78, to say that subjects act 
‘morally’ or in accord with a norm ‘for its own sake’, is again to embrace the 
group selectionist/phenomenological illusion, and clearly it is groups of genes 
that are trying to increase their inclusive fitness via well-known EP mechanisms 
like cheater detection and punishment.  Again, on p88, what he describes as 
other-regarding unselfish actions can just as easily be described as self-
regarding attempts at reciprocal altruism which go astray in a large society. 
 
Naturally, he often uses standard economics jargon such as ‘the subjective prior 
must be interpreted as a conditional probability’, which just means a belief in 
the likelihood of a particular outcome (p90-91), and ‘common subjective priors’ 
(shared beliefs) p122. Much of the book and of behavior concerns what is often 
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called ‘we intentionality’ or the construction of social reality, but the most 
eminent theorist in this arena, John Searle, is not discussed, his now standard 
terminology such as COS and DIRA (desire independent reasons for action) 
does not appear, he is not in the index, and only one of his many works, and 
that over 20 years old, is found in the bibliography. 
 
On p97 he comments favorably on Bayesian updating without mentioning that 
it is notorious for lacking any meaningful test for success (i.e., clear COS), and 
commonly fails to make any clear predictions, so that no matter what people 
do, it can be made to describe their behavior after the fact. 
 
However, the main problem with chapter 5 is that ‘rational’ and other terms are 
complex language games that have no meaning apart from very specific 
contexts, which are typically lacking here. Of course, as Wittgenstein showed 
us, this is the core problem of all discussion of behavior and Gintis has most of 
the behavioral science community (or at least most of those over 40) as 
coconspirators. Likewise, throughout the book, such as chapter 6, where he 
discusses ‘complexity theory’, ‘emergent properties’, ‘macro and micro levels’, 
and ‘nonlinear dynamical systems’ and the generation of ‘models’ (which can 
mean almost anything and ‘describe’ almost anything), but it’s only prediction 
that counts (i.e., clear COS). 
 
In spite of his phenomenological illusion (i.e., the near universal assumption 
that our conscious deliberations describe and control behavior—at odds with 
almost all the research in social psychology for the last 40 years), he also shares 
the reductionist delusion, wondering why the social sciences have not got a core 
analytical theory and have not coalesced. This of course is a frequent subject in 
the social sciences and philosophy and the reason is that psychology of higher 
order thought is not describable by causes, but by reasons, and one cannot make 
psychology disappear into physiology nor physiology into biochemistry nor it 
into physics etc. They are just different and indispensable levels of description. 
Searle writes about it often and Wittgenstein famously described it 80 years ago 
in the Blue Book. 
 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce 
anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely 
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descriptive.” 
 
He is also quite out of touch with the contemporary world, thinking that people 
are going to be nice because they have internalized altruism (i.e., group 
selection), and with demographic realities, when he opines that population 
growth is under control, when in fact predictions are for another 4 billion by 
2100 (p133), violence is increasing and the outlook is grim indeed. 
 
He sees a need to “carve an academic niche for sociology” (p148), but the whole 
discussion is typical gibberish (no clear COS), and all one really needs (or can 
give) is a clear description of the language games (the mind at work) we play 
in social situations, and how they show how our attempts at inclusive fitness 
work or go astray in contemporary contexts. Over and over he pushes his 
fantasy that “inherently ethical behavior” (i.e., group selectionist altruism) 
explains our social behavior, ignoring the obvious facts that it’s due to 
temporary abundance of resources, police and surveillance, and that always 
when you take these away, savagery quickly emerges (e.g., p151). It’s easy to 
maintain such delusions when one lives in the ivory tower world of abstruse 
theories, inattentive to the millions of scams, robberies, rapes, assaults, thefts 
and murders taking place every day. 
 
Again, and again, (e.g., top p170) he ignores the obvious explanations for our 
‘rationality’, which is natural selection –i.e., inclusive fitness in the EEA leading 
to ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategies), or at least they were more or less stable 
in small groups 100,000 to 3 million years ago. 
 
Chapter 9 on the Sociology of the Genome is inevitably full of mistakes and 
incoherence—e.g., there are not special ‘altruistic genes’, rather, all genes serve 
inclusive fitness or they disappear (p188). The problem is that the only way to 
really get selfish genetics and inclusive fitness across is to have Gintis in a room 
for a day with Dawkins, Franks, Coyne etc., explaining why it is wrong. But as 
always, one has to have a certain level of education, intelligence, rationality and 
honesty for this to work, and if one is just a little bit short in several categories, 
it will not succeed. The same of course is true for much of human 
understanding, and so the vast majority will never get anything that is at all 
subtle. As with the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper, I am sure that Dawkins, 
Franks and others would have been willing to go over this chapter and explain 
where it goes astray.. 
 
The major problem is that people just do not grasp the concept of natural 
selection by inclusive fitness, nor of subconscious motivations, and that many 
have ‘religious’ motivations for rejecting them. This includes not just the 
general public and non-science academics, but a large percentage of biologists 
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and behavioral scientists.   I recently came across a lovely review by Dawkins 
of a discussion of the selfish gene idea by top level professional biologists, in 
which he had to go over their work line by line to explain that they just did not 
grasp how it all works. But only a small number of people like him could do 
this, and the sea of confusion is vast, and so these delusions about human nature 
that destroy this book, and are destroying America and the world will, as the 
Queen said to Alice in a slightly different context, go on until they come to the 
end and then stop. 
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Is JK Rowling More Evil Than Me? (revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the 
Harry Potter novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to 
believe in fantasy rather than take responsibility for the world-- the norm of 
course. JKR is just as clueless about herself and the world as most people, but 
about 200 times as destructive as the average American and about 800 times 
more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for the destruction of 
maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash novels and all the erosion 
ensuing (not trivial as it’s at least 6 and maybe 12 tons/year soil into the ocean 
for everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so about 5000 
tons/year for Rowling’s books and movies and her 3 children). The earth loses 
at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing 
capacity will be gone. Then there is the huge amount of fuel burned and waste 
made to make and distribute the books and films, plastic dolls etc. She shows 
her lack of social responsibility by producing children rather than using her 
millions to encourage family planning or buy up the rain forest, and by 
promoting the conventional liberal stupidity of 3rd world supremacy that is 
destroying Britain, America, the world and her descendant’s future. Of course, 
she's not that different from the other 7.8 billion clueless - just noisier and more 
destructive. 
 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is no 
such thing as helping one person without harming others. Rights or privileges 
given to new entrants into an overcrowded world can only diminish those of 
others. In spite of the massive ecological disasters happening in front of them 
everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them to the unrestrained motherhood of 
“the diverse”, which accounts for most of the population increase of the last 
century and all of that in this one. They lack some combination of intelligence, 
education, experience and sanity required to extrapolate the daily assaults on 
the resources and functioning of society to the eventual collapse of industrial 
civilization. Each meal, each trip by car or bus, each pair of shoes is another nail 
in the earth’s coffin.  It has likely never crossed her mind that one seat on a plane 
from London to San Francisco produces about one ton of carbon which melts 
about 3 square meters of sea ice and as one of the overprivileged she has 
probably flown hundreds of such flights.  
 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including 
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virtually all teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the 
Western Democracies, now means social democratic (Neomarxist—i.e., diluted 
communist) third world supremacists working for the destruction of their own 
societies and their own descendants. So, those whose lack of education, 
experience, intelligence (and basic common sense), which should prohibit them 
from making any public statements at all, totally dominate all the media, 
creating the impression that the intelligent and civilized must favor democracy, 
diversity and equality, while the truth is that these are the problems and not the 
solutions, and that they themselves are the prime enemies of civilization. See 
my Suicide by Democracy 2nd ed (2019).  
 
 
 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the 
Harry Potter novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to 
believe in fantasy rather than take responsibility for the world-- the norm of 
course. JKR is just as clueless about herself and the world as all the other 
monkeys, but about 200 times as destructive as the average American and about 
800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for the 
destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash novels and 
all the erosion ensuing (not trivial as it’s 6 to 12 tons/year soil into the ocean for 
everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so about 5000 tons/year 
for Rowling’s books and movies and her 3 children). The earth loses at least 1% 
of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity 
will be gone. Then there is the huge amount of fuel burned and waste made to 
make and distribute the books and films, plastic dolls etc. She shows her lack of 
social responsibility by producing children rather than using her millions to 
encourage family planning or buy up the rain forest, and by promoting the 
conventional liberal stupidity of 3rd world supremacy that is destroying 
Britain, America, the world and her descendant’s future. Of course, she's not 
that different from the other 7.8 billion clueless - just noisier and more 
destructive. 
 
Like all the rich, she is able to multiply her destruction by causing others to 
destroy on her behalf. Each child she produced results in about 50 tons of 
topsoil into the ocean, 300 lbs of toxic chemicals produced, 1 acre of 
forest/wetland/ gone forever, every year. Like all people, her family steals from 
all people on the earth and from their own descendants (no human rights 
without human wrongs), and, like the vast majority, she is poorly educated, 
egomaniacal, and lacking self-awareness, so these issues never cross her mind. 
In addition to the material destruction to make and distribute her books and 
movies, there is the vast amount of time wasted in reading and viewing them. 
In addition, the extreme immaturity shown by the characters in them and their 
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preoccupation with infantile superstitious fantasies can only do harm to 
impressionable minds. The world would be a better place if she had never been 
born, but one can say it of nearly everyone. 
 
It has long been the understanding of spiritually aware people that all but a tiny 
number of us spend their whole lives asleep, and this view is powerfully 
supported by modern psychological research, which shows that nearly all our 
actions are done mechanically, for reasons of which we are not aware and over 
which we have no control. Our personality is an illusion produced by evolution 
to ensure reproduction. We are only a package for selfish genes carrying out 
their blind programs and, like all organisms, we live to replicate our genes and 
to accumulate and consume resources to that end. In our case that means we 
live to destroy the earth and our own descendants. It is essential to this game 
that we remain unaware of it, for, to the extent we become aware and live our 
lives as conscious beings, we diminish our reproduction and the genes which 
produce this behavior are selected against. 
 
Rowling is a typical example of a seemingly intelligent aware person who will 
walk through their whole life sound asleep—just like nearly all of the other 11 
billion (I extrapolate to 2100) —and like them, lives only to destroy the earth 
and to leave her toxic offspring behind to continue the destruction. Like so 
many, she, with Obama and the Pope, share the common delusion that the poor 
are more noble and deserving, but the rich differ only in having the chance to 
be more destructive.  The poor are the rich in waiting.   So, 800 Chinese or 
Indians do about as much damage as JKR and her family.  Rich or poor they do 
the only things monkeys can do - consume resources and replicate their genes 
until the collapse of industrial civilization about the middle of the next century. 
In the blink of an eye, centuries and millennia will pass and, in the hellish world 
of starvation, disease, war and violence that their ancestors created, nobody will 
know or care that any of them existed.  She is no more inherently evil than 
others, but also no better and, due to the accidents of history, she is high on the 
list of Enemies of Life on Earth. 
 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is no 
such thing as helping one person without harming others. Rights or privileges 
given to new entrants into an overcrowded world can only diminish those of 
others. In spite of the massive ecological disasters happening in front of them 
everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them to the unrestrained motherhood of 
“the diverse”, which accounts for most of the population increase of the last 
century and all of that in this one. They lack some combination of intelligence, 
education, experience and sanity required to extrapolate the daily assaults on 
the resources and functioning of society now to the eventual collapse of 
industrial civilization, as well as the courage to say so even if they do realize it. 
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Each meal, each trip by car or bus, each pair of shoes is another nail in the earth’s 
coffin.  It has likely never crossed her mind that one seat on a plane from 
London to San Francisco produces about one ton of carbon which melts about 
3 square meters of sea ice and as one of the overprivileged she has probably 
flown hundreds of such flights. 
 
It never crosses most people’s minds that the average American lower class 
family of 4 take out in goods, services, and infrastructure costs perhaps $50,000 
more every year than they contribute, and in 100 years (when it will have 
expanded to perhaps 10 people) will have cost the country about $15 million, 
and immeasurably more in long term ecological and social costs (what is the 
value for the collapse of civilization?). 
 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including 
virtually all teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the 
Western Democracies, now means social democratic (diluted communist) third 
world supremacists working for the destruction of their own societies and their 
own descendants. So, those whose lack of free speech (and basic common 
sense), which should prohibit them from making any public statements at all, 
totally dominate all the media, creating the impression that the intelligent and 
civilized must favor democracy, diversity and equality, while the truth is that 
these are the problems and not the solutions, and that they themselves are the 
prime enemies of civilization. 
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population 
growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. 
Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will 
collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and 
war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In 
America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and 
immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. 
Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and 
diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to 
overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship 
which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate 
psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated 
persons as though they had common interests. I have termed this the Inclusive 
Fitness Delusion. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads 
to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control 
democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm 
someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes 
destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are 
unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on 
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selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and 
immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or 
any country that follows a democratic system. 
 
Those who want a broader framework may see my book ‘Suicide by 
Democracy’ 2nd edition (2019). 
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A Review of The Murderer Next Door by David Buss 
(2005)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing 
specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available 
for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be 
comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader expected 
to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature on 
violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 
and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 
309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). He 
has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades and 
covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates almost 
entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual people to 
murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million years 
or so). 
 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations 
such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs 
and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains as to why 
these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not 
the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it inevitably boils down to 
inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle for access to mates and 
resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all organisms. 
Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males 
are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from 
industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, 
archeology, FBI data and his own research into normal people's homicidal 
fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues to accumulate of murders, 
including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young females, in 
prehistoric times. 
 
After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of intentional 
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psychology (the logical structure of rationality), which is covered extensively in 
my many other articles and books. 
 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from 
an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of 
Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of it, easily 
available on the net and in two of my recent books. Briefly, Pinker notes that 
murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of about 30 since 
our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it extremely easy for 
anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this is due to 
various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due 
mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our 
planet, coupled with increased police presence, with communication and 
surveillance and legal systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This 
becomes clear every time there is even a brief and local absence of the police. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations 
such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs 
and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains as to why 
these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not 
the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it inevitably boils down to 
inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle for access to mates and 
resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all organisms. 
Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males 
are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from 
industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, 
archeology, FBI data and his own research into normal people's homicidal 
fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues to accumulate of murders, 
including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young females, in 
prehistoric times. 
 
On p 12 he notes that the war between each individual and the world over 
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resources begins at conception, when it begins growing by robbing its mother 
of food and stressing her body, and when her system fights back with 
frequently fatal consequences for the conceptus. He does not tell us that 
estimates of spontaneous abortion are in the range of up to about 30% of all 
conceptions, so that as many as 80 million a year die, most so early that the 
mother does not even know she is pregnant, and perhaps her period is a bit late. 
This is part of nature’s eugenics which we have not succeeded in defeating, 
though the overall dysgenic effect of civilization continues and each day the 
approx. 300,000 who are born are on average just slightly less mentally a 
physically fit than the approx. 100,000 who die, with a net increase in world 
population of ca. 200,000 and an ever larger ‘unfit’ population to destroy the 
earth (while being partly or wholely supported by their ‘fit’ neighbors). 
 
On p13 he says that we don’t know for sure that OJ Simpson was guilty but I 
would say that regardless of the trial we do know he was, as it’s the only 
reasonable interpretation of the facts of the case, which include his bizarre 
behavior. Also, in the subsequent civil trial, where his multi-million dollar 
defense attorneys were not present to subvert justice, he was quickly convicted, 
which led to the attachment of his assets, which led to his armed robbery 
conviction and imprisonment. 
 
He notes on p20 that there were about 100 million known murders worldwide 
in the last 100 years, with maybe as many as 300 million if all the unreported 
were included. I don’t think he counts the approx. 40 million by the Chinese 
Communist Party (which does not count the approx.. 60 million who starved), 
nor the ten of millions by Stalin. It is also to be kept in mind that America’s 
murder rate is decreased by about 75% due to the world class medical system 
which saves most victims of attempts. I will add that Mexico has about 5X the 
murder rate of the USA and Honduras about 20X, and your descendants can 
certainly look forward to our rate moving in that direction due to America’s 
fatal embrace of Diversity. Ann Coulter in ‘Adios America’ (2015) notes that 
Hispanics have committed about 23,000 murders here in the last few decades. 
For now, nothing will be done, and crime here will reach the levels in Mexico 
as the border continues to dissolve and environmental collapse and 
approaching bankruptcy dissolve the economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 
100 U.S. citizens were known to have been murdered and more than 130 
kidnapped and others just disappeared, and if you add other foreigners and 
Mexicans it runs into the thousands. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy’ 2nd ed 
(2019) for further details. 
 
Even a tiny lightly traveled country like Honduras manages some 10 murders 
and 2 kidnappings a year of US citizens. And these are the best of times—it is 
getting steadily worse as unrestrained motherhood and resource depletion 
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bring collapse ever closer.  In addition to continued increases in crime of all 
kinds we will see the percentage of crimes solved drop to the extremely low 
levels of the third world. More resources are devoted to the solution of murders 
than any other crime and about 65% are solved in the USA, but in Mexico less 
than 2% are solved and as you get further from Mexico City the rate drops to 
near zero. Also note that the rate here used to be about 80%, but it has dropped 
in parallel with the increase in the Diverse. Also 65% is the average but if you 
could get statistics I am sure it would rise with the percent of Euro’s in a city 
and drop as the percent of Diverse increases. In Detroit (83% black) only 30% 
are solved. If you keep track of who robs, rapes and murders, it’s obvious that 
black lives matter lots more to Euros (those of European descent) than they do 
to other blacks. These are my observations. 
 
Throughout history women have been at a major disadvantage when it came to 
murdering, but with the ready availability of guns we would expect this to 
change, but on p22 we find that about 87% of USA murderers are men and for 
same sex killing this rises to 95% and is about the same worldwide. Clearly 
something in the male psyche encourages violence as a route to fitness that is 
largely absent in women. Also relevant is that murders by acquaintances are 
more common than those by strangers. 
 
On p37 he notes that with high likelihood of conviction (and I would say the 
higher likelihood the intended victim or others will be armed), murder is now 
a more costly strategy than formerly, but I think this depends entirely on who 
you are. In a largely Euro USA city, or among middle and upper class people, 
over 95% of murders might be solved, but in lower class areas maybe 20% might 
be, and for gang dominated areas even less than that. And in 3rd world 
countries the chances of justice are even lower, especially when committed by 
gang members, so it is a highly viable strategy, especially if planned ahead of 
time. 
 
Next, he deals with violence and murder as a part of mating strategies, which 
they have clearly been throughout our evolution, and remain so especially 
among the lower classes and in third world countries. He notes the frequent 
murder of wives or lovers by men during or after breakups. He comments in 
passing on mate selection and infidelity, but there is minimal discussion as 
these topics are treated in great detail in his other writings and edited volumes. 
It is now well known that women tend to have affairs with sexy men that they 
would not select as a permanent partner (the sexy son theory) and to mate with 
them on their most fertile days. All these phenomena are viewed from an 
evolutionary perspective (i.e., what would the fitness advantage have been 
formerly). 
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There is very strong selection for behaviors that prevent a man from raising 
children fathered by someone else for the same reasons that ‘group selection’ is 
strongly selected against (see my essay on group selection ‘Altruism, Jesus and 
the End of the World…’). However modern life provides ample opportunities 
for affairs, and genetic studies have shown that a high percentage of children 
are fathered by other than the putative partner of their mother, with the 
percentage increasing from a few percent to as much as 30% as one descends 
from upper to lower classes in various modern Western countries at various 
periods and undoubtedly higher than that in many 3rd world countries. In his 
book Sperm Wars: The Science of Sex (2006) Robin Baker summarizes: ‘Actual 
figures range from 1 percent in high-status areas of the United States and 
Switzerland, to 5 to 6 percent for moderate-status males in the United States 
and Great Britain, to 10 to 30 percent for lower-status males in the United States, 
Great Britain and France’. One might suppose that in societies where both men 
and women are highly concentrated in cities and have mobile phones, this 
percentage is rising, especially in the third world where use of birth control and 
abortion is erratic. 
 
He finds that most men and women who murder their mates are young and the 
younger their mates are, the more likely they will be murdered. Like all 
behavior, this is hard to explain without an evolutionary perspective. One study 
found men in their 40’s constituted 23% of mate murderers but men in their 50’s 
only 7.7%, and 79% of female mate killers were between 16 and 39. It makes 
sense that the younger they are, the bigger the potential fitness loss to the male 
(decreased reproduction) and so the more intense the emotional response. As 
Buss puts it: “From Australia to Zimbabwe, the younger the woman, the higher 
the likelihood that she will be killed as a result of a sexual infidelity or leaving 
a romantic relationship. Women in the 15 to 24 year old bracket are at the 
greatest risk.” A high percentage are killed within two months of separation 
and most in the first year. One study found that 88% of them had been stalked 
prior to being killed. In some chapters there are quotes from people giving their 
feelings about their unfaithful mates and these typically include homicidal 
fantasies, which were more intense and went on for longer periods for men than 
for women. 
 
He devotes some time to the increased risk of abuse and murder from having a 
stepparent with e.g., the risk to a girl of rape increasing about 10X if her father 
is a stepfather. It is now very well known that in a wide range of mammals, a 
new male encountering a female with young will attempt to kill them. One USA 
study found that if one or both parents are surrogates, this raises the child’s 
chance of being murdered in the home between 40 and 100X (p174). A Canadian 
study found the beating death rate rose by 27X if one parent in a registered 
marriage was a stepparent while it rose over 200X if the surrogate was a live-in 
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boyfriend. Child abuse rates in Canada rose 40X when there was a stepparent. 
 
In humans, being without resources is a strong stimulus for women to eliminate 
their existing children in order to attract a new mate. A Canadian study found 
that even though single women were only 12% of all mothers, they committed 
over 50% of infanticides (p169). Since younger women lose less fitness from an 
infant death than older ones, it is not surprising that a cross-cultural study 
found that teenagers killed their infants at rates about 30X that of women in 
their twenties (p170). 
 
He then briefly discusses serial killers and serial rapists, the most successful of 
all time being the Mongols of Genghis Khan, whose Y chromosomes are 
represented in about 8% of all the men in the territories they controlled, or some 
20 million men (and an equal number of women) or about half a percent of all 
the people on earth, which makes them easily the most genetically fit of all the 
people who have ever lived in historical times. 
 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing 
specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available 
for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be 
comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader expected 
to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature on 
violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 
and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 
309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014) He 
has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades and 
covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates almost 
entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual people to 
murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million years 
or so). 
 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from 
an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of 
Our Nature-Why Violence Has Declined’(2012) and my review of it easily 
available on the net and in two of my recent books. Briefly, Pinker notes that 
murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of about 30 since 
our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it extremely easy for 
anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this is due to 
various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due 
mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our 
planet, coupled with increased police presence, with communication and 
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surveillance and legal systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This 
becomes clear every time there is even a brief and local absence of the police. 
 
Others also take the view that we have a ‘nice side’ that is genetically innate and 
supports the favorable treatment of even those not closely related to us (‘group 
selection’). This is hopelessly confused and I have done my small part to lay it 
to rest in ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton 
Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, 
Rationality and Civilization. A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of 
Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’(2012)’.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
I now present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical 
structure of rationality) which is covered extensively in my many other articles 
and books. Impulsive violence will involve the automated subcortical functions 
of System 1, but is sometimes deliberated upon ahead of time via cortical 
System 2. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, 
Capacities, Hypotheses. 
 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (Wittgenstein RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he 
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loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced 
in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding 
lying), while third person statements about others are true or false (see my 
review of Johnston - ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out, we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over 
the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 
and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other 
viewpoints as well. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the 
Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, 
Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, 
Coliva etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this 
study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two 
systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which 
can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior 
(LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), 
of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought 
(DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought 
(LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
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to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings.  
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
 
A detailed explanation of this table is given in my other writings. 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
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and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this.
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Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? —A 
Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil 
(2012) (review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a 
book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes 
will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these 
may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to 
draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the 
work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously 
interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear 
distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific 
matters and their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into 
consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by 
its incoherent analysis. So it is with this volume. 
 
If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical 
structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought 
(dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to 
understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the 
philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how 
to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like most  
students of behavior, is largely clueless. He is enchanted by models, theories, 
and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we 
only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using 
language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear 
test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous critic) likes to say, 
clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to provide a start on 
this in my recent writings.   
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
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Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
Also, as usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, he gives no time to the very 
real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 
‘androidizing’ of society which is prominent in other authors (Bostrum, 
Hawking, etc.) and frequent in scifi and films, so I make a few comments on the 
quite possibly suicidal utopian delusions of ‘nice’ androids, humanoids, 
artificial intelligence (AI), democracy, diversity, and genetic engineering. 
 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will 
occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes 
coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, 
as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be feasible to 
make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes or those of 
other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists will be left 
behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement biobots 
or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem likely, 
economically or socially, to prevent the destruction of industrial civilization by 
overpopulation, resource depletion, climate change and probably also the 
tyrannical rule of the Seven Sociopaths who rule China. 
 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and 
directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal 
utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and 
human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying America and the world. 
I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but not by AI/robotics, 
CRISPR, nor by Neomarxism, diversity and equality. 
 
 
 
 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a 
book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes 
will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these 
may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to 
draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the 
work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously 
interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear 
distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific 
matters and their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into 
consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by 
its incoherent analysis. So, it is with this volume. 
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If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical 
structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought 
(dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to 
understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the 
philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how 
to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like most 
students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, theories, 
and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we 
only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using 
language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear 
test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous critic) likes to say, 
clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
Actually, ‘reduction’ is a complex language game or group of games (uses of 
words with various meanings or COS) so its use varies greatly depending on 
context and often it’s not clear what it means. Likewise, with ‘modeling’ or 
‘simulating’ or  ‘equivalent to’ or ‘the same as’ etc. Likewise, with the claims 
here and everywhere that ‘computation’ of biological or mental processes is not 
done, as it would take too long, but not ‘computabl’e or ’calculable’ means 
many things, or nothing at all depending on context, and this is usually just 
totally ignored. 
 
Chapter 9 is the typical nightmare one expects. Minsky’s first quote “Minds are 
simply what brains do” is a truism in that in some games one can e.g., say ‘my 
brain is tired’ etc. but like most he has no grasp at all of the line between 
scientific questions and those about how the language games are to be played 
(how we can use language intelligibly). Descriptions of behavior are not the 
same as descriptions of brain processes. This ‘reductionism’ is a hopelessly 
bankrupt view of life, -- it just does not work, i.e., is not coherent, and this has 
been explained at length, first by Wittgenstein and subsequently by Searle, 
Hacker and many others. For one thing, there are various levels of description 
(physics, chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, neurophysiology, brain, 
thought/behavior) and the concepts (language games) useful and intelligible 
(having clear meaning or COS) at one level work differently at another. Also, 
one ‘mental state’, ‘disposition’ or ‘thought’ or ‘action’, can be described in first 
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person or third person by many statements and vice versa, and one statement 
may describe many different ‘mental states’, ‘dispositions’, ‘thoughts’ or 
‘actions’ depending intricately on context, so the match between behavior and 
language is hugely underdetermined even for ‘simple’ acts or sentences. and as 
these become more complex there is a combinatorial explosion. Hacker and 
others have explained this many times.  
 
There is no clear meaning to describing my desire to see the sun set at the lower 
levels, and their never will be. They are different levels of description, different 
concepts (different language games) and one cannot even make sense of 
reducing one to the other, of behavior into neurophysiology into biochemistry 
into genetics into chemistry into physics into math or computation and like 
most scientists Kurzweil’s handwaving and claims that it’s not done because its 
inconvenient or impractical totally fails to see that the real issue is that 
‘reduction’ has no clear meaning (COS), or rather many meanings depending 
acutely on context, and in no case can we give a coherent account that eliminates 
any level. 
 
Nevertheless, the rotting corpse of reductionism floats to the surface frequently 
(e.g., p37 and the Minsky quote on p199) and we are told that chemistry 
“reduces” to physics and that thermodynamics is a separate science because the 
equations become “unwieldy”, but another way to say this is that reduction is 
incoherent, the language games (concepts) of one level just do not apply (make 
sense) at higher and lower levels of description, and it is not that our science or 
our language is inadequate. I have discussed this in my other articles and it is 
well known in the philosophy of science, but it is likely never going to penetrate 
into “hard science”. 
 
The psychology of higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by 
reasons, and one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology nor 
physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. They are just different and 
indispensable levels of description. Wittgenstein famously described it 80 years 
ago in the Blue Book. 
 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce 
anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely 
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descriptive.” 
 
Like nearly all ‘hard’ scientists and even sadly ‘soft’ ones as well, he has no 
grasp at all of how language works, e.g., of how ‘thinking’ and other 
psychological verbs work, so misuses them constantly throughout his writings 
(e.g., see his comments on Searle on p170). I won’t go into an explanation here 
as I have written extensively on this (Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century 4th ed (2019)). So, like most scientists, and even most philosophers, he 
plays one language game (uses the words with one meaning or Condition of 
Satisfaction) but mixes it up with other quite different meanings, all the while 
insisting that his game is the only one that can be played (has any ‘real’ sense). 
Like most, he also is not clear on the distinction between scientific issues of fact 
and the issues of how language can be used intelligibly. Also, he does not have 
a clear grasp of the distinction between the two systems of thought, the 
automaticities of nonlinguistic system S1 and the conscious deliberations of 
linguistic system S2, but I have described this extensively in my writings and 
will not do so here. 
 
Another thing that Kurzweil never mentions is the obvious fact that there will 
be severe and probably frequently fatal conflicts with our robots. Just think 
about the continual daily problems we have living with other humans, about 
the number of assaults, abuses and murders every day. Why should these be 
any less with androids--and then who takes the blame? There would not seem 
to be any reason at all why androids/AI should be less in conflict with each 
other, and with us, than other humans are already. 
 
And all devices/functions/weapons are being turned over to AI at a rapid pace. 
Soon all weapons systems, communications, power grids, financial 
activities,medical systems, vehicles, electronic devices will be AI controlled. 
Hundreds of billions of ‘smart’ devices connected to the Internet of Things and 
only a handful of programmers even possibly able to understand or control 
them. Millions of smart missles, ships, subs, tanks, guns, satellites, drones 
worldwide, programmed to automatically eliminate ‘enemies’ and increasingly 
dominated by a massive international Chinese military run by the Seven 
Sociopaths.  One hacker (or rogue AI) could paralyze or activate any of them at 
any time, and once the fireworks start, who could stop it? 
 
Asimov’s law of robotics –do not harm humans, is a fantasy that is unattainable 
in practice for androids/AI just as it is for us. I admit (as Searle has many times) 
that we are ‘androids’ too, though designed by natural selection, not having 
‘intelligence’ from one viewpoint, but having almost limitless ‘intelligence’ 
from another. 
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What is to stop AI having all the mental ailments we have—neuroses, 
psychoses, sociopathies, egomania, greed, selfish desire to produce endless 
copies of one’s own ‘genome’ (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racism 
(programism?), something equivalent to drug addiction, homicidal and suicidal 
tendencies or should we just term these all ‘biocidal bugs’? Of course, humans 
will try to exclude bad behavior from the programs, but this will have to be 
after the fact, i.e., when it’s already dispersed via the net to millions or billions 
of devices, and as they will be self programming and updating, any badness 
that confers a survival advantage should spread almost instantly. This is of 
course just the AI equivalent of human evolution by natural selection (inclusive 
fitness). 
 
John Searle killed the idea of strong AI with the Chinese room and other 
descriptions of the incoherence of various language games (as Wittgenstein had 
done superbly long before there were computers, though few have noticed). He 
is regarded by some as the nemesis of AI, but in fact he has just described it 
accurately, and has no antipathy to it at all.  Searle has said repeatedly that of 
course machines can think and feel, for we are such machines! Made of proteins 
etc., and not metal, but machines in a very fundamental sense nevertheless. And 
machines that took about 4 billion years of experimentation in a lab the size of 
the earth with trillions of trillions of machines being created and only a tiny 
number of the most successful surviving. The efforts of AI seem or at least 
robotics, so far seem trivial by comparison. And as he notes it is possible that 
much or all of our psychology may be unique to fleshy beings, just as much of 
AI may be to silicon. How much might be ‘true’ overlap and how much vague 
simulation is impossible to say. 
 
Darwinian selection or survival of the fittest as it applies to AI is a major issue 
that is never addressed by Kurzweil, nor most others, but is the subject of a 
whole book by philosopher-scientist Nik Bostrum and of repeated warnings by 
black hole physicist and world’s longest surviving ALS sufferer Stephen 
Hawking. Natural selection is mostly equivalent to inclusive fitness or 
favoritism towards close relatives (kin selection). And countervailing ‘group 
selection’ for ‘niceness’ is illusory (see my review of Wilson’s The Social of 
Conquest of Earth (2012)). Yes, we do not have DNA and genes in robots (yet), 
but in what is perhaps philosopher Daniel Dennett’s most (only?) substantive 
contribution to philosophy, it is useful to regard inclusive fitness as the 
‘universal acid’ which eats through all fantasies about evolution, nature and 
society. So, any self-replicating android or program that has even the slightest 
advantage over others may automatically eliminate them and humans and all 
other lifeforms, protein or metal, that are competitors for resources, or just for 
‘amusement’, as human do with other animals. 
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Exactly what will prevent programs from evolving selfishness and replacing all 
other competing machines/programs or biological life forms? If one takes the 
‘singularity’ seriously, then why not take this just a seriously?  I commented on 
this long ago and of course it is a staple of science fiction. So, AI is just the next 
stage of natural selection with humans speeding it up in certain directions until 
they are replaced by their creations, just as the advantages in our ‘program’ 
resulted in the extinction of all other hominoid subspecies and is quickly 
exterminating all other large lifeforms (except of course those we eat and a few 
degenerate pets, most of which will be eaten as starvation spreads).  
 
As usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, Kurzweil gives no time to the very 
real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 
‘androidizing’ of society, which are prominent in other nonfiction authors 
(Bostrum, Hawking etc.) and frequent in scifi and films. It requires little 
imagination to see this book as just another suicidal utopian delusion 
concentrating on the ‘nice’ aspects of androids, humanoids, democracy, 
computers, technology, ethnic diversity, and genetic engineering. It is however 
thanks to these that the last vestiges of our 
stability/privacy/security/prosperity/tranquility/sanity are rapidly 
disappearing. Also, drones and autonomous vehicles are rapidly increasing in 
capabilities and dropping in cost, so it will not be long before enhanced AI 
versions are used for crime, surveillance and espionage by all levels of 
government, terrorists, thieves, stalkers, kidnappers and murderers. Given 
your photo, fingerprints, name, workplace, address, mobile phone #, emails and 
chats, all increasingly easy to get, solar powered or self-charging drones, 
microbots, and vehicles will be able carry out almost any kind of crime. 
Intelligent viruses will continue to invade your phone, pc, tablet, refrigerator, 
car, TV, music player, health monitors, androids and security systems to steal 
your data, monitor your activities, follow you, and if desired, extort, kidnap or 
kill you. Its crystal clear that if the positives will happen then the negatives will 
also. It’s a toss-up who will do the most evil—the jihadists, the Seven 
Sociopaths, the hackers or our own programs, or perhaps all of them in concert. 
This dark side of AI/Robotics/The Internet of Things goes unmentioned in this 
book, and this is the norm.  
 
Though the idea of robots taking over has been in scifi for many years, I first 
started to think seriously about it when I read about nanobots in Drexler’s 
Engines of Creation in 1993. And many have worried about the ‘grey goo’ 
problem—i.e., of nanobots replicating until they smother everything else.  
 
Another singularity that Kurzweil and most in AI do not mention is the 
possibility that genetic engineering will soon lead to DNA displacing silicon as 
the medium for advanced intelligence. CRISPR and other techniques will let us 
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change genes at will, adding whole new genes/chromosomes in months or even 
hours, with superfast development of organisms or brains in vats without 
bothersome bodies to encumber them. Even now, without genetic engineering, 
there are precocious geniuses mastering quantum mechanics in their early teens 
or taking the cube of a 10 digit number in their head. And the programming of 
genes might be done by the same computers and programs being used for AI. 
 
Anyone who takes AI seriously also might find of interest my article on David 
Wolpert’s work on the ultimate law in Turing Machine Theory which suggests 
some remarkable facets of and limits to computation and ‘intelligence’. I wrote 
it because his work has somehow escaped the attention of the entire scientific 
community.  It is readily available on the net and in my article “Wolpert, Godel, 
Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, incompleteness, the liar paradox, 
theism, the limits of computation, a nonquantum mechanical uncertainty 
principle and the universe as computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing 
Machine Theory’ (2015). 
 
To his credit, Kurzweil makes an effort to understand Wittgenstein (p220 etc.), 
but (like 50 million other academics) has only a superficial grasp of what he did.  
Before computers existed, Wittgenstein discussed in depth the basic issues of 
what computation was and what makes humans distinct from machines, but 
his writings on this are unknown to most. Gefwert is one of the few to analyze 
them in detail, but his work has been largely ignored. 
 
On p222 Kurzweil comments that it is ‘foolish’ to deny the ‘physical world’ (an 
intricate language game), but it is rather that one cannot give any sense to such 
a denial, as it presupposes the intelligibility (reality) of what it denies. This is 
the ever-present issue of how we make sense of (are certain about) anything, 
which brings us back to Wittgenstein’s famous work ‘On Certainty’ (see my 
review) and the notion of the ‘true only’ proposition. Like all discussions of 
behavior, Kurzweil’s needs a logical structure for rationality (intentionality) 
and (what is equivalent) a thorough understanding of how language works, but 
it is almost totally absent. As much of my work deals with these issues I won’t 
go into them here, except to provide the summary table of intentionality. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, 
and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal- Sharrock, Read, 
Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or 
ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
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Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of 
Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality  (LSOR),  of  Intentionality  (LSI)  -the  
classical philosophical  term,  the  Descriptive  Psychology of Consciousness 
(DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language 
of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and 
in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause 
originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
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 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
 
A detailed explanation of this table is given in my other writings.  
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
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of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He 
showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences 
(language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
 
On p 278 he comments on our improving life and references ‘Abundance’ by 
his colleague Diaminidis – another utopian fantasy, and mentions Pinker’s 
recent work “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined”, 
but fails to note that these improvements are only temporary, and are bought 
at the cost of destroying our descendant’s futures. As I have reviewed Pinker’s 
book and commented in detail on the coming collapse of America and the world 
in my book ‘Suicide by Democracy’ 2nd  ed (2019) I will not repeat it here. 
 
Every day we lose at least 100 million tons of topsoil into the sea (ca. 
6kg/person/day) and about 20,000 hectares of agricultural land becomes 
salinified and useless. Fresh water is disappearing in many areas and global 
warming will drastically decrease food production in many 3rd world countries. 
Every day the mothers of the 3rd world (the 1st world now decreasing daily) 
‘bless’ us with another 300,000 or so babies, leading to a net increase of about 
200,000—another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month. 
About 4 billion more by 2100, most in Africa, most of the rest in Asia. The 
famously tolerant Muslims will likely rise from about 1/5th to about 1/3 of the 
earth and control numerous H bombs and AI controlled drones. Thanks to the 
social delusions of the few hundred politicians who control it, America’s love 
affair with ‘diversity’ and ‘democracy’ will guarantee its transformation into a 
3rd world hellhole and the famously benevolent Seven Sociopaths who run 
China are now taking center stage (look up The Belt and Road Initiative, Debt 
Trap Diplomacy and Crouching Tiger on the net or Youtube). Sea level is 
projected to rise one to three meters by 2100 and some projections are ten times 
higher. There is no doubt at all that it will eventually rise much higher and cover 
much of the world’s prime cropland and most heavily populated areas.  It’s also 
clear that the oil and natural gas and good quality easy to get coal will be gone, 
much of the earth stripped of topsoil, all the forests gone, and fishing 
dramatically reduced. I would like to see a plausible account of how AI will fix 
this. Even if theoretically possible, at what cost in money and pollution and 
social distress to created and maintain them? The second law of 
thermodynamics and the rest of physics, chemistry and economics works for 
androids as well as hominoids. And who is going to force the world to 
cooperate when its obvious life is a zero-sum game in which your gain is my 
loss? Certainly not the jihadists or the Seven Sociopaths.  There is no free lunch. 
Even if robots could do all human tasks soon it would not save the world from 
constant international conflicts, starvation, disease, crime, violence and war. 
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When they cannot be made to cooperate in this limited time of abundance 
(bought by raping the earth) it is hopelessly naïve to suppose that they will do 
it when anarchy is sweeping over the planet. 
 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will 
occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes 
coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, 
as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be feasible to 
make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes or those of 
other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists will be left 
behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement biobots 
or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem remotely 
possible, economically or socially to prevent the collapse of industrial 
civilization. 
 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and 
directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal 
utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and 
human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying America and the world. 
I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but not by AI/robotics, 
CRISPR, nor by democracy, diversity and equality. 
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Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and 
the World  (revised (2019) 
 
          Michael Starks 
 
     ABSTRACT 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive 
population growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd 
world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more 
ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, 
disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses at least 1% of 
its topsoil every year, and climate change will greatly decrease food 
production in much of the world, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing 
capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In 
America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and 
immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. 
Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and 
diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to 
overwhelm America and the world, destroying peace, prosperity and 
freedom, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness and 
permits united long-term planning. The root cause of collapse is the inability 
of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people 
to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. The idea of 
human rights is an evil fantasy promoted by leftists to draw attention away 
from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world 
motherhood. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to 
the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control 
democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm 
someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes 
destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere 
are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on 
selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. The most basic facts, 
almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America 
or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep 
them there.  The attempt to do this is bankrupting America and destroying 
the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our 
genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is 
other poor and not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there 
is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows 
a democratic system. 
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THE SADDEST DAY IN US HISTORY. President Johnson, with 2 Kennedy’s 
and ex-President Hoover, gives America to Mexico— Oct 3rd, 1965. Wolves 
in sheep’s clothing, like most Democrats from that day onward. 
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      PREFACE 
 
“At what point is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever 
reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If 
destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation 
of freemen we must live through all time or die by suicide.” Abraham Lincoln 
(1838) 
 
Among the millions of pages of print and web pages and incessant chat and 
chatter on TV and blogs and speeches, there is a notable absence of a short clear 
honest, accurate, sane, intelligent summary of the catastrophe that is destroying 
America and the world. This is partly due to a lack of understanding and partly 
to the suppression of free speech by the 
neomarxist/leftist/liberal/progressive/democratic/socialist/multicultural/divers
e/social democratic/communist/third world supremacist coalition. I attempt to 
fill that gap here. 
 
An integral part of modern democracy is The One Big Happy Family Delusion, 
i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious 
ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just 
manage things correctly (the possibility of politics).   The No Free Lunch 
Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and 
all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and 
stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces these 
delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so 
we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, 
greatly exacerbating the problems.  
 
I describe the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can 
be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology, which, though eminently 
adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa ca. 6 million years ago, when we 
split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 to 150,000 years ago, when many of our 
ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, 
economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is ultimately 
about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection, 
i.e., natural selection).  
 
One might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for 
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any kind of entity on any planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no 
being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that 
are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness 
is a law of physics.  
 
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth 
and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the human mind.  In 
recent times an even more evil notion arose, that humans are born with rights, 
rather than having to earn privileges. The idea of human rights, as now 
commonly promulgated, is an evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention 
away from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world 
motherhood.  Thus, every day the population increases by 200,000, who must 
be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce 
another 200,000 etc.  And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive 
must be taken from those already alive, and their descendants. Their lives 
diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways.  
Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception.  In a 
horrifically overcrowded world with vanishing resources, there cannot be 
human rights without destroying the earth and our descendant’s futures.  It 
could not be more obvious, but it is rarely mentioned in a clear and direct way, 
and one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood.  
 
The most basic fact, almost never mentioned, is that there are not enough 
resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out 
of poverty and keep them there.  The attempt to do this is bankrupting America 
and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, 
as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of 
the poor is other poor and not the rich.  
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population 
growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. 
Consumption of resources, and the addition of some 3 billion more ca. 2100, 
will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence 
and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil every 
year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity will be gone. Billions 
will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely 
accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined 
with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably 
turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and 
poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as 
it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness and enables long term 
planning. 
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The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to 
the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they 
had common interests (which I suggest may be regarded as an unrecognized -- 
but the commonest and most serious-- psychological problem -- Inclusive 
Fitness Disorder). This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads 
to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control 
democratic societies.  Few understand that if you help one person you harm 
someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes 
destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are 
unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on 
selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and 
immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or 
any country that follows a democratic system.  This is happening even without 
climate change or the evil designs of Seven Senile Sociopaths who rule China, 
but they make it happen much faster.  The only major change from the first 
edition of this essay is the addition of a brief discussion of China, which, after 
overpopulation, represents by far the greatest threat to peace and freedom 
worldwide.  The policy of appeasing them, which all countries and most 
businesses pursue, is the worst of the suicidal utopian delusions. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 
‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) all of these free on the net as 
well as Amazon Kindles and paperbacks.  
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PERCENT OF AMERICANS WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN -- the result of the 
“no significant demographic impact” immigration act of 1965—non-Europeans 
(the Diverse) were a 16% share, are now (2019) about 38% and will be about 
60% by 2100, since they are now 100% of the population increase of about 2.4 
million every year.  Suicide by democracy. 
 
 
PART OF THE COST OF DIVERSITY and of aging, being the world’s unpaid 
policeman, etc., (not counting future liabilities which are 5 to 10 times as  
much, barring major social changes).  
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Useful definitions for understanding American 
politics 
 
DIVERSITY: 1. USA government program for handing over control to Mexico. 
2. USA government program for providing free or heavily subsidized goods 
and services to those from other countries. 3. A means for turning America into 
a 3rd world Hellhole. 4. Multiculturalism, multiethnicism, multipartisanism, 
inclusivity, third world supremacy.  
 
RACIST: 1. Person opposed to diversity in above sense. 2. Person of different 
ethnicity who disagrees with me on any issue. 3. Person of any ethnicity who 
disagrees with me on anything.  Also, called ‘bigot’ ‘hater’ or ‘nativist’. 
 
WHITE SUPREMACIST: Anyone opposed to diversity in the above sense, i.e., 
anyone trying to prevent the collapse of America and of industrial civilization 
worldwide. 
 
THIRD WORLD SUPREMACIST: Anyone in favor of diversity in above senses. 
Anyone working to destroy their descendant’s future. AKA Democrats, 
Socialists, Neomarxists, Democratic Socialists, Marxists, Leftists, Liberals, 
Progressives, Communists, Maternalists, Leftist Fascists, Multiculturalists, 
Inclusivists, Human Rightists. 
 
HATE: 1. Any opposition to diversity in the above sense. 2. Expression of a 
desire to prevent the collapse of America and the world. 
 
EURO: White or Caucasian or European: one whose ancestors left Africa over 
50,000 years ago. 
 
BLACK: African or Afro-American: one whose ancestors stayed in Africa or left 
in the last few hundred years (so there has not been time for evolution of any 
significant differences from Euros). 
 
DIVERSE: Anyone who is not EURO (European, white, Caucasian). 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  An evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away 
from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world 
reproduction. Thus, temporary anomalies, such as democracy, equality, labor 
unions, women’s rights, child rights, animal rights, etc. are due to high 
standards of living created by the rape of the planet and will disappear as 
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civilization collapses and China rules the world.  
 
I should first note that I have no investment in the outcome of any social or 
political movement. I am old, without kids or close relatives, and in the blink of 
an eye I will be gone (of course the most important thing to remember is that 
very soon we will all be gone and our descendants will face the horrific 
consequences of our stupidity and selfishness). I offer these comments in hope 
they will give perspective, since concise rational competent analyses of the 
perilous situation in America and the world are almost nonexistent. I have close 
friends of various ethnicities, several times given my only assets to an 
impoverished third world person (no I did not inherit anything significant, did 
not have rich relatives, a trust fund or a cushy job), have had third world 
friends, colleagues, girlfriends, wives and business partners, and helped 
anyone in any way I could regardless of race, age, creed, sexual preferences or 
national origin or position on the autism spectrum, and am still doing so. I have 
not voted in any kind of election, belonged to any religious, social or political 
group, listened to a political speech or read a book on politics in over 50 years, 
as I considered it pointless and demeaning to have my views carry the same 
weight as those of morons, lunatics, criminals and merely uneducated (i.e., 
about 95% of the population). I find nearly all political dialog to be superficial, 
mistaken and useless. This is my first and last social/political commentary. 
 
The millions of daily articles, speeches, tweets and newsbites rarely mention it, 
but what is happening in America and worldwide are not some transient and 
unconnected events, but the infinitely sad story of the inexorable collapse of 
industrial civilization due to overpopulation and of freedom due to it and to 
the malignant dictatorships that are the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and 
Islam. Though these are the only important issues, they seldom are stated 
clearly in the endless debates and daily social convulsions, and few things in 
this article are ever discussed in any clear and intelligent way, in large part 
because the Diverse (i.e., those not of European ancestry) have a strangle hold 
on American and most Western media which make it impossible. Politics in 
democratic countries is dedicated almost entirely to providing the opportunity 
for every special interest group to get an ever-bigger share of the rapidly 
diminishing resources. The problem is that nearly all people are short-sighted, 
selfish, poorly educated, lacking experience and stupid and this creates an 
insoluble problem when there are 10 billion (by century’s end), or when they 
constitute a majority of any electorate in a democratic system.  It’s one thing to 
make mistakes when there are time and resources to correct them, but quite 
another when it’s impossible.  The USA is the worst case as it seems to have 
vast resources and a resilient economy, and what I and most people grew up 
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regarding as the wonderful traditions of justice, democracy, and equality, but I 
now see that these are invitations to exploitation by every special interest group 
(especially Hispanics, the CCP and Islam) and that giving privileges to 
everyone born, without imposing duties, has fatal consequences. Also, a system 
that operates this way cannot compete with ones that do not- Asia and above 
all China is eating America’s lunch (and that of all non-Asian countries), and 
nothing is likely to stop it, but of course overpopulation dooms everyone (the 
minority who will survive after the great 22nd/23rd century die-off) to a hellish 
life. A world where everyone is free to replicate their genes and consume 
resources as they wish will soon have a hard landing. The fact is that democracy 
has become a license to steal- from the government—i.e., from the shrinking 
minority who pay significant taxes, from the earth, from everyone everywhere, 
and from one’s own descendants, and that diversity (multiculturalism, 
multipartisanism, etc.) in an overcrowded world leads to insoluble conflict and 
collapse. 
 
The history in America is clear enough. In what can now be seen as the first 
major disaster stemming from the lunatic Christian idea of innate human rights, 
the politicians of the Northern states decided it was inappropriate for the South 
to have slaves. Slavery was certainly an outmoded and evil idea and was 
disappearing worldwide, and it would have been eliminated with economic 
and political pressures after emancipation via the 13th amendment. But then as 
now, the utopian delusions prevailed, and so they attacked the South, killing 
and crippling millions and creating poverty and dysgenic chaos (the death and 
debility of a large percentage of able bodied Euro males) whose effects are still 
with us. The Africans replicated their genes at a higher rate, resulting in their 
coming to comprise an ever-increasing percentage of the country. Nobody 
realized it at the time and most still do not, but this was the beginning of the 
collapse of America and the defects in psychology which led the North to 
persecute the South were a continuation of the Christian fanaticisms which 
produced the murder and torture of millions during the middle ages, the 
Inquisition, the genocide of the new world Indians by the Europeans, the 
Crusades and the Jihads of the muslims for the last 1200 years.  
ISIS, Al-Queda, the Crusaders and the Army of the North have a great deal in 
common. 
 
Without asking the voters, a few thousand statesmen and congressmen and 
President Lincoln made ex-slaves citizens and gave them the right to vote via 
the 14th and 15th amendments. Gradually there came to be vast ghettos 
composed of ex slaves, where crime and poverty flourished, and where drugs 
(imported mostly by Hispanics) generated a vast criminal empire, whose users 
committed hundreds of millions of crimes every year. Then came the 
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Democrats led by the Kennedys, who, raised in privilege and disconnected 
from the real world, and having like nearly all politicians no clue about biology, 
psychology, human ecology or history, decided in 1965 that it was only 
democratic and just that the country should change the immigration laws to 
decrease influx of Europeans in favor of 3rd world people (the Diverse). They 
passed the law and in 1965 president Lyndon Johnson signed it (see cover 
photo). There were misgivings from some quarters that this would destroy 
America, but they were assured that there would be “no significant 
demographic impact”! The American public never (to this day in 2019) had a 
chance to express their views (i.e., to vote), unless you count the Trump election 
as that chance, and congress and various presidents changed our democracy 
into a “Socialist Democracy”, i.e., into a Neomarxist, third world supremacist 
fascist state. The Chinese are delighted as they do not have to fight the USA and 
other democracies for dominance, but only to wait for them to collapse. 
 
A few decades ago, William Brennen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
suggested that a law passed a century before, to guarantee citizenship to former 
slaves (the first fatal legislative mistake, the second giving them the vote), 
should apply to anyone who happened to be born in America. Subsequently, 
other rulings of the court (not the people, who have never been asked) decided 
all those born in the USA, regardless of parental status (e.g., even if they were 
aliens from another solar system) had a right to US citizenship (anchor babies) 
and were subsequently permitted to make citizens of all their relatives – (the 
third and fourth fatal mistakes). Again, it never crossed the minds of congress 
or the courts that the constitution did not give any such rights, nor that the 
American public should be permitted to vote on this. In addition to the millions 
of 3rd world people here ‘’legally” (i.e., with the permission of a few hundred 
in congress, but not the people) millions began entering illegally and all 
produced children at about 3 times the rate of existing Americans and 
generated ever increasing social problems. Most of the Diverse pay little or no 
taxes, and so they live partly or wholly on government handouts (i.e., taxes paid 
by the ever shrinking minority of Americans who pay any, as well as money 
borrowed from future generations to the tune of $2.5 billion a day, added to the 
$18 trillion in debt and the $90 trillion or more of unfunded future obligations—
medicare, social security etc.), while the agricultural system, housing, streets 
and highways, sewers, water and electrical systems, parks, schools, hospitals, 
courts, public transportation, government, police, fire, emergency services and 
the huge defense spending needed to ensure the continued existence of our 
country and most others, were created, administered and largely paid for by 
Euros (i.e., those of European ancestry). The fact that the Diverse owe their well-
being (relative to the Diverse still in the 3rd world) and their very existence 
(medicine, technology, agriculture, suppression of war and slavery) to Euros is 
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never mentioned by anyone (see below). 
 
Naturally, the Euros (and a minority of tax paying Diverse) are outraged to 
have to spend ever more of their working lives to support the legions of newly 
arrived Diverse, to be unsafe in their own homes and streets and to see their 
towns, schools, hospitals, parks etc. being taken over and destroyed. They try 
to protest, but the media are now controlled by the Diverse (with the help of 
deluded Euros who are dedicated to destroying their own descendants), and it 
is now almost impossible to state any opposition to the collapse of America and 
the world  without being attacked as “racist”, “white supremacist” or “a hater”, 
and often losing one’s job for exercising free speech. Words referring to the 
Diverse are almost banned, unless it’s to praise them and assist their genuine 
racism (i.e., living at the expense of and exploiting and abusing in every way 
possible the Euro’s, and their Diverse tax paying neighbors), so one cannot 
mention blacks, immigrants, Hispanics, Muslims etc. in the same discussion 
with the words rapist, terrorist, thief, murderer, child molester, convict, 
criminal, welfare etc., without being accused of “hatred” or “racism” or “white 
supremacy”. They are of course oblivious to their own racism and third world 
supremacy. Keep in mind there is not and almost certainly will never be any 
evidence of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse in 
psychology, or IQ, and that their tendency to excessive reproduction and other 
shortcomings is wholly due to culture. 
 
Gradually, every kind of special interest group has succeeded in eliminating 
any negative reference to them in any easily identifiable way, so there has 
almost vanished from public discourse not only words referring to the Diverse, 
but to the short, tall, fat, thin, mentally ill, handicapped, genetically defective, 
disadvantaged, abnormal, schizophrenic, depressed, stupid, dishonest, crazy, 
lazy , cowardly, selfish, dull etc. until nothing but pleasant platitudes are heard 
and one is left puzzled as to who fills the jails, hospitals and mental wards to 
overflowing, litters  the streets with garbage, destroys the parks, beaches and 
public lands, robs, riots, assaults, rapes and murders, and uses up all the tax 
money, plus an extra 2.5 billion dollars a day, added to the  18 trillion national 
debt (or over 90 trillion if you extend the real liabilities into the near future). Of 
course, it’s not due all to the Diverse, but every passing day a larger percentage 
is as their numbers swell and those of the Euros decline. 
 
It is now over fifty years after passing the new immigration act and about 16% 
of the population is Hispanic (up from less than 1% earlier), who have been 
reproducing at about 3X the rate of Euros , so that about half of children under 
6 are now Hispanic,  while some 13% of the country are blacks, rapidly being 
displaced and marginalized by Hispanics (though few blacks realize it, so they 
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continue to support the politicians favoring further immigration and handouts 
and promising short term gains). Virtually nobody grasps the eventual collapse 
of America and the whole world, in spite of the fact that you can see it in front 
of your eyes everywhere. In America and worldwide, the Euros (and all the 
“rich” generally) are producing less than two kids per couple, so their 
populations are shrinking, and in America in 2014, for the first time since Euros 
came here in the 16th century, more of them died than were born, so their 
marginalization is certain. And, showing the “success” of the Neomarxist, third 
world supremacist immigration and welfare policies, the population of 
Hispanics in California passed 50%, so within a decade, the 6th largest economy 
in the world will be part of Mexico. 
 
The Diverse will, in, this century, eliminate all American “racism” (i.e., any   
opposition or legal hindrance to takeover of all political power, and the 
appropriation of as much of their neighbor’s money and property as they can 
manage,) except their own racism (e.g., graduated income tax which forces the 
Euro’s to support them). Soon they will largely eliminate legal differences 
between citizens of Mexico and California and then Texas, who then will have 
full ‘rights’ (privileges) anywhere in the USA, so that citizenship will became 
increasingly meaningless (and an ever-lower percentage of the Diverse will pay 
any significant taxes or serve in the military, and a far higher percentage will 
continue to receive welfare and to commit crimes, and to get free or heavily 
subsidized schooling, medical care etc.). One cannot mention in the media that 
the predominant racism in the USA is the extortion by the Diverse of anyone 
with money (mainly Euros but also any Diverse who have money), the 
elimination of free speech (except their own), the biasing of all laws to favor this 
extortion, and their rapid takeover of all political and financial  
power, i.e., total discrimination against Euros and anyone belonging to the 
“upper classes”, i.e., anyone who pays any significant taxes. 
 
 
Gradually the poverty, drugs, gangs, environmental destruction and the 
corruption of police, army and government endemic in Mexico and most other 
3rd world countries is spreading across America, so we will be able to cross 
over the increasingly porous border with Mexico without noticing we are in a 
different country –probably within a few decades, but certainly by the end of 
the century. The population continues to increase, and here as everywhere in 
the world, the increase is now 100% Diverse and, as we enter the next century 
(much sooner in some countries), resources will diminish and starvation, 
disease, crime and war will rage out of control. The rich and the corporations 
will mostly still be rich (as always, as things get worse they will take their 
money and leave), the poor will be poorer and more numerous, and life 
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everywhere, with the possible exception of a few countries or parts of countries 
where population growth is prevented, will be unbearable and unsurvivable. 
 
The cooperation among the Diverse to wrest control of society from Euros will 
crumble as society disintegrates and they will split into blacks, Hispanics, 
Muslims, Chinese, Filipinos, gays, seniors, disabled, and further where possible 
into endless subgroups.  The rich will increasingly hire bodyguards, carry guns, 
drive bulletproof cars and use private police to protect them in their gated 
communities and offices, as is already commonplace in 3rd world countries. 
With much reduced quality of life and high crime, some will think of returning 
to their countries of origin, but there also overpopulation will exhaust resources 
and produce collapse even more severe than in the USA and Europe, and the 
racism in the 3rd world, temporarily suppressed by a relative abundance of 
resources and police and military presence, will become ever  worse, so life will 
be hellish nearly everywhere. The population in the 22nd century will shrink as 
billions die of starvation, disease, drugs, suicide, and civil and international 
war. As third world nuclear countries collapse (Pakistan, India and maybe Iran 
by then, thanks to Obama) and are taken over by radicals, nuclear conflicts will 
eventually occur. Still, perhaps nobody will dare to suggest publicly that the 
prime cause of chaos was unrestricted motherhood. 
 
Of course, much of this story has already played out in America, the U.K. and 
elsewhere, and the rest is inevitable, even without climate change and the 
ravenous appetites of China, which just make it happen faster. It’s only a matter 
of how bad it will get where and when. Anyone who doubts this is out of touch 
with reality, but you can’t fool mother nature, and their descendants will no 
longer debate it as they will be forced to live it. 
 
The poor, and apparently, Obama, Krugman, Zuckerberg and most Democrats 
(Neomarxists), don’t understand the most basic operating principle of 
civilization—there is no Free Lunch. You can only give to one by taking from 
another, now or in the future. No such thing as helping without hurting. Every 
dollar and every item has value because somewhere, someone destroyed the 
earth. And leftists have the delusion that they can solve all problems by stealing 
from the rich. To get some idea of the absurdity of this, all US taxpayers earning 
over a million dollars have a total after tax profit of about 800 billion, while the 
annual deficit is about 1.5 trillion, and even taking it all does nothing to pay off 
the existing 18 trillion debt or the approx. 90 trillion in near term unfunded 
liabilities (e.g., medicare and social security). Of course, you cannot increase 
their tax or corporate tax very much more or it will greatly depress the economy 
and produce a recession, job losses and the flight of capital, and they already 
pay the highest taxes, relative to what they earn as a % of the nation’s income, 
591  
of any industrialized country. And once again, the top 1% of earners pay about 
50% of total personal federal income tax while the bottom 47% (mostly Diverse) 
pay nothing. So the fact is we only  have a sort of democracy, as we have almost 
nothing to say about what the govt. does, and a sort of fascism, as the ever 
expanding govt. spies on our every move, controls ever more minutely our 
every action, and forces us at gunpoint to do whatever they decide, and a sort 
of communism as they steal whatever they want from whomever they want and 
use it to support anyone they like, here and all over the world, most of whom 
have no interest in democracy, justice, or equality, except as means to take 
advantage of our fatally flawed system to get as much money and services as 
they can in order to support replicating their genes and destroying the earth. 
 
Speaking of Obama, Trump says that he is the worst president ever, and of 
course Obama, totally arrogant, dishonest and lacking any real grasp of the 
situation (or unwilling to be honest) just laughs, and babbles platitudes, but as 
I reflect a bit it’s clearly true.  Like Roosevelt, who gave us the first giant step 
into fascism and govt. waste and oppression with an illegal and 
unconstitutional tax (social security), Obamacare let the govt. swallow 1/6 of 
the economy and created his own illegal tax (called ‘penalties’ of Obamacare, 
where FDR called them ‘benefits’ and ‘contributions’). He tried to force the US 
to accept another 8 to 10 million illegals (nobody seems quite sure) which will 
‘birthright’ into about 50 million by 2100. In the first 3 years of his office (2009 
to 2012) the federal operating deficit increased about 44% from 10 to 15 trillion, 
the largest percent increase since WW2, while by mid 2015 it had increased to 
over 71% of fiscal operating budget -- over $18 trillion or about $57,000 for every 
person in the USA, including children. His deferral of the deportation of 
millions of illegals, all of whom now receive social security, tax credits, 
medicare etc., is estimated to have a lifetime cost to the govt. (i.e., to the minority 
of us who pay any significant taxes) of ca. $1.3 trillion. Of course, this does not 
include free school, use of judicial system, jails and police, free ‘emergency’ care 
(i.e., just going to emergency for any problem whatsoever), degradation of all 
public facilities etc. so it’s likely at least twice as much. And we have seen 8 
years of incompetent handling of the Iraq, Afghan and Syrian wars and the 
cancerous growth of the CCP and Islam He probably gave the ability to make 
nuclear weapons to Iran, which is highly likely to lead to a nuclear war by 2100 
or much sooner. He was clearly elected for classist, racist, third world 
supremacist reasons-- because he had visible African genes, while the Euros, 
having left Africa some 50,000 years earlier have invisible ones. He, and most 
of the people he appointed, had little competence or experience in running a 
country and they were picked, like himself, on the basis of Diverse genes and 
Neomarxist, third world supremacist sympathies. If he is not a traitor (giving 
aid and comfort to the enemy) then who is? It is clear as day that, like nearly 
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everyone, he operates totally on automatic primitive psychology, with his 
coalitional sympathies (biases) favoring those who look and act more like him. 
He (like most Diverse) is in fact doing his best to destroy the country and system 
that made his exalted life possible. In an interview near the end of his term he 
said that the major reason for the backwardness of the third world was 
colonialism. As with all leftist third world supremacists, it has never crossed his 
mind that about 95% of all the third world people owe their existence and their 
relatively high standard of living to Euros and colonialism (i.e., medicine, 
agriculture, technology, science, trade, education, police and judicial system, 
communications, elimination of  war and crime etc.), nor that the real enemies 
of the poor are other poor, who are just as repulsive as the rich, whom it is their 
greatest desire to emulate.  I agree that, with the possible exception of Lincoln, 
he is the worst (i.e., most destructive to American quality of life and survival as 
a nation) for his lack of honesty, arrogance and assault on freedom and 
longterm survivability —a stunning achievement when his competition 
includes Nixon, Johnson, the Bushes and the Clintons, and which makes even 
Reagan look good.  
 
When considering bad presidents, we should start with Abraham Lincoln, who 
is revered as a saint, but he (with the help of congress) destroyed much of the 
country and the lives of millions of people fighting the totally unnecessary Civil 
War, and in many ways, the country will never recover as it led to the civil 
rights movement, the 1965 immigration act and the 1982 supreme court anchor 
baby ruling. Slavery would have come to an end soon without the war, as it did 
everywhere and of course it was Euros who provided the main impetus to bring 
it to an end here and everywhere. After the war the slaves could have been 
repatriated to Africa, or just given residence, instead of making them citizens 
(14th amendment) and then giving them the vote (15th amendment).  He and his 
collaborators, like so many liberal upper class Euros then and now, was blinded 
by the utopian social delusions embodied in Christianity and democracy, which 
result from the inclusive fitness psychology of coalitional intuitions and 
reciprocal altruism, that was eugenic and adaptive in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation-i.e., from ca. 50,000 to several million years ago) but 
is fatally dysgenic and maladaptive in modern times.  
 
Note the great irony of the quote from him that begins this book, which shows 
that even the brightest are victims of their own limits, and have no grasp of 
human biology, psychology or ecology. It never crossed his mind that the world 
would become horrifically overpopulated and that the Africans would grow to 
become a giant social problem, at home and for themselves and the world as 
Africa expands to over 4 billion. Likewise, in spite of the now clear disaster, it 
seems not to cross Obama’s that the Diverse at home and abroad will destroy 
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America and the world, though any bright ten year old can see it. 
 
President Truman could have let McArthur use the atom bomb to end the 
Korean war, destroy communism and to avoid the continuing horror of China 
run by 25 sociopaths (the Politburo) or really just seven sociopaths (the 
Politburo Standing Committee) or perhaps actually just one sociopath (Xi  
Jinping).  Johnson could have done likewise in Vietnam, Bush in Iraq and 
Obama in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya.  China and probably many 3rd world 
countries would have used nuclear weapons if the situations were reversed. 
Once a radical Muslim country gets the bomb a preemptive strike by them or 
on them will likely ensue, and this is probable by 2100 and near certain by 2200. 
If Gaddafi had succeeded in his efforts to get the bomb it would very likely have 
happened. The US could have forced Japan, China and Korea, Iraq and Libya 
and all the countries of Europe (and the whole world for that matter) to pay for 
the costs of our military efforts in all the recent wars, and between wars, instead 
of taking on most of the cost and then helping them take over most of America’s 
manufacturing. Of course, these decisions, critical to the country’s survival, 
were made by a handful of politicians without consulting the voters. The 
Kennedy’s were an important part of changing the immigration laws in the mid 
60’s, so they have to count as traitors and major enemies of America on a par 
with Obama, G.W Bush and the Clintons. We could have followed the universal 
pleas of US industry and refused to sign the GATT, which gave free access to 
all our patents years before they are granted, though of course the Chinese now 
hack and steal everything with impunity anyway. Eisenhower could have let 
the UK keep possession of the Suez canal, instead of blackmailing them into 
leaving Egypt, and on and on. 
 
Some may be interested in a few statistics to give an idea of where we currently 
are on the road to hell. See the tables at the beginning. In the USA, the 
population of Hispanics will swell from about 55 million in 2016 (or as much as 
80 million if you accept some estimates of 25 million illegals—it’s a mark of how 
far the govt. has let things go that we don’t really know) to perhaps 140 million 
midcentury and 200 million as we enter the 22nd   century, at which time the 
US population will be soaring past 500 million, and the world population will 
be about 11 billion, 3 billion of that added from now to then in Africa and 1 
billion in Asia (the official UN estimates at the moment). The Hispanics are 
reproducing so fast that Euros, now a 63% majority, will be a minority by 
midcentury and about 40% by 2100. Most of the increase in the USA from now 
on will be Hispanics, with the rest blacks, Asians and Muslims, and all the 
increase here and in the world will be 100% Diverse. About 500,000 people are 
naturalized yearly and since they are mostly from the 3rd world and produce 
children at about twice the rate of Euros, that will add perhaps 2 million 
594  
midcentury and 5 million by 2100 for every year it continues. 
 
To show how fast things got out of control after the “no demographic impact” 
TKO (technical knock out or Ted Kennedy Outrage, though we could equally 
call it the LBJ outrage, the Neomarxist outrage, the Liberal outrage etc.) 
immigration act of 1965, there are now more Hispanics in California than there 
are people in 46 other states. In 1970 just after the TKO, there were about 4 
million Hispanics and now there are over 55 million “legals” (i.e., not made 
legal by the voters but by a handful of politicians and the Supremely Stupid 
court) and perhaps 80 million counting illegals. It never crosses the minds of 
the Democratic block-voting poor Diverse that the ones who will suffer by far 
the most from the “Diversification” of America are themselves. The U.S. has 
gone from 84 percent white, 11 percent black, 4 percent Hispanic and 1 percent 
Asian in 1965, to 62 percent white, 11 percent black, 18 percent Hispanic and 6 
percent Asian now, according to a recent Pew report. By 2055, no one group is 
expected to have a majority--a perfect scenario for chaos, but you can see 
countless idiots from academia (now a paradise for state funded Neomarxist 
third world supremacism) praising multipartisanism. The Asians are predicted 
to increase faster than any group, doubling their percentage in the next few 
decades, but at least they will have gone thru a minimal immigration 
procedure, except of course for anchor baby families (producing which is now 
a major industry as Asians fly here to give birth, though they are greatly 
surpassed by Hispanics who only have to walk across the border at night). Of 
course, the Asians are by and large a blessing for America as they are more 
productive and less trouble than any group, including Euros. 
 
The US government (alone of major countries) pushes “diversity” but in 
countries all over the world and throughout history attempts to weld different 
races and cultures into one have been an utter disaster. Many groups have lived 
among or alongside others for thousands of years without notably assimilating. 
Chinese and Koreans and Japanese in Asia, Jews and gentiles in thousands of 
places, Turks, Kurds and Armenians etc., have lived together for millennia 
without assimilating and go for each other’s throats at the slightest provocation. 
After over 300 years of racial mixing, the USA is still about 97% monoracial (i.e., 
white, Hispanic, black etc.) with only about 3% describing themselves as mixed 
race (and most of them were mixed when they came here). The Native 
Americans (to whom the whole New World really belongs if one is going to 
rectify past injustices against the Diverse, a fact which is never mentioned by 
the third world supremacists) are mostly still living isolated and (before the 
casinos) impoverished, as are the blacks who, 150 years after emancipation, 
largely still live in crime ridden, impoverished ghettos. And these have been 
the best of times, with lots of cheap land and natural resources, major welfare 
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and affirmative action programs (largely unique to ‘racist’ America), a mostly 
healthy economy and a  government which extorts over 30% of their money 
(i.e., 30% of their working lives, counting income tax, sales tax, real estate tax 
etc.), earned by the tax paying part of the middle and upper class, to give the 
poor massive handouts -- not only food stamps and other welfare, but police 
and emergency services, streets and parks, the government, the justice system, 
hospitals, national defense, schools, roads, bridges, power grid, etc., and the 
costs of environmental degradation,  and the financial and emotional costs of 
crime and it’s threat, etc., most of these never counted by anyone (and never 
mentioned by the Neomarxist third world supremacists) when considering the 
‘costs of welfare’ or the huge downside to diversity. 
 
In any case, the liberal, democratic delusion is that such largesse and social 
policies will weld our ‘diverse’ (i.e., fatally fragmented) society into one happy 
family. But government handouts need to continually increase (for social 
security, wars, health care, schools, welfare, infrastructure, etc.) while the 
relative tax base shrinks, and our debt and unfunded entitlements grow by 
trillions a year, so the economy is in the process of collapse. The average family 
has less real net earnings and savings now than two decades ago and could 
survive about 3 months without income, about 40% of retired Americans have 
less than $25,000 savings etc. And again, these are the best of times with lots of 
‘free’ resources (i.e., stolen from others and from our descendants) worldwide 
and about 4 billion less people than there will be by the next century. As 
economies fail and starvation, disease, crime and war spread, people will split 
down racial and religious lines as always, and in the USA Hispanics and Blacks 
will still dominate the bottom. It rarely occurs to those who want to continue 
(and increase) the numbers of and the subsidization of the Diverse that the 
money for this is ultimately stolen from their own descendants, on whom falls 
the burden of over $90 trillion debt if one counts the current entitlements (or up 
to $220 trillion if liabilities continued without reduction of handouts and no tax 
increase), and a society and a world collapsing into anarchy. 
 
 
As noted, one of the many evil side effects of diversity (e.g., massive increases 
in crime, environmental degradation, traffic gridlock, decreasing quality of 
schools, coming bankruptcy of local, state and federal governments, corruption 
of police and border officials, rising prices of everything, overloading of the 
medical system, etc.) is that our right to free speech has disappeared on any 
issue of possible political relevance and of course that means just about any 
issue. Even in private, if any negative comment on ‘diversity’ is recorded or 
witnessed by anyone credible, the racist, third world supremacist Diverse and 
their Euro servants will try to take away your job and damage your business or 
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your person. This is certain when it involves public figures and racial or 
immigration issues, but nothing is off limits. Dozens of books in the last two 
decades address the issue including ‘The New Thought Police: Inside the Left's 
Assault on Free Speech and Free Minds’, ‘End of Discussion: How the Left's 
Outrage Industry Shuts Down Debate, Manipulates Voters, and Makes 
America Less Free (and Fun)’ and ‘The Silencing: how the left is killing free 
speech’, but nothing will dissuade the Democratic Socialists (i.e., closet 
communists) and the lunatic fringe liberals. As noted, I am writing this book 
because nobody in Academia, nor any public figure, dares to do it. 
 
Another ‘side effect’ is the loss of much of our freedom and privacy as the 
government continues to expand its war on terror. There was never a 
compelling reason for admitting any serious number of Muslims (or any more 
Diverse for that matter). In any case, it seems a no-brainer to not admit and to 
expel single unmarried male Muslims aged 15 to 50, but even such obvious 
simple moves are beyond the capabilities of the retards who control congress 
and of course our beloved presidents, all of whom, with the members of 
congress, who voted for the immigration law changes starting in 1965, could be 
held personally responsible for 9/11, the Boston Marathon Bombing etc. Of 
course, Trump is trying to change this but it’s too little, too late and barring his 
declaring martial law, running the country with the army, and deporting or 
quarantining 100 million of the least useful residents, America’s date with 
destiny is certain. 
 
A lovely example of how suppression of free speech leads to ever more insanity 
is the case of Major Hasan (courtesy Mark Steyn’s “After America”). An army 
psychiatrist at Fort Hood who had SoA (Soldier of Allah) on his business card, 
he was frequently reprimanded when a student army intern for trying to 
convert patients to Islam, and many complaints were filed for his constant anti-
American comments--one day he gave a Power Point lecture to a room full of 
army doctors justifying his radicalism. Free speech and common sense being no 
more available in the military than civilian life, he was then promoted to Major 
and sent to Fort Hood, where he commented to his superior officer on a recent 
murder of two soldiers in Little Rock: “this is what Muslims should do—stand 
up to the aggressors” and “people should strap bombs on themselves and go 
into Times Square”, but the army did nothing for fear of being accused of bias. 
One day he walked out of his office with an assault rifle and murdered 13 
soldiers. It turned out two different anti-terrorism task forces were aware that 
he had been in frequent email contact with top radical Islamist terrorists. The 
Army Chief of Staff General George Casey remarked: “What happened at Fort 
Hood was a tragedy, but I believe it would be an even greater tragedy if our 
diversity becomes a casualty here”!!  Is it losing the 70 million on welfare or the 
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1.7 million in prison or the 3 million drug addicts that is more tragic? 
 
The invasion of the Southwest by Hispanics gives the flavor of what is coming 
and Coulter in her book “Adios America” tells of trashed parks, schools that 
dropped from A to D grade, billions for ‘free’ (i.e., paid for by the upper middle 
and upper class and businesses) medical care and other services in Los Angeles 
alone etc. Anyone living there who remembers what Texas or California were 
like 30 years ago has no doubts about the catastrophic consequences of diversity 
as they see it every day. In California, which I know personally, the urban areas 
(and even most parks and beaches) that I used to enjoy are now crowded with 
Hispanics and often full of trash and spray painted with gang signs, while the 
highways are horrifically crowded and the cities and towns overrun with drugs 
and crime, so most of it is now uninhabitable and the world’s 6th largest 
economy is headed for bankruptcy as it tries to move 20 million mostly lower 
class Hispanics into the upper middle class by using tax money from the Euros. 
One of the latest lunacies was to try to put all illegals on Obamacare. Some 
persons I know have had their annual medical coverage increase from under 
$1000 before Obamacare to about $4000 (2017 estimate) and the extra $3000 is 
what the Democrats are stealing from anyone they can to cover the costs of free 
or very low cost care for those who pay little or no taxes, and who already are 
bankrupting hospitals forced to give them free “emergency” care. Of course, 
the Republicans are trying to kill it, but like the whole government, it is already 
in a death spiral that only a huge increase in fees can fix. 
 
One of the most flagrant violations of US law by the left-wing lunatics who 
support immigration is the creation of ‘sanctuary cities’. The cities do not allow 
municipal funds or resources to be used to enforce federal immigration laws, 
usually by not allowing police or municipal employees to inquire about an 
individual's immigration status. This began with Los Angeles in 1979 (thus 
becoming the first large city donated to Mexico) and now includes at least 31 
major American cities. Presumably, the President could order the army or the 
FBI  to  arrest  the  city  officials  who  passed these regulations for obstruction 
of justice etc., but it’s a murky legal area as (in another indication of the total 
ineptness of congress and the courts and the hopelessness of the democratic 
system as currently practiced) immigration violations are civil offenses and not 
federal or state felonies which they clearly should be. After I wrote this the 
courts (predictably) blocked Trump’s attempt to cut off funds to sanctuary 
cities, forgetting that their purpose is to protect the citizens of America, and not 
those of other countries here illegally. And recently California declared itself a 
sanctuary state, i.e., it’s now part of Mexico. 
 
A competent government (maybe we could import one from Sweden, China or 
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even Cuba?) could pass such legislation in a few weeks. Also, it could force 
compliance by cutting off most or all federal funds to any city or state that failed 
to comply with federal immigration laws, and at least one such bill has been 
introduced into congress recently, but the Democrats prevented its passage, 
and of course Obama or Clinton would have vetoed any attempt at giving 
American back to Americans. Trump of course has a different view, though he 
cannot save America via democratic means.  
 
  
As long as the Democrats (soon to return to power and, rumor has it, to change 
their name to Neomarxist Third World Supremacist Party of Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East) are in power, nothing will be done, and more 
cities and states will cease to be a part of America until Hispanics take over 
completely sometime in the second half of the century. Only a military coup can 
save America now and it’s very unlikely the generals have the courage. 
 
For this review, I read a few politically oriented books and articles in print and 
on the web of the kind that I have avoided for over 50 years, and in them and 
the comments on them saw repeated accusations of ‘racist’ against people who 
were only stating their desire to have the USA remain a prosperous and safe 
country. This claim is now almost always false in the normal meaning, but of 
course true in the new meaning—i.e., one opposed to letting Mexico and Africa 
annex America. So, I wrote a reply to this slander, since I have never seen a 
good one. 
 
Actually, it’s not ‘racism’ but self-defense –the Diverse in America are the 
racists, as on the average, your life here is largely an exploitation of other races, 
notably Europeans and Asians who actually pay taxes. For genuine racism look 
at how different groups native to your own country (or immigrants) are treated 
there. The vast majority of immigrants in the USA would not even be permitted 
to enter your countries, much less permitted citizenship, the privilege of voting, 
free or low cost housing, food, free or subsidized medical care, free school, 
affirmative action programs, the same privileges as natives etc. And in the USA, 
it is the Diverse who have taken away the tranquility, beauty, safety and free 
speech that existed here before a handful of stupid politicians and supreme 
court justices let you in. We never voted to let you enter or become citizens--it 
was forced on us by halfwits in our government, beginning with Lincoln and 
his partners in crime. If we had a chance to vote on it, few foreigners except 
medical, scientific and tech experts and some teachers would have been 
admitted and perhaps 75% of the Diverse would be deported. In many cases, 
you have an alien religion (some of which demand the murder of anyone you 
take a dislike to) and culture (honor killings of your daughters etc.), do not pay 
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a fair share of taxes (typically none) and commit far more crimes per capita (e.g., 
2.5x for Hispanics, 4.5x for blacks). 
 
Furthermore, the middle class American pays about 30% of their income to the 
govt. This is about 66 days/year of their working life and maybe 20 days of that 
goes to support the poor, now mostly Diverse. And all the ‘free’ things such as 
welfare, food stamps, medical care and hospitals, schools, parks, streets, 
sanitation, police, firemen, power grid, postal system, roads and airports, 
national defense etc. exist largely because the ‘racist’ upper middle and upper 
class created, maintain and pay for them. Maybe another 4 working days goes 
to support the police, FBI, justice system, DHS, Border Patrol and other govt. 
agencies that have to deal with aliens. Add another 10 or so days to support the 
military, which is mostly needed to deal with the results of 3rd  world 
overpopulation (the real major cause of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the major cause of most of the wars, 
social unrest and conflicts past, present and future), and this cost, added to 
welfare, medicare, social security and environmental degradation (an ever 
increasing percentage for immigrants and their descendants) is bankrupting the 
country, with the only possible solution being to decrease the benefits and 
increase the taxes, the burden of which will fall on everyone’s descendants. You 
take advantage of the freedom of speech we created to tell malicious lies about 
us and prevent rational discussion!  Most of you, if doing this in your country 
of origin, would wind up in prison or dead! Shameless liars! What is your 
problem? --poor education, no gratitude, malicious, stupid, no experience with 
civilized society? (pick 5). And anyone who doubts any of this just does not 
know how to use their brain or the net as it's all there. These comments are just 
the facts that anyone can see, along with simple extrapolations into the future. 
 
Also, please let me ask the Diverse--do people in your country of origin work 
30 days a year to support tens of millions of aliens who commit crimes at several 
times the rate of natives, overcrowd your schools, highways, cities and jails, 
trash your parks and beaches, spray paint graffiti on buildings and import and 
sell drugs to addicts who commit over a hundred million crimes a year (added 
to the 100 million or so they commit themselves)? And have you had a 9/11 and 
many bombings and murders at home? Do immigrants control the media so 
that you cannot even discuss these issues that are destroying your country and 
the world? Will your country be totally in their control in a few generations and 
be another impoverished, crime ridden, starving, corrupt 3rd world hellhole? 
Of course, for most of you it already is, and you came to America to escape it. 
But your descendants won't have to be homesick for the hellhole, as they will 
have re-created it here. The Diverse here (and their Euro servants) never tire of 
complaining in all the media every day about how they are not treated fairly 
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and not given enough (i.e., the Euros and the relatively rich Diverse don't work 
hard enough to support them), and it never crosses their minds that if it were 
not for taxes paid mostly by Euros now and for over a century previous, there 
would be little or no police or fire or medical or school services or parks or 
public transport or streets or sewers in their communities, and of course there 
would not even be a country here, as it is mainly Euros who created, and 
support it and who serve in the military in all the wars. And it was primarily 
Euros and their descendants who created the net and the pc's that was used to 
create this and the electronic or print media you are reading this on, the tech 
that produces the food you eat and the medicine that keeps you alive. If not for 
the Euros technology and security, at least 90% of all the Diverse in the world 
would not exist. Everyone condemns colonialism, but it was the way that the 
Diverse were brought out of the dark ages into modern times via 
communications, medicine, agriculture, and enforcement of democratic 
government. Otherwise all their populations would have stayed very small, 
backwards, starving, disease ridden, impoverished, isolated and living in the 
dark ages (including slavery and its equivalents) to this day. To sum it up, the 
Euro’s antipathy to Diversity (‘racism’) is due to a desire that their children have 
a country and a world worth living in. Again, this is for everyone’s benefit, not 
just Euros or the rich. 
 
Likewise, all my life I have been hearing third world people saying that their 
disproportionate problems with drugs, crime and welfare are due to racism, 
and certainly there is some truth to that, but I wonder why Asians, who must 
be subject to racism as well ( insofar as it exists—and relative to most Diverse 
counties, it’s quite minimal here), and most of whom came here much more 
recently, spoke little or no English, had no relatives here and few skills, have a 
fraction of the crime, drugs and welfare (all less than Euros and so way less than 
blacks or Hispanics) and average about $10,000 more income per family than 
Euros. Also, blacks never consider that they would not exist if their ancestors 
were not brought to the new world and they would never have been born or 
survived in Africa, that those who captured and sold them were usually 
African, that to this day Africans in Africa almost universally treat those of 
different tribes as subhuman (Idi Amin, Rwanda, Gaddafi etc. and far worse is 
soon to come as the population of Africa swells by 3 billion by 2100), and that 
if they want to see real racism and economic exploitation and police 
maltreatment, they should go live almost anywhere in Africa or the 3rd world. 
Returning to Africa or Mexico etc. has always been an option, but except for 
criminals escaping justice, nobody goes back. And it was the Euros who put an 
end to slavery worldwide and, insofar as possible, to serfdom, disease, 
starvation, crime and war all over the 3rd world. If it were not for colonialism 
and the inventions of Euros there would be maybe 1/10 as many Diverse alive 
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and they would mostly still be living as they did 400 years ago. Likewise, it’s 
never mentioned that if not for the Euro’s, who were about 95% responsible for 
paying for and fighting and dying in WW2, the Germans and Japanese and/or 
the Communists would now control the world and only the Euros can prevent 
the CCP and/or the Muslims from doing so in the future. Also, it was mostly 
Euros who fought, are fighting and will be fighting the communists in Korea 
and Vietnam, and the Muslim fanatics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan and 
the many others soon to come. 
 
Insofar as any revenge on the Euros is needed for their slavery (but slavery by 
other blacks in various forms has always existed), blacks have already had it 
abundantly. First, they have been largely supported and protected by the Euros 
for centuries. Second, the parasites they brought with them have infected and 
destroyed the lives of tens of millions of Euros. Malaria, schistosomes, filariasis, 
ascaris, yellow fever, smallpox etc., but above all hookworm, which was so 
common and so debilitating up to the early decades of this century that it was 
responsible for the widespread view of Southerners as stupid and lazy. 
 
All this is crushingly obvious, but I bet there is not one grade school or college 
text in the world that mentions any of it, as it’s clearly ‘racist’ to suggest that the 
Diverse owe anything to Euros or to point out that other Diverse in their 
countries of origin always have and always will treat them far worse than Euro 
do. And they are incapable of grasping the true horror that is coming or they 
would all be one in opposing any increase in the population by any group 
anywhere and any immigration into America. Well before 2100 the Hispanics 
will control America, and the rest of the world will be dominated by Chinese 
and the rest by Muslims, who will increase from about 1/5th of the world now 
to about 1/3rd by 2100 and outnumber Christians, and neither group is noted 
for embracing multiculturalism, women’s rights,  child rights, animal rights, 
gay rights, or any rights at all. So, the obvious fact is that overall the Euros have 
treated the Diverse much better than they have treated each other. And we now 
have the best of times, while by 2100 (give or take a generation or two) economic 
collapse and chaos will reign permanently except perhaps a few places that 
forcibly exclude Diverse. Again, keep in mind that in my view there is not, and 
almost certainly will never be, any evidence of a significant genetic difference 
between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or IQ, and that their tendency to 
excessive reproduction and other cultural limitations are accidents of history. 
 
Likewise, it never crosses Diverse, leftist, third world supremacist, Neomarxist 
minds that every year maybe 500 billion dollars are spent in the USA by federal, 
state and city govts. on education, medicine, transportation (highways, streets, 
rail, bus and airline systems), police, fire and emergency care, numerous 
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welfare programs, the government and judicial systems--the vast majority of it 
created, maintained and paid for by the Euros, assisted by the taxes of the small 
minority of well-off Diverse. Also, there is the FBI, NSA, CIA, and the armed 
forces of the USA (another 500 billion a year) and other Euro countries, without 
which there would be no USA and little or no peace, security or prosperity 
anywhere in the world, and they have also been created, run and staffed largely 
by the Euros, who constitute most of the dead and wounded in every war (less 
an issue for Hispanics who serve in the military at about half the rate of Euros) 
and in every police force from 1776 to now. Without medicine and public health 
measures, most of their ancestors (and the whole third world) would have 
suffered and often died of leprosy, malaria, worms, bacteria, flu, tuberculosis, 
smallpox, syphilis, HIV, hepatitis, yellow fever, encephalitis, and the tech for 
high cholesterol and blood pressure, heart, cancer, and liver surgery, 
transplants, MRI, XRAY, Ultrasound etc., etc., has almost all been invented, 
administered and overwhelmingly paid for by the Euro ‘racists’ and ‘white 
supremacists’. 
 
You think colonialism was bad? Just think what the 3rd world would be like 
without it, or what it would be like living under the Nazis, communists or 
Japanese (and will be like living under the Chinese or Muslims once the Diverse 
destroy America). This excuses nothing but just points out the facts of history. 
But fine, let’s undo the ‘injustice’ and pass a Back to Africa (and Latin America 
and Asia etc.) law providing funds to repatriate everyone. They could sell their 
assets here and most could live like kings there, but of course there would be 
very few takers. And by the next century there will be 3 billion more Africans 
(the official estimate) and the whole continent will be a sewer, and 1 billion 
more Asians, and even India and China (who will add a hundred million or so  
each) will look like paradise in comparison to Africa, at least until the resources 
run out (oil, gas, coal, topsoil, fresh water, fish, minerals, forests). 
 
If you look on the net you find the Diverse incessantly whining about their 
oppression, even when it occurred decades or centuries ago, but I don’t see how 
anything that’s done by others, even today, is my responsibility, and much less 
so in the past. If you want to hold every Euro responsible for what the vast 
majority now alive are completely innocent of, then we want to hold all Diverse 
responsible for all the crimes committed by any of them here or their relatives 
in their countries of origin over the last 400 years, and for their share of all the 
tens of trillions spent to build and defend the USA and to keep them safe, 
healthy and well fed. Yes, most blacks and Hispanics are poor due to historical 
factors beyond their control, just as Euros are often richer due to historical 
factors beyond theirs, but the important points are that we now alive did not 
cause this, and that here, as almost everywhere that the Diverse are a significant 
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percentage, they commit most of the crime, collect most of the welfare, pay the 
least taxes and continue breeding excessively and dragging their countries and 
the world into the abyss. 
 
Consider as well that the evils of colonialism are only prominent because they 
were recent. If we look carefully, we find that nearly every group in every 
country has an endless history of murder, rape, plunder and exploitation of 
their neighbors that continues today. It’s not far off the mark to suggest that the 
best thing that could happen was to be conquered by the Euros. 
 
Once again, keep in mind that there is not and almost certainly will never be 
any evidence of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse and 
that their limitations are almost certainly due to culture. The problem is not the 
Diverse nor Euros, but that people are selfish, stupid, dishonest, lazy, crazy, 
and cowardly and will only behave decently, honestly, and fairly if forced to do 
so. Giving people rights instead of having privileges they must earn is a fatal 
mistake that will destroy any society and any world. In the tiny groups in which 
we evolved, where everyone was our relative, reciprocal altruism worked, but 
in a world soon swelling to 11 billion, this impulse to help others is suicidal. 
The world is totally preoccupied with terrorists, but their effects are actually 
trivial compared e.g., to traffic accidents, murders, drug addiction, disease, soil 
erosion etc., and every day the 7.7 billion do vastly more damage to the world 
just by living. The mothers of the third world increase the population by about 
200,000 every day, and so do hugely more damage every hour than all the 
terrorists worldwide will do in the whole 21st   century (until they get their 
hands on the bomb). Just the Diverse in the USA in one year will do far more 
damage to the USA and the world by destroying resources, eroding topsoil and 
creating CO2 and other pollution than all terrorism worldwide in all of history. 
Is there even one politician or entertainer or business person who has a clue? 
And if they did would they say or do anything— certainly not—who wants to 
be attacked for ‘racism’. 
 
People everywhere are lazy, stupid and dishonest and democracy, justice and 
equality in a large Diverse welfare state are an open invitation to limitless 
exploitation of their neighbors and few will resist. In 1979   7% of Americans 
got means-tested govt. benefits while in 2009 it was over 30% and of course the 
increase is mostly the diverse. Food stamps rose from 17 million persons in 2000 
to about 43 million now. In the first few years of Obama over 3 million enrolled 
to get ‘disability’ checks and over 20% of the adult population is now on 
‘disability’ which according to the Census Bureau includes categories such as 
“had difficulty finding a job or remaining employed “and “had difficulty with 
schoolwork”. There are now almost 60 million working age (16 to 65) adults 
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who are not employed or about 40% of the labor force. Illegal families get about 
$2.50 in direct benefits for every dollar they pay in taxes and about another $2.50 
indirect benefits (and not counting their damage to the biosphere) so they are a 
huge and ever increasing drain in spite of frequent fake ‘news stories’ on the 
net about their great value. 
 
Interest payments on our national debt are projected to rise to 85% of our total 
federal income by 2050. About half of our debt is owned by foreign govts., about 
a quarter by China, and if China continues to buy our debt at current rates, very 
soon our interest payments to them will cover their total annual military budget 
(ca. 80 billion vs U.S. of ca $600 billion) and (depending on interest rates) in a 
few years they would be able to triple or quadruple their military expenditures 
and it would all be paid for by US taxpayers. Actually, I have not seen it noted, 
but their lower costs mean that they are actually spending maybe 300 billion. 
And it is rarely mentioned why the US military budget is so enormous, and 
how it ties into the high life style and huge govt. subsidies in Europe and 
worldwide for that matter. The USA is the world’s free policeman, providing 
technology, money and troops for keeping the peace and fighting wars 
worldwide and is too stupid to ask the other countries to pay their share--until 
the recent comments by Trump. To a significant extent, the ability of the 
Europeans and countries worldwide to have a high standard of living is due to 
the American taxpayers (without of course being asked) paying for their 
defense for the last 75 years. 
 
The CIS reports total immigration will reach about 51 million by 2023, about 
85% of the total population increase (all the rest due to the Diverse already here) 
and will soon comprise about 15% of the total population—by far the largest 
percentage in any big country in recent history. It was reported that the Dept. 
of Homeland Security New Americans Taskforce was directed to process the 
citizenship applications of the 9 million green card holders ASAP to try to 
influence the 2016 election. 
 
The federal govt. is a cancer which now takes about 40% of all income from the 
minority who pay significant taxes and federal govt. civilian employees are 
hugely overpaid, averaging ca. $81,000 salary and $42,000 benefits while private 
employees get about $51,000 salary and $11,000 benefits. About 25% of all the 
goods and services produced in the USA are consumed by the govt. and about 
75% of total govt. income is given out as business and farm subsidies and 
welfare. If all federal taxes were increased by 30% and spending was not 
increased, the budget might balance in 25 years. Of course, the spending would 
increase immediately if more money was available, and also the economy 
would take a huge hit as there would be less incentive to earn or to stay in the 
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USA and business investment and earnings would drop. It is estimated that 
private sector compliance with govt. regulations costs about 1.8 trillion a year 
or about 12% of our total GDP, and of course it is growing constantly, so we 
waste more on govt. paperwork every year than the GDP of most countries. The 
main push for evermore confiscation of our money (years of our working lives) 
by the govt. is the communism/socialism/fascism forced on us by the rapid 
increase of Diverse, but being the world’s police force for free has cost us 
trillions, which also translates into years of our working lives as detailed 
elsewhere here. 
 
The poor are almost always spoken of as though they were somehow superior 
to the rich and it is implicit that we ought to make sacrifices for them, but they 
are only the rich in waiting and when they get rich they are inevitably exactly 
as loathsome and exploitative. This is due to our innate psychology, which in 
the small groups in which we evolved made sense, as everyone was our 
relative, but in a world that is fast collapsing due to the expansion of the Diverse 
it makes no sense. The poor care no more about others than the rich. 
 
Marvelous that even Obama and the Pope speak about the coming horrors of 
climate change, but of course not a word about the irresponsible parenthood 
that is its cause. The most you get from any govt. official, academic or TV 
documentary is a meek suggestion that climate change needs to be dealt with, 
but rarely a hint that overpopulation is the source of it and that most of it for 
the last century and all of it from now on is from the 3rd world. China now 
creates twice the C02 of the USA and this will rise as it is expected to about 
double the size of our GDP by 2030 or so, and USA Diverse create about 20% of 
USA pollution, which will rise to about 50% by the next century.  
 
Ann Coulter in “Adios America” describes the outrageous story of what seems 
to be the only occasion on which Americans actually got to vote on the 
immigration issue—what some call “the great Prop 187 democracy ripoff”. 
 
In 1994 Californians, outraged to see ever more Hispanics crowding into the 
state and using up tax money, put on the ballot Proposition 187 which barred 
illegals from receiving state money. In spite of the expected opposition and 
outrageous lies from all the self-serving, boot licking Neomarxist third world 
supremacists, it passed overwhelmingly winning 2/3 of white, 56% of black, 
57% of Asian and even 1/3 of Hispanic votes (yes, many middle and upper class 
Hispanics realize being taken over by Mexico will be a disaster). Note that all 
these people are ‘racists’ or ‘white supremacists’ (or in slightly more polite 
columns of the Carlos Slim Helu controlled NY Times etc. ‘bigots’ or ‘nativists’) 
according to the current use of this word by a large percentage of liberals, many 
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Hispanics, the Sierra Club, the ACLU and even Nobel Prize winning economist 
Paul Krugman (who recently called Trump a ‘racist’ for daring to tell the truth 
while defending the USA from annexation by Mexico). 
 
It even carried the hopeless Republican candidate for Governor, Pete Wilson to 
a landslide victory, with 1/3 of his voters stating his support for Prop 187 was 
their reason for voting for him. However, the “ACLU and other anti-American 
groups” (Coulter) brought suit and it was soon struck down by a Democratic 
appointed (i.e., ‘honorary Mexican’) District Court Judge for being 
unconstitutional (i.e., protecting Americans rather than aliens). As with the 1898 
and 1982 Supreme Court decisions giving citizenship to anyone who is born 
here, it was another hallucinatory interpretation of our laws and a clear 
demonstration of the hopelessness of the court system, or any branch of the 
government (at least a Democrat dominated one) in protecting Americans from 
a third world takeover. It has been suggested that the ACLU change its name 
to the Alien Civil Liberties Union and that it, along with the many other 
organizations and individuals working to destroy the USA, be forced to register 
as agents of a foreign government or preferably, be classified as terrorists and 
all their employees and donors deported or quarantined. 
 
In spite of this, neither the state nor federal govt. has done anything whatsoever 
to prevent the takeover, and Coulter notes that when G.W. Bush ran for 
president, he campaigned in America with the corrupt Mexican president 
Gortari (see comments on Carlos Slim below), had brother Jeb ‘Illegal 
Immigration is an act of love’ Bush speak in Spanish at the Republican National 
Convention, and after winning, gave weekly radio addresses in Spanish, added 
a Spanish page to the White House website, held a huge Cinco de Mayo party 
at the White House, and gave a speech to the blatantly racist National Council 
of La Raza, in which, among other outrages, he promised $100 million in federal 
money (i.e., our money) to speed immigration applications! Clearly with both 
the Republican and Democratic parties seeking annexation by Mexico, there is 
no hope for the democratic process in America unless it is drastically changed 
and clearly this will never happen by using the democratic process.  
 
 
California is the 6th largest in economy in the world, ahead of France, Brazil, 
Italy, South Korea, Australia, Spain, India, Russia, and Canada, and more than 
double that of Mexico, and in about 10 years, when their 10 million kids grow 
up and the total Hispanic population of Calif is about 22 million (counting only 
legals), they will own the state and it will have been annexed by Mexico. 
 
In recent years, Calif. Governor Brown signed legislation granting drivers 
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licenses to illegals, and paying for free medical care for their children (i.e., of 
course we the taxpayers pay). He agreed to let noncitizens monitor polls for 
elections, and they have been appointed to other government positions such as 
city councils without state govt. approval. He also forced all state officials to 
commit obstruction of justice by signing a law known as the Trust Act (i.e., trust 
they won’t rob, rape, murder, sell drugs etc.), which specifies that unless 
immigrants have committed certain serious crimes, they cannot be detained (for 
delivery to the feds for deportation) past when they would otherwise become 
eligible for release. The batch of new “lets become part of Mexico” laws also 
included one that would allow immigrants without legal status to be admitted 
to the state bar and practice law in California. But he vetoed the bill allowing 
illegal aliens to serve on juries. So, the only thing that prevented the final step 
in turning over the Calif. Courts to Mexico was the arbitrary decision of one 
man! However, it won’t be more than a few years before an Hispanic is 
Governor and then this and endless other atrocities will ensue, including 
presumably giving illegals the right to vote perhaps by passing another state 
law that violates or obstructs the federal one. In any case, there will soon by 
little distinction in California between being a citizen of the USA and a citizen 
of any other country who can sneak across the border. Note that as usual the 
Citizens of California were never permitted to vote on any of these issues, 
which were passed by the Democratic controlled state legislature. Why don’t 
they just be honest and change the name to Neomarxist Party of Mexico? At 
least they should be forced to register as the agent of a foreign govt. 
 
It is certain that California (and by the end of the century the USA) is lost to 
civilization (i.e., it will be like Mexico, which of course will be far worse by then 
since most of the world’s resources will be gone and another 3 billion people 
will by demanding them) unless the govt. sends federal troops into California 
(and other states with sanctuary cities) to deport illegals and arrest all those 
(including numerous elected officials) who are violating federal law. Even this 
will only slow up the catastrophe unless a law is passed terminating anchor 
babies (i.e., those getting citizenship because they are born here), preferably 
retroactively to 1982 or better to 1898, and rescinding citizenship for them and 
all those who gained it from them—i.e. all their descendants and relatives. Also 
of course the 1965 immigration law must be declared unconstitutional and all 
those (and relatives and descendants) who immigrated since then have their 
status reviewed with the significant taxpayers remaining and the non or low 
payers repatriated.  Hard to get precise statistics, as its ‘racist’ to even think 
about it, but in Stockton, California and Dallas, Texas about 70% of all births are 
to illegals and maybe 90% of the total counting all Hispanics, and of course the 
bills are almost all paid by Euros and ‘rich’ Diverse via forced taxation, which 
of course they never get to vote on. 
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To end birthright, a new law has to be passed and not an old one repealed, as 
there is no such law— this was an utterly arbitrary opinion of Justice Willie, 
“anchor baby” Brennan and only a handful of justices ever voted for this 
hallucinatory interpretation of the law. Those who want to  see how the 
Supreme Court destroyed our country by eroding the boundary between being 
an American citizen and a person who was passing through (and the lack of 
basic common sense in the law and the hopelessness of the American legal 
system- and the contrary opinions of legal experts) can consult Levin’s ‘Men in 
Black’ or see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (yes it was a 
Chinese who began the assault on America over a century ago) where 6 lawyers 
(i.e., justices of the court) granted citizenship to the children of resident aliens 
and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) where 5 lawyers (with 4 disagreeing) 
granted citizenship to the children of illegal aliens and anyone giving birth 
while visiting. If just one of the 5 morons who voted for this had changed their 
mind we would have maybe 10 million fewer on the welfare rolls now and 
perhaps 50 million fewer by 2100. Of course, none of the other 450 million or so 
adults alive between then and now have ever been permitted to vote on this or 
any of the basic issues leading inexorably to collapse. As we now see in the 
media every day, in a ‘representative’ democracy what is represented is not 
America’s interests, but egomania, greed, stupidity and third world 
supremacism. 
 
How many people did it take to hand America to Mexico? For the TKO 
Immigration disaster in 1965 there were 320 representatives and 76 senators, 
and for anchor babies the two Supreme Court decisions totaling 11 lawyers, 
most of these ‘outstanding citizens’ now dead, so out of the approx. 245 million 
adult Americans citizens alive now, about 120 very senior citizens actually 
voted for the handover. As clear a demonstration of the hopelessness of 
representative democracy (as practiced here) as one could want. 
 
Clearly, if America is to remain a decent place to live for anyone, the 1965 act, 
and all subsequent ones, need to be repealed by a law that puts a moratorium 
on all immigration and naturalization, and preferably rescinds or at least 
reviews citizenship for everyone naturalized since 1965 (or preferably since the 
first absurd birthright ruling in 1898), along with all their relatives and 
descendants. All their cases could be reviewed and citizenship conferred on 
select individuals who scored high enough on a point scale, with welfare 
recipients, the chronically unemployed, felons, and their descendants ineligible, 
those with college or medical degrees, teachers, engineers, business owners etc., 
getting points towards eligibility, i.e., just basic common sense if America is to 
survive.  
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Following Ann Coulter (‘Adios America’), we note that corporate tax in the 
USA is one the highest in the world of major countries at 39% and as the govt. 
continues to raise taxes to support the half of the country that is on some kind 
of welfare (if one includes social security, unemployment, food stamps, housing 
subsidies, welfare and veterans benefits), inevitably capital and jobs will leave, 
and entering the next century with vanishing resources, and since the entire 
annual population increase of 2.4 million is now Diverse, that means about 200 
million more of them ( for a total of around 350  million out of about 500 million) 
by 2100, a fragmented populace fighting for resources, and a drastically 
reduced standard of living with eventual collapse is inevitable, even without 
the predatory evils of the Seven Senile Sociopaths (i.e., the CCP).. 
 
Regarding the tax situation, in 2013, those with gross incomes above $250,000 
(nearly all of them Euros) paid nearly half (48.9%) of all individual income 
taxes, though they accounted for only 2.4% of all returns filed and their average 
tax rate was 25.6%. The bottom 50% of filers (those making under $34,000-
maybe half Diverse and half Euros) paid an average of 1.2% federal income tax 
for total share of 2.4% while the next 35% of filers (those making $34k to $69k) 
averaged 21% tax rate for a total share of 10.5% of total federal income tax 
collected. So, it is obvious that contrary to the common view of the 
Democrats/third world supremacists/Neomarxists, the upper and upper 
middle class are giving the poor a largely free ride, and that we already have 
one foot in communism. However, we must not forget the $2.5 billion a day the 
US is going into debt and the total $80 trillion or more unfunded liabilities (e.g., 
social security and medicare), which will have to eventually be paid by some 
combo of increased taxes and decreased benefits to their descendants. Consider 
this: “When we combine the populations of non-payers and non-filers and look 
to see what overall percentage of each group is not paying taxes, we find that: 
50.7 percent of African American households pay no income taxes, 35.5 percent 
of Asian American households do not, 37.6 percent of White American 
households do not, and 52 percent of (legal) Hispanics pay no income taxes.” 
There are about 5X as many Euros (whites) as blacks and 4X as many Euros as 
Hispanics in the USA, and there are about the same % of whites and blacks on 
welfare (39%) and about 50% of Hispanics, so percentage wise that means 
blacks are about 5X and Hispanics about 8X as likely to be on welfare as Euros. 
 
Including property taxes, sales taxes etc. brings the average middle class ($34k 
to $69k income) tax up to about 30%, so 4 months/year or about 15 years labor 
in a 50 year lifetime goes to the government, a large percentage to support 
immigrants who are destroying America and the world, and another large 
percentage for the military, which is a free police force for the rest of the world.  
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Counting all support as enumerated above (i.e., not just food stamps etc., but 
the poor’s fair share of all other expenses) the average middle class family 
works roughly 5 weeks/year or 5 years of their working life to support the poor. 
Neither mass immigration, nor slavery, nor anchor babies, nor excessive 
breeding, nor unemployment, nor crimes and drugs are their fault, but the 
middle and upper class pay for the poor, and their kids will pay more (likely at 
least 10 years of their 50 year working life well before 2100) until the standard 
of living and quality of life is about the same as that of Diverse countries, and 
they will both drop continually every year until collapse, even if the Gang of 
Seven Sociopaths is destroyed. 
 
Of course, every statistic has a counter statistic and the Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacists and the Fifty Cent Army of the CCP are busily spreading 
disinformation and trolling all social media, but as a rough guide we find a 
recent study that found that 37% of Hispanic immigrant households got the 
majority of their income from welfare while 17% of blacks did (whites were not 
reported but I would guess about 10%). Of the $ 3.5 trillion budget, about 595 
billion is deficit and about 486 billion goes to welfare, so eliminating welfare 
would almost balance it and eliminating all the costs associated with persons 
and their descendants naturalized since 1965 would put the USA solidly in the 
black and would probably allow paying off the $18 trillion national debt before 
the end of the century, while implementing a Naturalized Citizens Repatriation 
Act would likely allow this closer to midcentury. 
 
As I write this I see a ‘news item’ (i.e., one of the endless barrage of paid lies 
planted there every day by the Diverse and the Fifty Cent Army) on Yahoo that 
tells me that illegals are doing us a big favor as the majority are working and 
pay about $1000 each tax per year. But they don’t tell us that they cost the 
country maybe $25,000 each in direct traceable costs and if you add their share 
of all the other costs (to maintain the govt. the police, the courts, the army, the 
streets etc., etc.) it’s likely double that. As Coulter tells you on p47 of Adios 
America, a college educated person pays an average $29k taxes more per year 
than they get back in govt. services. Legal immigrants however get back an 
average $4344 more than they pay, while those without a high school degree 
get back about $37k more than they pay. She says that about 71% of illegal 
households get welfare. 
 
About 20% of US families get 75% of their income from the govt (i.e., extorted 
from taxpayers and borrowed from banks at 2.5 billion/day) and another 20% 
get 40%. In the UK, which is about on a par with the USA on its 
Diverse/Neomarxist path to ruin, about 5 million persons or 10% of able adults 
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live totally on welfare and have not worked a day since the Labour govt. took 
over in 1997, and another 30% receive partial support. Greece, famous for it’s 
recent huge bailout, is a typical case of how the masses always drag a country 
into chaos if permitted. People normally retire on full govt. pensions in their 
50’s and as early as 45, and when retirement at 50 was permitted for a couple of 
hazardous jobs like bomb disposal, it soon was enlarged to cover over 500 
occupations including hairdressers (hazardous chemicals like shampoo) and 
radio and TV announcers (bacteria on microphones)—no I am not joking. 
 
People often praise European countries for their generous welfare, but in fact it 
is mainly possible because nearly all their defense since the 50’s (to say nothing 
about the two world wars, the Korean and Vietnamese wars, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Syria, Somalia, Serbia etc., etc.), i.e., about $10 trillion in direct costs and perhaps 
another $10 trillion indirect) has been paid for by the USA (and by American 
lives and injuries), i.e., by the 20% of US taxpayers who pay any significant tax, 
plus much of the $18 trillion debt. In fact, like all the world, they would not 
even be independent countries if not for the USA who defeated the Germans in 
two wars and the Japanese and kept the communists and now the Muslims 
under control for half a century. So not only is the U.S. bled dry by the poor and 
Diverse here, but we pay for them all over the world as well as helping the rich 
there get richer. Typical of all Europe, in France, where the Muslims have 
become a huge problem, even when not slaughtering people, most of them are 
on welfare, paid for in part by the USA. For about a decade the biggest voting 
bloc in the U.N is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation which controls e.g., 
the Human Rights Council, where they allow only the rights permitted by 
Islamic law, and so forget women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, freedom 
of religion, free speech etc. and in fact freedom of any kind.  As the Muslims 
unrestrained breeding increases their percent of world population from 1/5 to 
1/3 by 2100 or so and civilization collapses, this will get much worse.  
 
Islam is defended with such ferocity because in the poor 3rd world countries it 
has been the only defense against selfishness and it provides poor men with a 
guarantee of reproduction and survival. The same used to be the case for 
Christianity. It is also clear that as the 22nd century approaches and America 
collapses, China will replace it as the ‘Great Satan’ since it will be dominant 
worldwide, protecting its ever-growing investments and Chinese citizens, and 
eventually doing whatever it wants, as ‘Diversification’ results in control of 
America by Mexicans and Africans and it loses military superiority and the 
money and will to fight. And of course, the Chinese will not follow America’s 
path and be ‘diversified’ into collapse, unless via some great misfortune they 
become democratic/Neomarxist (they are of course now only communist in 
name). 
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A bit off the mark but too nice to pass up is a lovely example of devolution 
(dysgenics) that is second only to overpopulation in bringing about the collapse 
of industrial civilization (though political correctness forbids discussion 
anywhere). U.K. Pakistanis, who often import their cousins to marry and so are 
inbreeding with up to 5 children a family, sometimes with multiple wives, 
produce 30% of the rare diseases in the UK, though they are 2% of the 
population. Of course, most are on welfare and the defectives result in huge 
expenses for full time nursing care and special education (for those not deaf and 
blind). And the European High Court, like the US Supreme Court, has forgotten 
its real reason for existing and enraptured by Suicidal Utopian Delusions, has 
ruled the govt must pay full spousal benefits to all the wives and can’t draw the 
line at two. 
 
A good part of Coulter’s book is spent on crime, and we should first note 
(Coulter does not seem to, though I expect she knows) that it is rarely 
considered that it is hugely underreported, especially among the poor and 
Diverse. Thus, the BJS says that about 3.4 million violent crimes per year go 
unreported and the figures for nonviolent ones (burglary, assault, petty theft, 
vandalism, drug dealing, etc.) must be in the hundreds of millions, 
disproportionately committed by (and suffered by) the Diverse. One finds that 
the percent of adult males incarcerated for whites is 0.7, for Hispanics 1.5 and 
for blacks 4.7. It appears impossible to find any precise national figures for the 
cost of incarceration but $35K/year seems a minimum, and perhaps $50K for 
the legal system, and perhaps another $50k in medical and psychological costs, 
rehab programs, loss of work by their victims etc. According to the BJS non-
Hispanic blacks accounted for 39.4% of the prison and jail population in 2009, 
while non-Hispanic whites were 34.2%, and Hispanics (of any race) 20.6%. 
According to a 2009 report by the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2007 Latinos 
"accounted for 40% of all sentenced federal offenders--more than triple their 
share (13%) of the total U.S. adult population”. Again, keep in mind there is not 
and almost certainly will never be any evidence of a significant genetic 
difference between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or IQ, and that their 
greater incidence of problems must be wholly due to their culture. 
 
If one counted only illegals, the crime and imprisonment rate would likely be 
double that reported for legal Hispanics. As Coulter notes (p101-2) it’s 
impossible to get the actual figures for immigrant crime since it’s of course 
‘racist’ to even suggest they should be collected (and as noted, all crime among 
Diverse is greatly underreported and many Hispanics are misclassified as 
whites), but it’s definitely above that stated, so their actual rate could be near 
that of blacks. One set of data showed about 1/3 of the 2.2 million state and local 
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prisoners are foreign born and maybe another 5% are American born Hispanics 
and another 30% black, leaving about 32% white. The foreign born were 70% 
more likely to have committed a violent crime and twice as likely a class A 
felony. As Coulter notes, virtually all immigrant groups have a higher crime 
rate than natives. As the invasion continues, bribery and extortion will see huge 
increases as they rise to the third world standard. Bribes (the mildest form of 
extortion) in cash or equivalent is the normal interaction between people in the 
third world and police, the military, customs and immigration officers, health 
and fire inspectors, teachers, school admissions officers, and even doctors, 
surgeons and nurses. I am not guessing here as I spent a decade of my life in 
the third world and experienced and heard countless stories about all of the 
above. As time passes, we can expect this to become routine here as well (first 
of course in California and the other Western states) and the nationwide norm 
thereafter. In addition to continued increases in crime of all kinds we will see 
the percentage of crimes solved drop to the extremely low levels of the third 
world. More resources are devoted to the solution of murders than any other 
crime and about 65% are solved in the USA, but in Mexico less than 2% are 
solved and as you get outside Mexico City the rate drops to near zero. Also note 
that the rate here used to be about 80%, but it has dropped in parallel with the 
increase in Diverse. Also 65% is the average but if you could get statistics I am 
sure it would rise with the percent of Euro’s in a city and drop as the percent of 
Diverse increases. In Detroit only 30% are solved. If you keep track of who robs, 
rapes and murders, it’s obvious that black lives matter lots more to Euros than 
they do to other blacks. 
 
Spanish may become the official and mandatory language and Roman 
Catholicism the official religion, and of course the Mexican cartels will be the 
dominant criminal organizations, at least for the Southwestern states by 
midcentury and likely the whole country by 2100. 
 
Of course, as Coulter points out, it’s very hard to get statistics on race and crime 
or increasingly on race and anything, as it’s considered ‘racism’ even to ask and 
the govt. refuses to collect it. Finding the truth is made much more difficult 
since Hispanic special interest groups (i.e., third world supremacists), abetted 
by Euro liberals, who have lost or sold whatever common sense or decency they 
may have had, are hard at work spreading disinformation with hundreds of 
thousands of false or misleading items on the net and social media every week. 
She does not seem to mention the massive deception facilitated by Yahoo, Bing, 
Facebook and others, who present among their news items, paid disinformation 
which presents ‘news’ that is deliberately false or hugely misleading, such as 
the item mentioned above (repeated many times a day somewhere on the net) 
which says that illegals are a good thing as they are paying taxes.  
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In spite of being given a largely free ride, the Diverse take it all for granted 
(especially as it’s ‘racist’, ‘hate’ and ‘white supremacist’ to point out their free 
ride, so you won’t find it in the major media) and have no problem suing the 
police, hospitals, and every branch of government for any imagined infraction. 
The Euros should get a clue and sue them back! They and the US govt, now that 
Trump is president, could file millions of suits or criminal cases against people 
who riot in the streets, picket and protest disrupting traffic, smashing windows 
and causing business losses, psychological trauma, etc. Sue and/or arrest all the 
criminals and their families for the damages to property, police, loss of business 
income and work, etc. Also sue the police and every branch of government for 
failing to protect them every time a crime is committed, especially by illegal 
Diverse. 
 
As I wrote this the parents of a young San Francisco woman murdered by an 
illegal alien criminal, who had been deported numerous times, and then 
shielded from deportation by the San Francisco police (obstruction of justice), 
is suing them and the feds (and they should sue the board of Supervisors and 
Governor Brown and the state legislature who voted for the sanctuary rules and 
Trust Act as well). Predictably he was found not guilty and in the sanctuary city 
of San Francisco (and now the sanctuary state of California) is able to live out 
his life of crime while being supported at public expense. 
 
Hundreds of thousands are robbed, assaulted, raped or murdered by Diverse, 
and perhaps 100 million victimized in lesser ways every year, and the injured 
parties (most often Diverse) should sue every time. To facilitate this, the Euros 
could establish a fund and various organizations to eliminate illegals and crime 
against Euros. And of course, all the countries that foreign born criminals come 
from should be forced to pay the cost of policing and prosecuting them and of 
keeping them here—welfare, medical care, schooling, and their share of all the 
goods and services mentioned above, including national defense. Mexico 
should pay all the costs of policing the border and for all the crimes and for all 
the upkeep of illegals here since day one—i.e., back to say 1965. And they and 
Colombia etc. should pay for the cost of drug enforcement, addict treatment 
and jailing, and say a $20 million fine every time someone is raped, disabled or 
murdered by a drug addict or by an illegal or a naturalized citizen or 
descendant of a person originating in their country. If they won’t we could 
expel everyone born there and cut off all trade and visas, or just confiscate their 
oil, mineral and food production. Like many of the ideas here it sounds bizarre 
because the cowardice and stupidity of ‘our’ leaders (i.e., not actually ours as 
we are never asked) has gotten us so used to being abused. We are the last 
country that should put up with abuse but the politicians and leftist morons 
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have made us the easiest mark on the planet. Yes 9/11 is the most striking abuse, 
but in fact we suffer as many deaths and injuries from the Diverse every year 
(e.g., just from drugs and addicts or just from wars), and far more damage every 
day, if you extrapolate the consequences of their presence here into the future. 
 
Much controversy was generated when Trump mentioned we were letting 
rapists into the country, but he was just stating the facts. Most crimes in Diverse 
communities are never reported, often because they are committed by the 
Hispanic gangs who control them.  Coulter recounts a few (the publisher cut 
the book in half and she says she can easily produce 50 cases for every one cited) 
of the more outrageous immigrant rape crimes committed here, noting a study 
in which Latino women here reported childhood sexual abuse at about 80X the 
rate of other American women, and since it seems likely many did not want to 
talk about it, it could be higher. She notes that in much of Latin America raping 
teenagers is not considered a crime (e.g., the age of consent in Mexico is 12) and 
in any case, it is rare that anything is done about it, since it’s often connected to 
gang members or their families and if you protest you die. 
 
Coulter notes that illegals have made large areas of SouthWestern USA public 
lands and parks unsafe and some have been closed. Half of some 60 forest fires 
on federal or tribal land between 2006 and 2010 were started by illegals, many 
of them set deliberately to avoid capture. The cost of fighting these 30 alone 
might pay for a good start on a secure border fence. 
 
I assume everyone knows about the massive marijuana growing operations 
conducted by the Mexican cartels in our national forests. In addition to the 
erosion and pollution, it is the norm for growers to kill numerous animals and 
threaten hikers. Most depressing of all is the sellout of the Sierra Club (who 
suddenly changed their tune after getting a $100 million contribution from 
billionaire David Gelbaum with the proviso that they support immigration—
clearly confused as his right hand protects nature while the left destroys it), who 
are now devoted to mass immigration, denouncing anyone opposed as “white 
racists” even when they are Diverse. So, they are another group that should be 
made to register as an agent of a foreign government and their executives and 
major contributors made to join the other criminals quarantined on an island 
(the Aleutians would be perfect but even Cuba would do) where they can’t do 
more harm. Considering the blatant trashing of California by Hispanics, and 
the clear as day end of nature in America as the immigrants about double the 
population during the next century or so, this is truly amazing from one 
viewpoint, but cowardice and stupidity are only to be expected. 
 
One murder in the USA is said to total about $9 million lifetime costs and if they 
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get death it is several million more. At about 15,000/year that would be about 
$150 billion/year just for homicides-most by Diverse. Mexico has about 5X the 
murder rate of the USA and Honduras about 20X and your descendants can 
certainly look forward to our rate moving in that direction. Coulter notes that 
Hispanics have committed about 23,000 murders here in the last few decades. 
As I write, this item appeared on the net. “In an undated file photo, Jose Manuel 
Martinez arrives at the Lawrence County Judicial Building in Moulton, Ala., 
before pleading guilty to shooting Jose Ruiz in Lawrence County, Ala., in March 
2013. Martinez has admitted to killing dozens of people across the United States 
as an enforcer for drug cartels in Mexico.” Not of course rare, just one of the few 
to make the headlines recently. 
 
Figuring about 2.2 million prisoners (over 1% of the adult population) and a 
cost to put them in jail from the start of their criminal career of maybe $50,000 
each or about $100 billion and the cost to keep them there of about $35,000 each 
or about $75 billion means a minimum of $150 billion a year, not including other 
governmental and social costs. I don’t see any really clear estimates on the net 
for the total cost of crime in the USA, but in 2013 it was estimated that violent 
crime alone cost the UK (where guns are much less frequent and the Mexican 
and Colombian  mafias  don’t operate significantly) ca. $150 billion or about 
$6000/household, or about 8% of GDP, but the USA has a much higher 
percentage of immigrants, guns and drugs, so including all the nonviolent 
crimes and figuring only 5% of the GDP, that would be about 900 billion per 
year. Figuring about 60% of crime due to the Diverse, or maybe 80% if you count 
that of Euros addicted to drugs imported by Diverse, we pay something like 
700 billion a year to support Diverse crime. 
 
Of course, all those guilty of felonies, regardless of national origin, history or 
status could have their citizenship rescinded and be deported or quarantined 
on an island, where their cost of upkeep could be from $0 to $1000/year rather 
than $35,000 and it could be made a one-way trip to avoid recidivism. Yes, its 
sci-fi now, but as the 22nd century approaches and civilization collapses, the 
tolerance of crime will diminish of necessity. For now, nothing will be done, 
and crime here will reach the levels in Mexico as the border continues to 
dissolve and environmental collapse and approaching bankruptcy dissolve the 
economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 100 U.S. citizens were known to have 
been murdered and more than 130 kidnapped and others just disappeared, and 
if you add other foreigners and Mexicans it runs into the thousands. Even a tiny 
lightly traveled country like Honduras manages some 10 murders and 2 
kidnappings a year of US citizens. And of course, these are the best of times—
it is getting steadily worse as unrestrained breeding and resource depletion 
bring collapse ever closer. 
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In another index of how far out of control Mexico is, the criminal cartels, 
believed to generate well over $21 billion each year from drugs, illegal mining, 
fishing and logging, theft, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping and 
embezzlement, are an increasing threat to Pemex, the Mexican oil monopoly. 
Between 2009 and 2016, thieves tapped the pipelines roughly every 1.4 kms 
along Pemex’s approximately 14,000 km pipeline network, getting more than 
$1 billion in annual revenue from the gas which they sell on the black market. 
They are able to do this by terrorizing Pemex employees to obtain info on its 
operations, offering them the same as they do for everyone in Mexico—silver 
or lead, i.e., take the bribes or you and your family die.  
Euros hear constantly about how bad they are not to want to give the Diverse 
even more. OK fine, lets agree to do it provided the third world country they 
are from lets in immigrants until they comprise about 30% of their population 
now and 60% by 2100, enforces legislation that gives all foreigners in their 
country, legally or not, citizenship for their babies, welfare, free food, free 
medical care, free schooling, immunity to deportation, free emergency care, 
drivers licenses, license to practice law, right to serve on juries, right to bring in 
all their relatives (who also get all these privileges), right to setup organizations 
that help them to lie on immigration forms, to evade deportation, to suppress 
free speech and to subvert the political process so that they can take  over the 
country. Actually, let’s make it easy and do it if even one of their countries 
implements even a few of these. Of course, it will never happen. 
 
Naturally, those with every kind of mental or physical deficiency are 
dissatisfied with their level of welfare and are getting organized too. Those with 
autism, actually a spectrum of genetic deficiencies due to as many as 1000 genes, 
are now campaigning to be regarded as not deficient but ‘neurodiverse’ and 
‘neurotypicals’ should regard them as peers or even their superiors. No 
problem for me if someone wants to have a ‘friend’ or spouse who cannot 
experience love or friendship and who feels the same when they die as they do 
when their goldfish does (except being more annoyed by the greater 
inconvenience). And those with more than mild cases will never hold a job and 
will be a burden to their relatives and society (i.e., the minority who pay taxes) 
all their lives, and have a strong tendency to pass the problem on to any 
offspring they have, so it will likely increase continually, the same as hundreds 
of other genetic problems with significant heritability. As diagnosis has 
improved, so has the incidence of autism, which now exceeds 1%, as does that 
for schizophrenia, schizotypal disorders, ADHD, drug addiction, alcoholism, 
alexithymia, low IQ, depression, bipolar disorder, etc., etc., so perhaps the 
combined incidence of disabling mental disorders exceeds 10% and those with 
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physical problems who need partial or complete lifelong support is probably 
similar, and both are rising in number and percent, the inevitable results of 
‘civilization’, ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. Clearly, as the economy 
collapses, the costs of health care rise, and an ever-larger percentage are 
nonworking elderly and mentally or physically disabled, this lunatic system 
will collapse-i.e., the USA will eventually have about the same handouts for 
everyone as third world countries by the early 22nd century—none. 
 
Coulter comments on Mexican citizen Carlos Slim Helu (the world’s third 
richest person as I write this) in the context of the near universal lying about 
and evasion of immigration issues by the New York Times and other media. He 
gave a huge loan to the Times a few years ago, to save it from bankruptcy, and 
this likely accounts for its subsequent failure to cover immigration issues in a 
meaningful way. Slim is the world’s premiere monopolist and his companies 
control 90% of the Mexican telephone market and many of its major industries 
(Mexican’s refer to their country as Slimlandia). His wealth is the equivalent of 
roughly 5% of Mexico's GDP. To add perspective, since the USA has about 15 
times Mexico’s GDP, to be comparable, Bill Gates or Warren Buffet would have 
to be worth about a trillion dollars each or about 12X their worth as of 2019. 
California is the biggest money making US state for Slim, whose take of 
Mexican goods and services is about $140 million/day. To get the flavor of how 
things were when Slim managed to acquire the Mexican telephone company 
(and what can be expected here soon), Gortari (chosen by G.W. Bush to 
campaign with him) was president of the vicious Mexican political monopoly 
PRI, and in subsequent years Gortari’s brother was found murdered, his 
relatives were apprehended by Swiss police when they tried to withdraw $84 
million from his brother’s bank account, and he fled Mexico for Ireland, where 
he remains. These are among the reasons Coulter calls Slim a robber baron and 
a baneful influence on Mexico and America. She notes that about $20 billion of 
Slim’s yearly income from his telephone monopoly comes from Mexicans living 
here. He is Lebanese on both sides, so Mexico has experienced it’s own foreign 
takeover. 
 
The bleeding hearts insist Americans show ever more “humanity” and 
guarantee our own collapse to help the mob, but what humanity do the Diverse 
show? They breed like rabbits and consume without restraint, thus condemning 
everyone, including their own descendants, to Hell on Earth. There is nothing 
noble about the poor—they are just the rich in waiting. Showing the typical 
oblivion of the establishment, our Secretary of State Kerry praises China for 
‘lifting 200 million people out of poverty’ but fails to note this placed a huge 
drain on the world resources, and is done by stealing from the future, including 
their own descendants, and that this is unsustainable. Ten or 11 billion (by 2100) 
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all trying to stay out of poverty guarantees the collapse of the world. China’s 
higher QOL, like our own, is only temporary, obtained at the cost of their own 
descendants and the worlds future. 
 
The major deficiency of the first edition of this essay was lack of any discussion 
of China.  The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China 
says this or China does that, we are not usually speaking of the Chinese people, 
but of the Sociopaths of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven 
Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSS)of the Standing Committee of the CCP 
who rule China. There are 25 members of the Politburo but only 7 members of 
its Standing Committee, one of them usually being chosen as Premier. 
Currently and probably until he becomes senile or dies this is Xi Jinping.   I 
recently watched some typical leftist fake news programs  (i.e., pretty much the 
only kind one can find in the media, i.e., nearly everything now –i.e., Yahoo, 
CNN, The New York Times, etc.) on Youtube,  one by VICE which mentioned 
that 1000 economists (and 15 Nobel Prize winners) sent a letter to Trump telling 
him that the trade war was a mistake,  and another which interviewed an 
academic economist who said that Trump’s move was a provocation for 
starting World War 3.  They are right about the disruption of global trade, but 
have no grasp of the big picture, which is that the Seven Sociopaths have total 
world domination, with the elimination of freedom everywhere, as their goal. 
and that there are only two ways to stop them—a total trade embargo that 
devastates the Chinese economy and leads their military to force out the CCP 
and hold elections, or WW3.  Clear as day, but all these “brilliant” academics 
can’t see it.  If the Sociopaths are not removed now, in as little as 15 years it will 
be too late and your descendants slowly but inexorably will be subject to the 
same fate as Chinese—kidnapping, torture and murder of any dissenters.  
 
Of course, the CCP started WW3 long ago (you could see their invasion of Korea 
as the beginning) and is pursuing it in every possible way, except for bullets 
and bombs, and they will come soon.  The CCP fought the USA in Korea, 
invaded and massacred Tibet, and fought border skirmishes with Russia and 
India. It conducts massive hacking operations against all industrial and military 
databases worldwide and has stolen the classified data on virtually all current 
US and European military and space systems, analyzed their weaknesses and 
fielded improved versions within a few years. Tens of thousands, and maybe 
hundreds of thousands, of CCP employees have been hacking into military, 
industrial, financial and social media databases worldwide since the early days 
of the net and there are hundreds of known recent hacks in the USA alone.  As 
the major institutions and military have hardened their firewalls, the SSS have 
moved to minor institutions and to defense subcontractors and to our allies, 
which are easier targets.  While it ignores the crushing poverty of hundreds of 
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millions and the marginal existence of most of its people, it has built up a 
massive military and space presence, which grows larger every year, and whose 
only reason for existence is waging war to eliminate freedom everywhere.  In 
addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-
trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. 
They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes 
the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic.  The Russians are not 
stupid, and in spite of pretending friendship with the Sociopaths, they surely 
grasp that the CCP is going to eat them alive, that their only hope is to ally 
themselves with the West, and Trump is right on the money in befriending 
Putin. Of course, the Neomarxist Third World Supremacists will likely take 
total control of the USA in 2020 and nothing could be more to the liking of the 
CCP.  Snowden (another clueless twenty something) helped the SSS more than 
any other single individual, with the possible exception of all the American 
presidents since WW2, who have pursued the suicidal policy of appeasement.  
The USA has no choice but to monitor all communications and to compile a 
dossier on everyone, as it’s essential not only to control criminals and terrorists, 
but to counter the SSS, who are rapidly doing the same thing, with the intent of 
removing freedom completely.   
 
Though the SSS, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums 
on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller 
engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the 
question that the SSS, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them 
then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal 
physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemy electronics via the net. No 
satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power 
grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes.   
 
Some may question that the CCP (and of course the top tiers of the police, 
army and 610 Office) are really mentally aberrant, so here are some of the 
common characteristics of Sociopaths (formerly called psychopaths) that you 
can find on the net.  Of course, some of these are shared by many autistics and 
alexithymics, and sociopaths differ from “normal” people only in degree.  
 
Superficial Charm, Manipulative and Cunning, Grandiose Sense of Self, Lack 
of Remorse, Shame or Guilt, Shallow Emotions, Incapacity for Love, 
Callousness/Lack of Empathy, Poor Behavioral Controls/Impulsive Nature, 
Believe they are all-powerful, all-knowing, entitled to every wish, no sense of 
personal boundaries, no concern for their impact on others.  
Problems in making and keeping friends. Aberrant behaviors such as cruelty 
to people or animals, Stealing, Promiscuity, Criminal or Entrepreneurial 
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Versatility, Change their image as needed, Do not perceive that anything is 
wrong with them, Authoritarian, Secretive, Paranoid, Seek out situations 
where their tyrannical behavior will be tolerated, condoned, or admired (e.g., 
CCP, Police, Military, Predatory Capitalism), Conventional appearance, Goal 
of enslavement of their victims, Seek to exercise despotic control over every 
aspect of other’s lives, Have an emotional need to justify their actions and 
therefore need their victim's affirmation (respect, gratitude), Ultimate goal is 
the creation of a willing victim, 
Incapable of real human attachment to another, Unable to feel remorse or 
guilt, Extreme narcissism and grandiosity, Their goal is to rule the world.  
Pathological Liars.  
 
This last is one of the most striking characteristics of the CCP. Virtually 
everything they say is an obvious lie, or distortion, mostly so absurd that any 
well educated ten year old will laugh at them. Yet they persist in saturating all 
the media every day (a $10 billion annual budget just for foreign propaganda) 
with preposterous statements.  The fact that they are so out of touch with 
reality that they think they will be taken seriously clearly shows what any 
rational person will regard as mental illness (sociopathy). 
 
There are only two paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion prisoners 
from the SSS, and ending the lunatic march to WW3.  The peaceful one is to 
launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military 
gets fed up and boots out the CCP.  The USA needs, by any means necessary, 
to join all its allies in reducing the trade with China to near zero—no imports of 
any product from China or any entity with more that 10% Chinese ownership 
anywhere in the world, including any product with any component of such 
origin.  No export of anything whatsoever to China or any entity that reexports 
to China or that has more than 10 % Chinese ownership, with severe and 
immediate consequences for any violators.  Yes, it would temporarily cost 
millions of jobs and a major worldwide recession, and yes I know that a large 
part of their exports are from joint ventures with American companies, but the 
alternative is that every country will become the dog of the Seven Sociopaths 
(and like all animals they keep dogs in small cages while they fatten them for 
the kill) and/or experience the horrors of WW3.  Other possible steps are to send 
home all Chinese students and workers in science and tech, freeze all assets of 
any entity more than 10% Chinese owned, forbid foreign travel to any Chinese 
citizen, to prohibit any Chinese or any entity more than 10% owned by Chinese 
from buying any company, land, product or technology from the USA or any 
of its allies.   All these measures would be phased in as appropriate.  
 
We should keep in mind that the Chinese monster is largely due to the suicidal 
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utopian delusions of our politicians.  President Carter gave them the right to  
send students to the USA (there are currently about 300,000), use our 
intellectual property without paying royalties, gave them most favored nation 
trading status, and by decree canceled our recognition of Taiwan and our 
mutual defense agreement (i.e., with no vote by anyone – he should be an 
honorary CCP member, along with the Bushes,  the Obamas, the Clintons, 
Edward Snowden, etc.). These were the first in a long series of conciliatory 
gestures to the world’s most vicious dictatorship which made it possible for 
them to prosper, and set the stage for their coming invasion of Taiwan, the 
South Sea Islands and other countries as they wish. These measures along with 
our failure to invade in the 40’s to prevent their takeover of China, our failure 
to nuke their army and hence the CCP out of existence during the Korean War, 
our failure to prevent their massacre of Tibet, our failure to do anything when 
they exploded their first nuclear weapons, our failure to take them out in 1966 
when they launched their first nuclear capable ICBM, our (or rather Bush’s) 
failure to do anything about the Tiananmen massacre, our failure to shut down 
the Confucius Institutes present in many universities worldwide, which are 
fronts for the CCP, our failure to ban the purchase of companies , property, 
mining rights etc. worldwide, which is another way to acquire high-tech and 
other vital assets, our failure to do anything over the last 20 years about their 
countless acts of espionage and hacking into our databases stealing nearly all 
our advanced weaponry, our failure to stop their allies North Korea and 
Pakistan from developing nukes and ICBM’s and receiving equipment from 
China (e.g., their mobile missile launchers, which they claim were for hauling 
logs and it was pure coincidence they exactly fit the Korean missiles), our failure 
to stop them from violating our embargo on Iran’s oil (they buy much of it, 
registering their ships in Iran),  and its nuclear program (equipment and 
technicians go back and forth to N. Korea via China), our failure to stop them 
from providing military tech and weapons worldwide (e.g., North Korea, Iran, 
Pakistan, the cartels in Mexico, and over 30 other countries, our failure to stop 
the flow of dangerous drugs and their precursors directly or indirectly (e.g., 
nearly all Fentanyl and Carfentanyl sent worldwide, and meth precursors for 
the Mexican cartels come from China), and our failure to do anything about 
their building “ports” (i.e., military bases) all over the world, which is ongoing.   
 
An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a targeted strike by say 50 
thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members 
are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual 
plenary meeting.  The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that 
they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be 
nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack.  
Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course.  It will 
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likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few 
decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen 
anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.).  Future conflicts will have hardkill and 
softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by 
hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial 
communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any 
device or vehicle connected to the net.  The Sociopaths are slowly fielding a 
worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or 
drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie 
dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US 
ships or planes.  While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating 
communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use 
theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior 
naval forces.  Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI.   
 
All this is totally obvious to anyone who spends a little time on the net and can 
understand English.  Two of the best sources to start with are the book 
Crouching Tiger (and the five Youtube videos with the same name), and the 
long series of short satirical pieces on the China Uncensored channel on 
Youtube or their new one www.chinauncensored.tv.  The CCP’s plans for WW3 
and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications and 
speeches.  They spend an estimated 10 billion dollars yearly to spread their 
propaganda worldwide. They or their puppets own or control newspapers, 
magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media 
everywhere every day.  In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of 
people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out 
legitimate commentary.  
 
The rule of the Seven Senile Sociopaths is a surrealistic tragicomedy like Snow 
White and the Seven Dwarves, but without Snow White, endearing 
personalities, or a happy ending.  They are the wardens of the world’s biggest 
prison but they are they far the worst criminals, committing by proxy every 
year millions of assaults, rapes, robberies, bribes, kidnappings, tortures, and 
murders, most of them presumably by their own secret police of the 610 Office 
created on June 10, 1999 by Jiang Zemin to persecute the qigong meditators of 
Falun Gong, and anyone else deemed a threat, now including all religious and 
political groups not under their direct rule.   By far the biggest ally of the Seven 
Dwarves is the Democratic party of the USA, which, at a time when America 
needs more than ever to be strong and united, is doing everything possible to 
divide America into warring factions with ever more of its resources going to 
sustain the burgeoning legions of the lower classes and driving it into 
bankruptcy. The CCP is by far the most evil group in world history, robbing, 
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raping, kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing starving to death and murdering 
more people that all the other dictators in history (an estimated 100 million), 
and in a few years will have a total surveillance state recording every action of 
everyone in China, which is already expanding worldwide.  
 
Though the SSS treat us as an enemy, in fact, the USA is the Chinese people’s 
greatest friend and the CCP their greatest enemy. From another perspective, 
other Chinese are their greatest enemy as they demolish all the world’s 
resources. 
 
Of course, some say that China will collapse of its own accord, and it’s possible, 
but the price of being wrong is the end of freedom and WW3 or a long series of 
conflicts which the Seven Sociopaths will almost certainly win.  One must keep 
in mind that they have controls on their population and weapons that Stalin, 
Hitler, Gaddafi and Idi Amin never dreamed of.  CCTV cameras (currently 
maybe 300 million and increasing rapidly) on highspeed networks with AI 
image analysis, tracking software on every phone which people are required to 
use, and GPS trackers on all vehicles, all transactions payable only by phone 
already dominant there and universal and mandatory soon, total automatic 
monitoring of all communications by AI and an estimated 2 million online 
censors, in addition to millions of police and army cadres there as many as 10 
million plainclothes secret police of 610 Office created by Jiang Zemin, with 
black prisons (i.e., unofficial and unmarked), instant updating of the digital 
dossier on all 1.4 billion Chinese and soon on everyone on earth who uses the 
net or phones. It’s often called the Social Credit System and it enables the 
Sociopaths to shut down the communications, purchasing ability, travel, bank 
accounts etc. of anyone.  This is not fantasy but already largely implemented 
for the Muslims of Xinjiang and spreading rapidly—see Youtube.   
 
How much Quality of Life (QOL- a general measure including wealth, crime 
rate, stress, traffic, drug problems, happiness etc.) might Americans gain by 
various measures? Banning anchor babies might up QOL 5% by mid-century 
and 10% by the end, relative to doing nothing. Making the ban retroactive to 
1982, or preferably to 1898, and thus deporting most of those naturalized by 
being related to anchor babies, might raise QOL another 5% immediately. 
Banning immigration might raise it another 10% by end of century, while 
making the ban retroactive to 1965 and deporting most immigrants along with 
their descendants and naturalized relatives might give Americans (Diverse and 
Euros) another 20% more QOL immediately. 
 
And there might be a Back to Africa or Slavery Restitution Act which sent all 
blacks, or at least those on welfare, unemployed or in prison, back to their 
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homelands so we would never again have to listen to their inane complaints 
about being kidnapped (as noted, they never consider that if not for slavery 
they would not exist and if not for colonialism and Euro technology maybe 90% 
of the people in the third world would not exist), not to mention if not for Euro’s 
they would now be living (or dying ) under the Nazi’s or the Japanese or the 
communists. Of course, one could do this on a case by case basis, keeping all 
the skilled (e.g., medical and hitech personnel). Instead of or prior to the slow 
deportation process, one could cancel the citizenship or at least the voting 
privileges of all the naturalized citizens and their descendants since 1965. 
 
The 42 million African-Americans (about 74 million by 2100) who account for 
4.5x as many prisoners per capita as Euros, get a largely free ride for all essential 
services and welfare, take over and render uninhabitable large areas of cities, 
increase the crowding and traffic by about 13% etc., so they may decrease the 
QOL of all Americans about 20% on average but to unliveable for those who 
are in poor neighborhoods. Hispanics amount to about 18% (or about 25% 
including illegals) and they account for a minimum of 2.5X as many prisoners 
as Euros and have all the other issues, thus causing a QOL drop of about 30% 
or again to unliveable in areas they dominate, which soon will include the 
whole southwestern USA. So overall, it’s a fair guess that deporting most 
Diverse would about double the QOL (or say from just bearable to wonderful) 
right now for the average person, but of course much more increase for the 
poorer and less for the richer. If one compares likely QOL in 2119 (i.e., a century 
from now), if all the possible anti-diversity measures were adopted, relative to 
what it will be if little or nothing is done, I expect QOL would be about 3X 
higher or again from intolerable to fantastic. 
 
After documenting the incompetence of the INS and the govt., and the countless 
treasonous and blatantly anti-white racist (in the original meaningful sense of 
racist) organizations (e.g., the National Council of La Raza) helping to swamp 
us with immigrants (partial list on p247 of Adios America) Coulter says “The 
only thing that stands between America and oblivion is a total immigration 
moratorium” and “The billion dollar immigration industry has turned every 
single aspect of immigration law into an engine of fraud. The family 
reunifications are frauds, the “farmworkers” are frauds, the high-tech visas are 
frauds and the asylum and refugee cases are monumental frauds.” Her book is 
heavily documented (and most data were left out due to size constraints) and 
of course nearly all the data can be found on the net. 
 
As Coulter notes, a 2015 poll shows that more Americans had a favorable 
opinion of North Korea (11%) than wanted to increase immigration (7%,) but 
most Democrats, the Clintons, the Bush’s, Obama, casino mogul Sheldon 
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Adelson, Hedge Fund billionaire David Gelbaum, Carlos Slim, Nobel Prize 
winning economist Paul Krugman and megabillionaire Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg don’t want Americans to ever vote on it. She also mentions that 
then Florida Governor Jeb Bush (with a Mexican wife) pushed for a bill to give 
drivers licenses to illegal aliens (copying California) just 3 years after 13 of the 
9/11 terrorists had used Florida drivers licenses to board the planes. Yes, the 
same Jeb Bush who recently called Illegal immigration “an act of love” (of 
course he means love for Mexico and hatred for the USA, or at least its Euros). 
 
The inexorable collapse of the USA (and other first world countries in Europe 
are just a step or two behind, as they have let in Diverse who are producing 
children at about 3 times Euro rates) shows the fatal flaws in representative 
democracy. If they are to survive and not turn into third world hellholes, they 
must establish a meritocracy. Change the voting age to 35 minimum and 65 
maximum, with minimum IQ 110, proof of mental stability, lack of drug or 
alcohol dependence, no felony convictions, and a minimum score on the SAT 
test that would get one into a good college. But the sorry state of what passes 
for civilization is shown by a recent Gallup poll which found that about 50% of 
Americans believed the Devil influences daily events, and that UFO’s are real, 
while 36% believe in telepathy and about 25% in ghosts. A yes on any of these 
would seem to be a good reason for lifetime exclusion from voting and 
preferably loss of citizenship as should a ‘yes’ or ‘possibly’ or ‘probably’ answer 
to “Do you think O.J. Simpson is innocent”. 
 
Perhaps it will lessen the pain slightly to realize that it is not only the American 
government that is moronic and treasonous, as versions of its suicide are 
happening in other democracies. In Britain, the National Children’s Bureau has 
urged daycare teachers to report any ‘racist’ utterance of children as young as 
three. About 40% of Britons receive some form of welfare. London has more 
violent crime than Istanbul or New York and is said to have almost 1/3 of the 
world’s CCTV cameras, which record the average citizen about 300 times a day. 
Of course, as usual, there are no trustworthy statistics for China, where some of 
the most successful electronics companies are in the CCTV business and where 
facial recognition software can often identify any random person in minutes. 
The UK has the highest rate in Europe of STD’s, unwed mothers, drug addiction 
and abortion. One fifth of all children have no working adult in their house, 
almost a million people have been on sick leave for over a decade, the courts 
forced the govt. to give a disabled man money to fly to Amsterdam to have sex 
with a prostitute because to deny it would be a “violation of his human rights”. 
The number of indictable offenses per 1000 rose from about 10 in the 1950’s to 
about 110 in the 1990’s in parallel with the increase in Diverse. Thanks to Mark 
Steyn’s “After America”, which is required reading for all bright, civilized 
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Americans who want their country to survive, though barring a military coup, 
there is not a chance.  
 
Coulter points out the absurdity of politicians fawning on the Hispanic voters 
(Hispandering). If presidential candidate Mitt Romney had won 71% of the 
Hispanic vote instead of 27% he still would have lost, but if he had won only 
4% more of the white vote he would have won. In fact, 72% of voters are non-
Hispanic white, so even if someone got ALL the nonwhite votes, a presidential 
candidate could still win by a landslide, as we saw in the Trump election. The 
problem is a sizeable percent of white voters are morons and lunatics who are 
unable to act in their own self-interest. The absurdity of letting average citizens 
vote was shown when many were seriously considering Ben Carson for 
president in 2016--a Seventh Day Adventist bible thumping creationist Detroit 
ghetto homeboy of such obvious immaturity and stupidity that no sane country 
would permit him to occupy any public office whatsoever (of course one could 
say the same of most people and most politicians). He has however, the huge 
advantage that his defects give him much in common with the average 
American. It appears to me his limitations include autism-the reason for his 
famous “flat affect”. Do not be fooled by his occasional simulations of laughter-
-autistics learn to mimic emotions at an early age and some even have successful 
careers as comedians. Famous comedian Dan Aykroyd had this to say about his 
Asperger’s -- "One of my symptoms included my obsession with ghosts and 
law enforcement -- I carry around a police badge with me, for example. I became 
obsessed by Hans Holzer, the greatest ghost hunter ever. That’s when the idea 
of my film Ghostbusters was born." 
 
“Gentle Ben” Carson wants to outlaw abortion, even in cases of rape and incest, 
thinks we should ditch Medicare, and adheres to many weird conspiracy 
theories, such as the pyramids not being built by the pharaohs as tombs, but by 
the biblical Joseph for the storage of grain! He proposes to turn the Department 
of Education into a fascist overseer of proper morals, with students reporting 
professors who displayed political bias (i.e., anyone whatsoever) to the 
government so universities' funding could be cut. “I personally believe that this 
theory that Darwin came up with was something that was encouraged by the 
Adversary.” The Adversary is a nickname for the devil; it’s the actual 
translation of the word “Satan.” He also dismissed the Big Bang, calling it a 
“fairy tale.” Like all creationists, that means that he rejects most of modern 
science--i.e., everything that lets us make sense of biology, geology, physics and 
the universe and puts them on all fours with people who lived 100,000 years 
ago--i.e., Neanderthals. Of course, to the sane, intelligent and educated, "fairy 
tales" are about heaven, hell, angels and devils, but these are at exactly the right 
level for the average low class American, Diverse or Euro. Hard to believe we 
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could do worse than the Clinton’s, Nixon, Reagan, Obama and G.W. Bush, but 
it will happen, and your descendants will see an endless line of politicians who's 
only real qualifications are greed, dishonesty, stupidity, sociopathy, dark skin 
or a Spanish surname. In any case, it's unavoidable in a mobocracy that morons, 
lunatics and the merely clueless will take over and run the show until it 
collapses, which is inevitable unless democracy as currently practiced changes 
radically and Diversity decreases. 
 
Now that we have a reasonably sane, intelligent, patriotic person as president 
(though seeing this thru the massive disinformation and libel produced by the 
Neomarxist Third World Supremacists can be difficult) and enough 
Republicans in congress (the Democrats having sold out their country long ago) 
we could theoretically deport the illegals, but unless we terminate immigration 
and retroactively deport most of those naturalized since 1965, it will only slow 
the disaster and not stop it.  However nearly everything Trump tries to do is 
blocked by the Neomarxist judges and the democrats who long ago ceased to 
represent America’s interests.  
 
Hillary Clinton was preferable to Obama, who was trained as a constitutional 
lawyer, so he knew our systems fatal weaknesses, and how much further he 
could go in creating a communist state enforced by fascism, like his much-
admired model Cuba. I can easily forgive Hillary for Benghazi and her emails 
and Bill for Monica, but not for their utterly cynical pardoning of clients of 
Hillary’s brother Hugh, tax cheat Marc Rich and four Hasids convicted in 1999 
of bilking the federal government of more than $30 million in federal housing 
subsidies, small business loans and student grants, in order to curry favor with 
N.Y. Jews. This is very well known and in fact just about everything I say here 
is easily findable on the net. 
 
Even though our mobocracy is a slow-motion nightmare, if we had a direct 
democracy (as we easily could in the computer age) and people were actually 
polled on important issues, perhaps most of our major problems would be 
disposed of quickly. Suppose tomorrow there was a vote of every registered 
voter with an email address or smartphone on questions something like this: 
 
Should all illegal aliens be deported within one year? Should welfare be cut in 
half within 1year? Should all convicted felons born in another country or one of 
whose parents were, have their citizenship canceled and be deported within 90 
days? Should all immigration be terminated except temporary work visas for 
those with special skills? Should all child molesters, rapists, murderers, and 
drug addicts have their citizenship canceled and deported, or if a native citizen, 
quarantined on an island? 
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So much the better if voting was restricted to those whose parents and/or all 
four grandparents are native born, who are non- felons, who have paid more 
than 5% of their income in taxes the last 3 years and passed mental health, 
current events and IQ tests. Again, the biggest benefactors would be the Diverse 
who remained here, but of course the majority will resist any change that 
requires intelligence or education to grasp. 
 
I am not against a Diverse society, but to save America for your children (recall 
I have no descendants nor close relatives), it should be capped at say 20% and 
that would mean about 40% of the Diverse here now would be repatriated. 
Actually I would not object to keeping the % Diverse we have now (about 37%) 
provided half the ones here were replaced by carefully screened Asians or by 
people from anywhere provided they  are carefully screened (i.e., no criminals, 
mental or physical defectives, no religious nuts, no drug addicts, well educated 
with a proven useful profession), and that they agree to have no more than two 
children, with immediate deportation if they produce a third, commit a major 
felony, or remain on welfare for more than one year. And no relatives are 
permitted entry. In fact, it would be a huge step forward to replace all the Euro 
criminals, drug addicts, mental cases, welfare users, and chronically 
unemployed etc. with suitable Diverse. Of course, it’s impossible now, but as 
civilization collapses and the Seven Sociopaths of the CCP take over, many 
amazing things will happen, all of them extremely unpleasant for billions of 
people, with the Diverse having the most suffering and dying. Coulter jokingly 
suggests inviting Israel to occupy the border with Mexico, as they have shown 
how to guard one. However, I would suggest really doing it—either giving 
them the Southern portion of each border state or perhaps just occupying the 
border section of Mexico (which we could do in a few days). Israel should be 
delighted to have a second country, since their position in Israel will become 
untenable as the USA, France etc. lose the ability to be the world’s policemen, 
and nuclear capable third world countries collapse. However, we should 
require the Israelis to leave the strict orthodox at home where the Muslims will 
soon get them, as we already have enough rabbit breeding religious lunatics. 
 
Speaking of the collapse of nuclear capable third world countries, it should be 
obvious that as this happens, probably before the end of this century, but 
certainly in the next, with H Bombs in possession of fanatics, it is just a matter 
of time before they begin vaporizing American and European cities. The only 
definitive defense will be preemptive “nucleation” of any such country that 
collapses, or where Muslim radicals take over. It must be obvious to Israel that 
they will have no other choice but a preemptive strike on Pakistan, Iran and 
maybe others. Another lovely gift from the Diverse. 
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In a late 2015 poll by You.Gov, 29 percent of respondents said they can imagine 
a situation in which they would support the military taking control of the 
federal government – that translates into over 70 million American adults. And 
these again are the best of times. At this time in the next century, give or take a 
few decades, (much sooner in many third world countries), with industrial 
civilization collapsing, starvation, crime, disease and war worldwide, military 
coups will be happening everywhere. It’s almost certainly the only cure for 
America’s problems, but of course nobody will get to vote on it. 
 
In sum, this is the American chapter of the sad story of the inexorable 
destruction of the world by unrestrained motherhood. Fifty-four years ago, 396 
US politicians voted to embrace the destruction of America by the third world, 
via the “no significant demographic impact” immigration act. Without the 
changes they and the Supreme Idiots Court made (along with failure to enforce 
our immigration laws), we would have about 80 million fewer people now and 
at least 150 million fewer in 2100, along with tens of trillions of dollars in 
savings. We would have a chance to deal with the immense problems America 
and the world face. But, burdened with a fatally fragmented (i.e., Diverse) 
population about twice the size we might have had, half of which will not 
contribute to the solution, but rather constitute the problem, it is impossible. 
What we see is that democracy as practiced here and now guarantees a fatally 
inept government. Peace and prosperity worldwide will vanish and starvation, 
disease, crime, military coups, terrorism and warlords will become routine, 
probably in this century, certainly during the next. 
 
To me it’s clear that nothing will restrain motherhood and that there is no hope 
for America or the world regardless of what happens in technology, green 
living or politics anywhere. Everything tranquil, pure, wild, sane, safe and 
decent is doomed. There is no problem understanding the stupidity, laziness, 
dishonesty, self-deception, cowardice, arrogance, greed and insanity of hairless 
monkeys, but it ought to seem a bit odd that so many reasonably sane and more 
or less educated people could welcome into their country (or at least permit the 
entry and tolerate the presence of) large numbers of immigrants who proceed 
to take over and destroy it. Monkey psychology (shared by all humans) is only 
capable of seriously considering oneself and immediate relatives for a short 
time into the future (reciprocal altruism or inclusive fitness), maybe decades at 
most, so there is no internal restraint. Democracy is the ideal breeding ground 
for catastrophe. 
 
Most people are neither smart nor well educated, but one can see collapse 
happening in front of us, and above all in the big urban areas and in the 
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Southwest, especially California and Texas. Sheer laziness, ignorance and a lack 
of understanding of ecology and the nature of population growth is part of it, 
but I think that the innate reciprocal altruism we share with all animals must 
have a big role. When we evolved in Africa we lived in small groups, probably 
seldom more than a few hundred and often less than 20, and so all those around 
us were our close relatives, and our behavior was selected to treat them 
reasonably well as they shared our genes (inclusive fitness) and would 
reciprocate good deeds (reciprocal altruism). We stopped evolving and began 
devolving, replacing evolution by natural selection with devolution (genetic 
degeneration) by unnatural selection about 100,000 years ago, when culture 
evolved to the point where language, fire and tools gave us a huge advantage 
over other animals, and there was no longer major selective force for changing 
behavior or increasing or maintaining health and intelligence. So, to this day we 
still have the tendency, when we do not feel in immediate physical danger, to 
act in a more or less friendly manner to those around us. The temporary peace, 
brought about by advanced communications and weaponry and the merciless 
rape of the planets resources, has expanded this ‘one big family’ delusion. 
Though the more intelligent and reflective persons (which of course includes 
many Diverse) can see the danger to their descendants, those who are poorly 
educated, dull witted, or emotionally unstable, sociopathic, autistic, or mentally 
ill (i.e., the vast majority) won’t see it or won’t act on it. But how about Adelson, 
Zuckerberg, Gelbaum, Biden, Clinton, Obama, Krugman and a very long list of 
the rich and famous? They have at least some education and intelligence, so 
how can they want to destroy their country and their own children’s future? 
Actually, they are no more well educated, perceptive and future oriented than 
the average college graduate (i.e., not very), and also, they and their relatives 
live in gated communities and often have bodyguards, so they will not be 
seriously concerned about or even aware of trashed neighborhoods, beaches 
and parks, drive by shootings, home invasions, rapes and murders, nor about 
paying taxes or making ends meet. They are just not thinking about the fate of 
their great grandchildren, nor anyone’s, or if it does cross their mind, like the 
vast majority, they don’t have clue a about human ecology, nor dysgenics, and 
can’t see the inexorable path to collapse. Insofar as they do, they will not risk 
personal discomforts by saying or doing anything about it (selfishness and 
cowardice). 
 
A reader suggested I was talking about ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Diverse by Euros, 
but what’s happening worldwide is exactly the reverse. I had not actually 
thought of the destruction of America and industrial civilization by Diverse as 
genocide, but since the number of Euros of all types (and many groups of 
Diverse such as Japanese and Koreans) will steadily decline, and their countries 
be taken over by Diverse, it does have that aspect, though it’s the Euros failure 
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to produce enough children that is responsible for their declining numbers. A 
few zealots (but not so few in the future as Muslims will increase from about 
1/5 of the world to about 1/3 by 2100, stimulating the conditions which breed 
fanaticism) like Al Qaeda and ISIS want to eliminate all Euro's (and Jews and 
Sunni’s and Feminists and Christians etc., etc.)  and the Arabs will certainly 
demolish Israel by and by, but otherwise there is little motivation to get rid of 
those who are giving you a free lunch (though of course few Diverse will grasp 
how big the lunch really is until it stops and civilization collapses). However, 
as time passes and the competition for space and resources gets ever more 
desperate, genocide of all Euro groups may become an explicit goal, though 
mostly it will be far overshadowed by attacks of various Diverse groups on 
others, which has always been the case and always will. In any event, all Euro 
and many Diverse groups are certainly doomed--we are talking roughly 2100 
and beyond, when the USA (then a part of Mexico) and Europe will no longer 
have the money or the will to suppress anarchy everywhere, as they will be 
unable to control it at home. 
 
Shocking as it is for me to come to these realizations (I never really thought 
about these issues in a serious way until recently), I don’t see any hope for 
America or the other ‘democracies’ (America has one foot in Fascism and the 
other in Communism already) without a drastic change in the way 
“democracy” works, or in its complete abandonment. Of course, it’s going to be 
pretty much the same elsewhere and both Euros and Diverse ought to pray the 
Chinese adopt democracy soon (so they collapse too) or they are doomed from 
outside and inside. That democracy is a fatally flawed system is not news to 
anyone with a grasp of history or human nature. Our second president John 
Adams had this to say in 1814: 
 
“I do not say that democracy has been more pernicious on the whole, and in the 
long run, than monarchy or aristocracy. Democracy has never been and never 
can be so durable as aristocracy or monarchy; but while it lasts, it is more bloody 
than either. … Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, 
and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit 
suicide. It is in vain to say that democracy is less vain, less proud, less selfish, 
less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or monarchy. It is not true, in 
fact, and nowhere appears in history. Those passions are the same in all men, 
under all forms of simple government, and when unchecked, produce the same 
effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty. When clear prospects are opened before 
vanity, pride, avarice, or ambition, for their easy gratification, it is hard for the 
most considerate philosophers and the most conscientious moralists to resist 
the temptation. Individuals have conquered themselves. Nations and large 
bodies of men, never.”  John Adams, The Letters of John and Abigail Adams 
633  
 
The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough 
resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out 
of poverty and keep them there.  The attempt to do this is bankrupting America 
and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, 
as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of 
the poor is other poor and not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate 
changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country 
that follows a democratic system.  
 
So, it is clear that Ann Coulter is right and unless some truly miraculous 
changes happen very soon, it’s goodbye America and hello Third World 
Hellhole. The only consolations are that we older folk can take comfort in 
knowing it will not be finalized during our lifetime, that those like myself who 
are childless will have no descendants to suffer the consequences, and, since the 
descendants of those who let this happen (i.e., nearly everyone) will be as 
loathsome as their ancestors, they will richly deserve hell on earth. 
 
 
      
This collection of articles and reviews are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so 
about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and 
manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  
As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in 
every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and 
psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance.  As things 
are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy 
and dictatorship appears inevitable.  
 
Since philosophy proper is essentially the same as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior), and 
philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity 
of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, 
not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, 
literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology.  It is universal to mix the 
language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and 
the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 1930’s. 
 
Although I separate the book into sections on philosophy and psychology, religion, biology, the ‘hard sciences’ and 
politics/sociology/economics, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at 
them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not 
merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would 
be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problems as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, or that that they differ 
only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of 
dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, but it’s clearly true.  
While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s 
future. 
 
I hope that these essays will help to separate the philosophical issues of language use from the scientific factual 
issues, and in some small way hinder the collapse of civilization, or at least make it clear why it is doomed 
 
